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RichTO90

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  1. Nope. In the aftermath of the sudden French collapse, the four non-Welle divisions forming from Landesschützen, nine divisions of the 9. Welle forming from Landesschützen, and the nine divisions forming from Ersatztruppen were cancelled. The major reorganization was in the fall and winter of 1940-1941. A large number of reservists were furloughed to industry and then were re-inducted in the spring. The German "flow of replacements" did not get "gradually bigger and bigger", it got smaller and smaller. The replacement problem was critical before BARBAROSSA began. As of 1 June 1941, the rep
  2. True. Not true. 😁 The notion the Nazis didn't believe in mass production isn't supportable, given the amount of support that Ford, GM, and Esso, among others, pumped into Nazi Germany's industrial expansion in the 1930s. The aircraft industry and motor vehicle industry were both designed for mass production, although heavy industry continued to rely heavily on traditional station production, but that was essentially true in every major nation. What the Germans did have was major production bottlenecks, where the lack of true mass production had an effect. One was in the produ
  3. Given that the Heer already was over 180 divisions before the decision to invade the USSR its unlikely to reduce. Furthermore, given that over 7-million forced laborers were incorporated into the Reich and the Heer at peak was 1 July 1943 at 10,133,898 it is unlikely it can be shrunk enough to solve the labor problem and simultaneously defend the land borders of the Reich.
  4. Sorry, but no, the Germans did not "change how it run its economy to invade Russia". It changed its government contracting policy after the invasion, but government contracting is only a small part of the overall economy. The economy was more effected by prewar economic decisions than anything done during wartime. Labor was needed in Germany full stop, not just for the army. It just happened that the largest part of the Wehrmacht was the Heer. The first problem was overmobilization and non-selective manpower mobilization in the first year of the war, which resulted in the large-scale "lab
  5. Yes, very good, thanks, but realize "increased productivity" in both general industry and specifically in the war industry had many causes, not just the contract changes or the "rationalization" by Speer? Among other things, the expansion of industry, especially the aircraft and armored vehicle industry, was also a product of investment both prewar - such as Nibelungerwerk - and in the early war years. Additionally, the input of more workers affected output. Nor does any of this have to do with "going to a total war economy". Indeed, but the Germans initially made limited use of t
  6. Why? Why not the U-Boot program? Why not the KM surface program? Why not the LW? Meanwhile, most of the small boat building capacity of Western Europe, Italy, and the Danube got involved in the MFP program...and still delays were endemic. Nor is there any real reason given - still - why there is "no Americans". I suspect you know better, having been corrected on this over and over again. Gibraltar requires Spain and there is little chance of Franco coming in. Marseilles and Toulon are great if you want a German buildup in Tunisia...why not Casablanca, Benghazi, and Oran while
  7. For those interested in reality; as late as June 1942, of the 271 RAF squadrons, 180 were based in the UK and Iceland, 48 in the Middle East, 11 in Malta, Gibraltar, and West Africa, and 32 in the Far East.
  8. You elevate the straw man argument to a new level. We've been through this ad nauseum. No, "increasing production of fast production types" is delusional. The average construction time for MFPs was not "fast". The Siebel has its own limitations. The K-Schiff program never got off the ground. Toulon and Marseilles do not help with Tripoli and Benghazi, nor is it likely the French will cooperate unless the Germans occupy Vichy. It also does not help with lack of shipping and lack of escorts. The Luftwaffe's record versus subs was not to good. Huh? Who is "Stuart"?
  9. No, he wasn't. That overstates the case. Halder eventually was in charge of the German Section of the Historical Division USAEUR. He was able to "sanitize" much of the histories written by former German officers, but mainly from the 1948-1954 time frame. The early works were unsupervised and were essentially interrogations.
  10. 😁 Nobody needs Spain, we have MFPs, unlimited supplies of aviation fuel from the USSR, and an invincible military that can walk on water! Evidently not, the desire to repetitively post misinformation is too strong with some.
  11. The first step to what? German and Italian fortunes in North Africa are unlikely to change with or without Malta in British hands. It increased losses to German and Italian shipping in route to North Africa, but had little to do with the starting lack of adequate shipping, escorts, and ports. Sure, they can build MFPs, but why is the Italian Navy "better supplied"? Better supplied with what? Why is the RAF absent from Britain? Did someone forget to leave the lights on? Oh, right, Spain again. The Germans do not "have Spain". They either have to acquire it as
  12. The Wiki is incorrect...go figure. It was not 58% of "high octane" that was shipped via Lend-Lease, it was 58% of the Soviet aviation fuels and 100% of the Soviet 100/130 octane aviation gasoline. The Soviets, like the Germans, had no catalytic cracking refineries and could not produce a 100-octane aviation gasoline domestically. Prior to the signing of the First Protocol in Moscow on 7 October 1941, between 22 June and 30 September 1941, the U.S. shipped on a cash basis 156,335 short tons of aviation gasoline to the USSR, of which 25,185 short tons were 100 octane, 130,729 tons were 87-9
  13. Um, the Germans did not march up Whitehall in 1940 and were not going to march up Whitehall in 1940, 1941, 1942... Continued German and American provocations in the Atlantic are unlikely to lead to anything other than war, regardless of what America First wants. It's also the same moment pf greatest danger for the USSR. The Winter War and Soviet threats to Romania and Hungary infuriated Hitler and more than likely affected his final decision for BARBAROSSA.
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