RETAC21

Another outstanding post at thinpinstripled blog: https://thinpinstripedline.blogspot.com/2024/05/hms-challenger-warship-that-never-was.html And what went wrong:

You are welcome, but the work was done by the editors of the Lexikon and Google translate

501 heavy tank battalion: "On September 9, 1943, Heavy tank battalion 501 was reorganized in Paderborn. The remains of the old battalion were also used for this purpose. On September 18, the detachment was moved to Sagan and from there to Mailly-le-Camp in France in mid-October. By November 12, 1943, 45 "Tigers" had been added to the battalion. From December 5th to 12th, 1943 the battalion was relocated to Vitebsk in Russia. In June 1944 the remaining "Tigers" were handed over to the Heavy tank battalion 509. The battalion moved to Germany to be equipped with the new "Tiger 2". By August 7, 1944, 45 "Tiger 2s" had been added to the battalion." 502 heavy tank battalion: "On August 1, 1944, 12 of the 37 Tigers were operational. On October 4, 1944, the battalion received the order to relocate to Germany to re-equip with Tiger II. On October 9, 1944, the 1st and 2nd companies reached the Memel. The 3rd Company remains in the Courland Pocket with 8 Tigers and is subordinated to the 510 Heavy Panzer battalion . On November 12, 1944, the 3rd Company transferred the 6 remaining Tigers to Heavy Panzer battalion 510 and moved them to Libau to be shipped. On December 16, 1944, 2 Tigers from the Großdeutschland heavy tank battalion reached the department. On December 17, 1944, the 3rd company also reached the Sennelager military training area . On January 21, 1945, parts of the detachment were embarked near Pillau. On January 31, 1945, the battalion was renamed Panzer battalion 511 ." 503 heavy tank battalion: "On June 1, 1944, the department was refreshed at the Ohrdruf military training area in Thuringia. From June 11th to 17th, 1944, the department was re-equipped with 33 Tiger Is and 12 Tiger IIs. The department moved to France by July 7th, 1944. On July 18, 1944, the 3rd Company is bombed during Operation Goodwood, but only 2 Tigers are destroyed. 13 tigers are destroyed throughout the day. From July 20th to 29th, 1944, the 3rd Company was moved to Mailly-le-Camp to be equipped with Tiger II. On August 12, 1944, the 3rd company moved to Paris. Here the majority of the company is destroyed by Allied air raids. The rest will be destroyed during the withdrawal from Normandy. Only 2 Tiger IIs can be saved." 504 heavy tank battalion seems to have had only Tiger Is during its existence 505 heavy tank battalion: "From July 11th to 12th, 1944 the battalion moved to Ohrdruf to be equipped with Tiger II. The department was then equipped with 45 Tiger IIs between July 26, 1944 and August 29, 1944." 506 heavy tank battalion: "On July 27th and 28th, 1944, the 6 remaining Tigers were handed over to the heavy tank battalion 507 . On August 15, 1944, the order was issued to relocate to Ohrdruf to be equipped with Tiger IIs. Between August 20, 1944 and September 12, 1944, the battalion was equipped with 45 Tiger IIs." 507 heavy tank battalion: "Between February 12 and 15, 1945, the department moved to the Sennelager military training area without the 1st company to be equipped with Tiger IIs. Between March 19 and 22, 1945 the department was equipped with 21 Tiger IIs." 508 heavy tank battalion: "On February 12, 1945, the remaining 15 Tigers were transferred to Heavy Panzer battalion 504. The personnel will be relocated to Germany to be re-equipped with Tiger II. However, the new tanks will no longer be transferred. Instead, parts of the battalion are “burned up” in infantry operations." 509 heavy tank battalion: "On April 19, 1944, only 2 of the 29 Tigers were still operational. In May 1944, the battalion moved by rail to Kolomia, Hungary, to train Hungarian Tiger crews. In June 1944, the used Tigers were handed over to the Hungarians, in return for which battalion received 9 Tigers from Heavy Tank battalion 501 . In total, the battalion has 46 new tigers. Between July 14 and 16, 1944, the battalion relocated near Lublin, Poland. Here the battalion is subordinate to the 1st Hungarian Army. There the remaining Tigers were handed over to the heavy tank battalion 501 on September 8, 1944 . The personnel are transferred to Germany to be equipped with Tiger II. Between December 5, 1944 and January 1, 1945, the battalion received 45 Tiger IIs and was relocated to Hungary from January 12, 1945." 510 heavy tank battalion: "On March 19, 1945, the remaining Tigers with the 18th Army in Courland were formed into a combat group; the rest of the department was to be evacuated from the Courland Pocket by sea. On March 30, 1945, the 3rd company in Kassel received 6 new Tiger IIs and was thrown into defensive fighting near Kassel on April 2, 1945." Heavy tank battalion Feldherrnhalle "The battalion was set up on December 21, 1944. The department was formed from the heavy tank department 503 as a corps force with 3 companies and subordinated to the Feldherrnhalle tank corps . In March 1945 the department was in action in the Vereleby area. Of the 26 Tiger IIs, 19 were still operational. In April 1945 the department retreated to Austria. During the retreat, 12 tigers are destroyed. In May 1945 the department withdrew to Bohemia." So the answer is that when due for re-equipment, the battalions handed over the remaining Tiger Is to other battalion to bring it up to strength and they relocated to Germany to receive the Tiger IIs, for the most part. Source: https://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gliederungen/PanzerAbt/GliederungTiger.htm

The ship is grounded, so not likely to rise much

But this is a war that Israel can win, if it has the will, rather than turning a blind eye to the monster camping next door. Gaza is rally a couple of medium sized cities and this is standard COIN stuff - unrewarding but no novelty.

Pertinent: https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/may/another-historic-year-pla-navy?mc_cid=bcd656a5c1&mc_eid=cc844f18fe Another Historic Year for the PLA Navy By Captain James E. Fanell, U.S. Navy (Retired) May 2024 Proceedings Vol. 150/5/1,455 For the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the biggest surprise of 2023 was the end-of-year announcement that Admiral Dong Jun, chief of the PLA Navy (PLAN), had been appointed as the 14th Minister of Defense.1 News of Admiral Dong’s appointment was overshadowed in Western media by the mystery surrounding the removal of his predecessor, Army General Li Shangfu. But the first-ever appointment of a career PLAN officer as head of the PLA is a testament to the importance Chairman Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have placed on transforming China into a great naval power to achieve the so-called Great Rejuvenation of China. Toward that end, growth has continued in the number of ships, submarines, and naval aircraft and their operations at sea. An Admiral at the Helm of the PLA The significance of Admiral Dong’s appointment should not be underestimated, as it represents the culmination of 25 years of PLAN modernization and growth—from being a brown-water force to an institution whose top officer is now leading China’s entire military. The appointment is important for two principal reasons. First, Admiral Dong is one of the PLA’s most experienced joint commanders, having deep expertise at the operational level of war in the Eastern and Southern Theater Commands that provides him with unique understanding and perspectives regarding China’s disputed sovereignty claims—cross-domain but fundamentally maritime issues.2 Second, and perhaps more important, Admiral Dong has the distinction of being the first Commander of the East China Sea Joint Operations Command Center (ECS JOCC), having served from July 2013 to November 2014 while he served as one of the deputy commanders of the East Sea Fleet. Established in 2013, the ECS JOCC was the PLA’s first joint operations command headquarters responsible for the operational coordination of the PLAN, PLA Air Force (PLAAF), and other forces—including the China Coast Guard and Strategic Rocket Forces—against Taiwan.3 Admiral Dong’s various appointments should be a reminder of the importance the CCP places on the PLAN and the PLA’s overall capability to take Taiwan by kinetic means should other efforts fail. Growth Continues While recent economic problems have slowed PLAN ship production over the past two years, Chinese reporting indicates the PLAN commissioned its eighth Type 055/Renhai-class cruiser, eight more Type 054A/Jiangkai II frigates, and one comprehensive submarine rescue ship.4 In addition, the PLAN launched one Type 075/Yushen-class amphibious assault ship, five cruisers and destroyers, two newer Type 054B frigates, and three nuclear-powered submarines. The total tonnage launched and commissioned in 2023 was about 170,000 tons, compared with 110,000 tons in 2022, although still somewhat lower than the 200,000-ton annual average prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. While China acknowledged this slight decrease, it claims to have achieved a “significant increase in quality,” particularly with the Type 054B frigates that began sea trials in January 2024.5 Despite producing fewer hulls and less tonnage, the PLAN remains the world’s leader in new commissionings by tonnage—as it has for at least five years. Expected U.S. shipbuilding growth in the coming years probably will not improve this worrying strategic trendline. The Workhorse Shandong While PLAN carrier strike groups (CSGs) today are not of the same caliber as the U.S. Navy’s, a mere 11 years after the first PLANAF fighter recovered on the deck of the Liaoning, China’s second aircraft carrier, the Shandong, was conducting “live-fire confrontation drills” in the South China Sea in January 2023.6 Operations included nighttime launch-and-recoveries as the carrier achieved the first of what would become an unprecedented number of at-sea periods for any PLAN carrier, rivaling days at sea by any U.S. carrier in the western Pacific for the year. In April, the Shandong CSG—which included a Type 055 cruiser, a Type 052D destroyer, two Type 054A frigates, and two comprehensive replenishment ships (a Type 901 and a Type 903)—was back at sea passing through the Bashi Channel and into the waters east of Taiwan. There, it participated in exercise Joint Sword with the PLAAF, PLA Strategic Rocket Forces, and surface combatants that encircled the island of Taiwan from 8 to 10 April.7 Following Joint Sword, the Shandong moved to an area 350 nautical miles west of Guam, close to where the Liaoning had operated just four months prior.8 According to observations by Japan’s Ministry of Defense, during 18 days of operations in the western Pacific, the Shandong conducted 620 aircraft sorties (fixed-wing and helicopter), far exceeding the 320 sorties the Liaoning conducted over 15 days in December 2022.9 Then, in September, the Shandong CSG entered the western Pacific via the Bashi Channel at the same time as a large number of PLAN warships were observed passing through the Miyako Strait into the Philippine Sea. Overall, some 20 PLAN warships were detected, the most ever tracked around Taiwan in a single day.10 A little more than a month later, the Shandong CSG was back at sea in the western Pacific, where it conducted nine days of operations that included 570 aircraft sorties—an average of around 63 aircraft sorties a day. This is nearly twice the number carried out in April and three times the sortie rate recorded by the Liaoning in January.11 Not done, in December the Shandong CSG returned to its homeport in the South China Sea via the Taiwan Strait following a month-long operation in the Bohai Sea, where the Shandong had helped train pilots from the Liaoning while the latter was in port for maintenance.12 While not as rigorous as that of the U.S. Navy’s carrier force, this level of at-sea training is evidence of the PLAN’s rapid growth in capability. The PLAN’s third carrier, the Fujian, completed mooring trials and began dead-load testing of her three electromagnetic catapults in November. She will likely begin sea trials in summer 2024. It seems clear that, while much of the world questions the efficacy of aircraft carriers because of the proliferation of anticarrier missile systems, the PLAN is doubling down on them. Russia and Iran Over the course of 2023, the PLAN continued its long-standing coordinated operations with the Russian Navy. In July, the two navies held joint exercises in the Sea of Japan. For the second year in a row, PLAN and Russian warships conducted a “show of force” when 11 warships transited eastward through the first island chain in August. Ties between Xi and Russia’s Vladimir Putin have grown, and these combined naval operations have expanded, even as the Russian invasion of Ukraine continues.13 In addition, the PLAN conducted two trilateral exercises with the Russian and other navies. The first occurred in February, when the PLAN’s 42nd Escort Task Force (ETF) participated in exercise “Mosi II” along with host South Africa’s Navy.14 Then in March, the PLAN’s 43rd ETF conducted the trilateral exercise “Security Belt” with the Russian and Iranian navies. These events are a stark reminder of the alternative international order Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran want to establish in the name of anything but maritime economic security. Preparing for War at Sea The appointment of Admiral Dong to lead China’s Ministry of Defense means that Xi and the CCP have undeniably recognized the importance of maritime power to complete the Great Rejuvenation of China. The CCP has handed over the leadership of the PLA to a man who views the world through the lens of war at sea. Recall that, in December 2022 while still head of the navy, Dong held a conclave of senior PLAN officers. The gathering could be reduced to a single, critically important theme: “Make all necessary preparations to defeat the U.S. Navy in great power war at sea.”15 Admiral Dong’s appointment will affect the entire PLA in the next year and throughout the remainder of this so-called decade of concern. 1. CDR Mike Dahm, USN (Ret.), “Who’s Hu, the New PLAN Commander,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 149, no. 12 (29 December 2023). 2. Andrew S. Erickson and CAPT Christopher Sharman, USN (Ret.), “Admiral Dong Jun Engages Friends and Foes: China’s First Naval Defense Minister Brings Joint Operational Experience,” China Maritime Studies Institute, 30 December 2023, 1. 3. Erickson and Sharman, “Admiral Dong Jun Engages Friends and Foes,” 2. 4. Tan Yusheng, “2023 Review of the Chinese Navy’s Equipment Development in 2023 [Original in Chinese],” Naval and Merchant Ships no. 2 (2024): 66–75. 5. Yusheng, “2023 Review of the Chinese Navy’s Equipment.” 6. “Highlights of Aircraft Carrier Shandong’s Live-Fire Drill in South China Sea,” PLA Daily, 16 January 2023. 7. Liu Xuanzun, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Shandong Holds Intensive Drills Comparable with Liaoning in West Pacific,” Global Times, 18 April 2023. 8. “Chinese Aircraft Carrier Nears U.S. Territory of Guam,” Radio Free Asia, 30 December 2022. 9. Liu Xuanzun, “China’s Shandong Aircraft Carrier Group Collaborates with Rocket Force, Land-Based Aviation Forces in 1st Far Sea Exercise,” Global Times, 7 May 2023. 10. Keoni Everington, “Chart Shows Chinese ‘Unprecedented’ Carrier Exercises around Taiwan,” Taiwan News, 18 September 2023. 11. Liu Xuanzun, “PLA’s Carrier Shandong Doubles Aircraft Sortie Rate Record in Latest Far Sea Drill,” Global Times, 7 November 2023. 12. Liu Xuanzun, “PLA’s Aircraft Carrier Shandong Transits Taiwan Straits after Operation in the North,” Global Times, 12 December 2023. 13. John Feng, “Map Shows Chinese Navy Ships Heading for Possible Russia Meet,” Newsweek, 19 March 2024. 14. Jay Gates, “Arrival of Chinese Navy Taskforce in Cape Town a Sign of Closer China/SA Ties,” Defence Web, 31 July 2023. 15. Ryan D. Martinson, “Winning High-End War at Sea: Insights into the PLA Navy’s New Strategic Concept,” Center for International Maritime Security, 18 May 2023

This is one of those "this is the manual vs this is how things are done". Peacetime army, soldier loses a piece of kit = Major flap!, wartime = let's write off this tank so we can use it for spares. As mentioned, there are plenty of "field modifications" going on but writing off a tank to make a cargo carrier is significant stuff that won't go unnoticed. As Roman said, the Russians seem particular asses on this stuff, but back in the day, when I served, there were no qualms about cannibalizing stuff to get a fully operational vehicle... in peacetime.

Now, that's a good question... we will never know how that was written in LICspeak

Sport! then you better stay off them conre durgs, if you know ur breech from ur mussel! Once you hear that, you know you are in the correct library.

A great opportunity was missed by not having this signing at the Kitsap Regional library, it would be the culmination of all Tanknetinesh...

As you may already know, there are 2 military museums that are worth the visit (and free), plus the Parajola battery, which doesn't have any guns but it's worth just for the view: https://www.xn--castillosdeespaa-lub.es/es/content/parajola-bateria-de-la https://bateriascostacartagena.blogspot.com/2016/04/la-parajola-c-3.html

No, they didn't, their priority was setting up a revolutionary committee and the killing off the officers and upper classes. It didn't figure on their immediate priority that they may lose and it might make sense to disable the ships. The order of business was: 1) get weapons 2) take power 3) start the executions. In Ferrol they got stuck on point 1, but in other places, the armories were opened to the masses and revolution ensued. See Cartagena (machine translate from here: https://www.laverdad.es/murcia/cartagena/201407/19/alzamiento-revolucion-1936-20140719004251-v.html?ref=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.laverdad.es%2Fmurcia%2Fcartagena%2F201407%2F19%2Falzamiento-revolucion-1936-20140719004251-v.html) "Friday July 17 The city had experienced a truly turbulent day caused by the indefinite general strike that had been going on since the 14th, in solidarity with the Canales de Riego workers. The population was still digesting the events that occurred by the well-known criminal nicknamed 'El Chipé' and his subsequent public lynching in the streets, in a preview of the violence that was coming soon. That morning, the officers in favor of the uprising had waited for signals for its start; the uprising should be launched from Valencia, which was the military headquarters; command of the uprising would be for the entire military region, including the Naval Base of Cartagena. Throughout this day the troops who had taken to the streets to control possible altercations returned to the Arsenal without incident. Already in the afternoon, rumors about an uprising of the African army were spreading throughout the base and through the Arsenal itself, there was intense nervousness, because the uprising movement was opposed by another counter-uprising of the elements that were not willing to remain impassive. Faced with such an event, republican cells from the different crews of the ships and the Arsenal, led by middle and auxiliary managers, many of them with deep connections in Freemasonry. Saturday July 18 Franco's proclamation was received at the Arsenal at 10 in the morning on July 18. At that moment is when the radio station is controlled by elements related to the Government, who intercept the messages sent by the rebels and broadcast only those that were governmental in nature. Despite the vast majority of the officers being in favor of the uprising, no one wants to assume its leadership, and even once Franco's message has been received, it is the Navy commanders themselves who transfer its content to the military governor, so that he can be the one. who takes the appropriate measures and declares a state of war in the city. But General Toribio Martínez Cabrera is openly faithful to the republican government, under pressure and not feeling safe to control the uprising with his loyal forces, he manages to deceive the rebels to delay this declaration, until he personally moves to Valencia and there receives the official declaration of the uprising by the captain general of the Levante area. It is nothing more than a ploy to buy time, knowing first-hand that in Valencia the generals of the organic division also remained loyal to Madrid. As night falls, it is confirmed that the forces in the garrison are no longer going to join the uprising, General Martínez Cabrera orders regular Army troops to take positions with the intention of quelling any movement against the Madrid government. Sunday July 19 At dawn the next day, the pessimism of the rebels is total and even more so when they learn that the ships' crews have mutinied and have arrested their officers. The first incident with victims and, therefore, the first fatal consequence of the uprising and therefore of the Civil War in Cartagena will be the death of lieutenant Ángel González López, at the hands of stoker Dionisio Marchante. The latter, exalted by the climate of tension experienced in the Arsenal throughout the day of July 18, met the officer in front of the Submarine Base building and without practically saying a word, shot him at point-blank range the entire magazine of his pistol. It seems that the stoker carried out this action on the lieutenant more than for any other reason than the fact that he was an officer; independent of his personal and ideological condition. The murder is witnessed by several witnesses who are looking out of the windows of the neighboring buildings. The attacker ran away, leaving his victim's body in a huge pool of blood. Immediately, an officer who was on duty went out in pursuit of Marchante, whom he shot repeatedly until seriously wounding him. Hours later, the stoker also died." As you can see, planning for the coup was piss poor and the revolutionaries weren't much better.

Conditions were rather chaotic, initially only the Army of Africa rebelled, and the Government thought they could keep the rebellion contained there, plus there was a change of government going on, which meant a lot of people were sitting on the wall waiting to see what happens. In many places, the coup went ahead or not depending on the actions of a few people and many were caught in the middle. For example, my great grandfather (retired LTC) thought the coup had no chance and then got arrested and murdered by Socialist militias, my wife's grandfather (Navy LT) was looking for housing in Madrid prior to starting the Naval Warfare College in Sept and had to hide with wife and kids. He managed to get the family safely to an embassy but he had to remain behind and was eventually drafted as a private in the Republican Army. Tried to desert in 1939 to Mallorca but was caught, sentenced to death and only saved because the war ended. These experiences were not unique by any means.

Yes, well, but then the plotters had Franco fly to Africa to take command of the African Army and used a couple of destroyers to take legionnaires and regulares to Cadiz (which tipped the balance there) before the crew clued up and mutinied. I think the idea was that it was expected that the Navy would join the coup by default while the Air Forces was sure to be Republican and what wasn't expected was the Republicans taking over the central radio station in Madrid and broadcasting for the crews to mutiny (new technologies and all that). Franco even made a point of his speech to the Navy in Vinaroz in 1938 to emphasize that officers needed to command the respect of their subordinates... which didn't sat particularly well. Franco has a love/hate relationship with the Navy, having been turned down at naval school.

Oddly enough, the Navy didn't figure on the planning of the coup, which explains why things went South so fast.

It should be noted that Spanish neutrality came and went a bit. When Germany invaded Poland in 1939, Spain declared strict neutrality as Franco was nonplussed at the invasion of a Catholic country, but when France fell and Germany became a neighbor unexpectedly, it switched to non-belligerency, meaning it was allied with Italy and Germany but not fighting shoulder to shoulder. For a very short window after the Fall of France and before the Battle of Britain, Spain was ready to join the Axis in the war, but the Germans weren't interested on either sharing the booty nor pissing the French off (as they would have to give up Morocco and half of Algeria). When the Battle of Britain didn't go Germany's way, the Germans became much more interested but Spanish enthusiasm had cooled off (hence, when Hitler met Franco at Hendaye, he compared the meeting to a visit to the dentist), however, Spain was under much pressure until Barbarossa. The invasion of the USSR gave Franco an excuse to stay out of the war while helping with the sending of the Blue Division, the Blue squadron and volunteers to the Kriegsmarine. Despite some initial enthusiasm and plenty of volunteers, as the war wore on, the Division had some difficulties that culminated with the Battle of Krasny Bor in 1943 (better known as Operation Iskra to Russian front historians) and it was recalled, with just a single regimental size "legion" left behind, which performed much poorly, so the Germans weren't really sad when it was pulled out in '44. Neutrality became again more strict when the US joined the war (mainly because they were supplying the fuel needed) and Torch was allowed to proceed with minimum warning to the Germans, though there was still collaboration (see Operation Mincemeat). Still, in 1943 the Pyrinees were fortified, just in case. By the time of Stalingrad and subsequent Italian surrender, the position moved to strict neutrality once again and some critical materials were embargoed. Franco expected some leniency for this post-war, and despite pressures from Stalin to do away with him, Churchill allowed his survival, but Spain was slapped with total isolation from the post-war world, with the exception of Argentina, only coming out again in 1953. Republican refugees fought in WW2, mainly on the ranks of the French Foreign Legion and the Leclerc division, though communist cadres were integrated in the NKVD division and some pilots fought in the Soviet VVS. In 1944, the Communist party gathered its cadres from the Resistance to invade Spain and start a guerrilla war, but it didn't end well.

No, it wasn't an even split, in fact, in July 1936 the Nationalist navy had only 3-4 operational warships, though others were brought into services as soon as possible. The wholesale murder of officers mentioned by Sunday was also followed by many officers preferring to hide, defect or take postings ashore, so merchant mariners had to substitute for regular officers just to get the ships to their destination. Soviet officers were seconded as "volunteers" to try to get some order in the ships but it was for naught mostly and to add insult to injury, the Nationalist navy managed to take control of the Gibraltar strait when the bulk of the Republican Navy sailed north to break the blockade... and then did nothing of note. It was only in late 1937-1938 that a modicum of discipline and order was established and some very limited operations were attempted (one of which ended up with the sinking of the nationalist cruiser Baleares) but in 1939, with the war going to be lost, the fleet abandoned Cartagena when there was a nationalist uprising and sailed to Bizerte in Tunisia, from where it was recovered by the nationalists. A couple of destroyers were damaged by air attacks and were left behind and the older subs were in no shape to go anywhere and were abandoned. Post-war, the material state of all ships was appalling and the first order of business was maintenance, so, for most of WW2, Spain had Canarias and a few destroyers and submarines, despite big plans to develop a substantial fleet that matured over the late 40s-50s in a bunch of rather poor destroyers and escorts.

I don't necessarily disagree, mainly because I don't see the Chinese going to war with the US over Taiwan, nor the US going to war with China over the Spratlys, but I see the Chinese are trying to overmatch the local US allies and safe their trade lines off India.

Yes, well, but there was a CV-7 and a CV-8 that were less than stellar... 😮 Regarding CVNs, Reagan and Lehman, plus the Navy brass who didn't bow to Carter's cost cutting, but on a big carrier, nuclear power is a nice to have if the owning power doesn't plan on sending it to the other side of the World routinely.

1) You are overlooking that the US (by choice) has to deploy in 2 oceans, cutting the available fleet by half and that the existing fleet is being run down as the LAs and Ohio ran out of hull life. Political shenanigans in the past will come home to roost as the SSN suffer the effect of less boats that still are too many to be properly maintained: https://news.usni.org/2023/10/26/aukus-sub-sale-will-result-in-10-year-dip-in-u-s-attack-boat-inventory-says-cbo https://www.cbo.gov/publication/57083 This will open a window of opportunity for the Chinese, IF their intent is to fight the US. 2) Test sites do not add to the technical capabilities of the submarines, the PRC has been able to leverage previous existing knowledge in both the East and West and it has taken them nearly 20 years to get up to par. We don't know what we don't know, but it would be risky to assume they remain behind when in other fields they are getting up to speed and surpassing the West. 3) And it's not only mining operations, the US remains extremely vulnerable to having its ports mined (remember the shipping glut a few years ago).

This is changing fast: "Turning to the maritime domain, in the last two years, the PRC has launched the first two hulls of its new Shang III class of nuclear-powered guided-missile submarines (SSGN)." https://armedservices.house.gov/sites/republicans.armedservices.house.gov/files/NNC 2024 Posture Statement_HASC_FINAL.pdf The Chinese seem to have ironed out whatever they didn't like on their SSN and started series production, there's photographic evidence of a third sub on top of those mentioned above and a possible fourth. Assuming the Chinese subs are of lower capability is just that, an assumption. The Chinese have devoted 20 years to refine the design and the sensors and there's no reason to assume they are less competent than the Russians, which have achieved near acoustical parity with their latest designs, while they have demonstrated that they are more competent in terms of maintaining and upgrading their ships. Achieving undersea superiority is a high priority for the PRC, looking at making oceans transparent, which is assessed here as very likely. This would negate, to a large measure, any marginal superiority of US SSNs in water of interest to the PRC (they would still be able to avoid detection in the larger ocean areas). Re mines, all of the systems you mention require getting close to the mined area by aerial platforms today or haven't been developed yet - so the capability remains marginal.

Enterprise was a one off for one decade and after Nimitz, there was a strong push for medium carriers (CVV) while Carter tried to veto any further nuclear carriers. It was only in the 80s when the Navy and Congress got behind the nuclear carrier and conventional carriers and it was only after at the end of the Cold War that nuclear powered carriers outnumbered conventional carrier.

That's what the USians wants to believe and it may have been true 10 years ago, but it's less supported by facts coming out of China year after year. The PRC has 2 key weaknesses right now, SSNs and mine warfare. They are addressing SSNs at twice the speed the US is producing new SSNs so they will close that gap in 10 years at most, given current trends. Mine warfare is not an issue because the US ignores it. Carrier aviation has jumped from beyond where the USSR ended (which wasn't much) to equal to France and Britain together in a decade. The next step will be equal to the US (Futon is being optimistic...) because they are already working on carrier based UAVs and F-35 equivalents, as well as airborne AEW and EW platforms. Nuclear power is not required for carriers (a point frequently forgotten) as the US only invested in nuclear carriers in the 80s. The US has allies now, but it's working hard at alienating them, while the PRC is creating relationships with less savory regimes or countries that are now happy to part away with the West, plus they don't intend on becoming a global power. They don't need to - the US has already plowed the way for them, and they gain nothing from deploying to the Med, for example, a staple of USN deployments since 1945, so they just need to focus on the Indo-Pacific. The previous challengers for world naval power were hampered by being continental powers that primarily needed a substantial army (Germany, USSR) and/or had an economy that was a fraction of that of its rivals (Japan, Germany). For China, the first is no longer the case, thanks to Russia's bumbling, and they are the second economy, the first in terms of naval production, so yes, in your lifetime they are going to achieve the position to challenge the US - and they don't seem to lack training and maintenance like the Soviets.

Why not? Aren't both aspiring powers in the naval arena?

In 1812 the recently born US Navy was able to fight one to one vs the war experienced Royal Navy, so where are those 300 years of experience that are needed to create a proper navy?