Flight Tj610 Crashed In The Sea.

[Stuart Galbraith]

Would the wiring problem include the poseidon?I can't recall what version it's based on.

[DB]

 

Should not be safety engineering done before mass production? From the article:

 

 

The company may eventually need to look into whether the same problem exists on the 737 NG, the predecessor to the Max. There are currently about 6,800 of those planes in service.

 

Of course.

 

But if you've identified a problem late, regardless of whether it's incompetence malice or an unpredictable emergent property, then applying the safety engineering process to modifications is normal, and is likely to reveal issues such as this.

 

In a working safety management system, one would perform one or more analyses to determine which functions were safety critical, their safe (and unsafe) failure modes and their dependencies on other subsystems. Functions with unsafe failure modes would then be subject to additional design rules to eliminate those unsafe conditions, or to make them sufficiently unlikely as to be considered acceptable for certification.

 

For whatever reason, MCAS was not classified as such and so was not subject to good safety design practice. (e.g. redundant inputs, watchdogs, etc.). Now it has been so identified, in the worst possible way, and the integrity has been re-evaluated with this result.

 

My opinion is that this is "good" news - it's evidence that the correct safety engineering is being performed, albeit rather later than anyone would have wanted. The question for me is - how far does this reinforced safety assessment process reach? How much of the MAX (and indeed other Boeing products) is being reassessed?

 

Stuart - Poseidon is based on the 800ERX, so is completely unaffected by MCAS related MAX issues.. Who knows what cultural issues it may have due to Boeing obviously not being diligent is anyone's guess.

[Adam Peter]

OK, now I understand what you mean, thanks!

[sunday]

It is always a privilege to get the skinny from a pro.

[Stuart Galbraith]

 

 

Should not be safety engineering done before mass production? From the article:

 

 

The company may eventually need to look into whether the same problem exists on the 737 NG, the predecessor to the Max. There are currently about 6,800 of those planes in service.

 

Of course.

 

But if you've identified a problem late, regardless of whether it's incompetence malice or an unpredictable emergent property, then applying the safety engineering process to modifications is normal, and is likely to reveal issues such as this.

 

In a working safety management system, one would perform one or more analyses to determine which functions were safety critical, their safe (and unsafe) failure modes and their dependencies on other subsystems. Functions with unsafe failure modes would then be subject to additional design rules to eliminate those unsafe conditions, or to make them sufficiently unlikely as to be considered acceptable for certification.

 

For whatever reason, MCAS was not classified as such and so was not subject to good safety design practice. (e.g. redundant inputs, watchdogs, etc.). Now it has been so identified, in the worst possible way, and the integrity has been re-evaluated with this result.

 

My opinion is that this is "good" news - it's evidence that the correct safety engineering is being performed, albeit rather later than anyone would have wanted. The question for me is - how far does this reinforced safety assessment process reach? How much of the MAX (and indeed other Boeing products) is being reassessed?

 

Stuart - Poseidon is based on the 800ERX, so is completely unaffected by MCAS related MAX issues.. Who knows what cultural issues it may have due to Boeing obviously not being diligent is anyone's guess.

 

Thanks for that!

[DB]

I will caveat the above by noting that it assumes the wiring issue is directly related to MCAS induced modifications. If they've found something else that is part of the legacy design, then yes, the older aircraft might be affected.

 

But this too is business as usual - if there are modifications required to in service aircraft, than an Airworthiness Directive would apply, and depending on the risk, there would be a required implementation date/number of flight cycles, or similar.

[DB]

I will caveat the above by noting that it assumes the wiring issue is directly related to MCAS induced modifications. If they've found something else that is part of the legacy design, then yes, the older aircraft might be affected.

 

But this too is business as usual - if there are modifications required to in service aircraft, than an Airworthiness Directive would apply, and depending on the risk, there would be a required implementation date/number of flight cycles, or similar.

[Stuart Galbraith]

I seem to recall we were in that territory with operations of the Nimrod towards the end, with the problems with one of the centre fuel tanks IIRC.

 

The 737-800 was actually a pretty nice airframe. There seems to have been little to no problems with the late 737's in service, once they got past the rudder hardover problem anyway. And they actually had that same problem in a number of other Boeing products.

[Brasidas]

Pretty much. Though I would givet more percents to the FAA, because they stamped it.

 

 

I have heard the theory that they hid the MCAS programming with its single sensor design to make it look less important to an evaluating engineer at the FAA. Cannot be that important if it is only one sensor and does not give a claer ifo/warning to the crew in case of failure, right? Really malicious if this is true.

 

 

 

And all this so that a someone with a type rating for a 1960ies original 737 was still allowed to fly a new production 737-8 or -9. That alone sounds crazy, that it has the same type rating.

 

So here is the criticality criteria for looking at a Failure Hazard Analysis in aerospace.

 

Flight controls which MCAS is part of or directly affects.

 

Does it change the flight characteristics of the aircraft in a critical phase of flight (take off/landing)?

 

If "yes", you must show that you have a system with redundant data paths supported by power shedding so that at landing there will always be a valid/functional/powered system capable of functioning and providing valid and non-misleading indications to aircrew without latent failures. All documentation for workarounds be they as an aircraft flight manual or non-normal procedure Quick Reaction Checklist must be made available to aircrew and for training of aircrew during type rating initial training.

 

If "no", you must

 

1) Show that the system design has sufficient requirements, System Safety Analysis, documentation, and are supported by design analysis from all relevant engineering disciplines including flight ops with substantiation how the system even when failed or malfunctioning shall not hazard the aircraft or increase the workload of the aircrew during a critical phase of flight such that it presents a hazardous condition.

 

and/or

 

2) Demonstrate that all fault or failure modes have mitigations that clearly indicate to aircrew what failure is comprised of, and the aircraft can still be flown safely with faults/failures active. Special care must be used to use non-specialized aircrew (no engineering flight test) to show that a trained aircrew can understand and counteract all faults in a timely manner without hazarding the aircraft. This would be supported by the FMEA, FHA, and SHA to ensure that all possible failures faults and malfunctions have been mitigated and will not hazard the aircraft

 

I see a lot of evidence, way too much evidence, that Boeing did hardly any of the above, and the FAA did not have the will or manpower to oversee.

[DB]

I can only agree, for what that's worth. Were the safety engineers incompetent, craven or kept in the dark?

[Stuart Galbraith]

When the Max was going through certification, wouldn't this have been around the time of sequestration? I always wondered if that had a knock on effect at the FAA.

[Ssnake]

The FAA has been downsized for about a decade now, and IIRC about 50% of the head count it used to have. Maybe a sequestration threw an additional stick into the spokes, but that only in the context of heaps of sand dumped into gears before, by Trump, and by administrations before him.

[DB]

I've mentioned before this that the FAA will not receive adequate funding until Americans die in an American plane, and then probably only if it's an American carrier on American soil.

 

It costs money, and doesn't fill any barrels of pork.

[lucklucky]

I can only agree, for what that's worth. Were the safety engineers incompetent, craven or kept in the dark?

Can only be explained as institutional, organizational failure by Boeing. Was the work so split that one hand did not know what the other was doing? but then someone have to verify and integrate the work. Then some group inside have to test and verify. I don't think a sole person have the power to make this disaster.

[Panzermann]

 

I can only agree, for what that's worth. Were the safety engineers incompetent, craven or kept in the dark?

Can only be explained as institutional, organizational failure by Boeing. Was the work so split that one hand did not know what the other was doing? but then someone have to verify and integrate the work. Then some group inside have to test and verify. I don't think a sole person have the power to make this disaster.

 

 

Memos, emails, other messages with warnings have been documented, but those engineers have been brushed aside. Boeing management was dead (ha! ) set on delivering a new-not new 737 that keeps the 1960ies typerating and all the grandfathering.

 

 

---

 

 

In other news the predecessor model the 737NG has also problems now with screens going black in the cockpit:

 

Software

Blackout Bug: Boeing 737 cockpit screens go blank if pilots land on specific runways

Odd thing haunts Next Generation airliner family (not the infamous Max)

Boeing's 737 Next Generation airliners have been struck by a peculiar software flaw that blanks the airliners' cockpit screens if pilots dare attempt a westwards landing at specific airports.

Amid the various well-reported woes facing America's largest airframe maker, yet another one has emerged from the US Federal Aviation Administration; a bug that causes all pilots' display screens in the 737-NG airliner family to simply go blank.

That bug kicks in when airliner crews try to program the autopilot to follow what the FAA described as "a selected instrument approach to a specific runway".

Seven runways, of which five are in the US, and two in South America - in Colombia and Guyana respectively – trigger the bug. Instrument approach procedures guide pilots to safe landings in all weather conditions regardless of visibility.

"All six display units (DUs) blanked with a selected instrument approach to a runway with a 270-degree true heading, and all six DUs stayed blank until a different runway was selected," noted the FAA's airworthiness directive, summarising three incidents that occurred on scheduled 737 flights to Barrow, Alaska, in 2019.

(...)

Commercial jet airliners are far from immune to software bugs. Infamously, Boeing's 787 Dreamliner needed power cycling every 248 days to prevent the aircraft's electronics from powering down in flight, while Airbus' A350 was struck by a similar bug requiring a power cycle every 149 hours to prevent avionics systems from partially or even totally failing to work.

Human error with electronics can also cause problems for commercial aviation: a typo in GPS co-ordinates left an Air Asia Airbus A330's navigational system thinking it was 11,000km away from its true position, while the captain of another airline's A330 found out the hard way that hot coffee and electronic hardware really do not mix.

 

https://www.theregister.co.uk/2020/01/08/boeing_737_ng_cockpit_screen_blank_bug/

[Brasidas]

Boeing's crisis is it's corporate culture. No one trusts them or the FAA anymore, and both entities refuse to come to terms with that fundamental issue.

[BansheeOne]

Memos, emails, other messages with warnings have been documented, but those engineers have been brushed aside. Boeing management was dead (ha! ) set on delivering a new-not new 737 that keeps the 1960ies typerating and all the grandfathering.

Boeing 737 Max: Worker said plane 'designed by clowns'

 

10 January 2020

 

The release of a batch of internal messages has raised more questions about the safety of Boeing's 737 Max.

 

In one of the communications, an employee said the plane was "designed by clowns".

 

The planemaker described the communications as "completely unacceptable".

 

The 737 Max was grounded in March 2019 after two fatal crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia, which killed almost 350 people in total.

 

Boeing said it had released the hundreds of redacted messages as part of its commitment to transparency.

 

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and US Congress were given unredacted versions of the communications last month.

 

"These communications do not reflect the company we are and need to be, and they are completely unacceptable," Boeing said.

 

Simulator pushback

 

One unnamed employee wrote in an exchange of instant messages in April 2017: "This airplane is designed by clowns who in turn are supervised by monkeys."

 

The documents, which have been published by the Washington Post, appear to show that Boeing rejected pilots being trained on simulators, which would have led to higher costs for its customers, making its aircraft less attractive.

 

"I want to stress the importance of holding firm that there will not be any type of simulator training required to transition from NG to Max," Boeing's 737 chief technical pilot at the time, Mark Forkner, said in a March 2017 email.

 

"Boeing will not allow that to happen. We'll go face to face with any regulator who tries to make that a requirement."

 

On Tuesday this week, Boeing reversed its position by recommending 737 Max simulator training for all pilots.

 

Another message dating from November 2015 appears to show that the company lobbied against the aviation regulator's calls for a certain aspect of simulator training.

 

"We are going to push back very hard on this and will likely need support at the highest levels when it comes time for the final negotiation," the message said.

 

The documents also appear to show problems with the simulators being discussed.

 

In February 2018, a Boeing worker asked a colleague: "Would you put your family on a Max simulator-trained aircraft? I wouldn't."

 

"No," came the reply.

 

[...]

https://www.bbc.com/news/business-51058929

 

It occurred to me yesterday that this affair unfortunately means that Michael Chrichton's "Airframe", which rants that all the complaints about the relation between US aviation industry and authorities are just a smear job by evil foreign competitors and sensationalist media, will likely never be turned into a movie now. Pity, it's a good novel.

[Panzermann]

edacted messages as part of its commitment to transparency.

​

 

redacted <-> transparency. clear opacity? An oxymoron.

 

 

 

It occurred to me yesterday that this affair unfortunately means that Michael Chrichton's "Airframe", which rants that all the complaints about the relation between US aviation industry and authorities are just a smear job by evil foreign competitors and sensationalist media, will likely never be turned into a movie now. Pity, it's a good novel.

 

Nonono, just exactly right now this movie must go into production to make Boeing look good again after it was smeared by Iran. Or Russia. China. Those evil mustache-twirling Yurropeens with their Airbus!

 

 

 

[R011]

I'm sure that if Boeing gives Disney or Sony a hundred million or so the produce the film, they would. They'd put a nice B or C list crew together and pocket as much of Boeing's cash as they could embezzel.

[BansheeOne]

Well, turning the lead investigator from a white into a black guy like in "Rising Sun" to evade racism charges probably won't suffice.

 

But then Hollywood can always produce more "Jurassic Park" sequels.

[Panzermann]

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/11/18/the-case-against-boeing

 

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/11/18/the-case-against-boeing

 

 

But the company was in tremendous flux. When Sorscher first went to work there, in 1980, after earning a doctorate in physics, he marvelled at its culture, which emphasized quality improvement and communication. Managers held regular meetings for engineers to address problems; engineers worked directly with suppliers; teams shared resources, knowing that the gesture would be reciprocated. The planes that Boeing was developing—such as the 777, its first jet to use significant computer controls—were a success, with few problems after launch.

In December, 1996, Boeing announced that it was buying a struggling rival, McDonnell Douglas, for thirteen billion dollars. Sorscher is one of many Boeing employees who have identified the merger as the moment when Boeing went from being led by engineers to being led by business executives driven by stock performance.

Sorscher recalled a labor-management breakfast, shortly before the merger, at which a top Boeing executive said that the company would reduce spending on a program that employed engineers to find improvements in the process of making planes. Sorscher, a member of the union’s bargaining unit at the time, pointed out how much money process improvement was saving the company.

The executive tipped his head back, as if thinking how best to explain basic economics to a clueless scientist. Finally, as Sorscher recalled, the executive said, “The decisions I make have more influence over outcomes than all the decisions you make.” Sorscher told me, “It was: ‘I can’t help but make a billion dollars every time I pick up the phone. You people do things that save four hundred thousand dollars, that take one shift out of flow time—who gives a crap?’ ”

Three years later, the engineers’ union went on strike over bonus pay and cuts in health coverage. James Dagnon, another Boeing executive, said that engineers had to accept that they were no longer the center of the universe. “We laughed,” Sorscher recalled. “This is an engineering company—these are complex, heavily engineered products. Of course we’re the center of the universe. But he wasn’t kidding. We didn’t get it. Who is the center of the universe? It’s the executives.”

In 2002, Sorscher, who had started working for the union full time, made his case to a Wall Street analyst in Seattle, arguing that bottom-line business models did not apply to building airplanes. The analyst cut him off. “You think you’re different,” he said, according to Sorscher. “This business model works for everyone. It works for ladies’ garments, for running shoes, for hard drives, for integrated circuits, and it will work for you.”

Taken aback, Sorscher said, “Let’s build an airliner with this business model. If it works, you and everyone who looks like you will be happy. And if I’m right, then we’ll all be very unhappy.”

In the spring of 2004, Boeing started designing the 787 Dreamliner, a three-hundred-and-thirty-passenger jet. The following year, the company named a new C.E.O., Jim McNerney, a Harvard M.B.A. who had worked at Procter & Gamble, McKinsey, General Electric, and 3M. According to Sorscher, under McNerney engineers were discouraged from voicing concerns. “What we heard five thousand times was ‘Follow the plan,’ ” Sorscher said. “ ‘Your job is to follow the plan, and if you can’t follow the plan we’ll fire you and get someone to follow the plan.’ ”

By the time the 787 was ready, in 2011, the program was three years late and tens of billions of dollars over budget. A year later, after the airplanes’ batteries displayed a tendency to catch fire, the fleet was grounded for three months.

​

 

quite good article although I always dislike those overly personalized emotional intros this one does have.

[Stuart Galbraith]

That supports every preconceived idea I had about what was going wrong with Boeing. The accountants took over an engineering company and ran it into the ground. How many times did we see THAT happen with British industry?

[Ssnake]

The plan was perfect. It was ruined by intransigent engineers who apparently refused to be team players.

[Stuart Galbraith]

'What do you mean you cant build it out of Cardboard! Dammit, its cheap. Think of the shareholders!'

[Jeff]

It's not the first time this has happened, is there any example of a company successfully turning back from this path?