Guest Murph Posted April 30, 2005 Posted April 30, 2005 True Ken, I was not clear. What I meant was that the Leadership of the French Army was at fault, not the troops or low to mid level commanders. I cannot fault the bravery of the French Army at all. However, the politcal will seems to have been lacking. But with the 25mm guns, weren't they rather poor? Actually, Murph, we covered that and more in our various 1940 threads [still avail?] in Feb-Mar. The French Army had excellent tanks, doctrine, orgn and capable armored leaders [not including the infantryman De Gaulle]. The Mod 1897 75mm worked just as well as an AT gun as an infantry or artillery piece, and there were plenty of 25mm and some 47mm available. French Inf-Arty doctrine used properly by the 1st Army stopped an attacking PzKps cold at Gembloux [sp?] just as their mech corps fought another to a standstill a few days earlier. The Maginot Line was actually a success: it was intended to guard against a surprise attack, allowing the army to complete mobilization and move into the field. The field armies were always supposed to decide the outcome. Not a single Maginot major work fell to the Germans [not to speak of the Italians] before the Armistice. That means that 75% of the frontier was safe and the remainder was the theater in contention. But for the German initiative at the Ardennes and the French high command remaining glued to the telephone, May-June 1940 could have been a much closer thing. Cheers, Ken169135[/snapback]
Colin Williams Posted May 2, 2005 Author Posted May 2, 2005 Actually, Murph, we covered that and more in our various 1940 threads [still avail?] in Feb-Mar. The French Army had excellent tanks, doctrine, orgn and capable armored leaders [not including the infantryman De Gaulle]. The Mod 1897 75mm worked just as well as an AT gun as an infantry or artillery piece, and there were plenty of 25mm and some 47mm available. French Inf-Arty doctrine used properly by the 1st Army stopped an attacking PzKps cold at Gembloux [sp?] just as their mech corps fought another to a standstill a few days earlier. The Maginot Line was actually a success: it was intended to guard against a surprise attack, allowing the army to complete mobilization and move into the field. The field armies were always supposed to decide the outcome. Not a single Maginot major work fell to the Germans [not to speak of the Italians] before the Armistice. That means that 75% of the frontier was safe and the remainder was the theater in contention. But for the German initiative at the Ardennes and the French high command remaining glued to the telephone, May-June 1940 could have been a much closer thing. Cheers, Ken169135[/snapback] Typical Estes response...presenting his initial opinion from a thread as the final consensus result of debate! Seriously, we shouldn't go overboard praising the French forces of 1940. Someone mentioned that the poilu of 1940 went off to war with as much enthusiam as his 1914 counterpart. In the wake of WW1, I don't believe any soldiers went off to war in 1939/40 with the same spirit shown in 1914, although the Germans did have the advantage of the morale boost from some succesfful campaigns under their belts by the summer of 1940. Of course we also can't forget the shortages of radios, the one-man tank turrets, the weakness of the DCRs (particularly in infantry and artillery), the shortage of anti-tank guns in frontline units (even though there were a number in depots), the nearly complete lack of anti-aircraft artillery, the failure of the Allied air forces to challenge German air superiority, etc. I culd go on and on...
Ken Estes Posted May 3, 2005 Posted May 3, 2005 Typical Estes response...presenting his initial opinion from a thread as the final consensus result of debate! Seriously, we shouldn't go overboard praising the French forces of 1940. Someone mentioned that the poilu of 1940 went off to war with as much enthusiam as his 1914 counterpart. In the wake of WW1, I don't believe any soldiers went off to war in 1939/40 with the same spirit shown in 1914, although the Germans did have the advantage of the morale boost from some succesfful campaigns under their belts by the summer of 1940. Of course we also can't forget the shortages of radios, the one-man tank turrets, the weakness of the DCRs (particularly in infantry and artillery), the shortage of anti-tank guns in frontline units (even though there were a number in depots), the nearly complete lack of anti-aircraft artillery, the failure of the Allied air forces to challenge German air superiority, etc. I culd go on and on...170123[/snapback] Huh? I think the point sometimes raised on the poilu of 1940 vs. 1914 is more recent, trying to counter the original interp/assumption that all were enthusiastic in '14 but dour and fatalistic in '40, Such generalizations rarely work, and not here either. But the enthusiasm for war in 1939 on all sides was measured, including the Germans as you point out, compared to the naivete of '14. The Germans [and Japanese] rallied well with early victories, but fell victim equally to victory disease. As to the last, it was also apparent that the French army got worse during the Phony War inactivity, whilst the Germans made their now-legion overhauls and key improvements in training and organization.
Colin Williams Posted May 3, 2005 Author Posted May 3, 2005 Huh? I think the point sometimes raised on the poilu of 1940 vs. 1914 is more recent, trying to counter the original interp/assumption that all were enthusiastic in '14 but dour and fatalistic in '40, Such generalizations rarely work, and not here either. But the enthusiasm for war in 1939 on all sides was measured, including the Germans as you point out, compared to the naivete of '14. The Germans [and Japanese] rallied well with early victories, but fell victim equally to victory disease. As to the last, it was also apparent that the French army got worse during the Phony War inactivity, whilst the Germans made their now-legion overhauls and key improvements in training and organization.170321[/snapback] Ken, Early on the in France 1940 thread, you argued that the French could have stopped the German attack, a position you repeated above as the resulting consensus from the thread. I was just pulling your leg! With respect to enthusiasm 1914 vs. 1940 (or 39), I certainly agree that there was less enthusiasm in 1914 than the traditional view suggests. Somewhere I have a scanned photo of the Irih Guards pulling their kit together at Waterloo Barracks in August, 1914, just before heading off for the train station and France. Enthusiasm is completely absent from the faces of these professionals. My basic point is that in 1939/40 no one had the luxury of ignorance about the true nature of modern war. Finally, with respect to the French Army "getting worse", I have only recently come to the realization that this subject needs more scrutiny, perhaps something already exists in French. Anyway, reading through a summary of the Riom trials of 1942, I have come across references to extensive combined arms exercises during the phony war. I will pull out the book and post the info. Colin
Ken Estes Posted May 3, 2005 Posted May 3, 2005 Ken, Early on the in France 1940 thread, you argued that the French could have stopped the German attack, a position you repeated above as the resulting consensus from the thread. I was just pulling your leg! With respect to enthusiasm 1914 vs. 1940 (or 39), I certainly agree that there was less enthusiasm in 1914 than the traditional view suggests. Somewhere I have a scanned photo of the Irih Guards pulling their kit together at Waterloo Barracks in August, 1914, just before heading off for the train station and France. Enthusiasm is completely absent from the faces of these professionals. My basic point is that in 1939/40 no one had the luxury of ignorance about the true nature of modern war. Finally, with respect to the French Army "getting worse", I have only recently come to the realization that this subject needs more scrutiny, perhaps something already exists in French. Anyway, reading through a summary of the Riom trials of 1942, I have come across references to extensive combined arms exercises during the phony war. I will pull out the book and post the info. Colin170524[/snapback] Both Robert Doughtey and Eugenia Kiesling show the deterioration in the Phony War in their respective books, especially the latter, as she is very much into the state of the reserves and their training before the Debacle. I think too many people were snookered by pop historians like Barbara Tuchman telling the old saw about hussar officers sharpening their sabers on the steps of the Wilhelmsstrasse in 1914, then took the notion of war fever. The Austrians were almost psyched out by their fears of the Rus and Serb armies, in turn, according to a recent German article. I get it now. I thought the separated part would be recognized as my own opinion. Cheers, Ken
Colin Williams Posted May 3, 2005 Author Posted May 3, 2005 Both Robert Doughtey and Eugenia Kiesling show the deterioration in the Phony War in their respective books, especially the latter, as she is very much into the state of the reserves and their training before the Debacle. 170560[/snapback] I will have to look into this more, as I seem to recall that Kiesling makes a pretty strong case for very poor standards of training in the interwar period. I have to believe that things could only get better during the Phony War! It's interesting to me that for all the insightful West Point (and other DoD insitute) faculty analysis of failed military doctrines, systems, strategies, etc., I can see so many of today's problems mirrored in the past. For example, from Kiesling we have this quote - "In fact, in September 1939, a regimental commander discovered that a sentry who did not know how to present arms had done his conscript year as an officer's batman and that fully 150 of the men in his regiment were products of the navy, the air force, the cavalry, or the tank arm. These men, who had never undergone the basic "school of the soldier," had to be removed from their companies to be trained as infantrymen." How many units deploying to Iraq could identify with this? And how many US voters can recognize this - "The sixty-eight articles of the new Loi sur l'organisation de nation pour le temps de guerre called upon the government to make peacetime preparations for the mobilization of the population and resources of France to meet the exigencies of war...Those parts of the Loi sur l'organisation de nation pour le temps de guerre that government agencies did not likewere simply ignored..."[The French] made do with a law that was politically acceptable and then told themselves it would be adequate..."
Ken Estes Posted May 5, 2005 Posted May 5, 2005 Heh, Colin, that seems to be the problem. The Frogs were so pleased to get the cumbersome reserve establishment into the field that they stopped with that and did not train it up. But of course, we have some evidence that the BEF was [apart from Monty's division] about as bad, failing to conduct field exercises, etc. I have talked to Kiesling about this and urged her to continue into evaluating the reservist performance in May-June, but, alas, she is now into classical strategy, Thucydides, etc. Many of us are not missing the analogies to the present day, though. Cheers, Ken
GdG Posted May 5, 2005 Posted May 5, 2005 By the way, an excellent article from David Lehmann (who is a credible source) from the France 1940 Yahoo mailing list: NUMBER OF AFVs ON 10th MAY 1940 *** FRANCE *** 1) HOTCHKISS TANKS 13e BCC : 40+5 Hotchkiss H3514e BCC : 40+5 Hotchkiss H39 (2e DCR)25e BCC : 40+5 Hotchkiss H39 (1e DCR)26e BCC : 40+5 Hotchkiss H39 (1e DCR)27e BCC : 40+5 Hotchkiss H39 (2e DCR)38e BCC : 40+5 Hotchkiss H3542e BCC : 40+5 Hotchkiss H39 (3e DCR)45e BCC : 40+5 Hotchkiss H39 (3e DCR) 342e CACC : 15 Hotchkiss H39 (Norway)1/42e CACC : 15 Hotchkiss H35 1e DLM : 86 Hotchkiss H35 (+ 8 reserve tanks)--4e RC (43 Hotchkiss H35 and 48 Somua S35) : 43+4 Hotchkiss H35--18e RD (43 Hotchkiss H35 and 48 Somua S35) : 43+4 Hotchkiss H35 2e DLM : 86 Hotchkiss H35 (+ 8 reserve tanks)--13e RD (43 Hotchkiss H35 and 48 Somua S35) : 43+4 Hotchkiss H35--29e RD (43 Hotchkiss H35 and 48 Somua S35) : 43+4 Hotchkiss H35 3e DLM : 153 Hotchkiss H39 (+ 10 reserve tanks)--1e RC (43 Hotchkiss H39 and 48 Somua S35) : 43+4 Hotchkiss H39--2e RC (43 Hotchkiss H39 and 48 Somua S35) : 43+4 Hotchkiss H39--11e RDP : 67+2 Hotchkiss H39 1e DLC, 1e RAM : 13 Hotchkiss H352e DLC, 2e RAM : 13 Hotchkiss H353e DLC, 3e RAM : 13 Hotchkiss H354e DLC, 4e RAM : 13 Hotchkiss H355e DLC, 5e RAM : 13 Hotchkiss H35 1e RCA : 13 Hotchkiss H35 and 14 Hotchkiss H39 (Tunisia) In the infantry divisions there is a cavalry unit in charge of reconnaissance or GRDI (Groupe de Reconnaissance de Division d'Infanterie). In the army corps there is a cavalry unit in charge of reconnaissance or GRCA (Groupe de Reconnaissance de Corps d'Armée). They were mostly equipped with motorcycles and horses but in the motorized infantry divisions they were grossly composed of one squadron of AMD, one squadron of AMR, one motorcycle squadron and one support company (about 26 armored cars, 15 side-cars, 2 cars, 2 trucks, 4 light trucks, 24 FM 24/29 LMGs, 12 Hotchkiss Mle1914 MMGs, 2 60mm mortars and 3-6 25mm AT guns)2e GRDI (9e DIM) : 13 Panhard 178 and 13 Hotchkiss H395e GRDI (25e DIM) : 13 Panhard 178 and 13 Hotchkiss H35 TOTAL = 859 Hotchkiss tanks (including 42 tanks in Norway and Tunisia) REINFORCEMENTS IN MAY 1940 :· 3e RC (39 Somua S35 + 40 Hotchkiss H39) : 40 Hotchkiss H39 (attached to the 4e DCR)· 7e RC (24 Hotchkiss H39 + 25 Somua S35) : 24 Hotchkiss H39· 351e CACC : 11 Hotchkiss H39 CONCLUSION :817 Hotchkiss tanks (306 Hotchkiss H35 and 511 Hotchkiss H39) in France on 10th May 1940. 2) RENAULT R35/39 TANKS 1e BCC : 40+5 Renault R35/392e BCC : 40+5 Renault R35/39 (4e DCR)3e BCC : 40+5 Renault R35/395e BCC : 40+5 Renault R35/396e BCC : 40+5 Renault R35/399e BCC : 40+5 Renault R35/3910e BCC : 40+5 Renault R35/3912e BCC : 40+5 Renault R35/3916e BCC : 40+5 Renault R35/3917e BCC : 40+5 Renault R35/3920e BCC : 40+5 Renault R35/3921e BCC : 40+5 Renault R35/3922e BCC : 40+5 Renault R35/3923e BCC : 40+5 Renault R35/3924e BCC : 40+5 Renault R35/39 (4e DCR)32e BCC : 40+5 Renault R35/3934e BCC : 40+5 Renault R35/3935e BCC : 40+5 Renault R35/3939e BCC : 40+5 Renault R35/3943e BCC : 40+5 Renault R35/3962e BCC : 30 Renault R35 and 15 Renault FT17 (Morocco)63e BCC : 40+5 Renault R35 (Levant)68e BCC : 40+10 Renault R35 (Levant) TOTAL = 1025 Renault R35/39 tanks (including 125 tanks in the colonies) on 10th May 1940 ON 20th MAY 1940 :· 44e BCC : 40+5 Renault R35/39 (4e DCR)· 40e BCC : 15 Renault R35/39 and 30 Renault R40· 48e BCC : 16 Renault R35/39 and 29 Renault R40 IN JUNE 1940 :· 25e BCC : recreated with 21 Renault R35/39 and 24 Renault R40· 2e BCC : reinforced with 9 Renault R35/39· Polish battalion : 17 Renault R35/39 and 28 Renault R40.The 10th Polish armored brigade consisted only of the 1st tank battalion and one motorized infantry battalion. Companies "Pagézy" and "Chabowski" were rearmed with Renault R-40 tanks. CONCLUSION :900 Renault R35/39 tanks in France on 10th May 1940. 3) RENAULT D1 TANKS Mostly all the Renault D1 tanks are in Tunisia : 61e BCC (45 Renault D1), 65e BCC (45 Renault D1) and 67e BCC (45 Renault D1). The 67e BCC is moved in France and engaged in mid-June 1940 with 45 Renault D1.There are also 8 tanks in training schools in France and 17 replacement tanks in Tunisia. CONCLUSION :0 Renault D1 tanks in combat units on 10th May 1940 in metropolitan France 4) RENAULT D2 TANKS 100 of these tanks were produced between 1937 and 1940. They were armed with a 47mm gun (47mm SA34 gun for the first 50 tanks and 47mm SA35 gun for the last 50 tanks), a coaxial 7.5mm MAC1931 MG and a bow 7.5mm MAC1931 MG.>From the 50 first produced tanks, 5 were issued to schools and 45 equipped the 19e BCC. In April, the first company (1/19e BCC) was issued with 14 brand new D2 tanks (47mm SA35 gun) and became temporary the 345e CACC. The 14 old tanks were intended to be transformed in flamethrower tanks.On 16th May 1940 the 346e CACC was equipped with 10 tanks and 12 tanks were issued to the 350e CACC on 20-16th May 1940. The 19e BCC and the 345e CACC are attached to the newly created 4e DCR.The 14 remaining tanks were probably used simply to replace 14 other ones armed with the short 47mm gun or to replace damaged or destroyed D2 tanks in combat units. CONCLUSION :45 Renault D2 in combat units on 10th May 1940 (including at least 14 D2 with the 47mm SA35 gun).In late May 1940 there are 67 Renault D2 in combat units (including at least 36 with the 47mm SA35, perhaps 50 ones with the last 14 produced ones.) 5) FCM36 TANKS 4e BCC : 40+5 FCM367e BCC : 40+5 FCM36 CONCLUSION :90 FCM36 tanks in combat units on 10th May 1940. 6) SOMUA S35 TANKS 1e DLM : 88 Somua S35 (+ 8 reserve tanks)--4e RC (46 Hotchkiss H35 and 48 Somua S35) : 44+4 Somua S35--18e RD (46 Hotchkiss H35 and 48 Somua S35) : 44+4 Somua S35 2e DLM : 88 Somua S35 (+ 8 reserve tanks)--13e RD (46 Hotchkiss H35 and 48 Somua S35) : 44+4 Somua S35--29e RD (46 Hotchkiss H35 and 48 Somua S35) : 44+4 Somua S35 3e DLM : 88 Somua S35 (+ 8 reserve tanks)--1e RC (46 Hotchkiss H39 and 48 Somua S35) : 44+4 Somua S35--2e RC (46 Hotchkiss H39 and 48 Somua S35) : 44+4 Somua S35 IN MAY 1940· 3e RC (39 Somua S35+ 40 Hotchkiss H39) : 39 Somua S35 (attached to the 4e DCR)· 7e RC (24 Hotchkiss H39 + 25 Somua S35) : 25 Somua S35 CONCLUSION :264 Somua S35 tanks in combat units on 10th May 1940. 7) RENAULT B1 and B1bis TANKS 1e DCR : 68 + 1 command tank = 69 Renault B1bis--28e BCC : 31+3 Renault B1bis--37e BCC : 31+3 Renault B1bis 2e DCR : 68 + 1 command tank = 69 Renault B1bis--8e BCC : 31+3 Renault B1bis--15e BCC : 31+3 Renault B1bis 3e DCR : 68 Renault B1bis--41e BCC : 31+3 Renault B1bis--49e BCC : 31+3 Renault B1bis IN MAY 1940 :· 46e BCC : 31+3 Renault B1bis (4e DCR)· 47e BCC (1/47 and 3/47) : 18 Renault B1bis (4e DCR)· 3/37e BCC reinforcement : 5 Renault B1· 347e CACC : 12 Renault B1 and 3 Renault B1bis· 349e CACC (2/47e BCC) : 10 Renault B1bis· 348e CACC : 10 Renault B1bis· 28e BCC reconstituted : 31+3 Renault B1bis IN JUNE 1940 :· 352e CACC : 10 Renault B1bis· Compagnie Bibes : 11 Renault B1bis (2 turretless tanks)· Compagnie de marche du 10e BCC : 8 Renault B1bis (4 turretless tanks) CONCLUSION :206 Renault B1bis tanks in combat units on 10th May 1940. 8) RENAULT FT17m and FT17c TANKS These WW1 tanks were completely obsolete in 1940. They were much slower (about 10 times in cross country) than the German tanks, poorly armored and armed either with an infantry gun or a MG. a) FT17 tank battalions :11e BCC : 42 Renault FT17m/c18e BCC : 63 Renault FT17m/c29e BCC : 63 Renault FT17m/c30e BCC : 63 Renault FT17m/c31e BCC : 63 Renault FT17m/c33e BCC : 63 Renault FT17m/c62e BCC : 30 Renault R35 and 15 FT17 (Morocco) - in transformation on Renault R3564e BCC : 45 Renault FT17 (Tunisia, coming from Algeria) - in transformation on Renault R3566e BCC : 45 Renault FT17 (Morocco) - in transformation on Renault R35colonial BCC : 63 Renault FT17m/c343e CACC : 21 Renault FT17m/c344e CACC : 21 Renault FT17m/c Total in the tank battalions : 567 Renault FT17 tanks. Regional platoons of FT17 tanks :1 to 4 FT17 regional platoons (4 to 16 tanks) were issued to 25 regional regiments (sections de chars de régiments régionaux) for a total of 192 Renault FT17 tanks. c) Protection for military and civilian installations in the military district. These units created during May 1940 included :Anti-paratroops tank companies : 7 companies of 12 tanks for a total of 84 Renault FT17 tanks.Airfield protection platoons : 1 to 5 FT17 regional platoons (4 to 20 tanks) were issued to 11 military districts for a total of 112 Renault FT17 tanks.Important buildings protection platoons : 1 to 3 FT17 regional platoons (4 to 12 tanks) were issued to 7 military districts for a total of 72 Renault FT17 tanks.Paris military region special group = 50e BCC : 50 Renault FT17m tanks.regional platoon of protection tanks : 9 tanks in 10 military regions for a total of 90 Renault FT17 tanks. Overseas regional platoons :One independent tank company in Tunisia to guard the coastline : 16 Renault FT17 tanks.District tank platoons to defend the major cities in Morocco (28), Tunisia (16) and Algeria (20) for a total of 64 Renault FT17 tanks. In the Levant there were the 56 former FT-17 tanks of the 63e BCC. Most remained in depots but the CACL (compagnie autonome des chars du Levant was created) with 3 groups of 10 tanks (9+1 replacement tank = = 3x FT17m, 6x FT17c, 1x FT17BS) in the cities of Beyrouth, Alep and Damas for a total of 30 Renault FT17 tanks. In June 1940, the CACL is reinforced by 6 FT-17 tanks (1x FT17c in each groups and 3 FT17m for the protection of the airbase in Estabel in Lebanon). There were also about 20 Renault FT17 tanks in Indochina (not all operational). à TOTAL : 1297 FT17 tanks were still in service : 1062 tanks in France and 235 in the colonies. From the 1062 FT17 tanks in France, 462 were in combat units on 10th May 1940. CONCLUSION :462 Renault FT17 tanks in COMBAT UNITS on 10th May France in 1940. 9) FCM-2C TANKS 51e BCC : 8 FCM-2C CONCLUSION :8 FCM-2C tanks in combat units on 10th May 1940. NUMBER OF FRENCH TANKS IN FRANCE ON 10th MAY 1940 : 2322 (2792)· Hotchkiss H35 : 306· Hotchkiss H39 : 511· Renault R35/39 : 900· FCM36 : 90· Somua S35 : 264· Renault D2 : 45· Renault B1bis : 206-->Modern tanks : 2322 · Renault FT17 : 462 (obsolete)· FCM-2C : 8 (obsolete)--> Obsolete tanks : 470 Tanks outside metropolitan territory on 10th May 1940 : 537· Norway : 342e CACC (15 Hotchkiss H39)· Algeria : 64e BCC (45 Renault FT17) and 20 Renault FT17 tanks.· Morocco : 62e BCC (30 Renault R35 and 15 Renault FT17), 66e BCC (45 Renault FT17) and 28 Renault FT17 tanks.· Tunisia : 1e RCA (14 Hotchkiss H39 + 13 Hotchkiss H35), 61e BCC (45 Renault D1), 65e BCC (45 Renault D1), 67e BCC (45 Renault D1) and 32 Renault FT17 tanks. The 67e BCC was sent in France in middle June 1940 and was engaged in the battle of Souain.· Levant (Syria, Lebanon) : 63e BCC (45 Renault R35), 68e BCC (50 Renault R35) and CACL (30 Renault FT17 tanks).· Indochina : 20 Renault FT17 tanks. --> 537 tanks· 29 Hotchkiss H39· 13 Hotchkiss H35· 125 Renault R35· 90 Renault D1 + 45 Renault D1 transported to France in June 1940 = 135 Renault D1· 235 Renault FT17 REINFORCEMENTS IN MAY / JUNE 1940 : probably about 556 (estimation)· Hotchkiss H39 : 75· Renault R35/39 : 123· Renault R40 : 111· Renault D1 : 45· Somua S35 : 64· Renault B1 : 17· Renault B1bis : 131 (not counting the 6 turretless tanks)--> 466 new or replacement tanks during May / June 1940.During early June 1940, the remains of the 5 DLCs were to be converted to a DLM "type réduit", a reduced DLM. The deteriorating military situation meant only 4e DLM and 7e DLM were actually formed. The 1e DLM, 2e DLM and 3e DLM are also reconstituted beginning June, as reduced DLMs, with men evacuated from Dunkirk and who returned to France after a transit in Great Britain. These 5 DLMs fought until 25th June 1940. These units include old vehicles from former units, taken in dumps, park and schools but also some brand new vehicles just out of the factories. These new units add probably about 50 Somua S35 tanks and 40 Hotchkiss H39 tanks. The total number of French tanks in COMBAT UNITS in France on 10th May (2837 tanks) seems quite impressive but :- These tanks are dispersed on the whole metropolitan territory not all facing the German main attacks and their ability to concentrate tanks- This number includes only 2367 'modern' tanks + FT17 tanks and a few FCM-2C- Among all the H35/39 and R35 tanks, only about 20-25% (about 300-400 tanks) are armed with the 37mm SA38 gun. Only 350 37mm L/33 SA38 guns had been delivered until April 1940 to equip various Renault R35 (then called R39), Hotchkiss (H35 and H39) and a few FCM36 tanks (So the number of 400 could even be overestimated on 10th May 1940). Concerning the FCM36 tanks only very few were converted and the 37mm SA38 gun equipped mainly Hotchkiss tanks and in priority the Hotchkiss H39 tanks (newly produced ones or converted ones, in priority the platoon commander tanks).Therefore on 10th May 1940, against the 955 Germans tanks armed with 3.7cm and 7.5cm guns there were only 515 French tanks armed with a 47mm SA35 and about 350 which had a 37mm SA38 gun = 865 tanks with an excellent (47mm SA35) to good (37mm SA38) anti-tank capacity. The huge majority of the French tanks are light tanks armed with the 37mm SA18 gun which could be used at 400m against the Panzer I and Panzer II but to knock out a Panzer III Ausf.E/F (the previous models were far less armored and were easier to destroy) or a Panzer IV Ausf.C/D they had to get as close as < 25-100m whereas the enemy could destroy them at about 300m (3.7cm KwK) to 500m (7.5cm KwK). 10) ARMORED CARS 1e DLM : 107 armored cars--6e RC : 40 Panhard 178 (+1 radio car + 2 reserve armored car)--4e RDP : 67 AMR33 / AMR35 ZT1 (+2 reserve armored cars) 2e DLM : 107 armored cars--8e RC : 40 Panhard 178 (+1 radio car + 2 reserve armored car)--1e RDP : 67 AMR33 / AMR35 ZT1 (+2 reserve armored cars) 3e DLM : 40 armored cars--12e RC : 40 Panhard 178 (+1 radio car + 2 reserve armored car) 1e DLC--1e RAM : 12 Panhard 178 (+1 radio car + 2 reserve armored car)--5e RDP : 23 AMR33 / AMR35 ZT1 2e DLC--2e RAM : 12 Panhard 178 (+1 radio car + 2 reserve armored car)--3e RDP : 23 AMR33 / AMR35 ZT1 3e DLC--3e RAM : 12 Panhard 178 (+1 radio car + 2 reserve armored car)--2e RDP : 23 AMR33 / AMR35 ZT1 4e DLC--4e RAM : 12 Panhard 178 (+1 radio car + 2 reserve armored car)--14e RDP : 23 AMR33 / AMR35 ZT1 5e DLC--5e RAM : 12 Panhard 178 (+1 radio car + 2 reserve armored car)--15e RDP : 23 AMR33 / AMR35 ZT1 GRDIs (Groupe de Reconnaissance de Division d'Infanterie) :1e GRDI (5e DIM) : 13 Panhard 178 and 12 Citroën-Kégresse P162e GRDI (9e DIM) : 13 Panhard 178 and 13 Hotchkiss H393e GRDI (12e DIM) : 13 Panhard 178 and 12 Citroën-Kégresse P164e GRDI (15e DIM) : 13 Laffly 50 AM and 12 Citroën-Kégresse P165e GRDI (25e DIM) : 13 Panhard 178 and 13 Hotchkiss H356e GRDI (3e DIM) : 13 Panhard 178 and 12 Citroën-Kégresse P16 and 4 AMR35 ZT37e GRDI (1e DIM) : 13 Panhard 178, 12 Citroën-Kégresse P16 and 4 AMR35 ZT3(32e GRDI (43e DI) : 5 Panhard 178) In these GRDIs were also dispatched some other armored cars including :AMR35 ZT2 : 10 (25mm turret gun)AMR35 ZT3 : 2 (25mm hull gun)AMR33 / AMR35 ZT1 : 10 (approximate number) -->TOTAL = about 575 armored cars in France on 10th May 1940Panhard 178 : 223AMR33 / AMR35 ZT1 : 259 (including about 150 AMR35 ZT1)AMR35 ZT2 : 10AMR35 ZT3 : 10Laffly 50AM : 13Citroën-Kégresse P16 Mle1929 : 60 NUMBER OF FRENCH ARMORED CARS ON 10th MAY 1940 : 575· Panhard 178 : 223 (wheeled)· AMR33 / AMR35 ZT1 : 259 (including about 150 AMR35 ZT1) (tracked)· AMR35 ZT2 : 10 (tracked)· AMR35 ZT3 : 10 (tracked)· Laffly 50AM : 13 (wheeled)· Citroën-Kégresse P16 Mle1929 : 60 (halftracked)--> TOTAL : 575 Not counted are the APCs (unarmed) :· Lorraine 38L VBCP : 150 (tracked) Armored cars in the colonies on 10th May 1940 : 234 (estimation)· AMR33 / AMR35 ZT1 : 10 (tracked)· White Mle1918 : 50 (10 in Indochina and 40 in the Levant) (WW1, wheeled)· Laffly 50AM : 50 (6-10 in Indochina and 12 in the Levant) (wheeled)· Laffly 80AM : 27 (Africa) (wheeled)· Panhard 165/175 TOE : 28 (16 in the Levant) (wheeled)· Panhard 178 (but with APX5 turret) : 4 (in Indochina) (wheeled)· Laffly S15 TOE : 45 (25 in North Africa and 20 in West Africa) (wheeled)· MG armed Renault UE tractors : very few in Indochina (tracked)· Peugeot and Renault Mle1915 : very few in Indochina (WW1, wheeled)· Berliet VUM : 1 (Levant, in Syria)· AMC Citroën-Kégresse-Schneider M23 : very few in the Levant· AM légère (AML) Panhard-Zudel : 5 (in the Levant)· AM légère du désert (AMLD) Hotchkiss : 13 (in the Levant, partially armored, only one LMG)· AMLD Chenard et Walker : 15 (in the Levant, not armoured cars, one MG, not counted) Not counted are the APCs (unarmed) :· Berliet VUDB : 32 (wheeled)· Panhard 179 : 30 (wheeled)· Citroën-Kégresse P104 : 10 (3-5 in Indochina) (half-tracked)· Panhard armored bus : 3 (in the Levant) REINFORCEMENTS IN MAY / JUNE 1940 : probably about 270 (estimation)· About 30 Renault AMC35 in various little units formed rather during June 1940 : "Escadron Audigier" and several "groupes francs de cavalerie"· 40 Panhard 178 (+1 radio car + 2 reserve armored car) issued to the 10e RC (4e DCR)· 70 Laffly W15 TCC tank destroyersDuring early June 1940, the remains of the 5 DLCs were to be converted to a DLM "type réduit", a reduced DLM. The deteriorating military situation meant only 4e DLM and 7e DLM were actually formed. The 1e DLM, 2e DLM and 3e DLM are also reconstituted beginning June, as reduced DLMs, with men evacuated from Dunkirk and who returned to France after a transit in Great Britain. These 5 DLMs fought until 25th June 1940. These units include old vehicles from former units, taken in dumps, park and schools but also some brand new vehicles just out of the factories. Several Panhard 178 went in combat without turret : with home-made armor plates (16-20mm) forming a casemate (40 would have been produced during June 1940) and armed with 25mm SA35 or 47mm SA34 guns and a LMG or completely without turret/casemate and simply armed with a LMG.Some Panhard 178 armored cars had a modified turret with a 47mm SA35 gun and a coaxial MG in June 1940 (Renault turret). This version participated to combats in June 1940 with at least one vehicle on the Loire River according to a photographic proof but the unit equipped with it is not know. It may have been of these DLMs. Several Renault AMR went also in combat without turret in June 1940, just with a mount for a LMG. These new units add probably about 80 Panhard 178 and 50 AMR33/35 new vehicles. ** BELGIUM ** Infantry units :Infantry division n°1 : 12 T13Infantry division n°2 : 12 T13Infantry division n°3 : 12 T13Infantry division n°4 : 12 T13Infantry division n°7 : 12 T13Infantry division n°8 : 12 T13Infantry division n°9 : 12 T13Infantry division n°10 : 12 T13Infantry division n°11 : 12 T131e division de chasseurs ardennais : 3 T15 and 48 T132e division de chasseurs ardennais : 3 T15Independent border cyclist company : 12 T138th border cyclist company : 12 T13PFN fortress company : 12 T13 (PFN = Position Fortifiée de Namur, Namur fortified position) Cavalry units :1st Cavalry division : 18 T15 and 18 T132nd Cavalry division : 18 T15 and 18 T13Escadron d'auto-blindées du corps de cavalerie : 8 Renault ACG-1. The Belgian ACG1 had a modified turret with a coaxial 13.2mm HMG instead of the 7.5mm MAC31 MG --> TOTAL : 8 ACG-1, 42 T15 and 228 T13 = 278 tanksThe Belgian army had also a few FT17 tanks but they were apparently not in combat units anymore. CONCLUSION : 278 Belgian AFVs on 10th May 1940 ** NETHERLANDS ** All the Dutch armored car were in the 1st armored car squadron of the light division (Lichte Divisie). Pantserwagen (Paw.) M36 (Landswerk L181) : 12Paw.M38 (Landswerk L180) : 14 (including 2 command cars)DAF M39 : 7 (never issued to combat units before the defeat)--> TOTAL : 26 armored cars CONCLUSION : 26 Dutch armored cars on 10th May 1940. ** UNITED-KINGDOM ** 12th Royal LancersMorris armoured reconnaissance car : 38 4th Northumbrian fusiliersDaimler Dingo scout car : 12 N°3 Air Mission Phantom (RAF)Guy armoured car : 6 4th battalion Royal Tank RegimentMatilda I : 50Vickers MkVIb : 5 7th battalion Royal Tank RegimentMatilda I : 27Matilda II : 23Vickers MkVIb : 7 13th / 18th Hussars (1st Division)Vickers MkVIb : 28(Carrier with Boys ATR : 44) 4th / 7th Dragoon guards (2nd Division)Vickers MkVIb : 28(Carrier with Boys ATR : 44) Lothian & Border Horse (48th Division)Vickers MkVIb : 28(Carrier with Boys ATR : 44) 15th / 19th Hussars (3rd Division)Vickers MkVIb : 28(Carrier with Boys ATR : 44) Innskilling Dragoon guards (4th Division)Vickers MkVIb : 28(Carrier with Boys ATR : 44) East Riding Yeomanry (3rd Corps)Vickers MkVIb : 28(Carrier with Boys ATR : 44) Fife & Forfar Yeomanry (51st Highland division)Vickers MkVIb : 28(Carrier with Boys ATR : 44) --> TOTAL = 304 tanks and 56 armored carsMatilda I : 73Matilda II : 23Vickers MkVIb : 208Morris armoured reconnaissance car : 38Daimler Dingo scout car : 12Guy armoured car : 6Carrier with a Boys ATR : 308 (not counted)Lorry with a French 25mm AT gun : ? (1) (not counted)(1) 220 French 25mm AT guns delivered to the BEF to increase the AT power in the British division. They were often mounted on a truck used as SP guns but their number is not known. IN MAY 1940 :1st Armoured Division arriving on 17th May 1940 1- Organization : 2nd Armoured Brigadeo 2nd Dragoon Guards (Queen's Bays)o 9th Queen's Royal Lancerso 10th Prince of Wales Lancers 3rd Armoured Brigadeo 2nd battalion Royal Tank Regiment (not present in France)o 3rd battalion Royal Tank Regimento 5th battalion Royal Tank Regiment 2- Tank strength :· Vickers MkVIb : 134· Cruiser MkI (A9) : 24· Cruiser MkII (A10) : 31· Cruiser MkIII (A13) : 95--> 284 tanks CONCLUSION : 304 tanks and 56 armored cars in France on 10th May 1940. ** GERMANY ** Tanks in the 10 Panzerdivisionen(source : Thomas L. Jentz on http://niehorster.orbat.com/011_germany/af...v_40-05-10.htm)Pz.Kpfw. I : 643 (total available : 1077)Pz.Kpfw. II : 880 (total available : 1092)Pz.Kpfw. III : 349 (total available : 381)Pz.Kpfw. 35(t) : 118 (total available : 143)Pz.Kpfw. 38(t) : 207 (total available : 238)Pz.Kpfw. IV A/B/C/D : 281 (total available : 290)Pz.Bef. : 148 (total available : 244) --> 2626 German tanks on 10th May 1940 Here is a reported loss table for the German tanks by the end of May 1940 : 529· Pz.Kpfw. I : 101· Pz.Kpfw. II : 150· Pz.Kpfw. III : 84· Pz.Kpfw. 35(t) : 44· Pz.Kpfw. 38(t) : 43· Pz.Kpfw. IV A/B/C/D : 63· Pz.Bef. : 44 And were replaced by reserve / new production which totaled : 288· Pz.Kpfw. I : 48· Pz.Kpfw. II : 35· Pz.Kpfw. III : 71· Pz.Kpfw. 35(t) : 35· Pz.Kpfw. 38(t) : 36· Pz.Kpfw. IV A/B/C/D : 19· Pz.Bef. : 44 Here is a reported loss table for the German tanks during May - June 1940 : 839· Pz.Kpfw. I : 182· Pz.Kpfw. II : 240· Pz.Kpfw. III : 135· Pz.Kpfw. 35(t) : 62· Pz.Kpfw. 38(t) : 54· Pz.Kpfw. IV A/B/C/D : 97· Pz.Bef. : 69 source : Panzertruppen 1, Thomas Jentz, Schiffer. These losses do not include StuG III A/B, Panzerjäger I, 15cm s.I.G.33 auf Pz.Kpfw.I and all the armored cars that have been lost. PanzerJäger I (4.7cm L/43.4 Pak(t) (Sfl) auf PzKpfw I) : 117 tank destroyersPz.Jäg.Abt. 521 : 18 (6 per Kompanie)Pz.Jäg.Abt. 605 : 18 (indicated as not participating to the French campaign by several sources)Pz.Jäg.Abt. 616 : 27Pz.Jäg.Abt. 643 : 27Pz.Jäg.Abt. 670 : 27 8.8cm FlaK (Sfl) auf Zugkraftwagen 12t (Sd.Kfz. 8) also known as "Bunkerflak" or "Bufla" : 6 tank destroyersThe Bufla was a special self-propelled version of the 8.8cm Flak 18 L/56 dedicated to anti-fortification role initially and also anti-tank role. 6 of these vehicles were issued to the 1. schwere Kompanie/Panzer-Jäger-Abteilung (for a total of 10 produced, 4 in reserve). The 'Bufla' was operational :in Polandin France along the 1.PzD and 2.PzD (there could therefore having been engaged in areas like Montcornet, Crécy-sur-Serre, Juniville etc.), at least 2-3 vehicles were lost in Francein Russia (with the XXXIX. Panzer Korps - Heeresgruppe Mitte -) where all the vehicles were probably destroyed, they served until March 1943. Sturmgeschütz III A : 24 tanksSturmgeschütz-Batterie 640Sturmgeschütz-Batterie 659Sturmgeschütz-Batterie 660Sturmgeschütz-Batterie 665 15 cm s.I.G.33 auf Pz.Kpfw.I : 38 self-propelled artillerys.I.G.Kp. (mot S) 701 (to 9. Panzer-Division)s.I.G.Kp. (mot S) 702 (to 1. Panzer-Division)s.I.G.Kp. (mot S) 703 (to 2. Panzer-Division)s.I.G.Kp. (mot S) 704 (to 5. Panzer-Division)s.I.G.Kp. (mot S) 705 (to 7. Panzer-Division)s.I.G.Kp. (mot S) 706 (to 10. Panzer-Division)However the organization was two 15cm s.I.G.33 auf Pz.Kpfw.I in each Zug (three Zug in each Kompanie), along with four 1t Zgkw. (Sd.Kfz.10), which only accounts for a total of 36 15cm s.I.G.33 auf Pz.Kpfw.I (and a total of 72 1t Zgkw.(Sd.Kfz.10)), so that leaves two 15cm s.I.G.33 auf Pz.Kpfw.I unaccounted for. Armored cars :In each Aufklärung Abteilung (AA) there seem to be :Battalion HQ with 1 SdKfz.247Signal platoon1 SdKfz.263 (Fu)1 SdKfz.261 (Fu)1 SdKfz.260 (Fu)2 companies of armored cars each with :o Company HQ with 1 SdKfz.247o Signal detachment with 4 SdKfz.223 (Fu) and 1 SdKfz.263 (Fu)o Heavy platoon with 3 6-Rad SdKfz.231 and 3 8-Rad SdKfz.232 (Fu)o Light platoon with 6 SdKfz.221o Light platoon with 4 SdKfz.221 and 4 SdKfz.222--> TOTAL : 56 armored cars (including 20 armored cars with a 2.0cm L/55 gun) There is an AA in each Panzerdivision, in 6 motorized divisions and in the 1. Kavallerie Division :AA 4 (1.PzD)AA 5 (2.PzD)AA 3 (3.PzD)AA 7 (4.PzD)AA 8 (5.PzD)AA 57 (6.PzD)AA 37 (7.PzD)AA 59 (8.PzD)AA 9 (9.PzD)AA 90 (10.PzD)AA 2 (2. ID mot.)AA 13 (13. ID mot.)AA 20 (20. ID mot.)AA 29 (29. ID mot.)AA Totenkopf (SS-Totenkopf mot.)AA Verfügungstruppen (SS VT mot.)AA 40 (1. Kavallerie Division) There were also at least some more armored cars in the 11th motorized brigade and the Lehr motorized regiment. Many infantry divisions had in fact at least 3 armored cars in their Aufklärungs-Abteilung. A total of 135 German divisions had been engaged, for 17 of them the AA have been listed previously. About 100 other divisions may have at least 3 armored cars. This leads to an approximation of 100x3 = 300 more armored cars of various models. --> TOTAL : 1252 armored cars including at least 340 armored cars with a real anti-tank capacity (2.0cm L/55 gun) CONCLUSION :2811 German tanks / self-propelled guns and 1252 armored cars on 10th May 1940. ---------------------------------------- ** CONCLUSION ** ALLIES : 1) Number of tanks, tank destroyers and self-propelled guns· France : 2322 (2792 (2))· United Kingdom : 304· Belgium : 278· Netherlands : -· Luxembourg : ---> TOTAL 1 : 2904 (3375(2)) 2) Number of armored cars· France : 575· United Kingdom : 56· Belgium : -· Netherlands : 26· Luxembourg : ---> TOTAL 2 : 657 TOTAL 1+2 : 3562 (4032(2))(2) counting the French FT17 and FCM-2C old tanks in combat units. GERMANY : Number of tanks and SP guns : 2811Number of armored cars : 1252--> TOTAL : 4063 ON 10th MAY 1940 : · There is a comparable number of allied and German tanks with about 2900 tanks. If all the AFVs are counted there are nevertheless only 3375 allied vs 4063 German AFVs even with the obsolete French FT17 and FCM-2C tanks being counted. This apparent equality in the number of tanks is purely mathematical but in the facts it is completely false. All the about 3000 German tanks are concentrated in the 10 Panzerdivisionen unlike only about 960 French tanks in the DCR/DLM. Each DCR/DLM has less tanks than a Panzerdivision : there are grossly 10x300 German tanks against 6x160 French tanks and many dispersed battalions. That was the reality on the battlefield. The British 1st AD concentrated the cruiser tanks but did not really change the balance and was quickly neutralized. All the Belgian tanks were dispersed in small numbers in their infantry divisions, the higher number of Belgian tanks could be found in the 1e division de chasseurs ardennais with about 50 AFVs. · All the French tanks have a power/weight ratio of 7-10 hp/ton ; the German tanks have a power/weight ratio of 15-20 hp/ton, they have a better mobility. French tanks were generally more adapted to heavy and brutal charges against slow or immobile targets but were not really conceived for a war in which speed and mobility rules. And this speed and mobility was created by the revolutionary Panzerdivisionen. Only the Somua S35 cavalry tank could really compete with the German tanks in terms of speed, mobility and autonomy. · All the French tanks have a better armor then the German tanks (13-30mm for the German tanks and 40-60mm for the French tanks). The 23 British Matillda II tanks are also far better armored than the German ones. French tanks are able to resist to many German hits. · But the Germans tanks had often a better AT capacity, except the French 47mm SA35 gun and 75mm SA35 gun. The 47mm SA35 L/32 gun is able to destroy all the German tanks up to 800-1000m but generally the French rate of fire is slower because of the 1-man turret where the commander is also spotter, loader and gunner. Notes : The crude comparison of tank numbers gives not a good representation of the reality on the battlefield. The allied used their tanks often spread among the infantry to provide support while the Germans concentrated all their tanks. The German "superiority" was mainly due to :· better tactical regulation, much more concentrated armor (usually 4 vs 1, sometimes 8-10 vs 1 odds)· generally higher speed and mobility of the German tanks· tracer and smoke shells available in the German tanks (not in the French ones)· more radio sets allowing to better organize and control the maneuvers· mostly always presence of observation planes (Hs126 and Fi156) to provide information about the allied position and direct artillery and aerial support· mostly omnipresent close air support· German tanks were spreading into the allied rears . difficult then to preserve a HQ or a fuel supply dump . leading to tanks being abandoned and scuttled due to lack of fuel· better and faster German logistical organization (and far less hindered by aerial attacks or artillery fire)· 1-man turret in most of the French tanks and several very recently constituted units lacking training· usually German tanks avoided combat with the heavy allied tanks like the B1bis which constituted a big threat, they were rather engaged by 8.8cm FlaK. and 10.5cm LeFH. Germany's victory occurred as a result of a combination of factors, including air superiority, strategic and tactical innovation (including concentration of their armor), and the failure of the allies to anticipate or respond effectively to German tactics (The French had the luck to have well armored tanks compared to the British lightly armored ones which constituted the majority of their tanks, only the Matilda II tanks were really well protected but there were only 23 of them in France). However, it occurred in spite rather than because of German tanks. The German ground forces suffered a lot in 1940 on the Western front. Their ground forces lost about 45,000 KIA and 111,000 WIA as well as 30% of the engaged tanks. 839 German tanks and numerous armored cars were definitively destroyed (for example about 2/3rd of the armored cars of the 7.PzD were knocked-out before the 1st June 1940). That gives of course not the total number of AFVs that were knocked out and needed to be repaired. Allied human losses :· Belgian losses in 19 days : 7500 KIA and 15850 WIA (all the AFVs destroyed or captured)· Luxembourg : no resistance, French troops entered the country to meet the Germans· Dutch losses in 6 days : 2890 KIA and 6889 WIA (all the AFVs destroyed or captured)· British losses in 26 days : 3457 KIA , 13602 WIA and 3267 MIA (167 tanks lost in Arras and Abbeville, other tanks were lost in Calais and Boulogne but most of the tanks abandoned)· French losses in 45 days : about 100,000 KIA and 202,000 WIA The Swiss historian Eddy Bauer says also that the Germans lost much more men in the second part of the western campaign, in France the resistance was harder when time advanced and the tactic changed from the constant try to build a continuous front to the constitution of anti-tank strongpoints composed of all kind of units (like the German Kampfgruppe) in the woods and towns and cities and on important roads.156,492 German losses (KIA and WIA) in 45 days, that's 3477 losses/day but in fact the French resistance harder in June than in May : 2499 German losses/day between the 10th May and the 3rd June but 4762 German losses/day between the 5th and the 24th June. You can compare that to the 4506 German losses/day during operation Barbarossa from 22nd June to 10th December 1941.. The Western campaign was much more deadly than commonly known. Main sources :"L'automobile sous l'uniforme" (François Vauvillier)"Chars B au combat - Hommes et matériels du 15e BCC" (Stéphane Bonnaud)"The French army 1939-1940 - organisation, order of battle, operational history" (4 volumes, Lee Sharp)"L'Arme Blindée Française (Tome 1) : Mai-juin 1940 ! Les blindés français dans la tourmente" (Gérard Saint-Martin)"Weygand, De Gaulle et quelques autres - La Somme 16-28 mai 1940" (Henri de Wailly)"Blitzkrieg à l'Ouest, Mai-Juin 40" (Jean-Paul Pallud)"Des forêts d'Alsace aux chemins de Normandie - La 43e division d'infanterie dans la guerre, 3 septembre 1939 - 26 juin 1940" (Thibault Richard)"Militaria" magazines (especially special issues n°4, 8, 17, 21, 31, 34)"Panzertruppen" (Thomas Jentz, Schiffer)http://www.chars-francais.net/ (Antoine Misner's website)http://france1940.free.fr/ (Nowfel Leulliot's website) and its discussion list with skilled and gentle peoplehttp://enpointe.chez.tiscali.fr/oobs.html (Stéphane Commans's website) Acknowledgments : Christian Ankerstjerne who helped me with the German data and Jean-Guy Rathé who provided information about French AFVs in the colonies. This document does only list vehicles in combat units, not the ones in depots or schools. Several times I saw so many mistakes about the number of French tanks that I thought I should try to research how many were really available for the 1940 western campaign. Finally I tried to list the AFVs of the other armies as well. This work was only led by my curiosity and is only personal. I don't pretend it being 100% accurate but I thought it would be worth sharing. Best regards, David
Guest Murph Posted May 5, 2005 Posted May 5, 2005 Excellent, although I was under the impression that France had fielded far more S35 tanks.
BillB Posted May 5, 2005 Posted May 5, 2005 Wow, GdG, that was a monster post! Excellent stuff, thanks for putting it up. Any chance of a URL to the source? all the best BillB
Colin Williams Posted May 5, 2005 Author Posted May 5, 2005 Heh, Colin, that seems to be the problem. The Frogs were so pleased to get the cumbersome reserve establishment into the field that they stopped with that and did not train it up. But of course, we have some evidence that the BEF was [apart from Monty's division] about as bad, failing to conduct field exercises, etc. I have talked to Kiesling about this and urged her to continue into evaluating the reservist performance in May-June, but, alas, she is now into classical strategy, Thucydides, etc. 170980[/snapback] More's the pity, although one can't expect favorite authors to only write on one's pet subjects! Certainly part of the problem lies with the French Army's attitude towards the reserves. Devaluing the reserves made at least a little sense in 1914 when Joffre blundered in assuming the Germans would also keep their reserve units out of the first line, but in 1940, despite the damage done by the years of one-year terms of service, every senior French officer had to know that it was the poilu of the reserves who fought most of the battles in WW1 after the active Army took in on the chin in 1914. The Riom Trials excerpts show this favoritism toward the active Army at the expense of the reserves - "In a general way the witnesses agreed in recognizing the quality of the officers and NCOs of the active army...General Requin in particular declared that the magnificent resistance of his soldiers during the withdrawl towards Troyes was largely due to the competence of the active officers...General Hering...in 1936, 1937, and 1938 took part in large-scale maneuvers which proved the excellent quality of the active officers and NCOs..." "The only witness who disputed the value of the reserve officers was General Etchberrigaray, who commanded the 5th Division on the Meuse. According to him the reserve officers were uneven: one-third were good, another third average, the rest incapable. General Mittelhauser noted, on the other hand, that the reserve officers were better trained that those of 1914...But generally the witnesses were agreed in considering that if the training of the reserve officers was good it was often too purely theoretic...the training of reserve officers was only possible on Sundays, and also that those who had been through the war of 1914-1918 were excused from training courses although the material in use had since been completely changed. The schooling of reserve NCOs, which was also too theoretical, was furthermore insufficient, and this the majority of witnesses attributed to the one-year service period...As for the soldiers, the inadequacy of their training, as a result of the short service of one year only, was emphasized by all the witnesses..." "Again, it must be noted that all the foregoing observations referred to the date of mobilization. From September 1939 to May 1940 training was being intensively pursued and improved. Maneuvers, and even combined maneuvers fro tanks and infantry, were held during this period, as we were told by General Sciard, and by Major Ragaine, who was in command of a tank battalion."
Colin Williams Posted May 5, 2005 Author Posted May 5, 2005 By the way, an excellent article from David Lehmann (who is a credible source) from the France 1940 Yahoo mailing list:171042[/snapback] Excellent posts GdG. A couple of quibbles. Although the French Army used the AMRs and AMCs in reconaissance units, they were at least as capable as the PzIs and PzIIs, so they should be included at tanks, despite their Automitrailleuse designation. (And don't get me started on the decision to maintain armor separately in the cavalry and infantry arms!)
Ken Estes Posted May 6, 2005 Posted May 6, 2005 "Again, it must be noted that all the foregoing observations referred to the date of mobilization. From September 1939 to May 1940 training was being intensively pursued and improved. Maneuvers, and even combined maneuvers fro tanks and infantry, were held during this period, as we were told by General Sciard, and by Major Ragaine, who was in command of a tank battalion." That one is sure worth another look, as it does not jive with the tales of the interval troops assigned to the Maginot Line and how hard they worked to improve their inadequate positions, the 1st Army preparing for the Dial movement, etc. There may have been small unit training, like a tank battalion working with an infnatry regt., but "maneuvers" might have been a matter of one's imagination?
Guest Murph Posted May 7, 2005 Posted May 7, 2005 But how well trained and equipped were the French Armored units?
GdG Posted May 7, 2005 Posted May 7, 2005 Wow, GdG, that was a monster post! Excellent stuff, thanks for putting it up. Any chance of a URL to the source? all the best BillB171151[/snapback]It's on the France 1940 mailing list. As for the training of the french armored units, well, it depends. The 1st DCR was the oldest (still young in comparison to the PzDivs) and the training was complete. The 2nd, 3rd DCRs had not completed their training by May. Not talk about the 4th DCR which was formed as hoc. The DLMs, especially the 1st DLM which was created by the middle of the 30's was very well trained, and composed of 'troupes d'active'. When the 2nd DLM was created, officers were transfered from the 1st DLM. So the 1st and 2nd DLMs were very well trained. The 3rd DLM was created during the Phoney War, so less trained, but still OK, as also composed of 'troupes d'active'. As for their equipment, the DLMs were rather well equipped (deficiencies due to the french dogma aside), except in term of AAA. They sure were among the firsts to get 25 mm AA guns, but still 3 or 4 times less than their german counterparts. The DCRs quickly lost their effectiveness to the german air raids on their supply lines though. And of course, they lacked of infantry and artillery (that's really hard to believe considering that in 1940, France had a better (technically and in term of skill) and larger artillery stock than Germany. Had two DCRs been assembled together, teamed up with a DLM and 3 or 4 'active' divisions and some organic artillery groups (that is to say the VIIth Army + the 1st and 2nd DCR kept in reserve), the Allies would have had a good tool at their disposition to disrupt the german plan.
nowfel Posted May 14, 2005 Posted May 14, 2005 http://groups.yahoo.com/group/France1940/ Wow, GdG, that was a monster post! Excellent stuff, thanks for putting it up. Any chance of a URL to the source?171151[/snapback]
Colin Williams Posted May 17, 2005 Author Posted May 17, 2005 Coming in November for all you Francophiles and Francophobes, from Robert "Seeds of Disaster" Doughty - http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog/DOUPYR.html
nowfel Posted May 17, 2005 Posted May 17, 2005 Woohoo ! That books has just jumped right to the top of my "to buy" list... Coming in November for all you Francophiles and Francophobes, from Robert "Seeds of Disaster" Doughty
lucklucky Posted May 17, 2005 Posted May 17, 2005 "Getting back to the French, I'm always amazed at how American and British posters never given them much credit. But if look at the British proformance in 1940 it was no better than the French and in Britian hadn't of been an island it would of been defeated too. After the fall of France in 1940 Britian had 2500 bren guns.. that's it. Germany would of rolled over the UK just as fast.. if not for the water in between." That's not fair , water is a strategic geographic advantage and when British build their forces they take that into planning. If Britain was linked to the Continental landmass there wouldnt be so much resources for Royal Navy for example and certainly more for the Army.
GdG Posted May 19, 2005 Posted May 19, 2005 One less poilu...9 left out of 8,5 million mobilized men... LYON (AFP) - L'un des dix derniers "poilus" de la Première guerre mondiale, Claude-Marie Boucaud, est décédé mardi, à l'âge de 109 ans, a-t-on appris mercredi auprès de la délégation départementale de l'Ain de l'Office national des Anciens combattants (Onac). Avec le décès de M. Boucaud, il ne reste plus que 9 "poilus" encore en vie, tous centenaires, sur les 8,5 millions de soldats mobilisés durant ce conflit. M. Boucaud était le deuxième en âge des soldats de la Grande guerre encore en vie. Leur doyen est Maurice Floquet, 110 ans qui a reçu en mars dernier les insignes d'officier de la Légion d'honneur à Montauroux dans le Var où il réside. Né le 12 août 1895 à Saint-Germain de Brionnais (Saône-et-Loire), Claude-Marie Boucaud avait été mobilisé le 20 décembre 1914 dans le 133e régiment d'infanterie de Belley (Ain). Il avait été blessé à deux reprises, une fois par un éclat d'obus, dans la Somme, à la bataille du Mont Curlu, en juillet 1916, puis au Chemin des Dames, par une balle de mitraillette qui lui avait broyé la cheville. Après la guerre, il devint mécanicien pour les chemins de fer PLM, puis chauffeur de locomotives, prenant sa retraite à 58 ans en 1946. Il s'installe ensuite à Priay (Ain), au hameau de Bellegarde, avec son épouse, décédée en 1979, avec laquelle il a eu un fils, Fernand, âgé aujourd'hui de 80 ans. Titulaire de la Croix de guerre, il avait été fait chevalier de la Légion d'honneur en 1983, puis Officier en 1996. Selon des témoins qui l'ont bien connu, M. Boucaud, toujours vêtu d'un costume-cravate, écrivait quotidiennement son journal dans un carnet de notes et lisait encore son journal sans lunettes. Etonnant de vitalité, il avait fêté ses 108 ans en faisant son baptême de l'air à Ambérieux (Ain). Il allait régulièrement dans des écoles relater son expérience aux élèves et essayer de transmettre son pacifisme. "Je n'ai pas de haine des Allemands, c'était des patriotes comme nous", expliquait-il.
Colin Williams Posted May 19, 2005 Author Posted May 19, 2005 One less poilu...9 left out of 8,5 million mobilized men...175168[/snapback] Thanks GdG. I don't know French, but am I a right in translating that he was mobilized into the 133rd Infantry Regiment in December 1914, fought at the Somme in 1916 and was wounded by a machine gun bullet at the Chemin des Dames? Incredible. As a French infantryman his chances of getting killed in the war were something like 25%, then to survive his wound without a crippling injury and live to be 109, simply amazing. To put this in context for my fellow Americans, if this guy had been a veteran of the Civil War, he would have been born in 1842, fought in the Peninsula Campaign, at Antietam, Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville before getting wounded at Gettysburg and then lived until 1951!
Durandal Posted May 19, 2005 Posted May 19, 2005 First flight at 108. Chuck Yeager look like a baby. ^^
Mikel2 Posted May 21, 2005 Posted May 21, 2005 (edited) It gives me a very odd feeling looking at WWI pictures, realizing that in my lifetime the number of veterans has gone from millions to dozens. And I'm 27 http://www.enquirer.com/editions/2004/08/1...fw18robley.html Edited May 21, 2005 by Mikel2
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