Dutch East Indies

[John_Ford]

Was it worth the investment by the Allied US, British and Australian forces to reinforce the Dutch Colonies?    The Natural resources not withstanding,   Dutch Military Forces commited to the Islands were barely enough for Policing duties without significent investment by the Dutch Government.   After the Fall of the Dutch Republic,  The Dutch Government in Exile attempted to make up for the lack of investment in the East Indies but the majority of purchased equipment from the US failed to arrive in time before the Japanese Invasion.   The lack of qualified Dutch and  indigenous personnel to man and maintain the existing equipment did not help either.   Thoughts? 

[Markus Becker]

It's news to me that the KNIL and navy had problems maintaining the equipment they had. 

They seem to have had the same problems everyone else in the region had. The forces stationed there were colonial garrisons to keep the locals under control, not for fighting a major war because there wasn't a credible conventional threat. Japan was an economic dwarf and they were having to keep at least one eye on the Soviet Union. 

That changed with the Fall of France and the invasion of the USSR. If anything the Dutch reacted faster to the new reality than the other powers. 

[Sardaukar]

And after Battle of Java Sea it was hopeless.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Java_Sea

But it was almost disaster for Japanese invasion transports and only high speed of IJN cruisers saved them.

If Doorman squadron had caught the transports, they'd have been toast and sunk. One stupid way of IJN conducting "distant support" that they also did in Midway with their heavy units. Almost turned to "no support". 

[lucklucky]

Yeah, IJN had a tendency to complicate.

[Argus]

From a period perspective, I don't there was much choice on any level. 

No one knew how far the Japanese could or would push, only that, they'd have to stop somewhere at sometime; and they had already come a bloody long way. So the this island could be the one, else, not contesting this island made the next island less likely to be the turning point. With hindsight we can suggest that the troops sunk into the NEI, Rabaul and Timor would have been more useful on the Owen Stanleys, Milne Bay and perhaps even Guadalcanal, but at the time...  

[futon]

The decisions and actions made to improve defenses are generally caused by other events. Related to the Pacific War, steps to improve defenses at various places like Wake Island, the Philippines, or setting up in areas in rear islands like Fiji were linked to what was going on diplomatically. A hypothetical to expedidate those actions would impact the course of history on the diplomat level. Likewise, if detaching the timing of the launch of the Japanese offensive from the diplomatic timeline, hypothetically if it was somehow prepared and launched in August instead of December, Japanese odds are hypothetically better. 

Edited April 24, 2024 by futon

[Markus Becker]

Speaking of diplomacy,

imposing much thougher and then crippling sanctions on Japan at a time when the Far East with all its valuable resources was very lightly defended, was an incredibly poor political decision. If they had played for time and gotten even half a year, their odds would have been far better.

[futon]

So then by riding back on the diplomat, the reason for the lightly defended areas was due to the naval treaties. While Japan had to accept US 5/ GB 5/ Jpn 3 ratio and the end of the anglo-Japanese alliance, one concession that they did get to serve as making up to it was that the US and British possessions in the western Pacific (minus Singapore as was already built up) were not allowed to be built up. Of course by 1940, they started building up on some of the islands. On the Philippines, not sure exactly, but if too early and thus out of a context of a menacing Japan, it would rub too strongly on Philippines promise of independence. The lead up to sanctions on Japan was coupled with growing financial and material to a CKS Nationalists on the verge of defeat in 1940. Toggling or adjusting points in the hypothetical mucks around with so many aspects. I'm not convinced the the US had to save a CKS's Nationalists Chinese that got embrouled into total war with Japan via the Xi'an incident. The Wang Regime was also representative for the Chinese. And despite the allies total victory in WW2, CKS still lost in mainland China. 

[Markus Becker]

The WNT banned the construction of new fortifications like fixed shore batteries a'la Fort Drum. Construction of general infrastructure(airports, ports) was permitted, as was the deployment of ground troops and air units. Plus the WNT was history before Japan moved into Northern Indochina, when the though sanctions began. 

[lucklucky]

British Naval Intelligence Division

1920

https://archive.org/details/cu31924062748995

1944 Vol I and Vol II

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.70084

https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.70085

[On the way]

On 4/10/2024 at 3:16 PM, John_Ford said:

Was it worth the investment by the Allied US, British and Australian forces to reinforce the Dutch Colonies?    The Natural resources not withstanding,   Dutch Military Forces commited to the Islands were barely enough for Policing duties without significent investment by the Dutch Government.   After the Fall of the Dutch Republic,  The Dutch Government in Exile attempted to make up for the lack of investment in the East Indies but the majority of purchased equipment from the US failed to arrive in time before the Japanese Invasion.   The lack of qualified Dutch and  indigenous personnel to man and maintain the existing equipment did not help either.   Thoughts? 

I don't think they really had a choice. What were the Americans, Brits and Aussies going to do? Just sail away from the Japs? These allied forces in the theater were already using obsolete equipment and outdated tactics. By trying to stop the Japs with what they had in hand, and not being aware of the Japanese tactics, they really didn't stand a chance but they didn't know it. At least they tried to stop the Japs even if they were sorely defeated. 

[futon]

23 minutes ago, On the way said:

I don't think they really had a choice. What were the Americans, Brits and Aussies going to do? Just sail away from the Japs? These allied forces in the theater were already using obsolete equipment and outdated tactics. By trying to stop the Japs with what they had in hand, and not being aware of the Japanese tactics, they really didn't stand a chance but they didn't know it. At least they tried to stop the Japs even if they were sorely defeated. 

Intentionally derogatory or... innocent shorthand or... the fake "innocent shorthand, chill dude".

 

[RETAC21]

7 minutes ago, futon said:

Intentionally derogatory or... innocent shorthand or... the fake "innocent shorthand, chill dude".

 

No, you have a point and "Japs" is against the ROE of the forum.

[futon]

Just now, RETAC21 said:

No, you have a point and "Japs" is against the ROE of the forum.

Personally, I almost don't even mind since he doesn't post often (^^)

 

[RETAC21]

2 minutes ago, futon said:

Personally, I almost don't even mind since he doesn't post often (^^)

 

Still, it's a breach and it's easy to amend. It's just basic courtesy. This is not twitter

[Rick]

Argus and On the Way have good points. None of the Allies, nor the Japanese, had any idea that the Japanese would be as swiftly successful for the small amount of losses over such a wide geographic area as they did. Only in post W.W.2 hindsight is the premise of the original question answerable.   

[Argus]

While I do agree, I think we have to be careful about exactly how much slack we cut everyone on the 'surprise' aspect. Having both air and naval superiority not only gave the Japanese a clear edge, it was appreciated as such at the time - we look at what reinforcements were sent out and the contemporary critiques of that. It's all about air and sea, the armies might have needed work too, but the deficits were nowhere near as large, and often as much about quality as quantity or theory. While the freedom of maneuver air and sea dominance gave the Japanese allowed amounted to strategic overmatch. I recon we could have put the best British/Empire infantry and commanders available into Malaya, and while the battles would have been different the outcome would have ended up about the same. 

I mean if things had held off for only a few months, there would have been a 'Battle of Britain' type ADGE covering most of Malaya, Singapore and Southern Thailand as just one example of the improvements in train. 

There's a very fine edge to the reality of this case, and I don't pretend to have half a clue about it. 

Edited August 1, 2024 by Argus

[futon]

The Japanese very well understood in the Malaysia peninsula campaign that there was real danger of getting bogged down. If the advance got bogged down, numerically superior British artillery would hammer away. Attrition would set in. And Singapore would be protected.

Japanese used combat engineers, tanks, infantry togther. And there was some degree of air observation dropping info messages to Japanese forces on the ground along the way. Obstacles removed unnoticed. Tank advances went unnoticed, creeping up closer to the line in night. Penetrations through the lines quickly, securing bridges before the British could detonate charges to destroy them. Some behind british movement were caught out of position by advancing Japanese tank companies, thus gaving the Japanese tanks better chance in direct engagement against anti-tank guns, direct fire artillery, heavy AA, and so on. There was one case the British saw this pattern, and got an Australian unit to timely set up anti-tank guns on the expected path of Japanese tanks, and they wiped out a company of light tanks. To that, the Japanese then reduced how often they had tanks lead the advance. 

If an exploiting quick advance could not have been achieved, then the result would be the Japanese ground forces likely never reaching Singapore. Locking horns and trying to muscle over the opponant was seen as not possible. That's why it was planned and executed in the way it was. They were able to study and plan it well in advance.

The major Guadalcanal ground advance was not execuited as well. Compared to the Malaysia canpaign, time to prepare was less, less air and naval cover, less accurate intel on opposing positions, less heavy equipment, poorer coordination. If they have contrasted the different set of circumstances between Guadalcanal and Malaysia, they should have not tried commiting for recapturing Guadalcanal. 

 

Edited July 31, 2024 by futon

[Rick]

Futon, have you read this book SINGAPORE - The Japanese Version by Colonel Masanobu Tsuji ?

[futon]

9 minutes ago, Rick said:

Futon, have you read this book SINGAPORE - The Japanese Version by Colonel Masanobu Tsuji ?

No actually. It looks interesting though. One related book I read was by a tank company commander Toyosaku Shimada during the campaign.

[Rick]

1 hour ago, futon said:

No actually. It looks interesting though. One related book I read was by a tank company commander Toyosaku Shimada during the campaign.

Is Mr. Shimada's book in English?

[futon]

26 minutes ago, Rick said:

Is Mr. Shimada's book in English?

I don't think there's an English version of it.

[Markus Becker]

9 hours ago, Argus said:

While I do agree, I think we have to be careful about exactly how much slack we cut everyone on the 'surprise' aspect. Having both air and naval superiority not only gave the Japanese a clear edge, it was appreciated as such at the time - we look at what reinforcements were sent out and the contemporary critiques of that. It's all about air and sea, the armies might have needed work too, but the deficits were nowhere near as large, and often as much about quality as quantity or theory. While the freedom of maneuver air and sea dominance gave the Japanese allowed amounted to strategic overmatch. I mean, I recon we could have put the best British/Empire infantry and commanders available into Malaya, and while the battles would have been different the outcome would have ended up about the same. 

I mean if things had held off for only a few months, there would have been a 'Battle of Britain' type ADGE covering most of Malaya, Singapore and Southern Thailand as just one example of the improvements in train. 

There's a very fine edge to the reality of this case, and I don't pretend to have half a clue about it. 

The Japanese intentions became clear when they oppupied the south of Indo China. That was months before December and triggered the last minute effort to reinforce the Phillipines.

 

WRT Malaya,

the Japanese had freedom of maritime movement but so did the British Empire. A convoy with an entire infantry division made it into Singapore a few days before it fell. On Java the situation didn't get hopeless until after the Fall of Singapore.

And the British Imperial ground forces in Malaya at the start of the war were fully trained and equipped and fairly nomerous. Two Indian divisions in the north, 2/3s of and Australian division in the mid-east, two Malayan brigades in Singapore itself, a brigade in reserve, plus fortress and volunteer untis.

Had Operation Matador been cancelled in time, the untis in the north would have met the attack from their prepared defensive positions and the battle for the north west would have probably been more like the one for Kota Bharu. The victory was costly for the Japanese and the British forces could withdraw in good order afterwards.

[Yama]

On 4/11/2024 at 1:16 AM, John_Ford said:

Was it worth the investment by the Allied US, British and Australian forces to reinforce the Dutch Colonies?    The Natural resources not withstanding,   Dutch Military Forces commited to the Islands were barely enough for Policing duties without significent investment by the Dutch Government.   After the Fall of the Dutch Republic,  The Dutch Government in Exile attempted to make up for the lack of investment in the East Indies but the majority of purchased equipment from the US failed to arrive in time before the Japanese Invasion.   The lack of qualified Dutch and  indigenous personnel to man and maintain the existing equipment did not help either.   Thoughts? 

Britain was always going to defend Singapore, and as long as that was the case, there was no reason for Anglo-Americans not to join forces with the Dutch, who were similarly going to defend NEI.

If all these forces had been controlled by a single entity with no other concern except military necessity, yes perhaps different decisions might have been made. But politically it was impossible for a colonial power to pull out  "we'll come back to liberate you later, we promise!"

[On the way]

On 7/30/2024 at 2:36 AM, RETAC21 said:

No, you have a point and "Japs" is against the ROE of the forum.

Well, your granduncle wasn't rounded up by the Japs, taken to their headquarters, and then never seen again. Likely, they took him out along with thousands of other Chinese males in Singapore and executed him on the beach. Mine was. His only crime was he was a young chinese male caught up in the Sook Ching massacre. And that's assuming they didn't torture him first. He left behind 2 young sons. I am being delicate and nice by calling them Japs. There is a lot worse thing I can call them.