The Trent Affair

[Burncycle360]

Seems to be a gamble; if the british commit, they had better make sure the south wins. If the south loses, canada might be gone for good and they'll be on bad terms with the union from the get go

 

If the south does win, they can probably get canada back (assuming they lost it), and maybe even more territory. Not to mention a strong trade partner, and a healthy profit both for the government and the merchants for moving the supplies...

 

The safe route would be not to take action though, and from what I hear from you guys, once Lincoln gave his EP and slavery became the issue, the popular support was not there in the british people, not to mention a lack of troops to send. I guess it was sabre rattling...

[KingSargent]

Troop carrier

 

By 1860 the British would have had access to the Great Eastern, with 4,000 passenger cabins and easy trans-Atlantic range.  Trooper estimates were between 10 to 15,000 per trip (she took 10,000 on one trip)..

One very short trip - at least short between victualling points. Then she would have to get back for more - with no coal....

Warrior by her self would be able to deal with the whole of the USN IF she could reach them, and of course there were the other British ironclads.

I believe I said that about Warrior (barring Golden BBs, of course). However the only other ironclad available in 1862 was Black Prince, IIRC. This is of course assuming the Brits would remove all ironclads from Home Waters. FTM, ironclads were not necessary to deal with the USN, the RN had a powerful steam battlefleet.

Most RN warships were sail or sail and steam so coal would nt be too much in demand and supplie would be available in Canada, Bahamas and the Carribean.

Please enlighten me on just when large coal mines were discovered in Eastern Canada, the Bahamas, and the Caribbean. The RN abandoned the North American and West Indies Station (as a fleet station anyway) because of coalling problems. The Committees on Imperial Defence could not recommend a way to provide fuel to NAWI! - this is not some wargame where a Union Jack on an island means an infinite supply of fuel, ammunition, and rations (not to mention repair bases) to any Brit ship that makes it there. The British had trouble getting the Crimean expedition through the Med, fer Chrissakes! Resupplying a force across the Atlantic just was not on.

BTM, many of the steamers (not all) were total dogs under sail. And if you think to save coal by using sail, it means longer trips, so you need more food... the sail auxiliary was useful when patrolling on colonial stations - they could always find food, but coal was expensive and hard to come by. The British flagship on the Pacific station never lit off her boilers for lack of coal.

The RN wouldn't, in general perform forced raids against heavy targets, they would do what they historically did, land raiding parties.

With what forces, with what landing craft, etc, etc? We are not talking a protracted war with massive lead times, we are talking quick response before Canada is overrun. Small whaleboat raids against fishing villages are not going to save Canada.

The two big factors, as have already been noted, was a dislike of slavery and a desire for trade not war.  There was almost no way that war (as opposed to threats) would have come about.

Of course not, but the thread assumes the war.

FTM, just how many times has war started for silly reasons? Palmerston was hot under the collar about the Trent affair, and was ready for armed intervention when Prince Albert stifled him.

The dislike of slavery was an intrinsic part of the RN, the RN having had a strong and continuous presence in anti-slaving patrols for 50-plus years.  Indeed, one of the big causes of annoyance between the British (and especially the RN) and the US was the activities of the US slaving ships and their objections to searches.

167435[/snapback]

The RN and its likes and dislikes were not factored into HM Gov't's war-making decisions. The pols, especially Pam, could have cared less.

And the USN could have cared less about RN searches of US-flagged slavers. There were a few instances of USN ships turning slavers over to the RN instead of taking them home to be let loose by some judge. The navies cooperated on anti-slavery patrol - mostly. The "The RN had no right to search them!" was lawyers trying to get their slaver clients off - just like now when "The fact that my client reeked of marijuana did not give the police cause to search him, so the fact that he was carrying five Ks of heroin is inadmissable!"...

[Burncycle360]

Does anyone have figures on what Union forces were present on the northern border when britain sent the 8,000+ troops?

Edited April 24, 2005 by Burncycle360

[KingSargent]

Does anyone have figures on what Union forces were present on the northern border when britain sent the 8,000+ troops?

167585[/snapback]

 

Doesn't really make much difference. The US rail network was infinitely superior to anything in Canada at the time (He!!, I'm not sure if Canada had a RR in 1862).

 

The Union could reinforce the Canadian frontier a lot faster from the Union States than the Canadian forces could be reinforced and/or resupplied from Britain. There were lots of Northern State Troops (militia) that did not go to the Union Army in every State in the Union. A brigade of PA militia (Stannard's) at least showed up for G-burg. I have no definite info, but I doubt that the Canadian frontier was left wide open.

 

Remember that 8000 troops was a large division or a small corps in ACW terms. Along a frontier the length of the Canadian-US, even just the Eastern part, that amounts to maybe five men per mile.

 

Also, at the time, there wasn't a Canadian Nation as such. Most of the populace was concentrated along the US border and had more relationship with the US than with the UK. Look at what our Canadian membership feels about the current government in Ottawa, multiply that by 20, and you can get an approximation of what the average Canadian felt about the Ministries in London. Some (Canadian/British) authors feel that there would not have been much 'grassroots' resistance in Canada to a US invasion/"Liberation."

And anybody that didn't like it could go to the Confederacy, like the Cajuns to LA. IMHO, the USA would have been better off in the long run with Canada than the Confederacy.

[Richard Lindquist]

Seems to be a gamble; if the british commit, they had better make sure the south wins. If the south loses, canada might be gone for good and they'll be on bad terms with the union from the get go

 

If the south does win, they can probably get canada back (assuming they lost it), and maybe even more territory. Not to mention a strong trade partner, and a healthy profit both for the government and the merchants for moving the supplies...

 

The safe route would be not to take action though, and from what I hear from you guys, once Lincoln gave his EP and slavery became the issue, the popular support was not there in the british people, not to mention a lack of troops to send. I guess it was sabre rattling...

167513[/snapback]

 

Britain's enemy at the time was still Napoleon III even though the Brits and French had been allies in the Crimea and in China. The Brit naval buildup was against the French navy. The Brits also had the consideratuion that if they helped the South, they would be helping Louis Napoleon with his Mexican scheme.

 

Even with a southern win, the north would be strengthened in Canada. They would suddenly have all of the troops facing the rebels to deal with the Brits in Canada. The exhaustion of the south meant that they would make peace if allowed secession at the drop of a hat.

[R011]

(He!!, I'm not sure if Canada had a RR in 1862).

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There was at least a reasonable well developed system in Canada East and West. AFAIK, though, it did not yet connect Canada East and the Martimes.

 

Some (Canadian/British) authors feel that there would not have been much 'grassroots' resistance in Canada to a US invasion/"Liberation."

 

I would be intersted in where they get that idea. Fear of the US was deeply ingrained in Ontario, at any rate, and fear of a possible US threat was a driving force behind Confederation. It was also a driving motivation behind the expansion of the Candian Militia.

 

Even so, the Union Army should readily be able to overmatch any British and Canadian resistance available at that time.

[R011]

Please enlighten me on just when large coal mines were discovered in Eastern Canada,

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There was coal in Nova Scotia. Some 294,000 tons was produced in 1858 with about five million tons being sold between 1861 and 1870. Apparently, much of the production was exported to the US. I will admit I have no idea whether that would be enough to supply a British fleet based in Halifax, but it might be a useful piece of data.

 

http://www.mininghistory.ns.ca/cadm001/cadm001_01.htm

[swerve]

There was coal in Nova Scotia. Some 294,000 tons was produced in 1858 with about five million tons being sold between 1861 and 1870.  Apparently, much of the production was exported to the US. I will admit I have no idea whether that would be enough to supply a British fleet based in Halifax, but it might be a useful piece of data.

 

http://www.mininghistory.ns.ca/cadm001/cadm001_01.htm

 

I think that would be plenty.

 

Nova Scotia is very defensible, if you control the sea. Halifax has an excellent harbour. Ah well, now we have a scenario. A British fleet based in Halifax, British troops & any remnants of Canadian militia who could get there holding NS & Newfoundland, & NS mines supplying coal to the blockading fleet, with any surplus being shipped to the Confederacy.

 

What difference could British supplies (guns, ammunition, uniforms, parts for the railways, coal, etc) have made to the Confederate war effort? How many of the troops freed from coastal defence could have been used against the Union armies on the northern border?

[JohnB]

Except that the Indian Mutiny and the invasion of China had moved a lot of the Brit army assets to Asia.  The Indian Mutiny had happened only five years earlier and  they needed to keep a large force in india to assure they could subdue the sepoys if it happened again.  The march to Peking and the destruction of the summer palace were also quite recent.

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The invasion scare of 1859 however prompted a huge increase in enlistments into the militia ('Form Riflemen, form') which not only freed more regular regiments for overseas service but also became a good source of at least partially trained recruits.

 

As it was by early 1862 there were 18,500 regulars, both British and Canadian, in Canada and 14,000 embodied militia. Sums had been spent on modern fortifications at Kingston, Quebec, Halifax and other places. Conquest would again be more than a 'mere matter of marching'.

[Richard Lindquist]

The invasion scare of 1859 however prompted a huge increase in enlistments into the militia ('Form Riflemen, form') which not only freed more regular regiments for overseas service but also became a good source of at least partially trained recruits.

 

As it was by early 1862 there were 18,500 regulars, both British and Canadian, in Canada and 14,000 embodied militia. Sums had been spent on modern fortifications at Kingston, Quebec, Halifax and other places.  Conquest would again be more than a 'mere matter of marching'.

167766[/snapback]

 

Halifax and the Maritimes were probably defensible against even a determined attack. I am not too sure that the Kingston fortifications would have held out against an invasion. US railroad construction and industrialization changed the logistics dynamic dramatically from 1812. It was no longer some frontiersmen going after each other.

 

I agree that the Canadians would certainly have resisted as they did not want to become part of the US.

 

If there was an "invasion scare" in 1859, would the threat of such have gone away by 1862 to permit dispatch of the militia overseas??

[Richard Lindquist]

There was coal in Nova Scotia. Some 294,000 tons was produced in 1858 with about five million tons being sold between 1861 and 1870.  Apparently, much of the production was exported to the US. I will admit I have no idea whether that would be enough to supply a British fleet based in Halifax, but it might be a useful piece of data.

 

http://www.mininghistory.ns.ca/cadm001/cadm001_01.htm

167723[/snapback]

 

The RN did not plan to base a blockade of the US coast on Halifax. The blockade would be based on Bermuda. The Brits poured a lot of resources into developing Bermuda as a base for an anticipated war against the US. The place still shows as a massive fortress from one end of the island to the other.

[JohnB]

If there was an "invasion scare" in 1859, would the threat of such have gone away by 1862 to permit dispatch of the militia overseas??

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The militia wouldn't have been sent overseas, they would have allowed regular units to be dispatched and provide a steady flow of recruits into the regular army.

British home forces in the early 1860's probably numbered 60,000 or more with upto a 100,000 garrisoning the Empire, as part of the Crown army in India and in the settlement colonies, including Canada.

 

The invasion scare, greatly exaggerated, came from France and seeing as they were anyway much keener to recognize the Confederacy than Britain, the two would likely be Allies again, as in the Crimea and China.

[DB]

[snip]

The invasion scare, greatly exaggerated, came from France and seeing as they were anyway much keener to recognize the Confederacy than Britain, the two would likely be Allies again, as in the Crimea and China.

167827[/snapback]

 

Presumably the invasion scare resulted in the construction of Palmerston's Follies?

 

Daivid

[swerve]

Presumably the invasion scare resulted in the construction of Palmerston's Follies?

 

Daivid

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I believe so.

 

IIRC it had less to do with any overtly threatening French actions or words, or perceived French intentions, than with the mere fact that by building the Gloire, France was actually presuming to challenge the completeness of Britains naval supremacy (shudder). Not that Gloire was a particularly good ship (well, none of the first ironclads were), but her armour made her dangerous. Hence Warrior et al. And then everyone else got in on the act, so that by 1866 Austria & Italy were able to field 7 & 12 ironclads respectively at the battle of Lissa.

Edited April 26, 2005 by swerve

[Grant Whitley]

All of the seaports on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts were well protected by these fortifications.  Note that the Union navy was never able to reduce the forts in Wilmington, Charleston, or Savannah.  All of these places fell as a result of sherman coming up behind them. 

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Not quite. Fort Fisher, at Wilmington, was an earthwork which did not predate the war. It was not one of the 3rd System masonry forts. Fort Pulaski, downriver from Savannah was, and it fell to the Union in short order. There may have been land based artillery at work there(as at Charleston), but that seems to have been SOP for the Union. Fort Macon in North Carolina springs to mind as another 3rd system fortification which was reduced in this way.

[KingSargent]

Not quite.  Fort Fisher, at Wilmington, was an earthwork which did not predate the war.  It was not one of the 3rd System masonry forts.  Fort Pulaski, downriver from Savannah was, and it fell to the Union in short order.  There may have been land based artillery at work there(as at Charleston), but that seems to have been SOP for the Union. 

 

One of the lessons of Fort Pulaski was the excellent effect of James Rifles (converted smoothbores) on the fortifications. They were indeed fired by the Army from shore positions.

[Grant Whitley]

One of the lessons of Fort Pulaski was the excellent effect of James Rifles (converted smoothbores) on the fortifications. They were indeed fired by the Army from shore positions.

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Poor landward defenses were the Achilles hell for a lot of the Third System fortifications. I don't believe that the Third System plan really anticipated an adversary capable of landing enough troops to represent a threat. The two major examples I can think of where Third System fortifications held out are Sumter and Fortress Monroe. Both of these had strong landward defenses due more to circumstance than design; Sumter was in the middle of Charleston harbor and as such lacked a landward side. Monroe was connected to the mainland only by a narrow peninsula.

[Richard Lindquist]

Monroe was connected to the mainland only by a narrow peninsula.

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"neck" not "peninsula"

[Grant Whitley]

"neck" not "peninsula"

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Yes, quite right. The fort sits on the peninsula and is connected by an isthmus.

[swerve]

Nobody willing to venture an opinion on how much difference British material aid to the Confederacy might have made?

[Richard Lindquist]

Nobody willing to venture an opinion on how much difference British material aid to the Confederacy might have made?

168096[/snapback]

 

Yes. Confederate soldiers starved because of the inadequacies of the southern logistics system. While a large part of this was pure mismanagment on the part of the CS War Dept and the railroad companies, the inability of the southern economy to manufacture railroad rails, locomotives, and the metal portions of freight and passnger cars was a major contributor. If these could be imported, it would have been a tremendous help to the war effort.

[DougRichards]

I have just scanned replies so far, so please excuse me if I raise points that others may have already mentioned.

 

Didn't the Union Army employ large numbers of British manufactured Enfield rifled muskets? Wasn't there extensive trade between the Union and Britain through the war?

 

Whilst the Union was heavily industrialised it also imported a significant quantity of war materiel.

 

As has been previously mentioned, if this materiel had been diverted from the North to the South there may have been some different outcomes in some campaigns.

 

Not too many people have mentioned the other British colonies. India and Egypt were also important producers of cotton, and Britain may have seen it to be in her interest to keep Southern cotton off the world market.

 

A different result may have been obtained from the British entering the war on either side. The British may have learnt the power of modern musketry, instead of going into the Boer wars thinking that they could advance lines of infantry onto areas defended by emplaced riflemen.

[swerve]

Not too many people have mentioned the other British colonies.  India and Egypt were also important producers of cotton, and Britain may have seen it to be in her interest to keep Southern cotton off the world market. 

 

A different result may have been obtained from the British entering the war on either side.  The British may have learnt the power of modern musketry, instead of going into the Boer wars thinking that they could advance lines of infantry onto areas defended by emplaced riflemen.

 

1) Egypt didn't come under British control until about 1880. In the 1860s it was a self-governing state within the Ottoman Empire. British governments were more interested in India as a captive market for British manufactures than a source of cotton. IIRC, cotton from the southern USA was cheaper than Indian, due to lower shipping costs, & the cotton manufacturers were far more important politically than Indian cotton growers, so no, there was no pressure to keep Southern cotton off the market. Au contraire.

 

2) A good point. Garnet Wolseleys reforms may have come 20 years earlier.

[Grant Whitley]

IIRC, cotton from the southern USA was cheaper than Indian, due to lower shipping costs, & the cotton manufacturers were far more important politically than Indian cotton growers, so no, there was no pressure to keep Southern cotton off the market. Au contraire.

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You're probably right about Southern cotton being cheaper. Currently at least, the varieties of cotton grown in tropical areas are specialty large boll strains used to make specialty goods. A compounding problem was that these varieties could only be grown in very specific climates and were very labor intensive. This is precisely why the South became an important cotton producer; varieties were developed which were specifically designed to thrive in more variable climates.

[JOE BRENNAN]

Didn't the Union Army employ large numbers of British manufactured Enfield rifled muskets?  Wasn't there extensive trade between the Union and Britain through the war?

 

As has been previously mentioned, if this materiel had been diverted from the North to the South there may have been some different outcomes in some campaigns.

 

Not too many people have mentioned the other British colonies.  India and Egypt were also important producers of cotton, and Britain may have seen it to be in her interest to keep Southern cotton off the world market. 

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I think the main answers to those both are economic, though they go in opposite directions.

 

Sale of 1853 Enfields was almost all by private contractors for profit. Both sides bought many, a common estimate is 500k north, 400k south. Not clear and not likely the south would have soaked up the other 500 at the same highly profitable (many fortunes made in CW arms making/dealing) prices. Something like 1.5mil Springfield 1855/61/63/64 were produced (the most common weapon though all kinds of older US and weapons sold from foreign arsenals too) so Enfield purchase was fairly significant. Assuming a reason to reduce gun maker profits it would have had a marginal impact (more guys retaining smoothbores and less effective old Continental purchased rifles, rather than fewer soldiers, probably) that could have tipped some campaign or battle, to not allow sale to the North.

 

3/4 of Britain's cotton imports in antebellum period were from the US, trending generally higher. Diversification to other exporters (or back to them in India's case, having been displaced by the South) was generally a result of the CW (or just postwar, like Suez Canal in India's case and general world economic growth) rather than preceding it. Moreover many mills were set up for the particulars of American cotton so immediate substitution was difficult; they were screwed for a while, even though obviously the supply was never entirely cut off. Cotton was definitely an economic reason for Britain to be pro-South (anti blockade anyway), conventional wisdom is correct on that one.

 

Re: third system fort land defences: in general ships alone seldom overcame forts in ACW or elsewhere, properly conducted unbroken land sieges with the right guns almost always did (really anytime after the invention of gunpowder). Again going back to Crimean example, the Sevastopol forts suffered hardly at all from a relatively rapidly deployed naval bombardment, but were reduced gradually by a systematic siege artillery bombardment, similar in both respects to ACW experience. I don't think any coast defence builder of that time would hope for success v. a proper land siege that couldn't be lifted by one's own land forces. But that requires a much better prepared, prolonged and focused effort by the enemy. It is true that geography rendered some forts able to defend waterways but difficult to lay siege to with land guns, with the ranges of that time. The increase in rifled gun ranges was a factor though perhaps in which locations might fall into this category, and how long a siege would take on others, v when the forts were designed.

 

Joe

Edited April 26, 2005 by JOE BRENNAN