Autumn of 1944 - decisive moment?

[RETAC21]

To King, I was thinking Sept. 1st. when he handed over command to Ike.

 

No, what it all boils down to is that for several very good reasons there wasn't much that could be ordered "across the AG boundary" except for XV Corps initially with the 79th and 90th ID and the 2nd FF AD...essentially everyone else was either racing eastwards to the Seine, westwards and southwards into Brittany, or were simply only in position to push the Germans eastwards out of the pocket. Add to that continued confusion about just where the Germans were and how many, the continuing attacks by II. SS Panzerkorps to keep the pocket open, and the open flanks of XV Corps - most of it was facing north and west...it's right rear consisted of the artillery concentration at Le Aigle (including my Dad's AAA battalion) and a battalion of the 357th Infantry, while just to the NE was the German LXXXI AK with an unknown strength, but including elements of 116. Panzer Division.

 

It was what you call a "fluid situation" and it is only truly in hindsight now that the opportunity is so obvious.

 

Please don't distract me anymore for a while...

 

Not to distract you... well, yes. Just a question, do you hold Monty responsible for not closing the gap?

[Rich]

"The main business lies to the east..."

 

George said he could close the gap at the time.

 

He did? When?

 

The Germans may have been able to turn the tables on a lot of Allied Generals but Patton wasn't one of them.

What does that mean in the real world?

 

I will grant that the situation was fluid and there may have been reasons why the gap may have stayed open but I think Montgomery, Bradley, and Patton were all aware that closing the pocket up was preferable to leaving it open.

 

They were? How do we know that?

[Rich]

Not to distract you... well, yes. Just a question, do you hold Monty responsible for not closing the gap?

 

No, not really, I'm not convinced that at the time they were that aware of the significance of the gap...and I'm not sure there was that much significance to it in any case.

[Tim the Tank Nut]

Montgomery argued to go wider and try to trap even more of the German forces in Western France. According to his diary Patton had similar ideas. Eisenhower wanted to cut in tighter (supply difficulties?) and get what could be got right around Falaise. Churchill was already asking about prisoners bagged before the pocket was even closed. Everyone wanted some form of encirclement to really knock the Germans out hard.

 

Patton's comments about charging forward and "Dunkirking the British" were well publicized at the time. He was certain his forces could close the gap if given the order to do so.

 

In the real world Patton knew how the German generals thought and had a pretty good idea of what they were capable of most of the time. If he felt like he could close the pocket then odds are he could've based his other performance as head of 3rd Army.

[KingSargent]

In the real world Patton knew how the German generals thought and had a pretty good idea of what they were capable of most of the time. If he felt like he could close the pocket then odds are he could've based his other performance as head of 3rd Army.

Once again, he had just brought 3rd Army into action and no one at the time had any idea how Patton and the 3rd would perform later. At the time you have a general more known for foot-in-mouth disease than fancy footwork and a transplanted USA CONUS training command for an Army staff. Not something to inspire confidence.

 

Now I admire Patton as much as you do; possibly (even probably) he could have delivered. But Patton and 3rd Army were untried in Sept 1944 and there was no reason for Brad and Ike to expect greatness.

[Rich]

Once again, he had just brought 3rd Army into action and no one at the time had any idea how Patton and the 3rd would perform later. At the time you have a general more known for foot-in-mouth disease than fancy footwork and a transplanted USA CONUS training command for an Army staff. Not something to inspire confidence.

 

Now I admire Patton as much as you do; possibly (even probably) he could have delivered. But Patton and 3rd Army were untried in Sept 1944 and there was no reason for Brad and Ike to expect greatness.

 

Er, it was August that was critical in this context?

 

Up to 14 August when XV Corps reached Alencon after a fairly hard fight, everyone pretty much decided the Germans had escaped the pocket except for stragglers. After securing the area 79th ID and 5th AD were turned eastwards to Mantes and the Seine and only 90th ID and 2nd FF AD were left behind to "mop up" the roughly 80,000 Germans stampeding out via Chambois, and secure the left and rear of Third Army and right of First Army against the threat of attack from II. SS-Panzerkorps and LXXXI AK.

 

Everything else is quite simply post hoc ergo propter hoc based upon what the participants said after the fact. But if someone wants to point out the documentary evidence for the contrary opinion, and I don't mean what Patton said a year later, Montgomery two years later, or Bradley ten years later, then I'll be pleased to look at it.

[Colin Williams]

Thanks Colin, I have downloaded it to my collection and will read it later. One would rather expect Oxfordian Colin Gray, the director of the Centre for Strategic Studies, University of Reading, to refute Weigley's pessimistic view of the value of war and battle and strategy, else his over 20 books, mostly on contemporary strategy, come under a cloud. He knows how to defend his turf, even if it is not early modern Europe. He also has provided much needed support to the neocon camp [cf. Hoover Inst] and Weigley is on the other side of the fence, most memorable to me for chastising CJSC Colin L Powell for publishing his op-ed in the NYT opposing Clinton's interventionism viz the Balkans as a violation of civilian direction of the military establishment.

 

In any case, you have already noted Parker, and readily understand that Weigley was turning over already-plowed fields in his survey, which nonetheless raised interesting questions. I also think that you are not put off by any of Weigley's prose and likely do not consider him off-thesis, nor intellectually dishonest. Perhaps then, you also find him useful in assessing the various factors regarding the dual advance to Germany and the log theme of this thread.

 

[edit for sanity]

 

Ken,

 

I remain a big fan of Eisenhower's Lieutenants, despite recent criticisms, and many authors' bios suggest Weigley was very successful as a advisor and mentor. It does seem the coventional wisdom on the whole period from the 30 Years War through the Napoleonic Wars has gone through some significant changes in recent years, but I can't comment on Weigley without reading "Age of Battles".

[KingSargent]

Er, it was August that was critical in this context?

DOH! Brain fart! Sorry, AUGUST!