CaptLuke

I dug into this a few years back and the best guess I could put together was that the NLOS space was 4.8m x 4.25m x 2.5m with a 7.5 tonne weight limit; this was planned to fit three NLOS Container Launch Units (CLU), each with 15 missiles, 45 missiles total. The space is larger than a Stanflex module, which measures 3 metres (9.8 ft) in length, 3.5 metres (11 ft) in width, and 2.5 metres (8.2 ft) in height.

You're right that there is more flexibility having the multi-mission spaces than without and that they could theoretically take alternative weapon systems to the current options, though I believe a shipyard would be involved (at least for the Hellfire space). We're getting into semantics here, but I'm going more or less by the dictionary definition of modular: "Designed with standardized units or dimensions, as for easy assembly and repair or flexible arrangement and use." The 30mm multi-mission space is a different size from the NLOS/Hellfire space and neither is standardized with anything else. The contrast to Stanflex is that any Stanflex fitted space can accept any Stanflex module, though admittedly where the module is on the ship can limit your practical options. It is interesting that LockMart's LCS upgrade proposals all seem to include the Mk41 VLS but that the USN didn't ask for that from the start, at least as an alternative module to the 30mm mounts (which is where LockMart seems to want to put them). I believe this shows that the USN could have easily have driven some modularity, not to mention firepower, into the original LCS design but chose not to, which brings us back to my original point.

I am comparing the LCS "as designed" on board armament to modular systems such as Stanflex / Mk41 VLS / Sylver VLS. With these systems, all it takes is a crane and maybe a software update to dramatically change your weapons mix or even introduce entirely new weapon types. Compare this to the LCS, where I believe you cannot switch out any on board armament without cutting metal. 57mm gun in bespoke mount, cannot be switched out for any alternative NLOS in bespoke mount, not modular, though at least it had two missiles planned, which has been replaced by a bespoke, Hellfire only, system RAM in bespoke mount, not modular, cannot be switched out for any alternative Last time I checked, admittedly a while ago, the 30mm gun mounts were also bespoke, there's no alternative armament packages that fit that space. Yes it's possible to "bolt on" the NSM, but historically no one has referred to that type of mounting as modular.

It's a feature not a bug . . . surface warfare types didn't want upgrades of ship borne weapons to be possible, otherwise some congress-folk might start seeing LCS as substitutes for "real", blue water ships. That's why all of the LCS "on ship" weaponry is in dedicated installations. Do I know this for a fact? No. But if you have another explanation why a ship that was touted as "modular, modular, modular" was designed so that all of it's armament was fixed and difficult to impossible to change (and this was done 20 years after Stanflex modules went to sea), then I'd like to hear it

Depends on the mission . . . If you're talking about a modern Destroyer Escort (a much cheaper alternative to Destroyers for open ocean escort duties), then I agree with RO11 and Yama: you'll need a lot more tonnage. OHP frigates (the closest thing to modern USN equivalent) ran over 4,000 tons. If we're still talking littorals, or just willing to accept shorter legs, then the Rudderows were in between the Sa'ar V and Sa'ar VI corvettes in size, so it's possible to put an lot of firepower in that sized hull. Please note that I am just using the Sa'ar V and Sa'ar VI as examples of what can be done with that much tonnage, not advocating for them per se. It's also worth noting, however, that the "conventional" alternative proposed early in the LCS program would have looked a lot more like one of those designs than what the LCS turned out to be.

Ref the Visby: that's interesting, thanks for the info. Ref Streetfighter: Pretty much agree with you and LuckyLucky. It just wasn't workable but it was valuable for challenging the thinking of the time, much of which is apparently still in place. I agree that a cheap, viable escort ship should have been a high priority, though that would have been a completely different program. It would have looked nothing like LCS and not much like the Constellation class, which is nearly the size of a Spruance (OHP class was about half the size of a Spruance, and that was probably too big to get costs down enough).

I said that ". . . designing the LCS to have little to no surface to surface capability against anything except speedboats." It was designed with NLOS which, along with it's immediate successors Griffin and Hellfire, are anti-speedboat weapons (short range, small warhead). Yes, later they bolted the NSM on, as is possible on any platform from a pickup truck on up, but I spoke to the USN thinking at the time of design; I'm not denying that USN thinking has evolved at least somewhat since then. Ref "the combat system architecture and the ship infrastructure would be able to be evolved and modified over time without expensive alteration to the physical ship." this is true of sensor suites and specialized, off board tools, but the LCS armament was specifically designed not to be modular. All the weaponry was designed in one-off, bespoke installations. Given both the example and ready availability of Stanflex modules, this was clearly a design decision to inhibit flexibility in, or upgrades for, the armament. Ref "LCS is a confluence of the Streetfighter concept with the realities of needing to cross oceans and operate helicopters." The streetfighter concept emphasized networked combat by much smaller, expendable combatants supported by off board sensors. It was founded on the idea that combat in the littorals was exceptionally dangerous and lethal. The LCS concept was based on the littorals being exceptionally safe, so much so that near constant underway replenishment was a primary design assumption and the idea of serious combat with either aircraft or ships with long range missiles was completely off the table. And the USN, rightly or wrongly, completely rejected the idea of expenability. Operating helicopters was a design decision that, while dramatically upgrading capability, also drove up size and cost dramatically, thus violating one of the key tenants of the program, affordability. We can debate the value of helicopters vs. rotary drones and/or the value of quantity vs. quality in the littorals, but many ships designed by navies that actually emphasize littoral warfare don't have helos (Visby and Skjold being standout examples). Also helos were not required at all for two of the three major LCS roles, plinking speedboats armed with RPGs and heavy machine guns, and mine hunting. "Need to cross oceans"? Much smaller ships can cross oceans (USN Destroyer Escorts and Royal Navy Corvettes in WWII). The more time a ship is going to spend in blue water, the more size pays off, but if you want an inexpensive ship that is designed to live, work, and fight in green, or even brown, water then something has to give.

Ref Pegasus, some very good design work went into but I think it ran into three things USN surface fleet doesn't care about anything except blue water warfare and Pegasus was a littoral weapon. BTW, I'm not saying this is an indefensible position, just that it is the case. Hydrofoils trade off high running costs for high performance; quite reasonable in war time but, combined with #1, a terrible position to be in when competing for peacetime dollars. Pegasus was designed to sink ships and USN doctrine for the longest time was that only aircraft and submarines sank enemy ships; you see the same thinking in all the LCS design work. Thus Pegasus, for all it's potential surface to surface lethality, went totally against the institutional thinking at the time. You'll note that this problem was "corrected" in the LCS program by designing the LCS to have little to no surface to surface capability against anything except speedboats. Ref Carrol's video, I have different thoughts, though I do agree with their opening point that the fact that we now have littoral combat and no one thinks the LCS is anywhere near suited for it is all you need to know about that program. First clue was when they linked LCS to the streetfighter program; LCS as designed had nothing to do with streetfighter. The streetfighter Conops was completely different, as were the proposals for hulls. Second clue was when the guy starts handwaving about "system of systems" for new ship designs while completely ignoring that: Conops for two out of the three ship types, LCS and Zumwalt, were braindead Even if the USN had gotten all three ships, none of them were suited for escort duties: LCS wasn't capable by design, and Zumwalts, never mind the 'cruiser that might have been', were massive overkill Final thing was when he started talking about what a great success it is that they've managed to put lipstick on the LCS pig because they've actually managed to swan around the Pacific without sinking. My hat is off to the sailors that have done the best they could with it, but pretending the LCS, and the Zumwalts, were not self-inflicted disasters for the USN is the path towards more disasters in the future.

Wasn't there an almost identical 'lesson learned' from the Seawolf in the Falklands? That's some mighty fine missile development work there, Lou.

Crusader/A-7, and earlier USN jets such as the A-4 and F-11, all used the Colt Mk 12, an advanced derivative of the wartime Hispano. USAF, on the other hand, introduced the Mk39, a revolver cannon based on the MG213, in late model F-86 and kept it through the F-100/F-101, after which it was replaced by the Vulcan. Not only were the guns different, but so was the ammunition. The Mk12 kept the USN on the 20x110mm cartridge they were familiar with from WWII. The M39 used the 20x102mm cartridge, which the USAF developed from their .60 caliber round, necked out and with an electric primer. So, I agree, institutional inertia/rivalry could be a factor here.

My recollection is that you are correct: I remember reading about US ordnance comparing German APHE to American AP (plain shot) in North Africa and then machining the driving bands of captured German 75mm ammunition to get an APHE round into service. It wasn't' my original source (which I've lost track of) but the Tank Archives site corroborates that story here.

The US experimented with a 37mm gun mounted on the M2 tripod so apparently even a 37mm gun was seen as a significant step up for infantry support work from .50 cal MG, never mind 75mm . . . The work was more or less a modern version of the Canon d'Infanterie de 37 modèle 1916 TRP (37mm mle.1916), possibly by way of the Japanese Type 11 37 mm infantry gun (which was, itself, based on the older French gun). This led to a follow on version, but by that time it was developed, it was roughly contemporaneous with the 57mm and 75mm recoilless rifle developments (as well as the 4.2" recoilless mortar), all of which would be far superior for shooting up Japanese bunkers, so it sank without a trace. In cae anyone is interested, the final version was the "GUN, 37mm, T33EI; MOUNT, GUN, 37mm, TI0E3; RECOIL MECHANISM, T38E5" and the specs were: All this is from "Pacific Area Material", published by the Office of the Chief of Ordnance in July 1945.

Ian Hogg lists an HE round for the PAW 600 with what I must assume is a nod to indirect usage: 3 charge options. A Kleine Ladung gave a range of 3400m, a Mittelere Ladung giving a range of 5600m, and Grosse Ladung giving a range of 6200m. Thus the PAW 600 ranges out to 6200m @32 degrees max elevation, which is superior to the IG42 infantry gun (4600m @ 32 degrees max elevation).

IIRC the tank destroyer units were particularly big on new, low profile mounts for the .50 because they had neither a coax nor a bow machine gun to fall back on.

It may be worth expanding the conversation to take a couple of additional things into consideration. Using the USN 8" Mk 12 vs. 6" Mk 16 as examples: The shell weight ratio for corresponding US land howitzers was roughly 2.1-1 (8" howitizer 203lbs vs. 6" howitzer 95 lbs) but for the naval weapons the 8" fired 335lb/152kg shell vs. the 6" 130lb/59kg, so a 2.6-1 advantage. The ratio for the UK guns you used is similar: 256lb/116kg vs 100lbs/45kg, so again roughly 2.6-1 This goes a ways towards offsetting the rate of fire advantage for 6" guns. Your points about fire control are well taken but there is also the issue of flatter trajectories for the 8" giving a larger beaten zone. At 16,000 and 20,000 yards, the US 8" was coming down at 17 degrees and 25 degrees, while the US 6" was coming down at 24 and 36 degrees. So the 8" advantage, from a fire control perspective, is not just a time of flight reduction but also a greater beaten zone. I'm not arguing that these two things "prove" anything about the 6" vs. 8", just that they are worth throwing into the discussion.