Manic Moran

Sure. And they also sent folks to each others schools, such as the US sending folks to the Kriegsakademie. The US's Experimental Mechanized Force was a direct result of a US political observing the UK's Experimental Mechanised Force. New York, 1939. COL Takatoshi Yakamura, BG Walter Short, Lt Gen Friedrich von Boetticher watching the US's maneuvers.

Finland had a similar observation. Timestamped.

I'm not at my books right now, but I'm not so sure that the 8.8 wasn't used in an AT role before Arras. Bear in mind a number of Panzerjager Abteilungs had heavy companies with (mainly towed) 8.8s and there was that one company running around somewhere with the SP 8.8. The idea of using the 8.8 in the AT role was already well cemented in German doctrine at the time. I have a vague recollection that the first 8.8cm tank kills were actually in Spain during the Civil War, though more as an ersatz mode.

On the other hand, they were sufficiently pleased with the HVSS variant of Sherman that when Marshal of the Armored Forces Bogdanov drew up his concept for the Soviet Union's new tank in 1946, he wanted the tracks from M4A2. Again, it's easy enough to pick one or two negatives and ignore the one or two positives which may counter it. An example is the comparative mobility testing by Sweden after the war: Yes, Panther was able to get over obstacles better than VVSS Sherman. We've all seen the video, and it's used as proof of Sherman's failing. However, not shown in the clips was the conclusion that a Sherman was more likely to end up at B after leaving A if for no other reason that it was able to simply bypass most obstacles (and take lighter bridges) Plus if it did get stuck, it was easier to unstick, reliability issues notwithstanding. Again, there were some things the Soviets liked about Sherman. And some areas for improvement. They did improve the tracks. How did T-34's traverse motor compare with the Sherman's Oilgear for engaging targets? Ken did indeed do a bit of M103 time.

I don't see anything saying it performed particularly poorly on the Eastern front either. If I look at the Conclusion chapter from "Sherman Tanks of the Red Army" by Samsonov, it doesn't seem unreasonable. "As with any tank, the relationship between the Red Army and M4A2 was mixed and several complaints cropped up [...] Red Army officers also noted many positive aspects of the M4A2 tanks [...] The fact that foreign-made tanks of every other type slowly retreated from the front lines to make room for the M4A2 speaks volumes about its quality [...] The Soviet system is often presented as a homogenous and uniform monolith. In reality it was anything but. The active Red Army, reach echolon organisations like GBTU, the tank industry and Soviet government each valued different aspects of an armored vehicle and had their own opinions about thanks, which were often quite distinct. The Medium Tank M4A2 was no exception[...] Red Army tank crews and proving grounds staff evaluated their tanks thoroughly. As with any tank, crews found some features to praise and some features to bemoan. Overall, the Medium Tank M4A2 played the same role as the T-34 and T-34/85 in the fight against Germany and Japan , and it played that role well". It's worth noting the similarity towards the end to the response from the Panzermuseum director when asked about the German opinion of Sherman. "It has its good points and its bad points. It is just like ours!"

I agree that he was pig-headed and often wrong, such as with T-23, but sometimes he was also pig-headed and correct. M36 would not have existed (at least, not in time for WWII) had he not insisted on the program proceeding despite both TD Branch and Engineers objecting to the thing. Further, he was correct when he said that field forces will likely only ask for things with which they are familiar. I suffered a similar issue in Afghanistan, when I needed a capability I didn't know was even possible, let alone in (secret) production. Of course, I didn't ask for the capability. Given his position as head of Army's R&D department, and the overall general level of success that the US Army had in its fielding of new materiel throughout the war I think overall he was a significant net positive to the Army.

In fairness, Barnes seems to indicate that he would have been quite happy to build the M3 Medium without a turret, but that one was demanded by Infantry Branch, supporting Rich's comment about the end users.

There are two of them, one each side. I wonder if it's a grab handle to swing the cal. .50 ring around the hatch.

Fair, though the 1944 revision of FM 18-5 did add the use of the TDs as assault guns at least as far as the anti-fortification direct fire role went in support of "assaulting units."

My recollection from his statement was that they were often preferred in the indirect fire role over the 105mm artillery pieces because they were less destructive to the roads and other terrain that the tanks were about to drive into and over. Looking at the records, in March '44, 701st TDB fired almost 10,100 rounds HE, 70 AP, 298smoke. 805th fired 11,000 HE or so. 636th TDB fired 11,982 HE rounds, 2x AP.

As far as the US was concerned, with data available in 1946, the 76mm was considered more accurate than the 90mm, but the gap was much smaller than for either to 17pr. But, yes, at typical ranges, the difference is relatively academic.

Dmitry Loza, "Commanding the Red Army's Sherman Tanks". He did like them, but the problem is it's a data point size of one. Peter Samsonov did a book about two years ago of the Soviet experiences with the M4, but he pointed out that evaluations and opinions of the tank itself are hard to come by: All you can do is see how the tank performed and draw your own conclusions, with occasional high-level commentary from specific units. (Mainly the complaints were the high vertical sides making tempting targets and with the running gear).

It was semi-indirect using HE from the 3" guns.

I have not seen an assessment of engagement ranges for the US 75mm in North Africa, but I suspect they are somewhat longer as well. For the record, the longest ranged tank kill I'm tracking in the war is claimed by C/805 TDB in Italy, two tanks at 12,500m.

So the lads in Detroit are obviously keeping an eye on what Ukraine is doing, and to quote one person, most of what the Ukrainians are doing to the M1 counts as emotional support modifications which either are not particularly beneficial, or have no positive effect whatsoever. They've even started pulling the track pads off on the assumption that they will get more grip.