Latest Littoral Combat Ship News-- Navy Reconsidering

[lucklucky]

15 hours ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

Its quite interesting to contrast with the last FAC the USN had, the Pegasus class. Took nearly 10 years of development getting them into service, projected a buy of 30, only bought 6, and got rid of them, some with only 10 years of service on the clock, because they were suddenly judged not cost effective to operate. That and they wanted the USN seems to have wanted to get out of coastal operations...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pegasus-class_hydrofoil

USN procurement is sometimes like watching a cat and a laser pointer.

It would be interesting to learn how many Admirals involved in the procurement of LCS, came from Frigate commands. I suspect, not a lot.

 

I think only a seismic change, like a generational change,  can explain it. I am speculating.

Nevertheless America have a strike of revolutionarism in it, also of trying to reach total domination by changing the subject , of making big bets not incremental bets .  It has also big resources so it can go a bit careless about it. It is always experimenting new things and its elite would not be happy doing another iteration for 50 years, it is not creative...

For example now that several other countries started to develop aircraft, USA best people are going into space, making a better 737 is not sexy anymore, consequently Boeing has trouble  because the best do not want to go to Boeing anymore. That is why US is seldom competitive with legacy industries (shipyards, cars, rail etc) where the growth and advance is gradual and incremental. Their best move out to new things.

To get into European car market US had to change the whole thing and do a Tesla , it could not do like the Japanese and the Koreans. it had to be a revolution- including the ideologic revolution of "Climate" to justify attraction to it. 

So the LCS had to be something different. At start of the XXI century. they could not do something from XX century another Perry,   neither something that everyone else was doing. They needed to be French and make a Citroen.

 

[Ivanhoe]

2 hours ago, Yama said:

A warship is an amalgamation of mobility and firepower, a FAC is simply a way to divide up those qualities across multiple hulls to avoid "Death Star syndrome" where too many eggs are concentrated on a single vulnerable basket. From a perspective of global navy such as USN, a FAC lacks mobility. LCS was an attempt to put the necessary mobility into a FAC.

Small craft are a pain to deploy globally, but when the USN wants to perform coastal control, lots of smaller vessels are much better than 2 Burkes trying to cover 400 km of coast.

[Yama]

7 hours ago, Ivanhoe said:

Small craft are a pain to deploy globally, but when the USN wants to perform coastal control, lots of smaller vessels are much better than 2 Burkes trying to cover 400 km of coast.

Indeed, but they would also need a support ship, and as their self-defence abilities are limited they also need backup ("it was expendable anyway" has never been a popular explanation for losses). So unless it's a permanent deployment on some corner of the world, it is easy to see why it doesn't seem like worth the hassle.

[John T]

FAC's prowess are in sea denial, and that they not supposed to be alone.
Land based sensors, or land bases air, should support with "situation awareness" and target data.

if you just want to use sea power to punish colonies ( even if the country consider themself independent) 
You littorial ships need to be able to deploy globaly, and then they can't be littorial anymore.

(basicall what everyone else said in the thread, when I read what I wrote)

[Stuart Galbraith]

8 hours ago, lucklucky said:

 

I think only a seismic change, like a generational change,  can explain it. I am speculating.

Nevertheless America have a strike of revolutionarism in it, also of trying to reach total domination by changing the subject , of making big bets not incremental bets .  It has also big resources so it can go a bit careless about it. It is always experimenting new things and its elite would not be happy doing another iteration for 50 years, it is not creative...

For example now that several other countries started to develop aircraft, USA best people are going into space, making a better 737 is not sexy anymore, consequently Boeing has trouble  because the best do not want to go to Boeing anymore. That is why US is seldom competitive with legacy industries (shipyards, cars, rail etc) where the growth and advance is gradual and incremental. Their best move out to new things.

To get into European car market US had to change the whole thing and do a Tesla , it could not do like the Japanese and the Koreans. it had to be a revolution- including the ideologic revolution of "Climate" to justify attraction to it. 

So the LCS had to be something different. At start of the XXI century. they could not do something from XX century another Perry,   neither something that everyone else was doing. They needed to be French and make a Citroen.

 

There is a fair amount of truth in that. I was watching the Ward Carroll video on the Ford class, and it struck me, did they REALLY need to put 34 new major technologies into it? It threw away the rulebook on USN carrier development for the past 40 years, which was incremental change. There is going to be a Norman Friedman book on USN Aircraft Carrier Development  in November, im sure its going to be an interesting read...

If they really wanted to be revolutionary, they could have gone partners on the QE class carriers, and got 2 or 3 carriers for the price it would have got a Ford. AND still have gone on producing Nimitz's forever. There was another video where a US Admiral said there as no room on a STOL carrier for a full airwing, and hencer rejected it. Which is doubtless true, but looking at the denuded state of US Carrier Airwings these days, you have to wonder if its really such a problem....

[Sardaukar]

Basically..."small ship to be deployed" has always been a frigate.

I think USN somehow forgot that. 

[Ivanhoe]

4 hours ago, Yama said:

Indeed, but they would also need a support ship, and as their self-defence abilities are limited they also need backup ("it was expendable anyway" has never been a popular explanation for losses). So unless it's a permanent deployment on some corner of the world, it is easy to see why it doesn't seem like worth the hassle.

Yep, they really need larger support vessels in the region, as well. Which has never been a hull type that USN officers want on their resume.

And in today's 298 ship USN, can't blame the USN for focusing on checking the PRC and throwing other missions overboard. Yet the US always finds itself in a war strategic diplomacy mission where the littoral is important. Having a weak navy has never stopped OPFOR or Congress (yes, I know).

 

[CaptLuke]

6 hours ago, Yama said:

Indeed, but they would also need a support ship, and as their self-defence abilities are limited they also need backup ("it was expendable anyway" has never been a popular explanation for losses). So unless it's a permanent deployment on some corner of the world, it is easy to see why it doesn't seem like worth the hassle.

One of the proposed ConOps for the Pegasus boats was deploying them with an OHP, which shared both an engine and a fire control system with the hydrofoils (thus it's technicians and spares would help out the PHM as well).  The Pegasus craft would deploy as a screen ahead of the OHP and lay quiet, using their own ESM and targeting data from the OHP (including the OHP passive sonar) for targeting.   Once a target was acquired, the Pegasus would use their high speed to move, attack, and retreat.  The OHP also provided at least limited air cover via a SAM system.

6 hours ago, John T said:

FAC's prowess are in sea denial, and that they not supposed to be alone.
Land based sensors, or land bases air, should support with "situation awareness" and target data.

 

Agree, and IIRC sensors and networked employment were where streetfighter went beyond the FAC approach.  Streetfighter, again IIRC, was big on using off board sensors, including sensor packs carried and then deployed by the streetfighter boats, as well as networked employment of not just SSM, but also SAM and ASW centered craft.  The idea was not just that each individual streetfighter was expendable: it was that, in an exchange, the enemy who revealed itself to sink a streetfighter would then be vulnerable to counterattack by another, networked streetfighter - an enemy would expose, and then lose, a valuable ship (or sub or aircraft) to kill an expendable streetfighter.  

It's already been pointed out that both the technology and the tactics to make this work were probably out of reach at the time, but the concept was a lot more advanced than "buy a bunch of FAC"

One of the reasons the streetfighter concept was completely rejected was this emphasis on "acceptable losses": the USN categorically rejected the idea of expendable ships.  Of course then, having gone down a completely different path with LCS, they compromised on survivability for lower costs anyway . . . but that's just part of the LCS program schizophrenia.

Edited May 21, 2022 by CaptLuke

[rmgill]

On 5/20/2022 at 8:38 PM, Ivanhoe said:

Small craft are a pain to deploy globally, but when the USN wants to perform coastal control, lots of smaller vessels are much better than 2 Burkes trying to cover 400 km of coast.

The answer there is a small fleet of Float on Float off ships just like that are used in the maritime supply/transport sector. 
 

Theu can double as recovery and logistics platforms for the over the horizon beach stuff. 

[rmgill]

Or a variant Gator carrier with a well deck and crane system for shifting from the stowage racks to the well for launch. Add in a few LASH barges for support and docking. And with a flight deck you can operate aircraft for added support of the platform set. 

[Argus]

The most realistic (IMHO) options I saw to actually address the original LCS spec were basically a re-rolled Wasp class gator freighter acting as mothership for variable group of helicopters and small craft that, some manned some drone, that could be tailored to the specific job at hand.  You can get a half decent small ship or three in the well deck, to cover the OPV and Mine Hunter roles. The flight deck handles a mix of drones and helicopters covering the surveillance, reconnaissance, light strike, ASW and SAR while supporting the smallcraft in the boarding and mine warfare roles. Between the two, the accommodation and vehicle decks provide all the supporting volume needed and then some - including easy movement of containerised 'stuff'... oh yeah and a fricking marine contingent.  

It fitted the spec, it was attainable at the time with then current technology, while being open to growth with evolving technology, and for the most part off the shelf. 

[Rick]

5 hours ago, rmgill said:

Or a variant Gator carrier with a well deck and crane system for shifting from the stowage racks to the well for launch. Add in a few LASH barges for support and docking. And with a flight deck you can operate aircraft for added support of the platform set. 

Brings back a memory from about 1980. Was on the L.S.T. Fairfax County making a port visit in a West Africa country. Was asked by a European visitor if the well deck could flood enough to hold a torpedo boat. I can't remember what I said.  

Edited May 22, 2022 by Rick

[Argus]

5 minutes ago, Rick said:

Brings back a memory from about 1980. Was on the L.S.T. Fairfax County making a port visit in a West Africa country. Was asked by a European visitor if the well deck could flood enough to hold a torpedo boat. I can't remember what I said.  

But the answer is - if not we can build one that will fit

[Nobu]

3 hours ago, Argus said:

The most realistic (IMHO) options I saw to actually address the original LCS spec were basically a re-rolled Wasp class gator freighter acting as mothership for variable group of helicopters and small craft that, some manned some drone, that could be tailored to the specific job at hand.  You can get a half decent small ship or three in the well deck, to cover the OPV and Mine Hunter roles. The flight deck handles a mix of drones and helicopters covering the surveillance, reconnaissance, light strike, ASW and SAR while supporting the smallcraft in the boarding and mine warfare roles. Between the two, the accommodation and vehicle decks provide all the supporting volume needed and then some - including easy movement of containerised 'stuff'... oh yeah and a fricking marine contingent.  

It fitted the spec, it was attainable at the time with then current technology, while being open to growth with evolving technology, and for the most part off the shelf. 

Intentional or not, this reads like a PowerPoint deck synopsis. Which the thing probably was from the outset.

Edited May 23, 2022 by Nobu

[Argus]

9 minutes ago, Nobu said:

Intentional or not, this reads like a PowerPoint deck synopsis. Which the thing probably was from the outset.

I think in fairness the whole thing was a powerpoint exercise in circle-square interface projections. That the role demands a 'force' and the program was about building a ship, suggests a certain disconnect between the job, the thinking and the program trying to bridge the two. 

Edited May 23, 2022 by Argus
word choice

[Nobu]

Yep. And what should be considered is the environment creating that disconnect. Politically and economically, an underlying but de facto state of no real enemy to fight at sea would probably do it.

 

[Argus]

On 5/21/2022 at 10:43 PM, Ivanhoe said:

 

And in today's 298 ship USN, can't blame the USN for focusing on checking the PRC and throwing other missions overboard. Yet the US always finds itself in a war strategic diplomacy mission where the littoral is important. Having a weak navy has never stopped OPFOR or Congress (yes, I know).

 

I'm sorry but yes, this is exactly the sort of thinking you can blame the USN for. They have this penchant for hyper focusing in just that way on 'Big Battle' Mahanian stuff, like the US Army only wanting to fight proper wars. Sure a lot of it is to have a simple story to sell Congress, but tell the story long enough and it sticks. The Imperial Japanese Navy takes a bit of flack for its 'Decisive Battle' obsession in WWII, but the USN was just as bad if you look at their pre-war doctrine. The difference of being course winners write the history and the USN had the depth of resources, time and pragmatic command to overcome its initial doctrinal handicap. Sadly the down side to winners writing the history is they also never seem to learn as much...

It takes a balanced fleet to win wars, always has, always will. An 'all battle fleet' Navy is as sensible as an 'all tank' army. How can the USN 'check' the PRC if it can't protect its fleet train and LoC's let alone do trade protection? Frankly back filling this shit is probably going to be the major contribution to any effort by America's allies, but thats no excuse IMHO. 

Oh look, I think I sat on my hobby horse... sorry guys

[Argus]

9 minutes ago, Nobu said:

Yep. And what should be considered is the environment creating that disconnect. Politically and economically, an underlying but de facto state of no real enemy to fight at sea would probably do it.

 

But (as I just posted) the USN have been as bad when they did have a real threat. I think its the extended periods between that are the problem, when selling a story for political ends up running the show. I mean they didn't do this in the Cold War, even though the pressure was still there to concentrate on the sexy stuff, there were enough reality checks to keep it kosha. Reforger was not going to work without convoy escorts, also I suspect they were less willing to sell the Russians short. With China there are all the temptations to short count their capabilities, publicity over performance, limited depth of experience, rapid rate of expansion, political factors etc etc. In fairness both Russia and China were/are new naval powers, but Russia was there when the USN need a yardstick to measure its new strength against, were China might be felt as a yardstick for its decline.

[Ivanhoe]

3 hours ago, Argus said:

But the answer is - if not we can build one that will fit

We can make it fit;

http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/Relativ/tdil.html

 

[Nobu]

I don't think Washington was serious about China and Chinese. The circumstantial evidence is in the LCS so to speak. There is an argument to be made that it never was, and never will be.

AKA they are married.

[Ivanhoe]

3 hours ago, Argus said:

The most realistic (IMHO) options I saw to actually address the original LCS spec were basically a re-rolled Wasp class gator freighter acting as mothership for variable group of helicopters and small craft that, some manned some drone, that could be tailored to the specific job at hand. 

Amphib carriers are also great at all sorts of odd tasks, including disaster response. To me, they always seemed like they offer a lot of bang for your buck.

Combining an amphib carrier and a whole shipload of low-cost drones could control a heck of a lot of grid squares.

[Argus]

1 hour ago, Ivanhoe said:

Amphib carriers are also great at all sorts of odd tasks, including disaster response. To me, they always seemed like they offer a lot of bang for your buck.

Combining an amphib carrier and a whole shipload of low-cost drones could control a heck of a lot of grid squares.

Absolutely, but one of the key things underlined in these options, was while RPV's were/are great, there were a ton of perfectly good manned options. Stuff in same sort of footprint/package that could be fielded without the metric shit ton of R&D needed to get to thing to where they are now from where they were 20 years ago.  The LCU foot print is large enough for a serious coastal mine hunter or small OPV, add a couple of CB90, MkV SOC or whatever for small fast, some Griffon 2000's for mucky work... the list is long

[rmgill]

Build it around the manned platforms and then when the unmanned platforms come to fruition, Bob's your uncle. 

[shep854]

REFORGER was not a seaborne combat reinforcement of Europe once war started; it was flying troops from the US to operate vehicles and weapons prepositioned in Germany BEFORE the shooting started.  Wartime convoys was a completely different problem.

[CaptLuke]

Damen did some interesting work on an affordable line of ships, not much larger than the LCS, but more flexible and generally more practical: the Crossover Ships.

When construction is modular with various fit outs and lengths using standard width construction modules, you can build a couple different, more optimized, versions without the costs or logistical issues of deploying multiple classes of ships.  Such an approach could probably have yielded an escort focused OHP replacement, a light amphib, and a "flexible" littoral ship versions with less cost and more commonality than the two-hull LCS produced.

I think there were a couple different ways the USN could have gone for a worthwhile LCS program and this is one of them. 

It's a lower cost, but less combat oriented approach than, for instance, building a combination of Absalon  and Iver Huitfeldt on the same hull, but one filling a "flexible roles, including HADR, using containerized equipment / small boats / ROV etc." role and the other for more or less the role of the Constellation frigates.