RichTO90

Because I embraced them and now we are us.

With over 800 pages before editing, I wrote more than a few things I have now forgotten I wrote. 😁

Yep. They had a remarkable set of them. 🤣 "Inclosure" instead of "enclosure". M everything. Ordinal "d" instead of "nd" or "rd" so 2d and 3d insetad of 2nd and 3rd. I cud go on an on.

Isn't it spelt liebrury?

Yep, U.S. Army "APC" was everyone else's APHE. Only capped. 😀

😁😜

Curiously, I have yet to find any M47's on the Kitsap, despite nearly ten years now of diligent searching. I am beginning to think they might possibly exist only in TankNet lore...

Which one? Downtown Bremerton? Sylvan Way? Both nice libraries. Port Orchard, Poulsbo, and Kingston are nice too. Then there is the new Silverdale branch, but I haven't been to that one yet. Kitsap has a great library system and is a great place to live. Don't tell anyone, but we also have the best weather in the CONUS.

Thank you so much for the recommendation. The 150 or so odd pages devoted to the Tank Destroyers got axed in editing. Can you guess why? Did you herniate yourself holding it? It's nearly 1.9 pounds - not quite a kilo for Yuropeens - as it is. Right now I am trying to finish my book on the 90th Infantry Division in Normandy - including my Dad's experience - and then will finish a separate Tank Destroyer organizational, doctrinal, and production tome to bookend with Mani Moran's excellent Can Openers.

Sorry, but no. Maybe Chicago to visit my granddaughter sometime. 😀

Well, it has shipped...with a price increase to $75. 🤪 However, if you happen to be on the Kitsap Peninsula, Washington State, on Saturday 25 May 2024, I will be signing at the Kitsap Mall Barnes and Noble from 12:00 to 15:00. 😁 https://www.amazon.com/American-Thunder-Design-Development-Doctrine/dp/0811773817/ref=sr_1_4?crid=1195R3TZRWK9Q&qid=1681839090&s=books&sprefix=american thinder,stripbooks,144

Um, the Mont St Michel causeway obviates the need to consult tide tables. 😁 https://en.normandie-tourisme.fr/unmissable-sites/the-mont-saint-michel/parking-and-access/ You can actually visit the four eastern beaches in a day, including Pointe du Hoc, but it would be a very busy day.

I doubt it. It is the same situation as with the old OR conundrum of where to armor aircraft based upon the damage on those that came back. 😂 Seriously, the Germans discovered with good reason that it was nigh impossible to down a B-17 with rifle caliber rounds and the .50 caliber and 13mm were not much more effective. I suspect most of those lost were hit by multiple 20mm, one or two 30mm, or single 88mm strikes. The firendly fire was probably just an embarrassing irritant.

If you do the math from the USAAF report: January 1944 - 55 of 200 small caliber/MG strikes were friendly fire. February 1944 - 68 of 228 March 1944 - 45 of 173 April 1944 - 41 of 226 May 1944 - 24 of 275 Total - 233 of 1,100, so about 21.2%

Eighteen infantry divisions in the numerical series, plus Americal, the 1st Cavalry (dismounted), and the 11th Airborne Division. Out of 65 numbered Infantry divisions, 1 named Infantry division, 2 (sort of) Cavalry divisions, 5 Airborne divisions, and 16 Armored divisions - 88 or 89 divisions. You are really counting 21 of 72 or 73, so between 1/4 and 1/3 of the non-armored divisions - about 29 percent - and less than 24 percent of all divisions. Note that 10 of those divisions were either garrisoning Hawaii at the start of the war or were part of the emergency reinforcement sent to the Pacific prior to the Battle of Midway. Two more that were already slated to the Pacific went in June 1942 and only one went in mid 1943, but then it was the first half of 1944 when the rest were allocated, basically to carry out the war-ending offensives in the SWPA and POA. BTW, one division that was slated to deploy to the Pacific went to Europe instead in the aftermath of the Battle of the Bulge.

Oh, okay, yes that makes sense then, since she was not yet a mine layer when sabotaged. It was on 28 (or 27, accounts vary) July 1943. Apparently one of the electricians working on her, Sigurd Weber, managed to place an SOE-delivered bomb on her that blew a hole below her waterline and sank her. Amazingly, he survived and lived to 92, dying in 2011. She was salved, arrived at Stettin for repairs on 16 August 1943 and repairs were completed on 26 January 1944, when she was taken in hand by the KM for conversion.

I think you are confusing the scuttling of the Danish fleet during SAFARI with sabotage actions later. I can find no evidence of a German mine layer lost by sabotage.

Probably the way every country did. Most of the women in industry or other jobs were married without children or unmarried. If they had children and worked they usually lived in a multi-generational household or had someone who took care of the children. There was also daycare and preschool/kindergarten, which was heavily subsidized by the Reich. French manufacturing was not much used until later in the war and most was confined to aircraft engines and some complete aircraft. Initially after the fall of France most French industry was ignored and/or looted for machine tools and resources, which were hauled back to the Reich. However, one place the Germans gained considerable advantage from were French shipyard workers, who did most of the maintenance for the KM vessels based in French ports.. By the time the Germans tried to make use of industry in Vichy or in the Occupied Zone it was too late and they were moribund or even had already had their workforce raided of essential personnel. For the most part they had limited options. Technically, Fremdearbeiter were volunteers recruited from Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria and were free to return home when their contract expired. Otherwise, they were various degrees of Zwangsarbeiter - forced labor - from POW to concentration camp inmates, with no choice.

In the US in 1940, there were 56,030,000 in the workforce, of whom 47,520,000 were employed. Of the 56-million in the workforce, 14,160,000 were female, 29.8%. In 1944, there were 65,140,000 in the workforce, 55,160,000 civilians and 9,980,000 military. Of those, 35,460,000 were males in the civilian workforce, and 19,700,000 were females in the civilian workforce, an increase of 5,640,000, so 35.7%, an increase of 5.9%, mostly in industrial jobs. In the Soviet Union, women were 38% of the workforce in 1940 and 53% in 1942. In Britain in June 1940, women made up 25.8% of the total workforce and 29.9% of the working civilian population. In June 1944, they made up 32.3% of the total workforce and 39.0% of the working civilian population. In Germany in 1939, women made up 37.4% of the civilian labor force and 51.1% in 1944. There was nothing unique about Rosie the Riveter other than the publicity. The real reason for the remarkable expansion of American production was that prewar, so much of American industry was idle, as was the working population. In Britain in June 1938, about 8.8% were unemployed, which dropped to 6.6% in June 1939. In the US in 1940, unemployment was nearly 15.2%, which dropped to nearly zero by 1944. The impact of losing the Jewish workforce in the German population during the war is also exaggerated, given there were just 330,000 German Jews or Mischlinge in the special census of 1939, out of a total Reich population of about 78-million.

The more I look into this, the more piss-poor the German-Italian planning appears, especially this fantasy by Student. It is actually worse than I initially thought. Part of what confused me about Student's plan was the expected capture of an RAF airfield, supposedly on the coast on the left of the German glider landing line, which they would use to airlift reinforcements. The thing was, there was no airfield there then, so I couldn't figure out what they thought they would capture. It turns out they were looking at RAF Qrendi (AKA Krendi), which construction had started in 1940 but halted when only partly complete because of the heavy bombing of April 1942 diverting construction resources to repair. However, the British also decided to use Krendi in the meantime as a decoy and would periodically turn on the landing lights to make it look as if it was completed...apparently it worked. Anyway, neither runway was complete or leveled, but it was occupied by Coy D, 3rd KOMR, with probably 125-150 O&OR. Then, about 1 1/4 KM to the southeast at Hagar Qim were Bn HQ, HQ Coy, and Coy B of the 3rd KOMR, with the Battalion 3" mortars. Then 1 1/4 to the northeast of Hagar Qim at the village of Qrendi was Coy C, 3rd KOMR. The last company of the battalion, A, was about 1 KM north of Qrendi village manning AAMG and LAA guns along the southwestern side of the Luqa Airfield. Altogether, the battalion probably manned about 40 AAMG (Bren, single Lewis, and twin Lewis). That is what the left two-thirds of Student's DS 230 line abreast was flying onto. The right two-thirds was supposed to land at the area northeast of the Blue Grotto (AKA the Wied Iż-Żurrieq) and southwest of the village of Zurrieq. The problem was, this is what the gliders were going to land on. And, yes, that was also what the gliders further west would be landing on. Anyway, the area of Zurrieq was defended by Coy B, 1st Hampshires, with Coy C at Safi, Coy D at Mqabba, with Bn HQ, HQ Coy, and Coy A further back at Gudja. And, along the coast and defending the airfield at Hal Far and the southern approach to Luqa, was the entire 4th HAA Regt RA with 16 3.7" guns, in three four-gun and two two-gun positions at Il-Hagra, Zurrieq, Birżebbuġa, Hal Ghaxaq, and Luqa, the first two of which could bear on any vessels approaching the Blue Grotto. Another two-gun 3.7" position was at Siġġiewi, just to the north of the 3rd KOMR positions. And then a line stretching east from Rabat to the east coast at Zabbar of 16 more 3.7" and three 3" guns. All could bear on the approaching Stukas and gliders. Looks pretty suicidal.

Some details. AA Guns A total of 8,403 US antiaircraft guns (2,110 20mm, 424 37mm, 5,595 40mm, 270 90mm, and 4 120mm) were actually shipped, with 7,833 arriving. In addition, 516 Navy 3” and 146 5” dual-purpose guns were shipped. The UK shipped another 288 antiaircraft and dual-purpose guns (162 20mm, 4 40mm, 22 12-pdr, 4 3.7”, 36 4”, and 56 130mm guns. Soviet wartime production (including the first half of 1941) 1941-1945 was 36,438. Thus, Lend-Lease, excluding the dual-purpose guns, totaled 8,121, about 18.2% of the total. But when looking at types we find something even more interesting. The Soviets produced just 4,860 M1940 25mm AA guns (1941-1945), Lend-Lease shipments of 20mm guns totaled 2,272 (31.9% of the total). The Soviets produced 19,116 M1939 37mm AA guns (1941-1945), Lend-Lease shipments totaled 6,023 37mm and 40mm guns (24% of the total). More interesting, these figures reflect the actual request made by the Soviet Union in the four Lend-Lease protocols with the US. In the first (1 Oct 41- 30 Jun 42) the Soviets requested 300 37mm AA guns or larger per month (2,700). In the second (30 Jun 42-30 Jun 43) a total of 360 12.7mm and 20mm guns (30 per month) and 3,000 37mm and 40mm guns (250 per month) were requested, along with 204 90mm guns. Thus we can see that a total of 5,700 37 and 40mm guns were requested and that 6,019 were shipped. There is little reason to suppose that the shipments were not completed under the terms of the protocol, so we may presume that about 4,200 were shipped in 1941 and 1942, about 69.8% of the total. In other words these shipments were completed to Soviet requirements – understandable considering the general dominance of the Luftwaffe, and given that just 3,896 Soviet M1939 37mm guns were completed in 1942 and that only a total of 6,802 had been completed in total. In other words, the US shipments may have accounted for between about 39 and 42 percent of the total receipts of that type. Motor Vehicles Total Soviet production of trucks in the second half of 1941 was 62,000, and then dropped precipitously to 35,000 in 1942, 49,200 in 1943, 60,600 in 1944, and 74,700 in 1945, for a wartime grand total of 281,500. So Soviet production of trucks in the second half of 1941 was 62,000, while Lend-Lease shipments from the US alone were 8,300 (11.8% of the total). Granted that only 1,506 arrived prior to 1 January 1942, but Soviet production in 1942 was only 35,000, while Lend-Lease from the US alone was 79,000 (69.3% of the total). Soviet production in 1943 was 49,200, while Lend-Lease from the US alone was 144,400 (74.6% of the total). Soviet production for 1944 and 1945 combined was 135,300, while Lend-Lease from the US alone through August 1945 was 188,700 (58.2% of the total). By 1 May 1945 32.8% of the Soviet Army truck park consisted of Lend-Lease vehicles. Thus, from June 1941 through December 1942, Soviet domestic production was 97,000, while US Lend-Lease was 87,300 (47.4% of the total). I have a difficult time not seeing that as significant, especially given how critical a time that was for the Soviets. Metals In terms of raw steel, Soviet production in 1941 totaled 17.893-million tons, but then catastrophically dipped to 44.1% of that in 1942, a total of 8.070-million tons. In 1943 production increased slightly to 8.475-million tons, and then steadily recovered thereafter to 10.887-million in 1944, and 12-252-million in 1945. US Lend-Lease data is less complete by year, but by 31 October 1943 a total of 1.198-million tons had been shipped, and 1.35-million tons by 1 January 1944. That is just 8.2% of the total domestic production through 1943, but obviously when production was at such low ebb any additions would have been beneficial. Nonetheless, the total of 2.017-million tons supplied through Lend-Lease was not critical compared to the 39.684-million tons produced domestically. In terms of finished steel and iron products production was also hard hit. In 1941 the Soviet Union produced 874,000 tons of rails, 780,000 tons of tubular steel, 185,000 tons of structural steel, 649,000 tons of steel wire, and 10.880-million tons of other steel and iron products. This decreased drastically in 1942, with only 112,000 tons of rails, 281,000 tons of tubular steel, 48,000 tons of structural steel, 210,000 tons of wire, and 5,045-million tons of other steel and iron products produced. Production then increased slightly in 1943 and then continued to recover through the end of the war. US Lend-Lease data is again incomplete, but in terms of rails, some 92,000 tons were shipped by 1 March 1943, 100,000 tons by 30 June 1943, and 656,000 tons to 31 March 1945. This may be compared to the total of 227,000 tons produced domestically in 1942 and 1943 and 664,000 tons total 1942-1945. At least in this area of metals production it appears that Lend-Lease may have played a critical role in covering the losses of production after the German invasion. In terms of non-ferrous metals, the Soviet Union produced 2.888-million tons in 1941, but was able to increase production in 1942 to 3.932-million tons. However, that increase was solely in tin, with copper production decreasing 36.2%, aluminum by 23.5%, lead by 23%, zinc by 46%, and nickel by 18.2%. In 1943 production decreased to 3.166-million tons. But copper production increased 10.2%, aluminum increased 19.2%, and nickel increased 44.4%. The others all decreased. By 1 January 1944 US Lend-Lease shipments of non-ferrous metals totaled just 384,000 tons, just 5.4% of Soviet production. However, most of the shipments were apparently concentrated in copper and aluminum, probably alleviating some of the shortfalls in that production. But again, it appears that other than as a temporary bridge to make up shortfalls Lend-Lease was not critical in these areas. POL Soviet domestic production of POL (diesel, petrol, motor fuel, and fuel oil) totaled 17.388-million tons 1942-1943, compared to US Lend-Lease POL shipments of 740,000 tons (4.3%). It is obvious that except for deliveries of hi-octane fuels and additives (which cannot be accurately assessed), Lend-Lease was a “drop in the bucket” compared to Soviet production. With regards to aviation gasoline however, US and Commonwealth shipments may have been critical. Overall, the Allies shipped 2.586-million tons of avgas to the Soviet Union between 1941 and 1945. From 1942-1945 Soviet receipts totaled 4.27-million tons – including the Allied shipments! It is difficult not to presume that this may have had as great an impact on Soviet air operations as anything else. Ammunition This is quite possibly one of the most critical areas and also the area in which Soviet production capability (next to production of basic foodstuffs) was worse hit by the German invasion. Prewar, the Soviet Union had spent enormous energy in expanding the chemical industry to support a major expansion in ammunition production. Unfortunately, much of this expansion was overrun in the first three months of the war, with the loss of annual production capability for 94,000 tons of propellant, 36,000 tons of TNT and 193,000 tons of nitric acid, 100-million artillery rounds, 32-million mortar shells, and 24-million aerial bombs. Lend-Lease supplied a total of 214,607 tons of finished explosives (mostly TNT), compared to domestic Soviet production of about 600,000 tons. In terms of raw materials, the US supplied 103,293 tons of toluene, compared to Soviet production of about 116,000 tons. In addition, the US shipped nearly 300,000 tons of propellants, equal to about three years worth of the production capacity lost when the Donbas chemical industry was overrun in 1941. This was probably critical, since the entire Soviet pre-war ammunition production (in terms of artillery ammunition) stockpiled from 1936 through June 1941, some 88-million rounds, was expended by the end of 1941. The loss of the Donbas chemical industry and of many ammunition plants meant that production delivered June-December 1941 was just 50 to 60 percent of the mobilization plan. As a stopgap production of aerial bombs, at 16-million in 1941, was reduced in 1942 to 6-million to allow diversion of the explosive filler and its constituent chemicals to other uses. As late as 1945 the production of bombs remained at under 6-million annually. But propellant production in the first quarter of 1943 was still at 91 percent of prewar capacity, while projectile production was at 113 percent, and gun production was at 281.6 percent. It is difficult to see how even this restricted production level could have been maintained without the Lend-Lease receipts. In fact ammunition production in terms of finished rounds peaked at just a 58% increase over the second quarter of 1941 – in the first quarter of 1945!

Well, yeah, which was established about 17 pages ago. 😁

Yes, but by fall 1941 in this scenario with no German commitment to North Africa, both those harbors are in British hands and Malta is well supplied via secure coasters and then a short run from Tripoli to Valletta. British air cover from North Africa also has just an easy 225 mile jump from Tripoli to Malta.

Oh, I forgot, in addition to the 2nd KOMR and parts of the 2nd Devons, the initial German glider landing also was on top of parts of the 8th KORR. In essence, a maximum of about 950 lightly armed riflemen were to land in gliders in the AORs of three strongly entrenched rifle battalions, which were liberally armed with LMG and MMG and were supported by numerous Bofors and AA LMG. I suspect the Germans will incur about 90% casualties in this lunatic enterprise.

As far as I can tell about Operazione C3/HERKULES, the whole thing reeks of indecision interwoven with desperation and wishful thinking. I've already mentioned that the air and naval requirements simply did not match what was actually available or that could be assembled for the operation. As yet another example, I am beginning to suspect that the participation of 7. Flieger-Division was simply pie-in-the-sky wishful thinking. If you dig a bit, you quickly see that it was rushed to the Ostfront on 27 September 1941 as emergency reinforcements, when it had barely been reconstituted and was still in the middle of retraining. FJR 1 was still incomplete (its II. Batallion was acting as FJ Lehr-Abteilung XI Fliegerkorps) and so II/LL-Sturm-Regiment was substituted. The regiment suffered heavy casualties by the time it was withdrawn in December - II/LL_Sturm was nearly destroyed. In April it moved to Normandy to complete training. FJR 2 was also incomplete, minus its II. Batallion, which between Corinth and Crete had been virtually destroyed, and so IV/LL-Sturm was substituted. They remained on the Ostfront until the end of July, when they returned to Germany and in the waning days of summer rejoined the division in Normandy. FJR 3 was nearly destroyed on Crete, with two of its battalions basically wiped out. Nevertheless, even though incomplete and nearly untrained, it went east too until December 1941. It joined the rest of the division in Normandy in April, where it began to rebuild and retrain. The best evidence I have found is that 7. Flieger-Division was in no condition to participate in C3. What was actually selected was Brigade Ramcke, comprised of various bits and pieces of reconstituted units that were operationally ready. That included I/FJR 2 with most of the trained cadre of that regiment, II/FJR 5, cobbled together from what was left of II/LLSR, II/FJR 2/FJ Lehr-Abteilung XI Fliegerkorps, which had returned from Africa where it had been a hasty reinforcement after CRUSADER, and von der Heydte's Fallschirmjäger-Lehr-Bataillon (eventually I/FJR 3). The brigade nominally was reinforced with II./Fallschirm-Artillerie-Regiment 7 (probably 12 10.5cm LG42), a company of Fallschirm-Panzerjäger-Abteilung 7 (probably 9 3.7cm Pak), 2./Fallschirm-Pionier-Bataillon XI. Fliegerkorps, and a signals and medical company. So not a massive, 10,000 man parachute division, but a four-battalion brigade - about one-third that. And even it was unlikely to participate, at least as according to Student, since he was called to Hitler's HQ in June and told in no uncertain terms that they would not participate in the Italians harebrained scheme. The short distance to fly back and reload the transports was compensated for by the simple fact that it was unlikely that many of those transports would return to Sicily after flying low and slow over the concentration of antiaircraft guns on Crete. Student's plan actually envisaged a single glider battalion landing at H-Hour (1330) in a line from Hagra s-Sweda in the west to Torri Zurrieq in the east, approaching from the south in DFS 230 towed by Stukas from a drop point 20 miles to the south. They would launch in line abreast at 11.500 to 13,000 feet and then the Stuka would go ahead to dive bomb various AA sites. The problem, of course, was lack of resources. As of mid-August II./Flieger-Korps had just 26 Ju 87 and in the entire Med there were just 77. However, imagine they all got together, attached 77 DFS 239 to them with 693 valiant troopers aboard...and get attacked by the 20 to 40 Spitfires, which was the typical reaction force, especially given they would have hours of warning time to track them as they flew from Sicily, circled Malta, and went in. Next, assuming they all somehow avoid RAF reaction, they get to fly in their line abreast and land along a front 5 kilometers wide. Defended, in prepared positions, by the 2nd KOMR...oh, except for the one-third of the poor sods who get to land at the eastern end of the line on the other side of the Blue Grotto, who land on the positions of the 2nd Devons. After that, the Germans get to form up and capture the suspected airfield in their zone so the La Spezia Division could be airlifted in...except that there was no airfield there. They were also to seize the area around the Zurrieq Valley, where the first amphibious landings by the San Marco marines would be made, at 0100, eleven and a half hours after the airborne assault began. In the meantime, two more air landings would occur, at 1615 (the rest of Brigade Ramcke) and 1900 (the first tranche of Folgore). I strongly suspect that by the time the first reinforcement arrives, the initial glider force would be hors de combat. Scattering a battalion across five kilometers of strongly defended front and giving them widely dispersed objectives is probably not a really great idea. The delusions of captured KV2 waddling ashore is one of the goofier myths that keep circulating.