Markus Becker

Ok, I can see Poland having trust issues with the UK and France but the US? They spend a great deal on defense, always did unlike others and they are on very good terms with the US. Have been under T1, Biden and are T2.

That "nuclear project" better be power stations and fuel processing for affordable and reliable energy that boots the economy, so you can spend 6% or more of your growing GDP on conventional weapons. I'm not convinced of the cost effectiveness of nukes, when you already have a nuclear shield via Nato.

Getting it now and in no small part thanks to memes.

Happy Valentine's Day

If a certain online source is right, Russia has less than 48 itself at the moment. Ok, production rate will increase over time but any deliveries to Iran might run into an IAF shaped problem. No way Israel will allow Iran to operate 5th gen stealth jets. And in other news, an additional CVN is heading to the Middle East.

Germany can not into the Eastern Front any more. "The Bundeswehr has recently been active in Lithuania. But two battalions are apparently far from as well positioned as they should be. More than half of the soldiers needed are missing, a media report said. The Defense Department now wants to make the service more attractive. To deter Russia, a Bundeswehr brigade will be stationed abroad for the first time. But according to information from the "Spiegel", too few soldiers have volunteered to draw up for the establishment of the combat federation on the NATO eastern flank in Lithuania. "Volunteer applications are not sufficient," according to confidential statistics from the army on the number of soldiers who have signed up for a two-year deployment on the Nato eastern flank. Especially with the team service levels, which make up the bulk of the brigade, the numbers are too low. Specifically, it is about the occupation of the service posts for the Panzerbattalion 203 and the Panzergrenadierbattalion 122. According to the papers, the previous volunteer reports reach only between 28 and 47 percent. The two units are to be equipped with soldiers this year and will be fully equipped for deployment on the eastern flank in 2027. In an internal state of affairs from the Ministry of Defense at the end of January, the missing reports are described even more drastically. For the "new main forces" of the Lithuanian brigade - specifically called artillery, enlightenment, pioneers and support troops - only "around 10 percent" of the necessary volunteers would have come forward in a nationwide survey for 1971 service posts. The Bundeswehr admitted on request that so far not enough volunteers have been found for the deployment. However, the figures from the internal papers were only "an interim status from the end of last year" from which "no reliable forecasts for voluntary applications could be derived." "Currently, it is not yet possible to predict exactly how the volunteer applications will develop in the coming months," a spokesman for the army said. The establishment of the brigade with qualified personnel remains "challenging." Defense Minister Boris Pistorius of the SPD had announced in the summer of 2023 to station a fully equipped Bundeswehr brigade permanently in Lithuania on the NATO eastern flank. According to his announcement, the association should be operational from 2027. For the soldiers, the deployment in Lithuania should be voluntary. Through extensive allowances, the Ministry of Pistorius has tried to make the mission as attractive as possible for the soldiers of the Bundeswehr. According to the internal paper from the ministry, extensive measures are now planned. First, the personnel office is to send 43,000 information letters to all soldiers who are eligible for the deployment. In addition, the Bundeswehr wants to offer day trips to Lithuania so that possible applicants can look at the barracks. A "reduction of the minimum period in Lithuania to one year" is also planned. Until now, it was considered a requirement that the volunteers should stay in Lithuania for at least two years."

And just when I think peak absurd has been reached reality hits me in the face. 🥳👍🏻

No, you should not care. An M1 in the late 80s configuration was great at the time and still is a very, very good base for modernisation. As would be a Leo II, but Germany sold almost all of them. So no massive reserve to draw from.

Isn't the US mostly rebuilding Cold War production tanks that they could keep in storage because of the fine print of arms limitation treaties?

North East Poland by any chance? I hear the Wilki have an entire szaniec there. 😇 Power to them going on patrol at night in the middle of winter.

Ian and Mike the optics guy, that's A grade entertainment for sure.

Given the pace the US military procurement moves, Ukraine better gets the move on with Trembita 2 and Flamingo 1.1

I reposted this and it's the annual production, not monthly? Does the part of the documentation show how much of what was ordered was actually received? Or does is show if it's an ex post facto order, where they count what they got and then fill out the paperwork to order that much?

Maybe time to pay up? Auto translation: Venezuela: The bill is due Von Guest author • Eduardo Muth Martinez / Three weeks after U.S. troops took Nicolás Maduro out of Caracas and dropped him off in a Manhattan federal courtroom, the vultures circle Not the political ones. The financial ones. And the carcass they're fighting for is all Venezuela still owns. A ruthless analysis. The numbers are almost too large to be tangible. Total foreign debt: somewhere between 150 billion and 170 billion dollars Government bonds in default since November 2017. Arbitration awards that pile up like unpaid parking tickets. Chinese loans backed by oil that we can no longer sell freely. Russian military contracts for jets and tanks that we should never have bought. And at the center of everything, a single asset that anyone can actually achieve: Citgo, the Houston-based refinery network that lent PDVSA to the limit before the lights went out. The creditors were patient. For eight years. Now they want to be paid. What we owe – and who Venezuela's debt structure reads like an autopsy of the petro-socialist model of the 21st century. The bond liabilities – general government and PDVSA combined – alone amount to around 58 billion dollars in capital. If you add eight years of unpaid interest, the amount grows to around 90 billion dollars. S&P declared a „selective default“ the day after Maduro announced: „Venezuela will never default.“ That was in November 2017. Both statements turned out to be correct in their own way: Venezuela has never formally rejected its debts. It just stopped operating them. Then there is China. Between 2006 and 2016, the China Development Bank around 60 billion dollars in seventeen loan agreements to Venezuela – around half of all Chinese loans to Latin America during this period. The construction was elegant: PDVSA supplied oil to the China National United Oil Corporation, proceeds went into escrow accounts under CDB control, and China made use of it first before Venezuela saw a dollar. At its peak, we exported between 400,000 and 640,000 barrels a day to China, of which 374,000 were exclusively for debt repayment. Venezuela still owes Beijing between 10 billion and 15 billion dollars after two debt reschedulings.The problem: The Trump administration now controls Venezuela's oil sales and has imposed a 25 percent tariff on every country that buys Venezuelan crude oil. China's repayment mechanism has thus become considerably more complicated. Russia's commitment is between 6 and 9 billion dollars, spread across several categories: corporate loans from Rosneft to PDVSA (6.5 billion dollars between 2014 and 2017), restructured national debt (3.15 billion dollars, stretched to ten years in 2017), as well as military financing for Su-30MK2 fighter jets, helicopters, T-72 tanks and air defense systems that protect a revolution that could not protect itself. A crucial detail: In December 2016 received Rosneft 49.9 percent of the Citgo-Parts as collateral for a loan of 1.5 billion dollars As U.S. sanctions Rosneft Trading when they met, these shares were transferred to a state-owned company called Roszarubezhneft transfer. Moscow has been waiting for its moment ever since. Arbitral awards add another 22 billion dollars or more. ConocoPhillips received 8.7 billion dollars for the nationalizations of oil projects in 2007 – with interest now worth over 11 billion. An application for annulment at the ICSID was rejected in January 2025. ExxonMobil, Crystallex, Rusoro Mining, Gold Reserve: The list of companies that Venezuela expropriated and subsequently lost in arbitration courts could fill an entire textbook. The IMF estimates Venezuela's debt-to-GDP ratio at 180 to 200 percent with a GDP of around 82.8 billion dollars in 2025. For comparison: Venezuela has not had an IMF Article IV consultation since September 2004 – a gap of 217 months, the longest of all Member States. We have been flying blind for 18 years. The Citgo Endgame Everything boils down to a refinery network in Texas. PDVSA pledged 50.1 percent of the Citgo-Holding shares as collateral for bonds issued in 2016 over 3.4 billion dollars – the infamous PDVSA-2020 bonds with a coupon of 8.5 percent. When PDVSA defaulted in October 2019, bondholders theoretically had an access path. The U.S. Treasury Department repeatedly blocked him through general licenses. The current protection, General License 5T, expires on 3 February 2026. At the same time, this is necessary for the enforcement of the Crystallex-Delaware court claims about 21 billion dollars in creditor claims against Citgo registered – far more than the estimated company value. In November 2025, Judge Leonard Stark approved the bid of Amber Energy over 5.9 billion dollars. Amber Energy is from Elliott Investment Management controls – the same distressed debt specialist who took 2.4 billion dollars from Argentina in 2016 after a 15-year legal war. They know how to wait. And how to win. The structure: 5.9 billion dollars purchase price in cash plus a settlement payment of 2.125 billion dollars to PDVSA-2020 bondholders – total value around 8.8 billion dollars Gregory Goff, former Andeavor chief executive, is slated to be CEO. Expected completion: sometime in 2026, subject to OFAC approval. But 8.8 billion dollars compared to 21 billion dollars of registered claims means: someone will go away empty-handed. Satisfaction follows the principle „first come, first served“. Subordinated creditors – without collateral, without arbitration awards, without Elliott's lawyers – may receive only cents or nothing at all. January changed everything On January 9, 2026, six days after Maduro's arrest, President Trump signed an executive order entitled „Protecting Venezuelan oil revenues for the benefit of the American and Venezuelan people“. It declares a national emergency with regard to Venezuelan oil revenues and prohibits any seizure, judgment, lien or legal proceedings against oil revenues held in U.S. Treasury accounts. The power of disposal lies with the Foreign Minister. Again: The 21 billion dollars in creditor claims? The Chinese oil-backed loans? The Russian collateral? All of this is now hitting a wall made of presidential orders. Venezuelan oil revenues –as long as this order applies – belong to the US government for distribution at its own discretion. The creditors have lawyers. The lawyers will submit applications. The applications are rejected, challenged and rejected again. This is what it looks like when state immunity meets geopolitical control. The debt doesn't go away. They just become irrecoverable. The Gold in London There are also 31 metric tons of Venezuelan gold at the Bank of England – around 1,125 bars worth 3 to 4.8 billion dollars. Legal history is baroque. When the United Kingdom recognized Juan Guaidó as interim president, it also accepted the central bank board of directors he appointed. This claimed the gold – as well as the Maduro directorate. The Supreme Court ruled in 2021 that British courts must accept the recognition of the executive branch („one-voice doctrine“). As Guaidó was recognized at the time of his appointments, they were valid. When Britain withdrew recognition of Guaidó in January 2023, the Court of Appeal ruled that it was not retroactive. The authority of the Guaidó panel continued for the recognition period. Today, Guaidó is irrelevant, Maduro is in custody, Delcy Rodríguez leads the remnants of the government, and Edmundo González is recognized by Washington as „legitimate president“. Britain does not recognize any of them. Secretary of State Yvette Cooper said on January 5 that the gold would remain frozen until there was „clarity about Venezuela's governance“. Clarity could take a long time. What recovery looks like Citigroup estimates that any debt restructuring would require at least a 50 percent haircut, with returns ranging from 25 to 50 cents per dollar – depending on policy trajectory. Bonds currently trade at 27 to 43 cents. Das Venezuela Creditor Committee, which represents over 10 billion dollars of institutional claims (among others. Fidelity, T. Rowe Price, GMO, Greylock), agrees „to initiate a negotiated debt restructuring process as soon as it is authorized“. The statute of limitations has been extended until December 31, 2028. You can still wait. But authorization depends on political clarity that may never come: Which government is restructuring? The one recognized by Washington but territorially powerless? Who holds territorial power but is not recognized? Or the military, which effectively rules while both sides negotiate abroad? Argentina's default in 2001 took 15 years to resolve. Greece's 2012 debt restructuring required the EU, ECB and IMF. Venezuela's situation is worse: higher debt, weaker institutions, more fragmented creditors and a geopolitical overlay between Washington, Beijing and Moscow. Currently, Venezuela's debt crisis remains the largest government default in the world –with the most complex solution ever attempted. Two watches Venezuelan democracy runs against two clocks at different speeds. The first belongs to the creditors. Eight years of patience, deadlines extended until 2028, lawyers on call. This watch is slow but relentless. The second belongs to the voters. Short attention spans, daily distress, rapidly fading memories. This watch is fast and merciless. María Corina Machado's government problem can be reduced to one thing: the creditor clock and the voter clock do not run synchronously. Recovery takes a generation. Elections come every six years. And the creditors want their money now. The creditor clock Let's track the passage of time: The statute of limitations for most Venezuelan bond claims should expire in 2023. Das Venezuela Creditor Committee negotiated a standstill agreement, however, which pushed this deadline back to 31 December 2028, a gesture of goodwill, recognition that it was impractical to collect from a country in an active political crisis, and waiting for clarity could produce better results than a forced approach. But 2028 is not far away. And the creditors have made it very clear: when that date is reached, they expect to start collecting. An analysis of Citigroup suggests that any rescheduling will require at least a 50 per cent haircut on capital, meaning that creditors will accept to receive only half of what is owed to them. Given eight years of accrued interest, actual recovery could be closer to 25 to 30 cents on the dollar. Bondholders will have to accept losses regardless of the outcome. But accepting losses as part of an orderly debt restructuring is completely different than accepting losses in a chaotic general approach. The creditors want a negotiated process with clear conditions. They want priority rules that respect their collateral positions. They want to see the IMF involved to ensure support and discipline. They don't want to have to hear indefinitely that Venezuela is too fragile to even talk about repayment. The question is how long they will wait – and what happens to a Venezuelan government caught between creditors' demands and the reality that there is no money to meet them. The Voters Clock Now let's consider the parallel passage of time within Venezuela. Maduro is arrested in January 2026. A phase of transitional government follows: Delcy Rodríguez under American supervision, or a technocratic placeholder solution, or a guided process that eventually leads to new elections. Whenever these elections are held, María Corina Machado, or her designated successor, faces a population that has endured twenty-seven years of decline. You've heard promises before. You've been told before that change is coming. They will have to see results – swift, visible, undeniable – or they will conclude that liberation was just another broken promise. What counts as a result? Flowing water that actually flows. Power that doesn't fail. Hospitals with medication. Schools with teachers. Streets that don't collapse. Police who protect instead of looting. Grocery stores with goods at prices that people can afford. Jobs paid in a currency worth something. None of this is cheap. None of this happens quickly. Infrastructure that has not been maintained since the early Chavez years cannot be repaired in a single budget cycle. Institutions eroded by systematic corruption do not rebuild overnight. Human capital that has fled to Madrid and Miami is not returning just because a new president is taking office. The gap between expectations and performance is enormous. And every day that this gap exists, the second clock ticks faster. The impossible bill Here is the calculation that makes democratic governance in Venezuela almost impossible after Maduro: Venezuela needs about 50 billion dollars in investment over the next decade to bring basic infrastructure and services back to working levels. This estimate comes from analysts studying post-conflict and post-crisis reconstruction, adjusted for Venezuela's specific destruction. Venezuela owes about 170 billion dollars to creditors legally entitled to payment. Venezuela generates about 15 to 20 billion dollars a year in oil revenues – revenues now controlled by the Trump administration, with current output. Even if every dollar of oil revenues went to reconstruction (which is impossible because governments have different spending), it would take years to achieve visible results. If creditors receive their share first, the reconstruction period extends to decades. If the government prioritizes reconstruction over repayment to creditors, it becomes an international pariah: without access to capital markets, cut off from normal financial relationships, vulnerable to asset seizures wherever Venezuelan property can be found. If the government prioritizes creditors over reconstruction, it becomes a political pariah: unable to deliver the visible improvements that voters demand and vulnerable to a resurgence of Chavismo in the next election. There is no bill that works. Something has to resign. Trump's watch stopper The January 9 executive order does something remarkable: it stops the creditor clock while the voter clock continues. By prohibiting the seizure of Venezuelan oil revenues, the order creates a gap between the debt and the ability to collect it. The creditors keep their claims. The debt continues But the collection is suspended indefinitely –depending on the discretion of the American executive. That gives every future democratic government something invaluable: a phase in which oil revenues can flow into reconstruction without being immediately siphoned off to service the debt. Let's look at what that practically means. Without the Executive Order: oil revenues → creditor claims → what remains goes to Venezuela (probably nothing). With the Executive Order: Oil Revenue → Treasury → Disbursement according to State Department priorities → Venezuela receives funding for reconstruction (amount of Washington to be determined). The second scenario is not ideal. Venezuelan sovereignty is restricted. The government becomes dependent on American goodwill. Every spending decision requires Washington's blessing. But this second scenario allows the voter clock to continue running while the creditor clock pauses. And that could make the difference between the survival of democracy and its collapse due to its own contradictions. Intention or coincidence? The honest answer is: I don't know if Trump's team conceived this as a strategy to protect democracy. The officially stated justification is completely different: American interests, leverage on the transition, keeping revenue away from the hands of opponents. Nothing in the Executive Order's wording suggests concern for María Corina Machado's political viability or the long-term survival of Venezuelan democratic institutions. But what matters is the effect, not the intention. Consciously designing a policy to give Venezuelan democracy the best possible chance of survival would do something very similar: prevent immediate creditor access that would divert resources from reconstruction. Control the use of funds to ensure that funds flow into visible improvements. Maintain influence to prevent regression while allowing political normalization. Limit the regulation in time to create pressure to ultimately reach a viable agreement. The Executive Order expressly fulfills points 1 to 3. Point 4 is implicit in the nature of executive orders: they can be canceled, changed or replaced. The regulation is inherently temporary and thereby creates its own incentives. Whether this is sophisticated statesmanship or a happy coincidence – the result is the same: Venezuelan democracy is given a scope for action that it would otherwise not have. What skeptics should worry about The risks are real and should not be downplayed. The dependency risk: A democratic government that survives only through American protection is not fully sovereign. Any major decision is filtered by Washington's preferences. When American interests diverge from Venezuelan interests –which is inevitable–, the government faces insoluble decisions. The sustainability risk: Executive orders are not permanent. A new government, a change of priorities, a change in the geopolitical situation – all of this could end protection. Then the creditors are still waiting, the debts continue to exist, and the democratic government is once again faced with the same impossible calculation as on the first day, now further weakened by years of dependence. The legitimacy risk: Venezuelans have fought for democracy for twenty-seven years, not to be governed by the U.S. State Department. The perception that MCM governs only with American toleration and that its government exists because Washington allows it undermines exactly what made the democratic transition desirable. The moral hazard risk: If this model works, it will establish a model: regime change with financial security for the successor government. That could encourage American intervention elsewhere – with unpredictable consequences. It could also entice opposition movements to rely on external rescue rather than building viable inner coalitions. These are serious concerns. They could ultimately prove to be crucial. But they have an impact on a longer time horizon than the immediate crisis of creditor pressure and voter expectations. The waiting of Chavismo What's left of the Chavist camp completely understands the two-watch problem. You don't have to win immediately. They do not have to organize a counter-revolution or offer armed resistance. You just have to wait. Wait for the Executive Order to expire or be repealed. Wait until the creditor clock starts running again. Waiting for the moment when MCM will have to choose between payments to Wall Street and payments to hospitals. Then start with a simple message: They promised you democracy. Democracy has brought you debt recovery. We promise you dignity. It's a lie. The debt was created by Chavismo. The crisis was produced by twenty-seven years of kleptocracy and mismanagement. The suffering is not the fault of the Democrats who inherited it. But lies work when they are easier than the truth. And „these people caused your problems“ is harder to sell than „these people don't solve your problems“. The chavistic watch runs the fastest of all. They need MCM's failure before the population forgets who actually ruined the country. What comes after „the finale“ María Corina Machado spoke of „la final“ as if the liberation of Maduro meant completion. The end of the nightmare. The beginning of the future. But Maduro in a cell in Manhattan is not the end of anything. It's the starting signal for a race against three clocks: Clock 1 (Creditor): Currently paused by Executive Order. Duration unknown. As soon as it starts up again, claims worth around 170 billion dollars will begin to push for collection. Estimated time to a critical mass of enforcement measures: 2–4 years after the loss of protection. Clock 2 (voters): Runs continuously. About 4–6 years until the first truly free election, in which Chavismo sends a rehabilitated candidate into the race. Any month without visible improvement increases the likelihood of an election defeat. Clock 3 (Chavismo): Runs fastest. Actively works to delegitimize the transition, portray austerity as a democratic failure and reposition oneself politically. A zero-sum game with democratic credibility. MCM's challenge – or the challenge of the one leading the democratic transition – is to 2 o'clock to show enough progress to maintain legitimacy while building enough institutional resilience to 1 a.m to survive when it starts up again, and 3 o'clock to forestall by establishing democracy as a normal and preferred state before Chavismo can rehabilitate itself. The Trump Executive Order helps 1 a.m. She is neutral towards 2 o'clock (american use of funds does not guarantee optimal reconstruction priorities). She could 3 o'clock even harm (dependence on Washington feeds the chavistic narrative of imperialism).It's not a solution. It's a breathing space. What matters is what happens during this respite. The crucial question Is it good policy to protect Venezuela's democratic government from its creditors? Not just good policy in a tactical sense, but really good policy for long-term regional stability, for showing that democracy can follow socialism, and for proving that American intervention does not necessarily end in chaos? The answer depends on what you optimize. If you optimize the rule of law and creditors' rights, the answer is: no. Debts should be paid, contracts enforced. Protecting a country from its obligations sets a precedent that weakens the international financial order. Optimizing the democratic transition is the answer: maybe. Democracy takes time to prove itself. MCM inherits an impossible starting point. Giving her air could make the difference between success and failure. Optimizing American interests is the answer: probably. A stable, pro-American Venezuela is valuable. It is not a failed democratic transition that brings Chavismo back to power. Protecting oil revenues gains influence and keeps opponents away. Optimizing Venezuelan interests –whatever those may be, defined by Venezuelans themselves–, the answer is unclear Protection that comes with dependency is a double-edged sword. The question is whether it is better than the alternative. I don't know the correct answer. I'm not sure anyone even knows her. The honest conclusion Twenty-seven years of Chavismo have created a country that cannot service its debt while rebuilding itself. This is not a political failure. This is arithmetic. The numbers don't add up. Trump's executive order freezes creditor clock as reconstruction clock continues. Whether this is deliberate strategy or happy coincidence is less important than the impact: time for democracy to show that it can follow socialism and deliver something better. Without this time, democracy is likely to fail. With this time it could succeed. „Could“ is better than „probably not“. The creditors are patient. Voters are impatient. The clocks are running. Everything depends on which one falls to zero first. Eduardo Muth Martinez was born in Venezuela and lives in the United States. He lived under Venezuela's authoritarian system and left the country in 2015 as part of the diaspora. He writes about Venezuela's political and social crisis, based on both his own experiences and analytical considerations. This post first appeared on his Substack account. There you will also find an extensive collection of sources for this text.

Did Serbia something to upset Russia or is El Presidente not telling the truth?