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Muilenberg a huge success, say the spreadsheets.

 

https://www.barrons.com/articles/boeing-ceo-dennis-muilenburg-pay-51577136749

 

Note also that he may still be eligible for bonuses accrued during his time there. Might work out in excess of $100,000 per body.

 

(This site asked me to subscribe, but let me read the article anyway)

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Muilenberg a huge success, say the spreadsheets.

 

(This site asked me to subscribe, but let me read the article anyway)

 

With no JavaScript activated by default, it'll leave you alone. ;)

 

 

 

 

Can one big negative erase a lot of smaller positives?

 

Ummm... let me think ... ummm ... YES

The Savings & Loans crash from 1982 erased all profits the US banking sector made since the Great Depression. Yes, it's absolutely possible that "a single negative" can outweigh all positives. Plus, it's not "a single" negative if the whole corporate culture is corrupted to suppress unwelcome news about a failing security culture. It's the result of a constant stream of decisions with bad consequences. Something that finance guys will never understand, I suppose.

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During his time at the helm of the company, Muilenburg earned more than $70 million in compensation, according to the company’s proxy statements between 2015 to 2018. What's more, upon termination, Muilenburg can walk away with another $30 to $40 million. And his supplementary executive pension is worth another $11 million, according to these statements.

 

The company wasn’t immediately available to comment on the resignation and Muilenburg’s compensation package.

 

The average percap GDP of an Ethiopian is $770.

 

The comment, if it ever comes, will probably land late in the evening of January 30.

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Finally, WTF took so long?

 

Boeing fires CEO Dennis Muilenburg, as the company struggles with 737 Max crisis

 

The KC-46 disaster shouldn't be forgotten either. You can't blame outsider incompetence for this, he spent his entire career at Boeing as did the also ousted head of the commercial airplane unit.

 

The VP of commercial aircraft was a GE drone. However, he was brought in right before the MAX certified, so his impact to product safety was minimal.

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there was a talk about the 737MAX on (in?) the 36C3 Chaos Communication Congress, that has just ended:

 

https://media.ccc.de/v/36c3-10961-boeing_737max_automated_crashes (video)

 

Everybody knows about the Boeing 737 MAX crashes and the type's continued grounding. I will try to give some technical background information on the causes of the crash, technical, sociological and organisational, covering pilot proficiency, botched maintenance, system design and risk assessment, as well as a deeply flawed certification processes.

On the surface of it, the accidents to two aircraft of the same type (Boeing 737 MAX), which eventually led to the suspension of airworthiness of the type, was caused by faulty data from one of the angle-of-attack sensors. This in turn led to automatic nose-down trim movements, which could not be countered effectively by the flight crew. Eventually, in both cases, the aircraft became uncontrollable and entered a steep accelerated dive into terrain, killing all people on board on impact.

In the course of the investigation, a new type of flight assistance system known as the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) came to light. It was intended to bring the flight characteristics of the latest (and fourth) generation of Boeing's best-selling 737 airliner, the "MAX", in line with certification criteria. The issue that the system was designed to address was relatively mild. A little software routine was added to an existing computer to add nose-down trim in situations of higher angles of attack, to counteract the nose-up aerodynamic moment of the new, much larger, and forward-mounted engine nacelles.

Apparently the risk assessment for this system was not commensurate with its possible effects on aircraft behaviour and subsequently a very odd (to a safety engineer's eyes) system design was chosen, using a single non-redundant sensor input to initiate movement of the horizontal stabiliser, the largest and most powerful flight control surface. At extreme deflections, the effects of this flight control surface cannot be overcome by the primary flight controls (elevators) or the manual actuation of the trim system. In consequence, the aircraft enters an accelerated nose-down dive, which further increases the control forces required to overcome its effects.

Finally I will take a look at certification processes where a large part of the work and evaluation is not performed by an independent authority (FAA, EASA, ...) but by the manufacturer, and in many cases is then simply signed off by the certification authority. In a deviation from common practice in the past, EASA has announced that it may not follow the FAA (re-) certification, but will require additional analyses and evidence. China, which was the first country to ground the "MAX", will also not simply adopt the FAA paperwork.

​

Edited by Panzermann
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That's a very good starting summary.

 

I haven't viewed the video yet, but this part is key: "the risk assessment for this system was not commensurate with its possible effects on aircraft behaviour"

 

I think it might be fair to say that the originally implemented control function did not warrant a significant risk assessment, as the original function described in the summary above did not have the same scope as the functionality eventually implemented. It appears that subsequent to the initial sign-off of the MCAS system, its function was over-loaded with additional functionality to deal with another issue. The gap in the risk analysis comes here - the MCAS seems to have remained "signed off" when its functional behaviour has changed sufficiently to warrant a re-evaluation. The institutional failing in Boeing is that this does not seem to have happened. This could have been a simple oversight, or it could have been a deliberate omissions to avoid schedule and/or cost problems.

 

The first of these options falls into the unfortunate category. The second one results (or should result) in criminal prosecution. Without access the all the Boeing paperwork (unencumbered by media headlines screaming about "whistleblowers" who may all turn out to be people fired for cause), all we have is speculation. I worry that any investigation is going to cover the FAA's ass, and let Boeing away with minimal punishment, because of the overriding interests of the US aviation industry.

 

As an aside, I think Muilenberg stayed until now because nobody wanted to pick up the job until all the bad news was out. It would be a remarkable coincidence that this happened only *after* the complete suspension of production.

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and let Boeing away with minimal punishment, because of the overriding interests of the US aviation industry.

​

 

Boeing is too big to fail nowadays. Without Boeing there is only Airbus. The others are also-rans at best.

 

 

 


 

The video is also up on youtube:

 

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​Boeing's 737 Max debacle could cut 0.5 percentage points from US GDP

Ben Winck
Dec. 17, 2019, 11:06 AM
AP Photo/Elaine Thompson
  • Boeing's recent decision to halt 737 Max production in January will cut 0.5 percentage points from gross-domestic-product growth in the first quarter of 2020, JPMorgan's chief US economist, Michael Feroli, said Tuesday.
  • The model is Boeing's bestselling plane, and the production cut will pull GDP growth lower by hitting the company's inventory growth, the economist said.
  • The production pause could also harm firms in Boeing's supply chain, as several parts-manufacturers rely on the aircraft as a steady revenue driver.

​​

 

https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/boeings-737-max-pause-to-cut-us-annualized-gdp-growth-2019-12-1028769614

 

 

 


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What I find particularly sickening in all this is how Boeing went after Bombardier for a low cost airliner it was building because it was built by 'Guvmint Subsidy'. Which was not true, certainly not the way Boeing gets Government subsidy in the 'any tanker you like as long as its a boeing' tanker contract. Anyway, this directly impacted Bombardier in Northern Ireland (formerly Shorts), which build components (presumably the wings) for it. Thankfully Boeing lost its case and the site survived, though Bombardier, perhaps not wanting to go through it every time it build a new aircraft, divested its aviation components.

 

And that is how Boeing operates. Screw anyone that one day might be a competitor, and become the last man standing in the US building airliners. Too big to fail. And the incestuous relationship with the FAA, which I can only assume occurred because the FAA didnt have enough money to do its job properly during sequestration, only reinforced the position. Boeing could build an outside toilet with wings and the FAA would slap an approved to fly sticker on it. As the rest of the world relies on the FAA for evaluation of any US airliner built, the problem with this cosy relationship are self evident.

 

Back in the 1990's, the French Complained the FSB and the FAA were biased against them when investigating Icing incidents. I thought at the time it was sour grapes on their part. Now, im willing to give them the benefit of the doubt.

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What I find particularly sickening in all this is how Boeing went after Bombardier for a low cost airliner it was building because it was built by 'Guvmint Subsidy'. Which was not true, certainly not the way Boeing gets Government subsidy in the 'any tanker you like as long as its a boeing' tanker contract. Anyway, this directly impacted Bombardier in Northern Ireland (formerly Shorts), which build components (presumably the wings) for it. Thankfully Boeing lost its case and the site survived, though Bombardier, perhaps not wanting to go through it every time it build a new aircraft, divested its aviation components.

 

And that is how Boeing operates. Screw anyone that one day might be a competitor, and become the last man standing in the US building airliners. Too big to fail. And the incestuous relationship with the FAA, which I can only assume occurred because the FAA didnt have enough money to do its job properly during sequestration, only reinforced the position. Boeing could build an outside toilet with wings and the FAA would slap an approved to fly sticker on it. As the rest of the world relies on the FAA for evaluation of any US airliner built, the problem with this cosy relationship are self evident.

 

Back in the 1990's, the French Complained the FSB and the FAA were biased against them when investigating Icing incidents. I thought at the time it was sour grapes on their part. Now, im willing to give them the benefit of the doubt.

 

They did it, because they can. It is a function of their size which opens up new options like simply steamrolling a competitor. sure in the end they are going to lose in court, but Boeing can afford to do so. US market regulation is notorious to act much too late (see e.g. Bell, Standard Oil). Boeing should never have grown to this size and absorbed all its competition. But this is exactly the "free market2 the apologists always talk about. but there is no free market, if there is only one or two competitors.

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What I find particularly sickening in all this is how Boeing went after Bombardier for a low cost airliner it was building because it was built by 'Guvmint Subsidy'. Which was not true, certainly not the way Boeing gets Government subsidy in the 'any tanker you like as long as its a boeing' tanker contract. Anyway, this directly impacted Bombardier in Northern Ireland (formerly Shorts), which build components (presumably the wings) for it. Thankfully Boeing lost its case and the site survived, though Bombardier, perhaps not wanting to go through it every time it build a new aircraft, divested its aviation components.

 

And that is how Boeing operates. Screw anyone that one day might be a competitor, and become the last man standing in the US building airliners. Too big to fail. And the incestuous relationship with the FAA, which I can only assume occurred because the FAA didnt have enough money to do its job properly during sequestration, only reinforced the position. Boeing could build an outside toilet with wings and the FAA would slap an approved to fly sticker on it. As the rest of the world relies on the FAA for evaluation of any US airliner built, the problem with this cosy relationship are self evident.

 

Back in the 1990's, the French Complained the FSB and the FAA were biased against them when investigating Icing incidents. I thought at the time it was sour grapes on their part. Now, im willing to give them the benefit of the doubt.

 

They did it, because they can. It is a function of their size which opens up new options like simply steamrolling a competitor. sure in the end they are going to lose in court, but Boeing can afford to do so. US market regulation is notorious to act much too late (see e.g. Bell, Standard Oil). Boeing should never have grown to this size and absorbed all its competition. But this is exactly the "free market2 the apologists always talk about. but there is no free market, if there is only one or two competitors.

 

 

I was genuinely sorry to see McDonnell Douglas hoovered up and shut down. IMHO the MD80 was a far superior airframe to the 737, and still would seem to have upgrade potential in it. The 737 simply didnt it seems. I dont know whether it was sheer laziness or complacency on the boards part that didnt drive them to develop an entirely new airframe, but looking back, that is entirely what they should have done. And now presumably will, because I dont see anyone touching the Max with a bargepole unless they start giving them away for free.

 

See, I dont regard this as the free market. I think this is crony capitalism. If the regulatiors work properly, if there had been more oversight to ensure Boeing didnt vacuum up all competitors, they would not be able to pull stunts like this. The Government systems seem to aided and abetted the rise of a monopoly, and then give limited oversight over it when it arose. That isnt the free market.

Edited by Stuart Galbraith
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You are both wrong, this is free market natural course of events, successful participants grow big and use size to leverage advantage, eventually becoming monopolistic, because there's no regulation - when regulation is eventually rolled out, is too late and either too little or too hamfisted.

 

Only way to avoid this is by having independent, adequately resourced, regulators that ensure a level play field for new players.

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Free market does not necessarily mean free of regulation. Though I concede that is the con job we have all been led to believe since the 1980s.

 

Only if you ignored decades of research in economy. Sure, you want as little regulation as possible but as much as necessary to keep markets in the condition to deliver efficient results without, ideally, externalization of costs effects, or market concentrations that will result in the formation of oligopolies.

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This is the level of malfeasance Boeing's 737 MAX certification.

 

Boeing designs a system with a single point of failure with a system (AoA vane) that meets 9X10^5 flight hours, tops. You can't even meet a major hazard with that level of system safety.

 

Boeing then includes the possibility of adding a second system as an option which the customer has to order and pay additional money for, which still would not cover the catastrophic impact of a dual failure which has no explicit indication to aircrew.

 

Boeing then includes the possibility of adding a failure indication for the AoA vanes for additional money (but then realizes post delivery that it isn't working properly).

 

Boeing does not properly document these aircraft deficiencies and corrective actions in aircraft flight manuals.

 

Boeing also changes the MCAS to not just augment maneuvering characteristics for the nose heavy aircraft, but to also ensure the aircraft maintains maneuvering characteristics very similar to the 737 NG aircraft so that customers do not have to expensively retrain aircrew which is a contractual deliverable in many 737 MAX purchase agreements.

 

Boeing then presents this to the FAA as a safe aircraft along with the aircraft flight manuals.

 

The FAA agrees and certifies it.

 

After the accidents have occurred, Boeing then asserts they have followed certification guidelines when the Failure Mode Effect Analysis does not show a catastrophic impact in the case of an AoA vane failure, nor an explicit failure indication which is required by standard certification standards world wide for flight critical hardware/software with such an impact.

 

95% of this present issue was caused by Chicago. 4% by the FAA. 1% falls on Renton where someone pitched this as a safe system and packaged it up for the FAA to rubberstamp.

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Pretty much. Though I would givet more percents to the FAA, because they stamped it.

 

 

I have heard the theory that they hid the MCAS programming with its single sensor design to make it look less important to an evaluating engineer at the FAA. Cannot be that important if it is only one sensor and does not give a claer ifo/warning to the crew in case of failure, right? Really malicious if this is true.

 

 

 

And all this so that a someone with a type rating for a 1960ies original 737 was still allowed to fly a new production 737-8 or -9. That alone sounds crazy, that it has the same type rating.

Edited by Panzermann
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Well, this would-be normal practice safety engineering once circuits have been determined to be safety critical.

 

As this is related to the modifications needed to make the aircraft certifiable, it's probably misleading to report it as a further example of MAX problems, but instead evidence that the safety engineering process might actually be working now that Boeing is being held to the fire.

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Should not be safety engineering done before mass production? From the article:

 

 

The company may eventually need to look into whether the same problem exists on the 737 NG, the predecessor to the Max. There are currently about 6,800 of those planes in service.

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