Italian Army Ww2

[JWB]

Laminar flow is largely a myth:

 

http://wp1113056.server-he.de/ABL/20-forschung/laminarfluegel/laminarfluegel_en.htm

[sunday]

Laminar flow is largely a myth:

 

http://wp1113056.server-he.de/ABL/20-forschung/laminarfluegel/laminarfluegel_en.htm

 

From that link:

 

One important result of the wind tunnel investigations on the original Mustang wing was its low profile drag. This lead to a comparison of the Mustang wing with wings from different German aircraft. In 1944, rather late in a war, comparative wind tunnel measurements were made with original wings of the Fw 190, He 219, He 177, Ar 234, Me 109 F, Ju 288 and Martin B-26 "Marauder". Objective of these measurements was the estimation of the profile drag for different lift coefficients. These measurements revealed a clear advantage of the Mustang wing. Compared with the ideal smooth wing (wind tunnel model), the wings of the German aircraft had up to 60% higher drag than the ideal smooth wing. This reflects the poor manufacturing standards in Germany at that time. The Mustang wing had by far the lowest profile drag that could not be explained with the laminar effect alone, but to a large extent with the very good manufacturing standards at NAA.

 

Concluding you can say that the performance of the Mustang could not be attributed to its laminar flow airfoil. It was the overall low drag design of this aircraft with clean surfaces including the careful design of the radiator that was the key of its good performance. Edgar Schmued succeeded to build an aircraft as clean as the wind tunnel model - a remarkable aircraft and a remarkable designer.

 

Even if the wing could not keep a laminar flow regime, it was clean enough to have a vastly reduced drag.

 

And that shows that engine performance is not the only reason of general aircraft performance.

[Ariete!]

The gross underperformance of Italy's armed forces in WW2, even relative to the poverty of resources is pretty glaringly apparent.
Indeed, even allowing for post-war, anti-fascist revisionism, the official history (Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito) is very clear about it.

I think the main 'systemic' reasons for such a poor performance were:

> The Fascist 'corporate' state ideology resulted in poor pre-war economic performance and then an inexplicable lack of economic coordination/mobilisation during it.

> General-grade Army officers who has experienced the sharp end of WW1's bloodbath possibly overreacted in the opposite direction.

> It did not help that Italy was allied with its centuries-old enemies (Germany/Austria) against countries which it did not deeply or convincingly despise (especiaklly ocne the US stepped in),

> The pre-war sanctions against Italy worked and Musso spent a lot of men and materiel and treasure in the 30s on dubious adventures. He was at least as bad a meddler as Hitler, in military affairs.

 

That said, the 'foreign' historiography at all levels below professional accounts is shockingly biased and inaccurate, when reporting Italian war events.

Just one example: the very susbtantial (and virtually free of charge) contribution to the Spanish Civil War is generally dismissed by the defeat at Guadalajara. You can read through long accounts of that conflict in which the Italian corps is breezily dismissed and yet.. somehow, features prominently in many key Nationalists offensives.

[Ken Estes]

Guadalajara is a fine example of exaggeration and bias against the Italians.

 

Discerning what actually happened on the battlefield remained a major obstacle to “learning lessons.” The actions fought during the Battle of Guadalajara on March 8-22, 1937 serve well to illustrate the problem. The Republican claims of having routed the CTV armor were much repeated in the world press and among foreign observers not present at this largely improvised battle. The French army decided that the apparent rout of the Italian corps’ advance by the Republican Center Army confirmed ex vivo the correctness of French doctrine. The French presumed that psychological factors had predominated, favoring the International Brigades and discrediting the CTV troops. They saw a failure by the Italians to exploit surprise, to maintain contact and to provide security against air and ground counterattack. The weather confined the vehicles to roads, later exposing their green crews to air attack and of course the Russian T-26s outclassed the light CV-33 tankettes.

The attack by the CTV was planned as only a limited push, in the direction of Alcalá de Henares, in order to give Franco’s stalled forces on the Jarama Front a chance to resume their advance, effecting a juncture at Alcalá and completing the isolation of Madrid. General Mario Roatta’s forces never planned more than this and his mechanized forces did not advance beyond the initial infantry movements, because of the unusually inadequate roads and the bad weather. When the Nationalists did not advance from their Jarama positions and the Republican Central Army reinforced against the Italians, any notion of an offensive evaporated as the Republicans then outnumbered the Italians both on the ground and in the air. An orderly withdrawal resulted in the loss of a few advanced guns, but no mounted troops or tanks were threatened by the eventual air attacks and the Italians retained about a third of the territory they had initially seized. Republican tank attacks were fought off with artillery pieces placed forward with the infantry and Italian infantry had no problem evading the T-26s as they were not accompanied by Republican infantry.

 

Later, with more men and armament, the Nationalists overcame resistance in Aragon and reached the Mediterranean coast in April, 1938, splitting the Republic. Barcelona fell in January, 1939. Among several columns approaching the city was the Italian CTV, at last capable of employing the Italian guerra clere doctrine of advancing armoured car detachments to open gaps in the opposition, through which the light tanks, motorized infantry and artillery poured into the enemy interior. This had worked in the CTV’s initial engagement in the Málaga Campaign, where weak Republican militia (12,000 troops deployed on a 175 mile front) had collapsed before the Italian columns. But later setbacks and the Franco politics of keeping the CTV away from key roles in the war all tended to downplay the CTV capabilities. The CTV spearheads operating in Cataluña during December 1938-February 1939 produced the closest approach to Blitzkieg seen in the Spanish Civil War, but this proved of no interest to the observers. The Italian Army continued with its mobile tactics, but their industry could not deliver the materiel to match the doctrine during the next war.

Edited November 8, 2014 by Ken Estes

[Rick]

Will have to repeat a question as I lost some document files when my computer crashed. Did Italy have the ability to

realistically capture Malta using only its own capabilities? Would it have mattered?

[Ken Estes]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Herkules

 

Pretty much tells the story, except that it was proposed by the Italians much earlier. The Italians had the ground forces assembled, but required German paras along with their own Folgore Rgt, the Germans would have had to provide an honest fuel ration for the Italian Navy and Rommel would have had to cool his jets while this operation was executed, as priority of logistics and air support, among others would have gone to that operation.

 

It is a clear example of the liability of being an ally of Germany, especially when you are right and the Germans wrong.

 

Fortuna Favet Fortibus. Except when it doesn't!

Edited November 9, 2014 by Ken Estes

[sunday]

Guadalajara is a fine example of exaggeration and bias against the Italians.

 

Discerning what actually happened on the battlefield remained a major obstacle to “learning lessons.” The actions fought during the Battle of Guadalajara on March 8-22, 1937 serve well to illustrate the problem. The Republican claims of having routed the CTV armor were much repeated in the world press and among foreign observers not present at this largely improvised battle. The French army decided that the apparent rout of the Italian corps’ advance by the Republican Center Army confirmed ex vivo the correctness of French doctrine. The French presumed that psychological factors had predominated, favoring the International Brigades and discrediting the CTV troops. They saw a failure by the Italians to exploit surprise, to maintain contact and to provide security against air and ground counterattack. The weather confined the vehicles to roads, later exposing their green crews to air attack and of course the Russian T-26s outclassed the light CV-33 tankettes.

The attack by the CTV was planned as only a limited push, in the direction of Alcalá de Henares, in order to give Franco’s stalled forces on the Jarama Front a chance to resume their advance, effecting a juncture at Alcalá and completing the isolation of Madrid. General Mario Roatta’s forces never planned more than this and his mechanized forces did not advance beyond the initial infantry movements, because of the unusually inadequate roads and the bad weather. When the Nationalists did not advance from their Jarama positions and the Republican Central Army reinforced against the Italians, any notion of an offensive evaporated as the Republicans then outnumbered the Italians both on the ground and in the air. An orderly withdrawal resulted in the loss of a few advanced guns, but no mounted troops or tanks were threatened by the eventual air attacks and the Italians retained about a third of the territory they had initially seized. Republican tank attacks were fought off with artillery pieces placed forward with the infantry and Italian infantry had no problem evading the T-26s as they were not accompanied by Republican infantry.

 

Later, with more men and armament, the Nationalists overcame resistance in Aragon and reached the Mediterranean coast in April, 1938, splitting the Republic. Barcelona fell in January, 1939. Among several columns approaching the city was the Italian CTV, at last capable of employing the Italian guerra clere doctrine of advancing armoured car detachments to open gaps in the opposition, through which the light tanks, motorized infantry and artillery poured into the enemy interior. This had worked in the CTV’s initial engagement in the Málaga Campaign, where weak Republican militia (12,000 troops deployed on a 175 mile front) had collapsed before the Italian columns. But later setbacks and the Franco politics of keeping the CTV away from key roles in the war all tended to downplay the CTV capabilities. The CTV spearheads operating in Cataluña during December 1938-February 1939 produced the closest approach to Blitzkieg seen in the Spanish Civil War, but this proved of no interest to the observers. The Italian Army continued with its mobile tactics, but their industry could not deliver the materiel to match the doctrine during the next war.

 

Agree. There was also the Italian contribution in the North Front, when the Basques decided it was less dishonourable to surrender to the Italians, thus causing the "Treason of Santoña". But that was more of a political move than a military one.

Edited November 9, 2014 by sunday

[RETAC21]

Everyone forgets Malaga which led to Guadalajara. The CTV needed to reshuffle its commanders before it became truly effective, but lets not forget that the Nationalists generals remained unimpressed by the Italian land force through the war (even though Franco valued their artillery and air force). The Italian navy showing was quite poor too and should have lead to a reappraisal of the role of their submarines, but didn't.

[Yama]

 

Will have to repeat a question as I lost some document files when my computer crashed. Did Italy have the ability to

realistically capture Malta using only its own capabilities? Would it have mattered?

 

 

I believe Herkules would have worked - however, by that point Italian fleet fuel shortages were extreme. Germans had to pony up huge amounts of fuel for the operation. Since by that time Malta had become essentially harmless, it was just not seen as worth of the effort and risk. Possession of Malta would not have changed the eventual outcome of the NA war, however it may have not ended in such a disaster if the Axis had Malta. Large scale evacuations may have been possible.

 

Interesting question is, would the RN have intervened? ULTRA would have probably kept them somewhat informed. I don't remember if the Mediterranean fleet had any battleships operational at that point, but AFAIK, Nelson, Rodney, Malaya and maybe one of the KGV's were at Gibraltar at the time, maybe other capital ships and carriers as well.

[firefly1]

 

 

............... Since by that time Malta had become essentially harmless, it was just not seen as worth of the effort and risk. ..........

 

.

 

Just where did you get that from ?

 

Just the recon flights and submarines meant that Malta was worth the effort of keeping it.

 

AND, any idea of letting Malta fall into Axis hands would have meant that the RN would face a Mediterranean essentially divided in two by a wall of Axis bases.

 

.

[Colin]

Important for the Brits, but by late 42 the Axis were more interested in hanging on to what they had, then expanding.

[Ken Estes]

I think the capture of Malta, even in 1942, could have changed the situation greatly, enabling the Axis to fight an economy of force campaign in NA instead of in central Italy, thus keeping a shaky but significant Axis partner in the fight. Of course, the megalomaniacal drive on Cairo by you-know-who would have upset the balance regardless, even if the Central Med were no longer in contention.

[mnm]

But how important was Malta in preventing the Axis reinforcement of Tunisia after Torch? And now that we are at it what about a hypothetical early invasion of Sardinia in the same timeframe or right after Torch? Threatened or real, wouldn't that weaken the reinforcement of North Africa, besides immediately threatening Italy's shore?

[Andreas]

Well since Sardinia is about nowhere near the reinforcement routes, geographically speaking, I seriously doubt it would have any impact whatsoever.

 

All the best

 

Andreas

[JWB]

But how important was Malta in preventing the Axis reinforcement of Tunisia after Torch? And now that we are at it what about a hypothetical early invasion of Sardinia in the same timeframe or right after Torch? Threatened or real, wouldn't that weaken the reinforcement of North Africa, besides immediately threatening Italy's shore?

That would only work if Corsica was taken also. Sardinia is out in the middle of nowhere a long distance from the "Leg". Corsica points at and threatens the "groin".

[Colin Williams]

The gross underperformance of Italy's armed forces in WW2, even relative to the poverty of resources is pretty glaringly apparent.

Indeed, even allowing for post-war, anti-fascist revisionism, the official history (Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito) is very clear about it.

I think the main 'systemic' reasons for such a poor performance were:

> The Fascist 'corporate' state ideology resulted in poor pre-war economic performance and then an inexplicable lack of economic coordination/mobilisation during it.

> General-grade Army officers who has experienced the sharp end of WW1's bloodbath possibly overreacted in the opposite direction.

> It did not help that Italy was allied with its centuries-old enemies (Germany/Austria) against countries which it did not deeply or convincingly despise (especiaklly ocne the US stepped in),

> The pre-war sanctions against Italy worked and Musso spent a lot of men and materiel and treasure in the 30s on dubious adventures. He was at least as bad a meddler as Hitler, in military affairs.

 

That said, the 'foreign' historiography at all levels below professional accounts is shockingly biased and inaccurate, when reporting Italian war events.

Just one example: the very susbtantial (and virtually free of charge) contribution to the Spanish Civil War is generally dismissed by the defeat at Guadalajara. You can read through long accounts of that conflict in which the Italian corps is breezily dismissed and yet.. somehow, features prominently in many key Nationalists offensives.

 

 

It's also true that Italian industry was simply not up to supporting simultaneous land, air, and naval warfare against first class opponents. Of the four major combatants who had to take on this task, only the United States was really up to it, although the British Commonwealth certainly outperformed both the Italians and the Japanese in the role, even accounting for the substantial support from Lend-Lease. The Italian Army seems to have come in third place in the quality/quantity of weaponry compared to the Navy and Air Force. It's particularly noteworthy that both the British and the Germans agreed that the Italian armored forces fought reasonably well in North Africa, considering the failure of Mussolini's regime to provide them with anything like up-to-date equipment. If the other armies had been saddled with the same burdens, then through 1942 the British would have been fighting with only the A10 tank and 2pdr AT gun while the Germans would have been stuck with the 37mm PzIII and AT gun. It's difficult to imagine the Afrika Korps doing much at Gazala or El Alamein under those conditions!

[mnm]

 

But how important was Malta in preventing the Axis reinforcement of Tunisia after Torch? And now that we are at it what about a hypothetical early invasion of Sardinia in the same timeframe or right after Torch? Threatened or real, wouldn't that weaken the reinforcement of North Africa, besides immediately threatening Italy's shore?

That would only work if Corsica was taken also. Sardinia is out in the middle of nowhere a long distance from the "Leg". Corsica points at and threatens the "groin".

 

 

Yes and no, I said Corsica because it wasn't Italian territory but Vichy French (not that it mattered too much) but it might have provided some hesitation (least expracted approach, etc, etc). Supply might have followed a northerly route, the sea between the Baleares and Spain proper is/was international waters and away from Sardinia and Sicily. Franco would have to be mollified, but there is no siege machine like a mule loaded with silver.

[Ken Estes]

There is no longer any Vichy controlled territory after November 1942, except a few colonial holdings. The Italians occupied a zone centered around Nice and Corsica, the Germans the rest of So. France.

[mnm]

Hit on the head by a jacknammer, but besides that trifle I'm all right