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Everything posted by Rich

  1. I forgot to mention, the Miranda's also built Tucker's Tiger...it too used the AAC Baldwin 37mm.
  2. The Mirandas were a pair of Mexican-Amercian brothers who got into arms dealing in the 1920s and 1930s. They were called in front of the Nye Committee and eventually were convicted of illegally selling arms in South America through their company, American Armament Corporation (AAC). They also were vigorous self-promoters and acquirers of arms patents...that is why AAC's 37mm aircraft cannon was simply the retooled Brewster gun and the gins for the M-H tanks were variations of the MacClean (Maklen)/Poole/Driggs guns. They were instrumental in the M-H deal with the Netherlands East Indies and built the gins for the tanks at their subsidiary "ordnance" manufacturer, which originally built elevators. During the war they also "helped" tank Brewster Aircraft...after serving a year in the Federal pen for their arms-selling conviction, and generally created havoc wherever they went...especially with lazy historians who confuse their self-promotion for actual production. For example, despite what many Wiki entries and books might tell you, the Ordnance series of 37mm AA, Aircraft, Antitank, and Tank cannon owe zero to AAC and are all Browning/Colt and Rheinmetall derivatives. I first have to finish the editing and find someone who'll publish the damned thing. It turned out like Topsy, it just growed. and is now 750 pages of text in Word PLUS 450-odd photos. Stackpole has right of first refusal and I doubt they will want to do a two-volume version, which is probably what it will have to turn out to be. I'll keep you up to date.
  3. The M-H tanks and the involvement of the Miranda Brothers - the "Merchants of Death", no relation to Carmen - is fascinating in a train-wreck sort of way. I decided to do an extended excursis on them in For Purpose of Service Test and when I re-read it it is more bizarrely funny than the first time.
  4. Yep, what Manic said. There is only one clear error of fact I found reading it, otherwise it is just the normal memory isn't an accurate record errors, so for example some of the timing and events of the "Duel at Cologne" are not exactly correct to the record, but that is understandable because of Clarence's POV. Otherwise, it is slightly "purple", but not jingoistic, so a pretty good balance.
  5. Jesus Christ on a Crutch. We're fucked.
  6. It is part and parcel of the growing US national crisis of irresponsibility. Everyone wants their "rights", but no one is willing to accept the responsibilities that go along with those rights. I know a lot of kids, many adults, and most politicians that need a refresher course is in high school civics...and that applies to most denizens of both sides of the political spectrum.
  7. Yep. DESRON 27, 29, 30, and 31 were all organized primarily with the flush deckers as Eastern Seaboard and Atlantic convoy escorts. As DE became available in the specialized CORTRONs they shifted more and more to short-range seaboard escort.
  8. US Atlantic Fleet Destroyers as of 1 December 1943 consisted of: DesRon 7 - Capt. J. P. Clay DesDiv 13 - F. D. Giambattista PLUNKETT (DD-431) (F) - Cmdr. E. J. Burke NIBLACK (DD-424) - Lt. Cmdr. R. R. Conner BENSON (DD-421) - Cmdr. R. J. Woodman GLEAVES (DD-423) - Cmdr. B. L. Burnette MAYO (DD-422) - Cmdr. A. D. Kaplan DesDiv 14 - Cmdr. W. R. Headden MADISON (DD-425) (F) - Cmdr. J. W. Hager LANSDALE (DD-426) - V. Havard, Jr. HILARY P JONES (DD-427) - Lt. Cmdr. F. M. Stiesberg CHARLES F HUGHES (DD-428) - Cmdr. "JC" G. Wilson DesRon 8 - DesDiv 16 - WAINWRIGHT (DD-419) (F) - Cmdr. W. W. Strobehn MAYRANT (DD-402) - Cmdr. O. A. Scherini TRIPPE (DD-403) - Cmdr. R. C. Williams RHIND (DD-404) (temp assigned to DesDiv 33) - Lt. Cmdr. O. W. Spahr, Jr. DesRon 9 - H. C. Robison DesDiv 17 - MOFFETT (DD-362) (F) - Lt. Cmdr. G. H. Richards, Jr. WINSLOW (DD-359) - Lt. Cmdr. W. T. Samuels DesDiv 18 - DAVIS (DD-395) (F) - Cmdr. W. A. Dunn JOUETT (DD-396) - Cmdr. J. C. Farham, Jr. SOMERS (DD-381) - Cmdr. W. C. Hughes, Jr. DesRon 10 - T. L. Lewis DesDiv 19 - ELLYSON (DD-454) (F) - Cmdr. E. W. Longton HAMBLETON (DD-455) - Cmdr. H. A. Renken RODMAN (DD-456) - Cmdr. J. F. Foley EMMONS (DD-457) - Cmdr. E. B. Billingsley MACOMB (DD-458) - Cmdr. J. C. South DesDiv 20 - Cmdr. C. M. Jensen FORREST (DD-461) (F) - Cmdr. K. P. Letts FITCH (DD-462) - Cmdr. K. C. Walpole CORRY (DD-463) - Cmdr. L. Ensey HOBSON (DD-464) - Lt. Cmdr. K. Loveland DesDiv 21 - Cmdr. G. C. Wright LIVERMORE (DD-429) (F) - Cmdr. H. E. Seidel, jr. EBERLE (DD-430) - Lt. Cmdr. C. B. Smiley KEARNY (DD-432) - Cmdr. L. Williamson ERICSON (DD-440) - Lt. Cmdr. B. H. Meyer DesRon 13 -Capt. H. Sanders DesDiv 25 - WOOLSEY (DD-437) (F) - Cmdr. H. R. Wier LUDLOW (DD-438) - Cmdr. L. W. Creighton EDISON (DD-439) - Cmdr. H. A. Pearce DesDiv 26 - Capt. V. Huber WILKES (DD-441) (F) - Cmdr. F. Wolsieffer SWANSON (DD-443) (temp F) - Cmdr. E. L. Robertson, Jr. NICHOLSON (DD-442) - Cmdr. W. W. Vanous ROE (DD-418) - Cmdr. F. S. Stitch DesRon 15 - DesDiv 29 - same as DesRon DAVISON (DD-618) (F) - Cmdr. J. D. Collett MERVINE (DD-489) - Lt. Cmdr. R. R. Frakes QUICK (DD-490) (temp assigned to DesDiv 34) - Cmdr. P. W. Cann TILLMAN (DD-641) - Cmdr. C. S. Hutchings DesDiv 30 - Cmdr. R. B. Nickerson COWIE (DD-632) (F) - Cmdr. R. C. Johnson KNIGHT (DD-633) - Cmdr. J. C. Ford DORAN (DD-634) - Lt. Cmdr. N. E. Smith EARLE (DD-635) - Cmdr. G. O. Hobbs DesRon 16 - Capt. C. J. Cater DesDiv 31 - PARKER (DD-604) (F) - Cmdr. J. W. Bays LAUB (DD-613) - Lt. Cmdr. A. G.Hay KENDRICK (DD-612) - Cmdr. A. M. Boyd MacKENZIE (DD-614) - Cmdr. B. N. Rittenhouse, Jr. McLANAHAN (DD-615) - Lt. Cmdr. N. C. Johnson DesDiv 32 - Cmdr. J. C. Sowell BOYLE (DD-600) (F) - B. P. Field CHAMPLIN (DD-601) - Cmdr. C. L. Melson NIELDS (DD-616) - Cmdr. A. R. Heckey ORDRONAUX (DD-617) - R. Brodie, Jr. DesRon 17 - Capt. A. C. Murdaugh DesDiv 33 - NELSON (DD-623) (F) - Lt. Cmdr. T. D. McGrath MURPHY (DD-603) - Lt. W. M. Klee GLENNON (DD-620) - Cmdr. C. A. Johnson JEFFERS (DD-621) - Cmdr. L. W. Nilon DesDiv 34 - BUTLER (DD-636) (F) - Cmdr. M. D. Matthews GHERARDI (DD-637) - Cmdr. J. W. Schmidt HERNDON (DD-638) - Cmdr. G. A. Moore SHUBRICK (DD-639) - Lt. Cmdr. J. V. Smith DesRon 18 - W. K. Mendenhall, Jr. DesDiv 35 - FRANKFORD (DD-497) (F) - Cmdr. T. J. Thornhill CARMICK (DD-493) - Cmdr. R. O. Beer DOYLE (DD-494) - Cmdr. C. E. Boyd ENIDCOTT (DD-495) - Cmdr. W. S. Heald McCOOK (DD-496) - Cmdr. S. C. Anderson DesDiv 36 - Cmdr. W. J. Marshall BALDWIN (DD-624) - Lt. Cmdr. E. S. Powell, Jr. HARDING (DD-625) - G. G. Palmer SATTERLEE (DD-626) - Lt. Cmdr. J. F. Witherow THOMPSON (DD-627) - Cmdr. L. A. Ellis DesRon 19 - DesDiv 37 - STEVENSON (DD-645) (F) - F. E. Wilson STOCKTON (DD-646) - Cmdr. R. E. Braddy, Jr. THORN (DD-647) - Cmdr. E. Brumby TURNER (DD-648) - Cmdr. H. S. Wygant, Jr. DesDiv 38 - HOBBY (DD-610) (F) - Cmdr. G. W. Pressy GILLESPIE (DD-609) - Cmdr. J. S. Fahy KALK (DD-611) - Lt. Cmdr. H. D. Fuller WELLES (DD-628) - Cmdr. D. M. Coffee DesRon 27 - Capt. G. L. Menocal DesDiv 53 - DECATUR (DD-341) (F) - Cmdr. J. B. Williams BADGER (DD-126) - Cmdr. R. A. Wolverton BABBITT (DD-128) - Cmdr. S. F. Quarles LEARY (DD-158) - Cmdr. J. M. Kyes SCHENCK (DD-159) - Lt. Cmdr. E. W. Logsden DesRon 29 - DesDiv 57 - WHIPPLE (DD-217) (F) - Lt. Cmdr. S. E. Woodard, USNR ALDEN (DD-211) - Lt. W. Herkness, 2nd JOHN D EDWARDS (DD-216) - Lt. Cmdr. G. Hutchinson JOHN D FORD (DD-228) - Lt. Cmdr. J. S. Slaughter DesDiv 58 - BULMER (DD-222) (F) - Lt. Cmdr. G. T. Baker PARROTT (DD-218) - J. N. Hughes BARKER (DD-213) - Lt. Cmdr. R. G. Tolbert PAUL JONES (DD-230) - Lt. Cmdr. C. P. Unmacht DesRon 30 - Capt. G. L. Menocal DesDiv 60 - DALLAS (DD-199) (F) - Cmdr. A. C. Roessler ELLIS (DD-154) - Cmdr. C. W. Musgrave BERNADOU (DD-153) - Lt. Cmdr. B. L. E. Talman COLE (DD-155) - Lt. Cmdr. B. Chipman DUPONT (DD-152) - Cmdr. J. G. Marshall DesDiv 61 - C. J. Whiting GREER (DD-145) (F) - Lt. M.D. Cooper, Jr., USNR TARBELL (DD-142) - Lt. Cmdr. H. M. Payne, USNR UPSHUR (DD-144) - Cmdr. E. B. Ellsworth LEA (DD-118) - Cmdr. D. I. Thomas DesRon 31 - Capt. G. W. Johnson? DesDiv 62 - not same as DesRon MacLEISH (DD-220) (F) - Lt. Cmdr. R. P. Winkle, USNR BAINBRIDGE (DD-246) - H. C. Transue DesDiv 63 - McCORMICK (DD-223) (F) - Lt. Cmdr. F. A. Brock BROOME (DD-210) - Lt. C. S. Arthur SIMPSON (DD-221) - Lt. Cmdr. L. W. Sedgwick, USNR DesDiv 66 - BRECKINRIDGE (DD-148) (F) - Lt. Cmdr. F. R. Arnold BARNEY (DD-149) - Lt. H. D. Sprenger, USNR BLAKELEY (DD-150) - R. J. Brooke BIDDLE (DD-151) - Lt. R. H. Hopkins, USNR
  9. That no follow on US tank had wet stowage would seem to affirm the proposition that the wet stowage was of little or no benefit. Yep.
  10. The idea was that if the cartridge case was penetrated, the water would prevent the ignition...the propellant oxidizer still needs an ignition source. Tests seemed to indicate it would work, although postwar tests seemed to indicate it did not Except that made no difference, since the real benefit of the design was not the water, but the location of the racks in the floor of the tank. Basically, the RAC noticed early on that the higher the ammo was stored in the tank, the more likely it would be struck by a penetrating round and ignited. Removing the ammo from sponson and turret basic racks and relocating them to the hull floor is probably what made the difference.Ready racks in the turret were also armored and the number of rounds reduced.
  11. For most of the time post-war, gasoline was blamed for the M4's apparent flammability. Ammo was comparatively recent, in popular perceprtion In "popular", i.e. uninformed, opinion only. The British knew the cause was propellant by late 1941. The Americans were told the same and the Ordnance Department confirmed it in a series of tests in 1942 and 1943. The test findings were the direct cause for the development of wet stowage.
  12. I don't think it is correct. As I said, RAF did not treat Africa as a priority front as long as they viewed England was threatened and Axis held the air superiority even when outnumbered. Although in the end, Luftwaffe aircraft losses in Africa were of course serious - as noted, they couldn't evacuate very much - but it was not in same level as in Eastern Front or defence of the Reich. LW aircraft losses in Tunisian campaign can be contrasted to over 400 aircraft they lost in Battle of Kursk in four weeks, or 300+ which were lost in Big Week over just 6 days. Actually, it is correct, but as I said, it was after your waypoint of summer 1942. Note that even then, the "split" is actually 692 "east" and 577 "west", with 109 aircraft doing double duty supporting German forces in Karelia and the far north, as well as defending Norway against perfidious Albion. At this point the Luftwaffe was still functioning reasonably well, but the fall and winter of 1942 and spring of 1943 was when it all began to go south. The Stalingrad and Tunisian airlifts wrecked the Transportgruppen and again disrupted the training programs in Germany, just as the Norwegian-French campaign in spring 1940, the Crete campaign in 1941, and the winter and spring Russian campaign in 1942 did. By summer 1943 the downward spiral was well in motion. Compare the commitments then to July 1942. Next, look at the losses by front over time. If I get a chance sometime this week I'll try to get into the Maxwell documents and draw up a clear picture, but for now: Luftwaffe allocation to the "East" (front line aircraft, main combat categories only/1E Ftr/2E Ftr): 8 November 1941 - 63%/50%/69% 10 December 1942 - 49%/38%/49% 20 December 1943 - 37%/27%/6% 10 February 1944 (last of document series) - 34%/21%/5% Losses All Types to All Causes (West/Med/East): 1 June-30 November 1941 - 702/233/2353 = 28% lost in the West and Med 1 December 1941-30 November 1942 - 1312/1945/4338 = 43% lost in the West and Med 1 December 1942-30 November 1943 - 3385/3858/4598 = 61% lost in the West and Med
  13. Basically, what DKTanker and Bojan said... I have seen accounts in the First Army tank loss reports of M4 with through and through penetrations of less than half full tanks...and the only result was leakies, basically the crew didn't realize until they evacuated the tank. Various studies by the Brits in late 1941 and early 1942 and then by Ordnance in late 1942 and early 1943 (trust the Brits but verify I suppose) demonstrated that it was ammunition fires that was the culprit.
  14. I have difficulty to believe there were no Bf 109 protecting Germany only FW 190. It is correct, but that is the on hand for 27 July 1942. Serviceable was 116. The 9 Bf 109 (8 serviceable) were in 11.(Höh.)/JG2 and were modified high-altitude capable Bf 109E-7/NZ and Bf 109F-4/Z with nitrous oxide boost. The FW 190 were introduced early to the West because they gave the necessary edge to the opposition that at that time most of the Bf 109E and F did not have...except in the East. Conditions began to shift in 1943.
  15. The Luftwaffe was wrecked in the west...beginning in early 1943 in the Mediterranean. I try not to watch podcasts, they are usually timewasters.
  16. Ooops! Yes. That still does not compute. The Flugzeugbestand und Bewegungsmeldungen give monthly losses for durch Feindeinw. (enemy action), ohne Feindeinw. (without enemy action, which I count as "accident"), Überholung (returned to depot or Heimat, usually the latter, for rebuild), and an andere Verbände (transferred to another unit. The last is the only "non loss" loss, if you see what I mean, but the first two would encompass all those "did not return". There was no separate category for them. Anyway, January losses to enemy action alone, as reported by the Flugzeugbestand und Bewegungsmeldungen then were: II/JG 51 9 (not "7") II./JG 2 3 (not "2", but thanks I forgot them) Stab JG 53 0 - at El Aouina I JG 53 8 - at Bizerta II JG 53 11 - at Bizerta, El Aouina, and Gabes III JG 53 3 - at Tunis and Trapani JG 3 total 22 (not "8", which is just for i./JG 53...why would they exclude the rest of the Geschwader?) Stab JG77 2 - at Bir Dufan and Castel Bonito I JG 77 10 - at Bir Dufan and Castel Bonito II JG 77 11 - at Zarzur, El-Asabaa, Bir Durfan, and Medenine III JG 77 8 - Bir Durfan, El-Asabaa, and Malacha JG 77 total 31 (not "15"...I have no idea how they could arrive at that figure) II/NJG 2 3 - at Comiso (when did nightfighters not become fighters?) Total 68...quite a few more than "32". Even excluding the nightfighters it is a loss of 65.
  17. 1. Losses (enemy action/accident/damaged greater than 100% and evacuated for rebuild) for January 1943: II/JG 51 9/9/2 Stab JG 53 0/5/0 I JG 53 8/19/2 II JG 53 11/4/0 III JG 53 3/11/1 Stab JG77 2/1/0 I JG 77 10/6/2 II JG 77 11/9/1 III JG 77 8/9/1 III/ZG 1 0/4/0 II/NJG 3/0/0 Total 65/77/9 = 151 Where does the notion of 30 to 40 come from? 2. Between 1 November 1942 and 30 April 1943 the Luftwaffe lost ,2422 aircraft in the Med to enemy action, accident, and overhaul. 3. Transport losses 1 January-31 May 1943 in the Med (there is no data for the December losses, which were probably all to accident): I KGzbV 1 7/5/15 III KGzbV 1 15/4/0 IV KGzbV 1 28/5/5 KGzbV 323 25/12/0 KGzbV 800 22/8/1 KGzbV 106 22/2/0 KGzbV 400 0/1/0 KGzbV 600 7/2/2 Total 126/49/23 (123 Ju 52 and 14 Me 323 in April alone) The Stalingrad airlift cost 279 aircraft failed to return, including 174 Ju 52 and 67 He 111, another 215 were damaged
  18. I think it was at AHF? Michael Kenny commented I seem to recall? Sooner or later I will get to reading these and see what I can comment based on the KTB. [edit]I see the new thread at AHF you posted touches on some of the problems with Wheatley's analysis, including his over-reliance on what he thinks he sees on the aerial photos as opposed to what the German loss documentation said, especially with regards to the "lost" Tiger.
  19. Thanks for that. However, I seem to recall there was so questions raised last year regarding his methodology and conclusions?
  20. No shit Sherlock, so what are you doing making comments on something you obviously have never read? Try reading it yourself before you make trolling assumptions. Chapter 7, "Feasibility of S-Tag, 25 September 1940", pages 243-272 comes to that exact conclusion. Page 264, "As discussed in the previous section, neither the RAF or the Royal Navy was likely to stop the first wave...On S-Tag the Germans would establish four lodgements and link up with their paratroops..." There then follows page after page where the Germans do everything right and the British everything wrong, until Britain surrenders. Then in his conclusion, page 311: "If executed, Operation Sea Lion would have changed the course of World War II, but probably not decisively. Even with Britain out of the war..." Instead of "seem to recalling" why don't you actually read the damned thing instead of continuing to make shit up? At least its a bit better than outright lying about shit. So making shit up is followed by a spurious appeal to authority. Neat. Argumentum ad auctoritatem, straw man argument, and argumentum ad ignorantiam. You got the logical fallacies down pat. And yet another straw man argument...or maybe ignoratio elenchi? Forczyk is a retired lieutenant colonel, Armor, his assumption regarding the naval aspect is that the inadequate mine plan and a few S-Boot and U-Boot would suffice to drive off any attempt by the Royal Navy to intervene. That may not be a jingoistic take on the matter, but it is facile beyond all understanding. Ooo that sounds good, but it is actually just as simplistic a conclusion as thinking the Royal Navy only had to sail past the German barges to swamp them with its wakes.
  21. Back to the straw men again I see glenn. How predictable. Please point out where I ever said "Sealion was absolutely impossible". I am "sensitive" to: 1. Inability to explain away simple historical limitations to "alternate" history. 2. Inability to substantiate peek-a-boo references. 3. Alien Space Bats as serious "alternate" history. You've just managed in one sentence to bring up all three. Why an extract? How about the original, which I've referenced before? D-159, Oberst Fritz W. Siebel, Ferry Operations, (Mediterranean), May 1947, pp. 3-4. "II. Functions of the Special Ferry Service In July 1940, on the occasion of inspection of the model ferries, and the test run held on Bangdorfer Lake near Berlin, and at Emden which were attended by Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, General Halder, General Jakob, and General Udet, Oberst Siebel was instructed to leave no stone unturned to motorize as many vessels as possible for the crossing, and likewise to provide a large quantity of vessels similar to the model ferry. In this connection, he was promised complete support on the part of the engineers. By the middle of September 1940, this order was executed by making available for the crossing operations a total of 391 vessels with aerial propulsion, which were assembled in the harbors and channels of Holland and Belgium." Well shit dude, sorry,you got no problem, right? You got 391 of them... Yeah. No, when Siebel wrote that in 1947 he managed to conflate the order to mass-produce the improved-design SF-type Siebel ferries with the total number of SF-type ferries produced during the war, 391 of them (although again his memory was not 100%, Gröner records the completion of 393 of them by pennant number, SF01 to SF393, beginning in 1941 and ending in 1944/1945. NONE OF THOSE were available for a 1940 Seelöwe. Earlier, on page 2, Siebel also addressed the initial attempts at ferry design, including empty aircraft gasoline tanks as floats, before describing the first "successful design, developed in July, the "Typ-B" ferry, of which "150 of this type ferry immediately were constructed and in due time stored, ready for assembly, at St. Omer." Damn dude, sorry again. You got 150 Siebel ferries. Yay! Sorry, no again. The Typ-B ferry utilized four standard undecked Brücko-B pontons, mounted a single aircraft engine, could carry only 50 men, or one 105mm howitzer, or one Panzer II...and was completely incapable of traversing the Channel. Siebel waffled in 1947, saying it "was seaworthy as long as it traveled in a light or moderate sea". However, even if that was true, the Typ-B was rejected by BOTH the Heer and Kriegsmarine as not seaworthy (Schenk, p. 27). It was formally rejected on 5 September, after the Emden demonstration on 17 August (Shenk, p. 101). So Siebel turned to using the larger, more seaworthy, decked "Herbert" and schwere Schiffsbrücke pontons. Beginning in late August and early September, just three to four weeks before the last likely landing date, the first were completed and tested. The Herbert ferry sections were dispatched from the Pionier depots in Austria to the Pionier Lehr-Batallion 47. on 19 August. They completed six ferries by 10 September and they arrived at Cherbourg on 15 September. Eight more were assembled at Antwerp and eight at La Tait, near Rouen by 23 September. None of these were issued pennant numbers that I can find (Schenk pp. 101-103). The construction of the actual prototype "Siebel" ferry using the schwere Schiffsbrücke pontons was also begun in late August. It was tested at Emden on 31 August with three aircraft engines, which was found to be inadequate except for the final run-in at speed. So it was retested again on 4 and 5 September using the Opel truck engines, which were preferred. Construction was begun by Sonder Kommando Böndel at Antwerp, which completed 25 for Flak Korps I and II by the end of September (Schenk, pp. 103-107). Another four were completed by the end of the year and were assigned pennant numbers s.F.201-227. Ten of an "improved design were then developed, assigned pennant numbers s.F.241-250, but only four were completed. Experience with the two sonder-Fähre designs - special ferries, which is what s.F. designated - led to the construction in 1941 of the improved design the - Siebel Fähre or Siebel ferry, which is what SF designated. Eventually 393, pennant number SF 1-393 were built. So no, your statement that, "Siebel himself said he’d completed the conversion of, what was it, 160? Both of those things could be true at the same time, can they not?" Is not true. The 150 Typ-B ferries were never used and never considered for use. Twenty-two Herbert and 25 s.F. ferries were ready by the end of September and all or most of them may have been ready for a landing attempt in the last possible September window. Worse, since you have been informed of these facts before, your repetition of information you know to be not true can only be assessed as a lie on your part. Since you apparently can only reliably lie, create straw man arguments, or make shit up, Since you have repeatedly done this now for well over a decade, my patience is at an end. I can only conclude that you are a very reliable fantasist, liar, and troll, so I will quite happily ignore you except to make fun of your obvious fantasies, trolling, and lying.
  22. I also read one of the volumes (Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front, 1943–1945: Red Steamroller), and thought it was quite good. No fanboyism there. He is quite critical of SS Panzer Divisions performance in the battle for Kiev (1943). To be fair, I don't think Forcyk is a fanbois, he just lost the forest for the trees of all that wonderful German improvisation and never looked deeply into what the actual British defenses they would encounter were...or even if the German landing plan was matched to the terrain and enemy.
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