Mighty_Zuk

Over 10,000 people undeadass just resurrected and nobody cares. One might expect the genocide-screeching discounted Palestine fan club to celebrate, but okay.

RUMINT says IDF is advancing a "cannon solution" for C-UAS.

Allies performing better in war = stronger alliance.

Figured some here probably don't know what Gaza looks like so here's a nice visualization:

Agreeable and APS-pilled.

Hamas knew exactly where they went. All those towns and villages they invaded - they mapped them out thoroughly. Hamasses knew exactly where the shelter of every home was, how to access it, and what families lived there. It was all planned very carefully.

It is theoretically possible to simply modify radar filters via software, but with the IDF's experience in Gaza it is evidently crucial to maintain a response time as low as possible. Changing the filters to include more raw data will inevitably slow down the response. Unless - they update the system to add more computational power. Someone uploaded this in another forum. I'm trying to figure out if the numbers are pixel counting or milimeters. Most indicative part is the barrel. Could a barrel's overall diameter reach 270mm? That's over twice the bore.

Needless to say Mr Smotrich is an utter buffoon and should be nowhere near a ministerial post.

Rafah op will reportedly last 2 months.

Refugees going kaboom

You are attributing to them a high level of incompetence or just low intellect because they committed an action that is immoral and in some ways self destructive. But if we do this for every enemy that operates in a similar pattern, we'll eventually just hurt our own chances of survival. If an enemy's actions seem unreasonable, you simply have to look harder into where that reason is. Hamas are a de facto government for Gaza. Even if they're indifferent to the suffering of the people, it still takes a great deal of competence, organization, and intellectual people in key positions, to effectively run a government that doesn't collapse within a week. And they certainly run things better than many African countries. There are a few ways to find reason in October 7th: 1. A gamble - with Iran, Hezbollah, and co, they could attempt to grab more territories than they eventually managed, in a blitz. Their plans actually showed this. They initially planned to drive a wedge between north and south Israel, and if that succeeded, Iran could have launched a larger scale attack. And if they'd lose the gamble, they'd have enough leverage to prevent their total destruction - hostages. 2. Raise Hamas popularity beyond Gaza to establish control elsewhere, particularly J&S but also in Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Jordan etc. Can always recruit more in Gaza anyway. 3. Israel is averse to major political moves and strives to lock onto a status quo favoring quiet over sustainability. Therefore it is safe to assume Israel will not seek a radical change and will be inclined to eventually make a deal that would allow Hamas to preserve itself even in the worst case scenario. 4. Hamas's leadership abroad, leadership in Gaza, and mid-level leadership in Gaza, are all sufficiently decoupled. Leadership abroad is rich and safe as long as it has leverage and it finds a host that's willing to protect them for some favors. Leadership in Gaza is also somewhat safe as it has significant infrastructure built solely to protect them, as well as connections in Egypt for an escape and the necessary assurances from leadership abroad that they won't be abandoned (they are a lifeline for one another). Mid level leadership in Gaza is expendable and they hope to climb the ranks fast enough to become rich and immune on their own. In the end, they're not stupid. They're smart, and evil. For good reason (for them) they raped and killed some, and kidnapped others. The number of kidnapped was intentionally significant, albeit limited enough to preserve Hamas's ability to constantly maintain an eye on them in the chaos of war. The Israeli government needs to be clear about such things with the public. They're not telling anyone anything Hamas don't know themselves.

You mean a plan to acquire a total of 350, or it has 350 now?

Even I didn't hear about it so what kind of yellow media you got it from? Besides, it's true. What's the harm in saying the truth? Hamas are too stupid to understand it on their own? Yeah, they're not that stupid.

Generator, perhaps with one of those follower drones that move in convoys with just one pilot, giving extra juice whenever needed. More interesting though is what would be a possible niche? Perhaps for urban areas to go door to door? You need significant armor there, but not a lot of endurance. Perhaps half an hour of fuel in most cases. It's one task where modern armed forces have yet to be able to achieve an asymmetrical technological edge.

Is there any technical limitation preventing us from developing a fully enclosed and armored exosuit capable of carrying a crew served weapon, with an endurance of 6-12 hours?

More M113 with Pitbull very light RCWS. I shared a photo here not long ago of another such M113. I thought it could be unmanned as it was seen in a built-up area in Gaza. These two could also be unmanned as they're driving in a very dangerous area. You can also see that on the farther M113, there is a similar attachment of the Pitbull RCWS on a heightened mount, on the center of the vehicle. On the M113 with flags, we see the RCWS mounted on its right side.

Since Trophy aims to prematurely detonate a warhead rather than disable it (e.g. Iron Fist), a successful interception can definitely cause a vehicle to be hit. The residual penetration could damage armor blocks, but also vital items like optics, the APS itself, antennas, and other external equipment. We also know that Hamas employs weapons that APS cannot intercept like IEDs and sticky HEAT charges, which it can use either as standalone or as part of a larger attack to first disable a vehicle, then deplete its APS. I don't think they'd count hits on vehicles with depleted APS into the statistics.

No it has not, and it says so in the article you linked. Hamas "accepted" something Israel never offered, immediately when Israel initiated its offensive into Rafah - to make it look like Israel rejected a deal. Saying "ok but don't shoot" when you already have a bullet in your head - doesn't count. They should have accepted the deal. Now they're going to find out. After Rafah, all that's left is to turn the leadership abroad into nuggets.

Strikes in Rafah. Likely a replay of this war's early days. Go in, recon, expose, deliver fire, go out. Repeat for deeper analysis. Full scale operation days or weeks later. This time, however, with many more political factors intertwined with operational ones.

Evacuation of Rafah begins. I believe this is done in small steps to put pressure on Hamas to accept a deal.

Okay, I hear you. But I still disagree. First, let's just get Hezbollah out of the equation, okay? They're not in the geographical area of this plan (which frankly I don't believe even 20% of it will materialize), and they're not really in a position to threaten it either. Maybe in the future something will change but for now they're a deterrent for Iran against attacks on Iran proper, and not really an operational arm to project power outward like the Houthis. And while I see a trend of force buildup, I don't see their strategy changing in the near future. Second, Hamas itself is in the process of being dismantled. They're not a threat now, nor will they be a threat in the near-mid future as long as the IDF prosecutes this war properly and doesn't cut it early. That plan actually mentions Iran a lot, I just chose to translate only the operative sections. While it does not involve any actions directly tackling Iran on its soil, it does mention a few pillars of this plan that are meant to tackle Iran's regional force buildup: 1. Dismantle Hamas - deny Iran's military and political influence and capabilities in Gaza, thus removing one potential front from the grand confrontation. 2. Bolster regional alliance - Israel's geographical limitations and the Arab relative military impotence can be negated by creating a defense pact with the US and forming a regional mini-NATO of Israel and the Arab states, which actually successfully went through a baptism of fire in last month's Iranian attack on Israel.

Hence me saying the economical part is pure copium. It includes some concessions Israel would have to make, economically, and that's not realistic. Israel is willing to let Gazan economy integrate with Israel's to mutually benefit from each other's shortcomings, but not actually give up economical opportunities. Also, Gazans do NOT respond well to economical incentives. In 2005 they destroyed the infrastructure Israel built for them and nullified their own export potential. They responded to Israel's policy on gradually improving their quality of life via donations - with a genocide. Gaza should be rebuilt, with foreign money, but they shouldn't get any rewards for their terrorism.

What makes Iran a stakeholder?

Apparently a presentation on a Gaza plan, dubbed "from crisis to prosperity", was leaked to Israeli press. In PDF format here: https://ynet-pic1.yit.co.il/picserver5/wcm_upload_files/2024/05/03/r1xP7iKGf0/Gaza_Businessmen_Initiative_heb___Copy__1_.pdf I'm not going to translate everything, I simply don't have the time. So I'll just give you the main points: Governance 12 months - Humanitarian aid. Israel creates safe, Hamas-free zones starting in the north and gradually going south. Essentially a clearing operation and dismantling black markets. Arab nations (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco) fund and supervise humanitarian aid in the safe zones. Gazan Palestinians govern the safe zones under Arab states' supervision. 5 - 10 years - Multilateral body. Israel maintains general responsibility over security. Arab states create a multilateral body that will supervise, direct, and fund an authority for the rehabilitation of Gaza. Gazan Palestinians run the rehabilitation authority that assumes responsibility over safe zones. Implementation of a "Marshall Plan" and de-radicalization initiatives. Long term - self governance. Israel maintains right to act against security threats. Arab states transfer rule over Gaza to a Gazan Palestinian government or a unified (with J&S) one - as long as said government proves its ability to maintain de-radicalization and de-militarization, and subject to all parties' agreement. Palestinians run Gaza independently, and join the Abraham Accords. Field Work Dismantle Hamas. Humanitarian aid: Establishment of Hamas-free safe zones while new cities are built in the Gaza strip. Safe zones are run by local Palestinians under the supervision and funding of Arab states. Rebuilding: Remove rubble. Build "from scratch" modern planned cities. Self governance - Elected figures will have to pledge peace and denounce all forms of terrorism. Strategic Outlook Israel: Long term security in the south. Regional integration. Economical opportunities in the south. Normalization with Saudi Arabia. Egypt: Prevention of crisis leakage to Sinai. Stopping export of radical islam from Gaza to Egypt. Business opportunities in Sinai. Economical aid. Establishment as a regional power. USA: Stablizing the middle east. Regional dominance. Fulfillment of IMEC vision (India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor). Gaza population: End Hamas's oppressive regime. End Gaza's siege and opening its economy to the world. Massive economical and job opportunities. Clear vision for an independent Palestinian government. Path for unification of Gaza and J&S under one government. Saudi, UAE, Bahrain: Stability and regional influence. Defense pact with USA. Access to Mediterranean sea. Intervention model repeatable in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon. Incentivizing investment in their economies. Jordan: Lower internal pressures. Financial incentives. Stopping export of radical islamism from Gaza to Jordan. Case for economical model Gaza as car battery production hub: Metals worth $1.3 trillion are to be unearthed in Saudi Arabia. Many of them can be transferred to Gaza, processed, and then made into batteries for vehicles. These are then exported to Europe for final assembly into vehicles. Okay so that sounds like quite the utopia, right? Unfortunately, while some aspects of it sound very logical and even necessary for a sustainable peace, it does seem to include copious amounts of the same conception that much of Israel's defense establishment believed in until October 7th, and from which it was disillusioned. The conception is as such: Radicalism can be deterred via improvement of quality of life. A person with more to lose, will fear more of losing it. This is obviously not the case anymore. Despite tremendous efforts to improve quality of life in Gaza, they set out to genocide the Jews. While I'm sure the opposite approach - reducing quality of life to deter radicalism - also won't work, it seems incredibly naive to me to relinquish economical opportunities as well as critical infrastructure to Gaza, considering Gaza's horrendous record of dismantling their own lifelines.

New article on Eitan and Trophy. If you're google translating it, don't read it too literally. Yoav Zaitun is a shitty and sensational defense "journalist". https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/bkwdivbga 1. Eitans were refitted on the field to act as casevac. >250 soldiers were evacuated with the Eitan. 2. Nahal brigade will complete adoption of the Eitan next year with 110 units. 3. IDF has yet to decide on whether to equip another brigade or to prioritize recon units. 4. 30mm cannon still planned. 5. RCWS (12.7mm) planned to be fitted with Spike or Matador. 6. There is more international interest in Eitan than with the Merkava and Namer. 7. IDF equipped "tens of tanks", during the war, with Trophy systems. Not new tanks, but older ones. 8. 45 AFVs equipped with Trophy were hit. Of them 38 required treatment. 50 successful interceptions were made (successful interception =/= not being hit or not needing treatment). 9. Interception rate ~85%. 10. 2 AFVs are considered a total loss, including one Namer CEV in which demolition charges detonated after being hit.