Possible US / China War

[Josh]

4 hours ago, glenn239 said:

This article,

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/09/26/world/asia/china-fishing-south-america.html

Indicates that the 'deep water' fishing fleet capable of reaching the Americas and operating is about 3,000 ships strong.   The smaller ones presumably have to keep closer to China, but there will be plenty that can sail out to DF-21 and DF-26 ranges.

Ok. But that is a lot less than 500,000 and I still question: what happens if the U.S. just shoots at them? A lot of these arguments about overturning the current laws of the sea seem very focused on the country that made those rules following them in the face of something overturning them. Why would the U.S. enforce freedom of navigation in the face of something else actively fighting it, and who would stop them?

 

if the USN just decided to murder any ship it wants to, who else rules the ocean such that the decision can be contested? If the USN executed every fishing vessel on site, who exactly will hold them accountable in a global war between two powers with a UN veto when the USN is the only power that could possibly make international trade work?

[Josh]

4 hours ago, glenn239 said:

This article,

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/09/26/world/asia/china-fishing-south-america.html

Indicates that the 'deep water' fishing fleet capable of reaching the Americas and operating is about 3,000 ships strong.   The smaller ones presumably have to keep closer to China, but there will be plenty that can sail out to DF-21 and DF-26 ranges.

Ok, but they literally will be slaughtered. Any Burke can just use 5” fire, or literally any SAM. Any ASW aircraft can just pop a couple coming or going. Over a long enough war, there is going to be a lot less of them.

Also you are assuming they have navigation and communication…so US GPS doesn’t work but a fishing boat’s does?

[Josh]

22 hours ago, glenn239 said:

Surface ships are not as good at ASW as submarines are, so it is fairly common for navies to use submarines to protect surface forces from hostile submarines.  Back in Syria in 2018, the Russians had deployed surface forces, and they had Kilo Class submarines protecting them,

https://www.businessinsider.com/uk-submarine-russia-tracked-before-syria-strikes-2018-4

The USN does the same thing.  Here,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carrier_strike_group

 Each of the Navy's 12 existing carrier battle groups consisted of an aircraft carrier; an embarked carrier air wing; cruisers, destroyer, and frigate units; and two nuclear-powered attack submarines.

Two SSN's per carrier sounds plausible, one for each hemisphere.   

Also, in addition to the carriers, the USN will be needing to escort convoys to Japan and places like Guam.  These too will require SSN escorts, to supplement surface forces.

Yeah, but the PLAN has literally a half dozen boats that could range the US coast, and they have to cross a choke point of sensors across the first island chain every time they do so.

IMO, if the PLAN wants to send its boats to the U.S. coast that is a win.

Edited February 24 by Josh

[Perun]

U.S. general warns troops that war with China is possible in two years

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/01/27/us-general-minihan-china-war-2025/

and

Why is a U.S. general predicting war with China by 2025?

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/01/30/why-us-china-war-2025/

[RETAC21]

9 hours ago, glenn239 said:

Surface ships are not as good at ASW as submarines are, so it is fairly common for navies to use submarines to protect surface forces from hostile submarines.  Back in Syria in 2018, the Russians had deployed surface forces, and they had Kilo Class submarines protecting them,

https://www.businessinsider.com/uk-submarine-russia-tracked-before-syria-strikes-2018-4

The USN does the same thing.  Here,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carrier_strike_group

 Each of the Navy's 12 existing carrier battle groups consisted of an aircraft carrier; an embarked carrier air wing; cruisers, destroyer, and frigate units; and two nuclear-powered attack submarines.

Two SSN's per carrier sounds plausible, one for each hemisphere.   

Also, in addition to the carriers, the USN will be needing to escort convoys to Japan and places like Guam.  These too will require SSN escorts, to supplement surface forces.

Again you are making shit up, and quoting wikipedia to make up for your BS numbers? 

No, it's not "common" for navies to use submarines to protect surface forces from submarines, in fact, quite the contrary, for several reasons:

1) Most navies only have SSKs that cannot keep up with a surface group, and they have better things to do than try to keep up.

2) As already shown battlegroup operations are the exception, so I dare you to go to DANFS: https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs.html and find a single case where a battlegroup has had 2 SSNs in attendace.

3) Never, ever have SSNs been used for convoy escort, anywhere. it's not even in their mission statement. Why? because it's pointless.

4) You are ASSuming that, because there's a submarine, it must be tied to a surface group. But then if you apply your logic to your fantasy across the board, suddenly the Chinese-Russian threat drops to... zero. Why? they have far more surface forces than submarines, so try assigning 2 SSNs to each of the 3 carrier groups, plus the amphibs, plus the SAGs and that leaves none to do anything else.

 

[RETAC21]

9 hours ago, glenn239 said:

The USN says this, 

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/march/promise-better-submarine-air-independent-propulsion

In the ideal world, then, a modern 1,800-ton conventional AIP submarine could carry up to 3 metric tons of hydrogen for the cost of 216 metric tons of metal hydrates, to which must be added 48 tons of liquid oxygen—some 290 tons in total for the hydrogen and oxygen cryogenic containers. In essence, we have a maximum of 70,000 kilowatt hours (kWh) for three weeks’ patrolling, or 504 hours at 4 knots with a hotel load of less than 100 kW.

And,

It is time again for modern navies to complement their submarine forces with non-nuclear-powered submarines. They are more affordable, and this new AIP technology can give them an underwater endurance of 10,000 nm at 10 knots—without a single hour of snorting.

So the 1st gen AIP systems on an 1,800 ton sub give about 2,000nm at 4kt.  But that's older technology, and the Yuan Class is 3,600 tons, not 1,800 tons.  They've built them bigger, no doubt increasing their range.  The newer AIP systems are much longer range, and I don't think we'll have any way to tell just how far the Yuans can go, but I can say this - they're not building them at 3,600 tons because they're coastal boats.

Typical, you haven't either:

- Read the article

- Know what AIP the Chinese use

The article refers to fuel cells and closed cycle diesels, which the Chinese don't use. They use Stirling engines. 

"It is understood from the table that the fuel cell has the maximum total weighted coefficient and emerges as the best solution amongst other AIP systems. Though Stirling engines have been installed onboard conventional boats and have performed consistently over the years, the technology however has reached its maturity and has very minimal scope for extraordinary improvement unlike the case of fuel cell AIP system"

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/296529342_China_develops_Stirling_AIP_technology_for_submarines

https://www.drdo.gov.in/drdo/sites/default/files/inline-files/13678-Article Text-48810-1-10-20200210.pdf

Of note, the Japanese have moved away from the Stirling engine to lithium-ion batteries in their latest subs.

[RETAC21]

5 hours ago, Josh said:

Ok, but they literally will be slaughtered. Any Burke can just use 5” fire, or literally any SAM. Any ASW aircraft can just pop a couple coming or going. Over a long enough war, there is going to be a lot less of them.

Also you are assuming they have navigation and communication…so US GPS doesn’t work but a fishing boat’s does?

Even Coast Guard cutters will work against these "picket boats". In WW2 the USN used submarine deck guns against the equivalent Japanese pickets.

On top of that, given the need to communicate, they are a source of intelligence if captured.

[Josh]

12 hours ago, Perun said:

U.S. general warns troops that war with China is possible in two years

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/01/27/us-general-minihan-china-war-2025/

and

Why is a U.S. general predicting war with China by 2025?

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/01/30/why-us-china-war-2025/

IMO, China’s best window is basically now through 2027. I think US anti access weapons programs make their position harder there after and problematic after 2030.

[Josh]

22 hours ago, glenn239 said:

The USN says this, 

https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/march/promise-better-submarine-air-independent-propulsion

In the ideal world, then, a modern 1,800-ton conventional AIP submarine could carry up to 3 metric tons of hydrogen for the cost of 216 metric tons of metal hydrates, to which must be added 48 tons of liquid oxygen—some 290 tons in total for the hydrogen and oxygen cryogenic containers. In essence, we have a maximum of 70,000 kilowatt hours (kWh) for three weeks’ patrolling, or 504 hours at 4 knots with a hotel load of less than 100 kW.

And,

It is time again for modern navies to complement their submarine forces with non-nuclear-powered submarines. They are more affordable, and this new AIP technology can give them an underwater endurance of 10,000 nm at 10 knots—without a single hour of snorting.

So the 1st gen AIP systems on an 1,800 ton sub give about 2,000nm at 4kt.  But that's older technology, and the Yuan Class is 3,600 tons, not 1,800 tons.  They've built them bigger, no doubt increasing their range.  The newer AIP systems are much longer range, and I don't think we'll have any way to tell just how far the Yuans can go, but I can say this - they're not building them at 3,600 tons because they're coastal boats.

Even assuming that China can improve on those numbers, the speed limits still apply. If they want to get to 1000nm, they are going to do so slowly. And they are going to return slowly. And to maintain a consistent screen over a long time, they are going to have to stagger deployments heavily, cutting into their numbers.

[Josh]

On 2/23/2024 at 7:45 PM, glenn239 said:

Insufficient information.   Worst case scenario is that the missiles are beyond the design limits of the ships and cannot be effectively intercepted at all.  Best case scenario would be the opposite.  DF series missiles appear to have one warhead.  If so, then this would suggest the Chinese expect them to be able to get through the defenses to their targets.  Otherwise, they'd provide more mirvs per missile?

I assume the Chinese have as many MARVs as they can per booster. I do not know what that number is. It might be one, it might’ve a few.

 

On 2/23/2024 at 7:45 PM, glenn239 said:

I think if the US is looking to blockade China, they need to reckon with a very serious international situation in which dozens of countries are picking sides, and many will not pick the USA.  In terms of overseas deployments, once the coastal forces have enough DF-26's for home defense, there would be no reason at all that surplus forces won't be trained for out-of-country deployments.  China will eventually have allies that will need and demand DF-26's to protect them from US carrier strikes, right?

I think most countries will sit and wait. The U.S. could lose a war with China and still control most of the sea lanes anyway. I can’t imagine anyone wanting to jump on that grenade.

 

On 2/23/2024 at 7:45 PM, glenn239 said:

HIMARS in Ukraine are being hunted by Russian drones and satellites all the time, and they operate at ranges far closer to the front than would DF-26's.  I think finding these things would be needle in a haystack, but the deployment zone would have to friendly to China.

comparing the USAF to the VKS or a 6 axle <10,000lb truck to a ten axle 50,000 lbs missile is absurd.

 

On 2/23/2024 at 7:45 PM, glenn239 said:

In terms of cost, a Kinzhal is quoted at about $10 million for a 4,300kg round.  So if we x5 for the weight of the DF-26, we get $50 million each.  A Ford costs 13 billion, call it 20 billion with the planes and such - for twenty billion the Chinese can get maybe about 400 DF-26 missiles.  Would it take 400 to eliminate the carrier BG?  Seems unlikely.  Would it take as few as 20?

goal post moving. I suspect the Chinese can keep US carriers at a long distance with their DF26. I do not expect them to have so many they can seed the world with them. I also find your Iskander cost comparison stupid: DF-26 is a lot closer to a minuteman 3 ICBM than it is to a TBM.

 

On 2/23/2024 at 7:45 PM, glenn239 said:

I think the scenario is extraordinarily dangerous to the USN and the future of the US as a power capable of power projection on a global scale and that at all costs and under almost any conceivable circumstances, the USN must not be placed in a position to find out.  Taiwanese politicians should take notice of this to understand that when American politicians are lying to them, they need to know that the actual extent of support will be less than what might be being whispered.

I think the U.S. would struggle to sustain Taiwan if China arbitrarily destroyed any neutral ship that supplies Taiwan. I think China would find itself under a huge amount of pressure if the U.S. countered that move by destroying any ship that supplies China.

 

that said, the U.S. ability to kill DF-26s where they live is marginal at best, until new platforms and weapons come online. IMO if China is really willing to destroy its political capital and economy to fight for Taiwan, its best window is now until 2028 ish. After that, things get harder, imo.

[Perun]

Indonesia and Australia hold defense talks as both nations move toward signing a security agreement

https://www.stripes.com/theaters/asia_pacific/2024-02-24/indonesia-australia-defense-nations-security-agreement-13110617.html

[Perun]

Blinding the Enemy: How the PRC Prepares for Radar Countermeasures

https://jamestown.org/program/blinding-the-enemy-how-the-prc-prepares-for-radar-countermeasures/

and

https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Read-This-Issue-in-PDF.pdf

[txtree99]

 

[glenn239]

On 2/23/2024 at 11:49 PM, Josh said:

IMO, China’s best window is basically now through 2027. I think US anti access weapons programs make their position harder there after and problematic after 2030.

The Chinese appear to have no such apprehensions about the future and are acting as if the US military capacity in Asia relative to China’s is in a more or less straight line decay well beyond 2030.  

 

Quote

Even assuming that China can improve on those numbers, the speed limits still apply. If they want to get to 1000nm, they are going to do so slowly. And they are going to return slowly. And to maintain a consistent screen over a long time, they are going to have to stagger deployments heavily, cutting into their numbers.

You were giving me the impression that you thought the Chinese submarine force was essentially coastal in nature and second rate.  This is not correct for all classes, the Yuan Class in particular is excellent, is capable of distant operations, and is in mass production.  The limitations you describe about slow transit rates and time on station look to me applicable to places like Guam or Hawaii, but not where the Chinese have logistic base support, and not in many of the places where the USN will be needing to exercise a blockade.

Quote

Yeah, but the PLAN has literally a half dozen boats that could range the US coast, and they have to cross a choke point of sensors across the first island chain every time they do so.

I wasn’t picturing PLA(N) diesel boats operating there, more like in the Indian Ocean,  the China Seas, the Sea of Japan, Southeast Asia, and the Marianas.    Operations in the Americas would require PLA(N) bases in the Americas, and AFAIK they have none.
 

[glenn239]

20 hours ago, Josh said:

if the USN just decided to murder any ship it wants to, who else rules the ocean such that the decision can be contested? If the USN executed every fishing vessel on site, who exactly will hold them accountable…?

The USN can’t be inside the coverage zone of land based anti-ship missiles without being in danger of destruction at any moment.  Where-ever these batteries are deployed, the USN will have problems with access.  In terms of USN warships dealing with Chinese civilian vessels at ranges greater than this, I don’t see the need to sink without warning.

Quote

Also you are assuming they have navigation and communication…so US GPS doesn’t work but a fishing boat’s does?

We’re assuming in this discussion that no satellite navigation systems are 'down'.  So yes Josh, the fishing boat has an exact fix on the blockading warship, and a missile can be on target within minutes.  What if GPS, Glonass, and BieDou are down?  I don’t know.  

Quote

I assume the Chinese have as many MARVs as they can per booster. I do not know what that number is. It might be one, it might’ve a few.

I think the DF-21’s and 26’s have one warhead. 

Quote

think most countries will sit and wait. The U.S. could lose a war with China and still control most of the sea lanes anyway. I can’t imagine anyone wanting to jump on that grenade.

 I think maybe a half dozen or more will side with China immediately, including Russia and Iran.  I also wonder if the USN “will control” the sea lanes at the end of such a conflict.  The USN has only about 80 guided missile cruisers and destroyers and 20 big carriers, so it lacks the numbers for the job and will rapidly lose its capacity due to attrition and wear and tear.  The USN SSN force is more survivable for much longer, of course, but both sides can play the unrestricted submarine warfare game.

Quote

comparing the USAF to the VKS or a 6 axle <10,000lb truck to a ten axle 50,000 lbs missile is absurd.

The USAF can’t even handle the Houthis in Yemen, so the idea that it could take on the Chinese across four continents and a half dozen or more countries seems a stretch.  In terms of HIMARS vs a DF-26, the Russians are hunting HIMARS to a zone of maybe 80km behind a 1,000km of front.  That’s an 80,000 km^2 search area.  A DF-26 that can hide in Iran, Yemen, Russia, China, this has what, maybe 10-15 million km^2 to hide in?  That’s an area over a hundred times bigger than the Russian HIMARS hunt in Ukraine.  So the USAF problem is much, much harder than Russia's in Ukraine.
 

Quote

oal post moving. I suspect the Chinese can keep US carriers at a long distance with their DF26. I do not expect them to have so many they can seed the world with them. I also find your Iskander cost comparison stupid: DF-26 is a lot closer to a minuteman 3 ICBM than it is to a TBM.

The Minuteman III is almost twice as heavy as a DF-26, I googled the cost of at $7 million each, (probably a decades old price).  The DF-26, I think they will mass produce in large numbers, along with plenty of other systems, in order to deter the US from even considering a war with China over Taiwan.
 

 

[glenn239]

On 2/24/2024 at 5:06 AM, RETAC21 said:

No, it's not "common" for navies to use submarines to protect surface forces from submarines, in fact, quite the contrary, for several reasons:

Unless the USN plan is to park its surface forces and give up on protecting its own global logistics network, the USN will use a large slice of its SSN force for fleet and for convoy protection.  These are big jobs, and SSN’s would be integral to the ASW forces protecting the surface ships performing these tasks.  Many of the rest of the boats will be going after the Chinese and Russian navies, or be in routine maintenance.

Quote

Typical, you haven't either:
- Read the article
- Know what AIP the Chinese use <Stirling Engines>

It’s clear that (1) the Chinese have used traditional AIP in their Yuans and (2) that Chinese submarine design is in a rapid state of evolution and that AIP technology is a high-priority program.  When I wrote,

So the 1st gen AIP systems on an 1,800 ton sub give about 2,000nm at 4kt.  But that's older technology, and the Yuan Class is 3,600 tons, not 1,800 tons

I mean that a3,600 ton submarine should be able to go further on its AIP system than an 1,800 ton submarine, even if the same technology, because it’s a bigger boat and (b); the newest Chinese submarines might not be using the older AIP technology. 

Quote

  Of note, the Japanese have moved away from the Stirling engine to lithium-ion batteries in their latest subs.

No shit sherlock, and the Chinese are doing the same thing,

https://asiatimes.com/2023/11/chinas-new-stealth-sub-built-for-a-taiwan-blockade/

The People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) has been trying to replace traditional lead-acid batteries with lithium-ion ones for over a decade but apparently hesitated due to thermal runaway and fire risks.

However, recent advancements such as using low-cost, readily available iron and phosphate can replace the usual but dangerous nickel and cobalt combination while hard carbon and ceramic coating can improve the safety of battery packaging.

Once available, I assume they'll retrofit their older boats with the upgraded batteries too.

Edited February 26 by glenn239

[James1978]

On 2/21/2024 at 9:45 AM, RETAC21 said:

2) Logistic support networks for SSNs comprise food and... food. Maybe some torpedoes, and the occasional spare part. The USN has this things called Submarine tenders that enable support form any suitable bay in, I don't know, New Guinea, Australia, Christmas island...

3) The notion that "The ports have to be close to blockade positions" is also absurd, more so with 50+ SSNs to cover what, 6 straits?, maybe less. That, without counting surface ships, of course, that can also do this.

RE: Submarine Tenders - The US Navy has precisely two (2) of those left. Both are homeported in Guam. Figure one of them stays in Guam since we have a submarine squadron based there. Besides torpedoes, rearming the Tomahawk cells might be important. The other might go to the Philippines if we can get basing during an actual shooting war.

RE: 50+ SSNs - The USN has about 52 active SSN, but has a massive maintenance backlog with close to 40% of the boats non-deployable. The remaining 30ish boats have to cover not just the Pacific but also the Atlantic, Indian, and Mediterranean.

[futon]

5 hours ago, James1978 said:

RE: 50+ SSNs - The USN has about 52 active SSN, but has a massive maintenance backlog with close to 40% of the boats non-deployable. The remaining 30ish boats have to cover not just the Pacific but also the Atlantic, Indian, and Mediterranean.

米国さん、お手伝いしましょうか。

[futon]

 

[Josh]

13 hours ago, glenn239 said:

The Chinese appear to have no such apprehensions about the future and are acting as if the US military capacity in Asia relative to China’s is in a more or less straight line decay well beyond 2030.

Good. If they delay any military action until 2030 then I think they will have little hope of success.

 

13 hours ago, glenn239 said:

You were giving me the impression that you thought the Chinese submarine force was essentially coastal in nature and second rate.  This is not correct for all classes, the Yuan Class in particular is excellent, is capable of distant operations, and is in mass production.  The limitations you describe about slow transit rates and time on station look to me applicable to places like Guam or Hawaii, but not where the Chinese have logistic base support, and not in many of the places where the USN will be needing to exercise a blockade.

You used the word “coastal”, not I. I merely noted the transit times for a 1000nm journey. I chose that distance based on the range of Tomahawk and DF-21 missiles - a thousand miles puts a USN ship inside the range of the Taiwanese coast while at the ragged edge of the DF-21 if launched right at the adjacent mainland coast, and out of range of any more inland DF-21s. That would likely force the use of the more DF-26, which exists in smaller numbers. It also is effectively out of range of tactical fighters without in flight refueling, and in the context of the Yuan, forces a week long deployment trip that would likely use up 30-50% of its AIP fuel one way - forcing it to snort at its patrol station or else all the way home. I consider a two week long transit time problematic for an SSK that has a limited endurance and war load. This is not a weakness of the Tuan design but rather a trait of SSKs in general.

 

13 hours ago, glenn239 said:

I wasn’t picturing PLA(N) diesel boats operating there, more like in the Indian Ocean,  the China Seas, the Sea of Japan, Southeast Asia, and the Marianas.    Operations in the Americas would require PLA(N) bases in the Americas, and AFAIK they have none.
 

Note that the distance to Guam is larger than the distance that German type 212 crossed on AIP. 1700nm would likely take two weeks and exhaust the AIP fuel on the trip.

Edited February 26 by Josh

[Josh]

12 hours ago, glenn239 said:

We’re assuming in this discussion that no satellite navigation systems are 'down'.  So yes Josh, the fishing boat has an exact fix on the blockading warship, and a missile can be on target within minutes.  What if GPS, Glonass, and BieDou are down?  I don’t know.

I would not assume that civilian grade communications and navigation aides would be functional in close proximity of USN vessels.
 

12 hours ago, glenn239 said:

 I think maybe a half dozen or more will side with China immediately, including Russia and Iran.  I also wonder if the USN “will control” the sea lanes at the end of such a conflict.  The USN has only about 80 guided missile cruisers and destroyers and 20 big carriers, so it lacks the numbers for the job and will rapidly lose its capacity due to attrition and wear and tear.  The USN SSN force is more survivable for much longer, of course, but both sides can play the unrestricted submarine warfare game.

I do not think Russia or Iran will fight a war on China’s behalf. Iran in particular would be extremely vulnerable to U.S. air attack and the 5th fleet would likely still be present. Russia has about a dozen Soviet vintage SSNs and a dozen SSGNs, only three of which post date the USSR. They would engage USN nuke boats at extreme risk. They also likely trigger NATO article V and involve the French and British navies in the Atlantic.

 

 

 

[Josh]

14 hours ago, glenn239 said:

The USAF can’t even handle the Houthis in Yemen, so the idea that it could take on the Chinese across four continents and a half dozen or more countries seems a stretch.  In terms of HIMARS vs a DF-26, the Russians are hunting HIMARS to a zone of maybe 80km behind a 1,000km of front.  That’s an 80,000 km^2 search area.  A DF-26 that can hide in Iran, Yemen, Russia, China, this has what, maybe 10-15 million km^2 to hide in?  That’s an area over a hundred times bigger than the Russian HIMARS hunt in Ukraine.  So the USAF problem is much, much harder than Russia's in Ukraine.

The Houthi are using relatively tiny, low signature weapons with far greater cross country mobility than a DF-26. And their casualties seem to be non trivial; the rate of their attacks did in fact decline rather markedly after the US started actively bombing their launch sites pre-emptively. I concede that any launch site in China or Russia is likely quite safe; I doubt the small patch of Houthi controlled Yemen has much luck concealing or defending a massive road bound TEL. The resolution of an EO/IR system needed to identify a small cruise missile launcher, let alone a UAV launch site, is probably an order of magnitude greater than what is needed to track a vehicle literally larger in most dimensions than a tractor-trailer. And again, firing at US ships makes you a belligerent, and the US is not required in any way to limit its attacks to DF-26 launch and storage sites. How difficult would it be for the US to simply destroy all Iranian gasoline refinement capability or cripple the primary oil export center at Kharg? The Houthi have basically no military or economic infrastructure to lose; Iran on the other hand has plenty.

Russia could easily host DF-26s if it wanted to, but one assumes in the short term than any escalation leads to rather immediate consequences in Ukraine, on top of any combined NATO action or blockade. I also think that Russia would find it incredibly embarrassing to use Chinese weapons as part of their war effort.

I also would assume that there would be a rather start US diplomatic and economic response to China arming other states with IRBMs (or else hosting its own forces in such) that would probably include basing US equipment, or even troops, in Taiwan.

 

14 hours ago, glenn239 said:

The Minuteman III is almost twice as heavy as a DF-26, I googled the cost of at $7 million each, (probably a decades old price).  The DF-26, I think they will mass produce in large numbers, along with plenty of other systems, in order to deter the US from even considering a war with China over Taiwan.

I think they will definitely build a lot of them. But it cannot be a cheap or quick to produce system. If you want to look at a more modern US weapon, the LRHW is reportedly in the mid tens of millions for a mass of ~8 tons. US prices will of course be higher than Chinese ones for a given piece of equipment, but never the less DF-26 represents a huge stack of solid fuel if nothing else, on top of a very substantial launch vehicle. The US likely cannot directly target them with its existing systems, but that will likely change by end of decade. The US also definitely has the means to hit static targets all over China with its existing cruise missiles, even if mobile targets like TELs can avoid engagement.

Edited February 26 by Josh

[glenn239]

3 hours ago, Josh said:

I would not assume that civilian grade communications and navigation aides would be functional in close proximity of USN vessels.

 It's neither wise or likely that the USN will attempt a blockade inside a DF-21 / 26 umbrella.  They will pull back to outside of this range, and only challenge inside it when they really need to.

Quote

I do not think Russia or Iran will fight a war on China’s behalf. Iran in particular would be extremely vulnerable to U.S. air attack and the 5th fleet would likely still be present.

I think USN planners will assume that Iran and Russia will fight on the side of China.  That is to say, if the war plan cannot survive this most obvious assumption, then the war plan will have to be changed.

Quote

Russia has about a dozen Soviet vintage SSNs and a dozen SSGNs, only three of which post date the USSR. They would engage USN nuke boats at extreme risk. They also likely trigger NATO article V and involve the French and British navies in the Atlantic.

NATO involvement is assumed.

No one said anything about Russian nuclear boats going after US SSN's.  That would be a foolish use of resources.  What I said was that the USN will park its SSN's around its important naval task forces and convoys so that if the Russians want to go after these, then the SSN's will be in the vicinity. 

Russian attack subs will want to go after surface targets.  Carriers, logistic ships, ships and submarines in port or drydock.  They will be happy fighting a war of slaughter against such targets and never fighting a USN SSN even once.  Russian Kilos, I assume, will be assigned closer to home, protecting boomer patrol areas and coastal patrols.

Edited February 26 by glenn239

[glenn239]

13 hours ago, James1978 said:

RE: 50+ SSNs - The USN has about 52 active SSN, but has a massive maintenance backlog with close to 40% of the boats non-deployable. The remaining 30ish boats have to cover not just the Pacific but also the Atlantic, Indian, and Mediterranean.

God, and here  I thought they still didn't have enough boats with over 50 operational.....

[glenn239]

1 hour ago, Josh said:

I think they will definitely build a lot of them. But it cannot be a cheap or quick to produce system. If you want to look at a more modern US weapon, the LRHW is reportedly in the mid tens of millions for a mass of ~8 tons

They’ve already built large numbers of them, and they are not slowing down in production.  Estimates range as high as about 500 missiles already,

https://www.businessinsider.com/china-growing-df-26-missile-arsenal-more-than-carrier-killers-2023-10

There are about 250 launchers that are able to be reloaded, as there are an estimated two missiles for every launcher, meaning China could quickly overwhelm an adversary's defenses with a barrage of DF-26s, which China says is capable against large and medium-size ships.

A production rate between 2021 and 2023 of somewhere around 60-65 missiles per year from 2016,

The report shows that in 2022, China increased the number of intermediate-range ballistic missiles from 300 in 2021 to 500.

And, contrary to my guess of $50 a copy, an estimate of cost at less than half of that,

As Shugart wrote in August 2021, "without doubt, in a war at sea the PLA, if it had the inventory to do so, would be perfectly happy to trade a missile (or several), costing perhaps in the order of US$20 million each, for a destroyer that would cost billions to replace."