Italian Army Ww2

[Markus Becker]

That would have to be the IJN G4M Betty.

 

In terms of capital ships sunk definitely but total tonnage? I'm sceptical. The attack on the transport fleet on the second(?) day of the Guadalcanal landings was an EPIC fail of the Betty.

 

About her speed. The early models did 430 kph(B-25 speed), the late models 470(B-26). OK, probably at lower attitudes but they were TB.

[lastdingo]

Certainly there were some fine units (Ariete, the Paras, Bersaglieri and Alpini) but overall they suffered a massive systemic failure, why?

 

(I read nothing good about their paras.)

 

Italy prepared for war for about 15 years, and thus it didn't prepare for war at all. It was caught off-guard. The other European great powers had an important arms race from 1938-1939.

The Italian industry lacked substance and access to raw materials and wasn't able to substantially improve the equipment of the army once the war had started.

The Italian artillery consisted largely of WW1 and captured WW1 ordnance, for example.

The quality of hardware was 2nd rate at best as well;

- underpowered, underarmed aircraft

- submarines of low technical quality

- small arms were about as poor and antiquated as the Japanese ones

- cruisers more designed for show (top speed during trials) than fighting

- tank designs obsolete by a few crucial years (they were still normal or good quality by 1938)

 

The Italian officer corps resembled the French and British ones, but German generals always expressed their satisfaction with how well the Italians fought given their poor equipment.

 

 

They did actually have some good items in their inventory, but never in satisfactory quantity:

90/37/20 mm AAA

75 mm light field gun

149 mm heavy howitzer

a dedicated long range light truck for African deserts

frogmen equipment

fighters with German DB601 or DB603 (too late) engines (strangely, the Italians had a strong twin radial engine, but didn't use it on fighters)

[bojan]

 

- small arms were about as poor and antiquated as the Japanese ones

 

Carcano was perfectly adequate as was any other bolt action. Carbines were way more useful then full length rifles anyway. Breda M.37 HMG was good, Beretta 1938 series SMGs were excellent if expensive to make (but so was a Thomson and everyone adores it...)

 

149 mm heavy howitzer

 

149/40 gun was nice in specs, but emplacing it took much longer then US 155mm Long Tom.

75mm field gun was just OK, nothing great about it even by '30s standards.

75mm mountain gun was very good however.

Edited October 28, 2014 by bojan

[RETAC21]

 

Certainly there were some fine units (Ariete, the Paras, Bersaglieri and Alpini) but overall they suffered a massive systemic failure, why?

 

(I read nothing good about their paras.)

 

 

They did well but fought mostly in the 4.FJD

 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/4th_Parachute_Division_(Germany)

[Markus Becker]

The Italian CA were rather good, I read. OK, they were 'a bit' over the 10k ton limit but that speaks not against the Italians.

[Andreas]

The Spica class escorts also performed very well, considering the age and limitations the class was designed under.

 

All the best

 

Andreas

[RETAC21]

The Italian CA were rather good, I read. OK, they were 'a bit' over the 10k ton limit but that speaks not against the Italians.

 

No, they weren't, they were impressive on paper, but their actual performance left a lot to be desired, mainly for materiel deifciencies.

[Martin M]

apropos aircraft . . . . . .

 

 

We all know and enjoy all the "fuss" about warplanes. Spads, Fokker x, Messerschmidts, Mustangs, Jaks, Zeros and Spitfires, and how great they are, and what a good job this or that company / designer did.

 

But isn´t it REALLY all about ENGINES ?

 

The more powerfull engine produces more or less automaticly the superior aircraft. Faster and more payload.

Of imaginary 10 most importants in aircraft design, 9 go to the engine, and number 10 to the sum of parts attached to it.

 

 

Shouldn´t we be discussing the engine designers and manufacturers. Don´t they earn most credit ?

[sunday]

Counter-example: P-51D with 1720HP had better performance than P-47D, despite the 2535HP of the later's engine.

Edited October 31, 2014 by sunday

[Marek Tucan]

Not sure - wasn't P-51D actually slower and with worse roll rate than the Jug?

[sunday]

Could be. However, Were P-47 performance 30% better than P-51's?

[Martin M]

BTW, I went to a airplane museum a while ago, which also had the cut open / and or partly destroyed engines.

 

Anyway, I was astounded by 1. gigantic displacement, and 2. seemingly delicate build of engine parts.

 

Built for power, and only limited endurance.

[lastdingo]

apropos aircraft . . . . . .

 

 

We all know and enjoy all the "fuss" about warplanes. Spads, Fokker x, Messerschmidts, Mustangs, Jaks, Zeros and Spitfires, and how great they are, and what a good job this or that company / designer did.

 

But isn´t it REALLY all about ENGINES ?

 

The more powerfull engine produces more or less automaticly the superior aircraft. Faster and more payload.

Of imaginary 10 most importants in aircraft design, 9 go to the engine, and number 10 to the sum of parts attached to it.

 

 

Shouldn´t we be discussing the engine designers and manufacturers. Don´t they earn most credit ?

 

Check out

* Fokker D.VIII

* He 100D

* B7A2 vs. B6N2 performance and capabilities

* Fw 187 vs. Bf 110 performance and capabilities

* Ki-100 engine power vs. Ki-84 engine power and pilots' opinion which was better in a fight

 

9/10 is a vast exaggeration

 

But the Italians had hardly any good engines. The Piaggio P.XII was older and worse than the BMW801 yet afaik their strongest aviation engine.

Still, it might have been useful for a fighter generation.

[Ken Estes]

There remains the overarching problem for Italy in WWII that it had chosen the wrong side, unlike in WWI.

 

German Military Incompetence through Italian Eyes

 

James J. Sadkovich

 

I. German Efficiency and Italian Incompetence

So many writers have so regularly contrasted Italian military incompetence with German efficiency that the one has become a corollary to the other.^[1] It is beyond the scope of this paper to ascertain why this corollary exists, but "Anglo-saxon racism"—which Gaetano Salvemini believed "less severe" than its Nazi cousin only owing to Anglo-American "priggishness"—permeates our historiography, and it can hardly be coincidental that depictions of competent Germans repeatedly "rescuing" inept Italians are congruent with a general denigration by Anglo-American authors of Italian society and culture.^[2]

In 1943 Mario Einaudi cautioned that, "The attitude of condescension which not infrequently obscures the consideration of Italian problems should be done away with." Yet three years later an American diplomat believed that the "wops" could be won over by "a kind word and a slice of bread, some public homage to Italian culture and discrete allusions to the virtues of American-style democracy"; and the State Department viewed Italians as politically immature and Italy as an "undeveloped" country in need of "benevolent paternalism" where the United States could dump surplus product and excess capital.^[3]

According to H. Stuart Hughes, even where Italian "society follows the more normal Western European model," "the middle classes have demonstrated a curious lack of self-confidence and faith in their own values." Alan J. Levine has argued that only Mussolini's "imbecilic attack on Greece" forced Hitler to move into the Mediterranean, and John Gooch concluded that among modern nations "Italy seems to stand alone" in displaying "common patterns of inadequacy which can be discerned in both the liberal and the fascist state" and which have repeatedly led to incompetent military performance.^[4]

 

Cyril Falls thus found it hard to rank the World War I Italian generals, Cadorna and Diaz, on a par with such "outstanding figures" as the Austrians, Krauss and Conrad, even though the Italians beat their Austrian opponents. And Major H. A. Deweerd, associate editor of Infantry Journal, excluded Italians from his list of "great soldiers of World War II," which included Hitler, Gamelin, and Chiang Kai-shek.^[5] Even a sympathetic writer like John Diggins concluded that if America's admiration for Mussolini owed something to the misapprehension that he was "americanizing" the "indolent" Italians, Americans—"nursed on 'Poor Richard' and rocked to the rhythm of the industrial machine"—could "hardly be expected to see...the beauty of (Latin) idleness."^[6]

Given such convoluted ethnocentric reasoning, it is not surprising that Giuseppe Mancinelli, who served as liaison between the Italian and German armored forces in Africa, believed that "the preconception of Italian inferiority inevitably was applied to every unfavorable and unfortunate episode from which the Germans were certainly not immune," and "the responsibility for failure" was thus assigned solely to the Italians.^[7]

Although a detailed effort to assess responsibility for Axis failures is also beyond the scope of this paper, it is instructive to see what Italian sources made of Germany's performance during the war. What emerges is far from the standard Anglo-american interpretation of the bold, genial and competent Germany weighted down with a perfidious Italian ally and defeated by the doughty British. Rather, the Germans appear to have been cautious to the point of timidity and careless to the point of ineptitude. Easily discouraged, they refused to confront the British, whom they saw as formidable racial cousins, and instead foolishly attacked the Russians, whom they perceived as genetically and culturally inferior.^[8] Arrogant and ignorant, their refusal to take their ally seriously made defeat in the Mediterranean inevitable; and their inability to assess their enemies accurately led them to botch the diplomatic preparation and military planning for every major operation they studied, from Sealion to Barbarossa.^[9]

 

In the spring of 1943, Mussolini's chief of staff, Vittorio Ambrosio, drew up what amounted to an indictment of Germany for losing the war. According to Ambrosio, the Germans had failed to invade Britain in 1940, then botched efforts to bring Spain into the war, thereby leaving Gibraltar in British hands. They had denied Italy the use of Tunisian ports in 1941–2 and, because they viewed the Mediterranean theater "con la faciloneria di Rommel," they had forced Italy to postpone the invasion of Malta in mid 1942, thereby fatally compromising Axis logistics to North Africa. The Germans had also foolishly attacked the Soviet Union in 1941, and thereafter stubbornly resisted Italian efforts to get a separate peace. More, German intelligence had mistaken the timing, significance and place of the Allied invasion of North Africa in late 1942, thereby assuring that Axis forces were not deployed to meet it. Finally, Ambrosio excoriated Hitler for provoking a European war in 1939, despite his promises not to do so prior to 1942 and despite Italian efforts to dissuade him.^[10] As a frustrated Mussolini told Giuseppe Bottai in late 1942, his relations with the Germans had been "a continual 'I told you so'."^[11]

 

II. Diplomatic Incompetence: Provoking War in 1939

Germany's first blunder was to provoke war in 1939, despite repeated warnings from Rome that Italy would not be ready to fight until sometime after 1942.^[12] Like the Austrians with the Serbs in 1914, so Hitler and Ribbentrop gambled that they could 'localize' their conflict with the Poles in 1939. They thus brushed aside Ciano's reminders that they had promised to refrain from any bellicose action for three years, and they ignored Mussolini's warning that an attack on Poland would trigger a European war that Italy did not approve and could not join.^[13] Their complete disregard for their ally struck Maurizio Belloni, a military aide in Berlin, as disloyal; and Ciano traced the roots of the "Italian tragedy" to the "cynical German determination to provoke" war in 1939. Hitler's foolish attack on the USSR two years later only confirmed the Italian foreign minister's belief that the Germans could not be trusted.^[14]

 

According to Mario Luciolli, Germany's attack on Poland left Mussolini and Ciano full of "bitterness and contempt" for their "arrogant and reckless ally." Ciano privately fumed that he would "never wage war alongside these scoundrels," and in December he publicly denounced Germany's breaches of faith in a speech to the Italian Chamber.^[xv] As early as August, Italian leaders correctly assumed that should they enter the war, Britain and France would seek to defeat them in the Mediterranean before taking on Germany.^[xvi] By mid September, while Göring predicted a short war, Mussolini argued that the British would draw the conflict out for at least three years, given their strategy of blockade and attrition. In short, the Italian leader displayed a grasp of British strategy that generally eluded the Germans, whose recklessness had forced Italy into an embarrassing "nonbelligerancy" that Mussolini could end only at the peril of attracting the main weight of the Allied war effort against Italy.^[xvii]

[1]. Williamson Murray, The Change in the European Balance of Power, 1938–1939. The Path to Ruin (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 110–118, 396 ftnt. 56, esp. 112 discerned "a general incompetence" in Italian military forces during World War II and like Knox views the Italian military as the mirror-opposite of the German. W. D. Puleston, The Influence of Sea Power in World War II (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1947), pp. 63, 57 observed that "On paper Italy had a more balanced and formidable fleet than Germany, but its personnel was not as efficient," i.e., were less competent.

[2]. Gaetano Salvemini, L'Italia vista dall'America (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1969) p. 141; and Gian Giacomo Migone, Problemi di storia nei rapporti tra Italia e Stati Uniti, (Turin: Einaudi, 1971), pp. 115–117, for Salvemini's approval of a "gaullist" response to the Allies because "Italia liberata significava Italia ubbidiente alle autorità anglo-americane."

[3]. Council on Foreign Relations, Studies of American Interests in the War and the Peace, E-C13, p. 12; E-C11, pp. 36, 47–53; Marco Finzi & Roberto Faenza, Gli Americani in Italia (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1976), p. 135; Migone, Problemi, p. 135.

[4]. H. Stuart Hughes, The United States and Italy (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1953/1965), p. p. 39; Alan J. Levine, "Was World War II a Near-Run Thing?" Journal of Strategic Studies (1985), pp. 57–59; and John Gooch, "Italian Military Incompetence," The Journal of Strategic Studies (1982), esp. p. 264.

[5]. Cyril Falls, The Great War, (New York: Capricorn, 1959/1961), p. 10, 308–10, saw the Italians "as little more than capable organizers" and believed that the mere arrival of British and French troops in Italy persuaded the Austrians to abandon their attempts to cross the Piave in November 1917. H. A. Deweerd, Great Soldiers of World War II (New York: Norton, 1944), was even-handed with the Italians compared to writers such as Norman Kogan, Italy and the Allies, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 32–3, who interpreted Castellano's efforts to negotiate with the Allies "a classic Italian reversal of alliances." For an early Italian reaction to this sort of treatment of Italy's performance, see Angelo Gatti, La parte dell' Italia. Rivendicazioni (Milan: Mondadori, 1926).

[6]. John Diggins, Mussolini and Fascism: the View from America (Princeton NJ: Princton University Press, 1972), pp. 316–17. Hughes, Italy, pp. 112–13, praised the Italian soldier for not "showing bravery in a futile war for a bad cause," arguing that "In his sober and unheroic fashion, the Italian soldier who fought listlessly, who deserted, or who surrendered to the enemy, had made the only contribution he could to the triumph of the Allied cause." Alexander De Conde Half Bitter, Half Sweet. An Excursion into Italian American History (New York: Charles Scribner's, 1971), p. 237, for some interesting similarities between American and fascist policy.

[7]. Giuseppe Mancinelli, Dal fronte dell'Africa settentrionale (1942–1943) (Milan: Rizzoli, 1970), p. 62; also Ugo Cavallero, Comando supremo, diario del capo di stato maggiore (Bologna: Cappelli, 1948), 15 Sept. 1941 for Gambara's complaints along the same lines; and Paolo Caccia-Dominioni, Alamein, 1933–62. An Italian Story (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966), pp. 106–7, for the German tendency to shift responsibility for failure to the Italians, and Gause, Bayerlein, and Westphal, who all "disliked and despised" Italians in general. For the Italian war effort, see Sadkovich, "Of Myths and Men: Rommel and the Italians in North Africa," International History Review (1991), "Understanding Defeat: Reappraising Italy's Role in World War II," Journal of Contemporary History 1989), and "Re-evaluating Who Won the Italo-British Naval Conflict, 1940–42," European History Quarterly (1988).

[8]. Documenti Diplomatici Italiani Series 8, Vol. 13 (hereafter DDI 8/13), doc. 476, for Magistrati's 30 August report that Hitler had asked Henderson if a German-British war could be avoided, and the bewildered reaction of German leaders when Britain continued to urge Poland to resist after the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet pact. The Germans rationalized their blunder by claiming that Mussolini's letter of 25 August announcing Italy's inability to enter the war had emboldened London. See DDI 9/3, docs. 126, 171, 203.

[9]. Mario Roatta, Otto milioni di baionette, l'Esercito italiano in guerra dal 1940 al 1944 (Milan: Mondadori, 1946), pp. 156–8, 195–6, for lack of coordination in the Mediterranean and his anger at the niggardliness of German aid.

[10]. Renzo De Felice, Mussolini l'Alleato, (Turin: Einaudi, 1991), II, p. 1126.

[11]. Giuseppe Bottai, Vent'anni e un giorno, (Milano: Garzanti, 1977), 19 Nov. 1942.

[12]. DDI 8/13, doc. 129; also Donald S. Detweiler, Charles Burdick and Jürgen Rohwer, German Military Studies, (New York: Garland, 1987),(hereafter GMS), XIV, B-495, pp. 4–6, 8–9.

[13]. DDI 8/13, docs. 1, 4, 21, 27, 36, 130, 250; GMS, v. 14, B-495, pp. 11–12; and Enno Rintelen, Mussolini als Bundesgenosse. Erinnerungen des deutschen Militärattachés in Rom, 1936–1943, (Stuttgart: Hermann Leine, 1951), pp. 68–72.

[14]. Maurizio Belloni, Uno come tanti, (Rome: Faro, 1948), pp. 21–34; Galeazzo Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, 1939–1943 (New York: Doubleday, 1946), 23 Dec. 1943.

[xv]. Mario Luciolli, Palazzo Chigi: anni roventi. Ricordi di vita diplomatica italina dal 1933 al 1948 (Milan, 1978), pp. 68–71; and Dino Alfieri, Dictators Face to Face (New York: New York University Press, 1955), pp. 32–3.

[xvi]. DDI 8/13, doc. 130.

[xvii]. DDI 9/1, docs. 155, 249. For Mussolini's letter to Hitler, see DDI 8/13, docs. 102, 298; for events leading up to 1 September 1939, see Renzo De Felice, Mussolini il duce (Turin: Einaudi, 1981), passim; and Mario Toscano, The Origins of the Pact of Steel, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1967), passim.

 

 

 

 

The outline of the remaining 25pp:

 

II. Diplomatic Incompetence: Provoking War in 1939

III. Strategic Incompetence: Operation Sealion

IV. Operational Incompetence: Operation Barbarossa

V. Who was Incompetent?

 

 

It was therefore the failure to cooperate rather than the competence of either partner that determined their defeat. Because each Axis partner fought its own "parallel" war, the strategic consequences of errors by one ally affected the other, and failures appeared abnormally large because each Axis partner tended to inflate its initial successes, whether in Greece or in Russia, and to blame its failures on its ally. Because both Germany and Italy were fighting parallel wars, neither was interested in cooperating with its ally so much as it was in undercutting a competitor. The strategic errors, tactical mistakes, and diplomatic blunders of one's ally were therefore translated into expressions of ridicule and accusations of incompetence and served as the salve for disappointed expectations and the magic balm that dissipated one's own shortcomings, just as subsequent assertions of incompetence by historians have become a method of simplifying analysis, justifying policy, and avoiding unpleasant realities.

. De Felice, Alleato, I, 199–274, for Axis competition for control of the Arabs, which effectively destroyed any chance that they might be used effectively against the British.

 

[Markus Becker]

Counter-example: P-51D with 1720HP had better performance than P-47D, despite the 2535HP of the later's engine.

Depends on block and altitude, doesn't it.

[RETAC21]

While what Sadkovich writes is undoubtely true, it's a little difficult to argue Italian competence if in 1943 they handed over the whole country to the Germans. Cobelligerence after that was limited to a contribution similar to occupied Poland's, and not for lack of resources, many of which were in allied PoW camps.

[Ken Estes]

Every European ally of Germany ended up declaring war on Germany, but only the Finns managed to retain their sovereignty while showing the Germans the door. Insularity and the Red Army offensive played a great part in that.

 

Otherwise, Mussolini was right, Italy could not be ready for war until 1942, and it showed. He was beguiled into coming to the rescue of the winner in June40, but expected only a peace treaty with Fr & UK and the annexation of Nice. Modernization of the army and air force stalled because of the efforts in Spain, where most of the best airplanes, tankettes and expended funds remained in 1939. German fuel rationing kept most of the Italian battle fleet idle, although it gave a good showing against the RN given the lack of radar and sonar for most of the war. Cunningham certainly respected the Italian Navy and the RN planned Taranto from well before the war.

 

In the main theater for Italy, the Central Med, they managed to dominate most of the 39 months. The Germans came and went, but the Italians were stuck with the odds. Without Italian logistics, infantry and artillery, plus their mech corps, Rommel would have scarcely advanced past Benghazi. Actually, that would have been a good thing, provided they took Malta as well, another Italian requirement not met by their 'ally,'

 

In the end, the Central Med became a trap, once the US was in the war and superior forces closed from both directions.

 

The Italian economy was not capable of storing strategic materials over 10 years preparing for a war, as Last Dingo proposed. Italy remained the weakest of the major European powers and there is little to be gained by proposing that they should have done better. Nobody did well in WWII in 1940-41 except the Germans and Japanese. After that, Axis successes tended to work against them. As AJP Taylor commented long ago in his The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, it becomes tiring to explain how the Italians fall short of measuring up to their great power status, henceforth, it is to be presumed.

Edited November 8, 2014 by Ken Estes

[istvan47]

All by all, Mussolini and fascists had what they deserved.

 

Not forget: while UK and France believed in a very long and warless time, or refuge themselves behind the Maginot, the fascists did grow the belligerent spirit in the italian population. And did fought many local wars to 'enstablish the empire', cheering about the martial valour of the fascism and the war.

 

Ever eard about Balilla, Giovani Fascisti, etc? They even played with carbine toys. Find me in democracy, something similar. US, UK, France and so on. Italians did believe really about all this crap. They believed in violence and war, weapons and 'italian superiority bla bla'.

 

Italy really followed the 'excellence' in almost anything. Football, cyclism, aeronautic records everywhere (but... what PITA about the Schneider trophy!).

 

Mussolini dreamed about a sort of new roman empire.

 

And this at last failed miserably for a series of already mentioned causes. But above all, because the arrogance they had.

 

Rightfully ended, i'd say.

 

At the beginning of the war, fascists believed to be invincible, their SM.79 Sparviero, biplanes, fast cruisers, 'tanks' (sigh), eight millions bayonets.

 

Well, at the fall of 1940, they were kicked in the ass. Badly: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Compass

 

My only disappointment is, that fascists weren't never eradicated by my country. We retained policemen, politicians and magistrates of the fascist regime, and even fascists laws (Rocco's code). Atleast, Mussolini did some good thing (such social previdence, EUR, etc).

 

But the over inflating made up by fascist government was too much and finally exploded as it deserves to be.

[istvan47]

 

Their twin engine torpedo bomber probably wasn't bad, compared to current single engined USN and IJN machines.

 

Wasn't the SM.79 the most successful land based torpedo bomber of the war?

 

 

BAH! In propaganda, perhaps.

 

Aircraft carriers sunk: 0 damaged: 1 (in 1943!)

 

Battleship sunk: 0 damaged: 0 (Nelson was torpedoed by the dumb brother, the SM.84, that was, in return, butchered badly, with almost the whole 36st Wing annihiled in just one mission).

 

Cruisers damaged: atleast 6 sunk: 0.

 

Some destroyers and merchant ships were effectively torpedoed, but few sunk.

 

In 1941, the best SM.79 year, just 9 ships sunk, with 14 aircraft shot down.

 

When the allied started to deploy better a.a. and fighters, then the SM.79 days were gone (just relegated as night bomber/torpedo).

 

The He 111 was perhaps not better; still, in Mediterranean sea, in 1941-44, sunk or damaged roughly the same amount of tonnage that did the SM.79 in 1940-43. Not bad, since the 1942 the torpedo bombers were definitively too vulnerable (Devastator and G4M included).

 

Not forget, the SM.79/84 were employed literally in hundreds, the He 111 were just few squadrons.

 

 

We can talk about the Swordfish, the british WW-1 era torpedo-bomber. It had the same engine of the Sparviero (SM-79), but only one; and it was around 1-third as fast.

 

Still, the bunch of Swordfish did much more damage than all the Axis TB in Mediterranean sea put togheter.

 

Just check how the few Swordfish formerly based on HMS Eagle, literally exterminated all the DD italian fleet based in North Africa, in just two months.

Edited November 1, 2014 by istvan47

[istvan47]

-About the SM.79. Bear in mind, that even if apparently fast, the SM.79 was a tri-motor, not a twin.

 

Even with the weaker engines, it had over 2,200 cv for a 23,000 lb machine.

 

This is why it was fast. The last model, with 475 km/h, was motorized by 3x 920 cv, equalling a two with 1,400 hp each! And it was still quite light.

 

SM.84 and Z.1007 had 3x1,000 cv each, this is around such a DB-7 or B-25/26 or a Ki-21/49. So they were fast, but surely not underpowered. The Z.1007ter had around 490-500 km/h, but with 3x1,150 cv (3/4 of a 30 t B-17!).

 

-The fighters were, in comparasation, more performing, just look the MC.202 with the same Emil engine. But, anyway, it was not faster than the Bf 109F, and less armed as well.

 

-About the machine-guns: many in Italì talk well about the Breda Mod 37.

 

Now, it's necessary to add, this weapon was 'excellent'...

 

19,4 kg (43 lb), plus around 20 for the tripod (= 110 lbs!)

 

450 rpm

 

20 rd magazines (yess, it was too easy to mount a 250 rd belt!)

 

 

Basically it was 2/3 heavy such the M2HB, but it had a 1/3 firepower than the MG42, absolutely the worst power(firepower)-to-weight ratio of any WWII machine guns.

 

Germans though their MG were better than italian ones (go figure!). And they were right.

 

-Germans rated better italian mortas than theirs.

 

I read that the 81 mm had 3 km range with normal round, but some other sources talks even 4 km. This is a value too much optimistic, i'd say. Basically, the 81 mm Breda was just another copy of the french Brandt, so the performances should have been around 3 km, that was already very good (8 cm german had 2,5 km range).

 

-Breda 30 was crap, but there were a lot of them. It was horrible as shape as well. Let's say 'better than nothing'.

 

-Brixa 45 mm mortar. Ah ah ah, you call it a weapon?

 

 

-Eric Brown tested the MC.205, not the other '5' series, even if a G.55 was in UK. Atleast i never heard about it. Definitively not the Re.2005, arguably the best of the breed.

 

-MC.205 was a very capable low-medium fighter. Basically sound, but still too conservative and labor-intensive to build. Even so... it was sometimes kicked by USAAF P-40s (the 'mediocrity' TM).

 

It happened atleast on 30th April 1943 (when allieds kicked hard, sinking 3 enemy DD as well) and 22nd July (3 Macchi vs 2 P-40 lost). Not bad for the 'old' P-40.

Edited November 1, 2014 by istvan47

[Ifor]

I'm surprised, my impression was that the 205 was a very capable fighter, and was an able adversary for the more modern allied fighters?

[Ken Estes]

With WWII, there is a definite problem posed by when each country began to rearm. Those too early in the 1930s [uSSR, Italy, Japan] had passed the point where their current materiel was up to snuff, albeit still serviceable, and there was a definite gap before the next generation was ready for issue. The USSR was better off than Italy and Japan in this regard and its next generation was almost ready for full production in 1941 for the extreme test. France, UK and the US were obviously last to begin rearmament of the scale necessary in WWII. The French fell before they could improve upon their mid-30s armaments, but the UK and USA each benefitted from the later start and their materiel was reaching peak performance by 1944. The Germans hit the middle point with their initial rearmament program being on the mark for 1940-41 performance and thus a moment in the sweet spot, so to speak, for the war's outbreak in Europe. However, after 1941 they had problems with both design and production of much of their second generation type/model/series that was not helped by their political/economic failure to mobilize for total war until after 1942.

 

So, the coming of the War in Europe caught France, UK, Italy, US and the USSR in weaker state than the more aggressive powers, Germany and Japan. The French were unable to continue, Italy remained crippled and the Russians, British and US proceeded to modernize and incorporate technology and mobilize production in a way that the early successes of the Germans and Japanese paled by comparison, and they were swamped in the process.

[lucklucky]

Counter-example: P-51D with 1720HP had better performance than P-47D, despite the 2535HP of the later's engine.

 

P 51 engine had an inline engine so much more aerodynamic. A radial always have to make more power due to inherent worse aero to get to an inline level.

 

P-51 reportedly also had other advanced aero.

 

 

I'm surprised, my impression was that the 205 was a very capable fighter, and was an able adversary for the more modern allied fighters?

 

Why you are surprised? there is always an instance that a superior aircraft can be defeated. It can be surprise, a lucky shot, the pilot was incompetent etc. There was an instance that a Cant slow float plane downed 2 Spitfires. That doesn't mean we should rate the float plane better than a Spit.

Edited November 2, 2014 by lucklucky

[Markus Becker]

 

P 51 engine had an inline engine so much more aerodynamic. A radial always have to make more power due to inherent worse aero to get to an inline level.

 

P-51 reportedly also had other advanced aero.

 

 

AFAIK radials have a better power to weight ratio because they have no engine block in the traditional sense and no cooling system. What gave the P-51 such an advantage were the laminar flow wings.

[sunday]

Yep, the laminar flow wings and the novel radiator installation.