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Mighty_Zuk

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  1. I recently connected a few dots, I wonder if they really connect, and maybe a few questions along the way. So there was the anti-KE thread I opened a while back with a Rafael solution. The pics: 1. 4 plates on a mount, with some sealing on the side. 2. Only 2 plates on a mount, seemingly no sealing, very minor damage to the module. 3. The 4 plate module, with the sealing and 2 shots in, mostly intact but there is serious deformation leaving gaps. 4. The 4 plate module before impact, showing the side sealing design is true to the simulations. Now let's look at the armor of the Merkava 4A, i.e the old variant: I assume the slots are for a controlled release of energy to prevent excess deformation of the armor and to, sort of, create a desired balance between per-shot performance, and multi-shot capability. If so, and correct me if I'm wrong, this seems like the Merkava 4A's armor is highly volatile (perhaps not necessarily ERA but some NxRA), albeit meant to release lower amounts of energy judging by the slots. In this pic from 2006 we see a Merkava 4A with first generation of armor, showing significant armor deformation after taking hits. Then, a few years later, IDF officials said they were working on a new and improved armor that would reduce post-shot vulnerabilities, or in other words just increase multi-shot capability. Said armor was implemented in the Merkava 4B around 2011-2012, and was continued with the Mark 4M. In these pics, however, we see no slots: Could it be that the energy is just vented in some other more elegant way? Or perhaps increased structural integrity to allow plates be maximally volatile? In one ground warfare conference, several officials, including very high ranking ones, strangely specified not the need for high protection as they generally do, but specifically referred to "continuous semi-reactive armor", possibly referring to Rafael's innovations in NxRA which is claimed to get out of the curve of previous types of armor like NERA, ERA, and SLERA. So, is it possible that like many previous Rafael products (first become operational and then advertise), some form of the Rafael 'Armor Shield KE' / ASPRO-KE has already been installed on Merkava tanks? How likely is it, given the above photos?
  2. Previously scheduled for 2027 but all ground vehicle programs got a 2 year delay due to government dysfunction and lack of state budget. Some of the Carmel technologies will appear on existing combat vehicles though.
  3. That's $1 militants for you. Hezbollah's got quality fighters it's holding back - plenty of cannon fodder for this "less important fight". Anyway, with almost nothing to lose, Lebanon's only way out of this sectarian and religious mess is a civil war. Am I smelling a 2nd shot at a South Lebanon Army?
  4. I also live in a non-muslim country in the middle east, albeit thankfully not Armenia. And it's hard to comprehend for me as well.
  5. Nope, but IOC in 2029. Expect a prototype about 4-5 years before that.
  6. The engine can be accessed in 2 ways. First, by lifting the smaller plate in the front, it gives a limited access to the powerpack. It can be opened by hand. Second, by lifting that plate and also a much larger plate behind it. This one requires a crane. I have never heard of any damage-induced difficulty in opening either. On the Merkava 3 and 4, the only remaining models in service, some turret armor needs to be removed to access the larger plate.
  7. IAI selected as prime contractor for Carmel program of the IDF. Demonstration will proceed on the Eitan.
  8. It's still a TOW, can't escape it. There's only so much you can squeeze from such systems.
  9. Maybe a concept of short range operations? It already has modern SAMs to keep its forces protected.
  10. Estonia becomes 2nd buyer of Gabriel-based missile after Finland: https://www.iai.co.il/estonia-awards-contract-to-proteus-for-blue-spear This missile is marketed by multiple entities. The Estonian program acquires the Blue Spear, offered by IAI and ST Engineering, while another derivative is currently offered to the UK, called Sea Serpent and offered by IAI and Thales. It is rumored Israel and Singapore are already using this missile in some variants, making the possible number of distinct variants anywhere from 3 to 5.
  11. Give me one western country that aided Syria and Iran for the sake of these countries and not itself, that isn't an enemy of the west.
  12. Nothing. In my comment I have clearly said it fought all these groups either independently (i.e not in assistance to Syria or Iran), or in assistance to allies (i.e not in assistance to Syria or Iran). If anything, in some of ISIS' areas of control Israel had an interest in Iran and Syria spending resources. They were only a threat in the Golan, Europe, Sinai, Gaza, and West Bank - numerous regions where they had little presence. It's not suspicious. You're just being an idiot.
  13. That is the most likely reason. Iran knows Israel's preparations for an attack are candid, and its previous operations in Iran, including yesterday's, are both successful and significant. This alone allows Israel to go a long way with its threats to attack - they are not empty. Relevant forces are actually making preparations and exercising based on already crafted and ever changing plans. It keeps Iran on edge.
  14. Yes. Israel has fought against these groups both independently and in support of allies, including the US, and also Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and UAE.
  15. And now back on topic. Beyond the ideas presented here about why Iran is doing what it's doing, and some arguments it may not go far with its threats, it's worth mentioning Iran is fairly over-extended by now. Because of its financial troubles, it maintains an armed force that is very polar in its capabilities. On one hand, its fighting units are light in nature - relying largely on infantry with light, mobile, cheap, and attritable weaponry and systems. They make no notable use of MBTs, heavy artillery, or employ combined arms tactics involving aviation. Their tactical assets are typically light artillery and recently the use of drones of various types. On the other hand, they invest greatly in surface-level strategic capabilities for the theater and regional level, including SRBMs to attempts at ICBMs (space programs), long range cruise missiles and suicide drones. Rather than invest in deepening their existing strategic capabilities, they invest in creating more surface level capabilities to match emerging global trends. It currently needs to supply allies like Hezbollah in Lebanon, Syria, the Houthis in Yemen, and allies in Africa. The most self reliant, Hezbollah, still does not produce a large enough share of its strategic weapons at home and requires deliveries of essential components from its sponsor. Despite the switch to delivery of components rather than complete system, there is overall a struggle to both arm allies and remain properly stocked. Iran must maintain readiness to fight a sufficiently protracted war against Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE at the very least. Yet its existing stock of strategic munitions is only sufficient to make potshots at strategic sites like the Aramco oil facilities. In any shooting war with either of its enemies, Iran will be unable to commit to more than a daily dripping of munitions at its enemies, or very few critically draining mass attacks. Even if we assume 0 attrition to enemy missile-hunting efforts. Should there be any conflict with Azerbaijan, which would be highly unlikely for reasons stated above, Iran will be largely unable to commit any of its strategic assets to the fight, and would have to pit its lightly armed ground forces against the much more advanced, diversified, and better controlled Azerbaijani armed forces. This does not bode well for Iranian deterrence, further hollowed by empty threats which show a sign of weakness.
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