The Trent Affair

[Burncycle360]

It started with the Union capture of two confederate diplomats, and culminated with the British mobilizing and sending 8,000 troops to Canada. While crisis was averted, I have a couple of questions

 

What was the mindset of the British people at the time? Did they offer popular support for war, or was it sabre rattling?

 

The very threat of a 2 front war would force the North to divide it's forces; would the US have been able to pull off a victory on land? Would the British fleet punch a hole in the blockade and begin supplying the confederates, or would the US Navy hold?

[Guest aevans]

It started with the Union capture of two confederate diplomats, and culminated with the British mobilizing and sending 8,000 troops to Canada. While crisis was averted, I have a couple of questions

 

What was the mindset of the British people at the time? Did they offer popular support for war, or was it sabre rattling?

 

The very threat of a 2 front war would force the North to divide it's forces;  would the US have been able to pull off a victory on land? Would the British fleet punch a hole in the blockade and begin supplying the confederates, or would the US Navy hold?

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Lincoln eliminated any chance of British intervention with the Emancipation Proclamation. The British government could never be seen to be allied with such an immoral cause as slavery. And that's exactly what the Proclamation made the Confederate cause out to be. Prior to that, the South was actually closing in on British recognition, and at least some minor military and naval aid, though how much blood and treasure the British would actually have shelled out is highly debatable. I personally don't think it ever would have happened under any real-world combination of circumstances -- the Brits were methodical plodders when it came to extra-Empire affairs during the middle of the 19th Century. The subject of recognition had been tabled in the Cabinet several times prior to September, 1862, for lack of interest in doing anything precipitous. After that, it was moot.

Edited April 20, 2005 by aevans

[R011]

The biggest problem for the British woudl be getting a multiple-corps sized fiorce into what is now Ontario and Quebec before the Union. Holding the Maritmes should not be a serious problem.

 

The biggest problem for the US is that the RN will break the Union blockade of the South and impose a strict one on the North instead. It was simply far superior in nearly every way to the USN. Britain, and probably France, would be able to provide enough logistic and financial support, and possibly some troops, to allow the South to maintain its independence and keep nearly all the seceeded states intact.

 

Britain might well resume the raiding tactics it used successfully in 1814. This would likely draw troops from the frnt and cause considerable discontent. OTOH, the British would soon find that the Union army of 1862 is not the rabble they usually fought along the Eastern Seaboard in 1814.

Edited April 20, 2005 by R011

[swerve]

It would have been very hard for Britain to go to war against the Union. There was public dislike of the South, because of slavery, to the extent that attempts by cotton manufacturers to mobilise laid-off (because of cotton shortages) to pressure the government to break the blockade of the confederacy could not find support. Unemployed workers wouldn't rally for their jobs if it meant seeming to support slavery.

 

On land, Britain would have had difficulty finding enough troops for anything except raiding and a holding campaign in Canada, except by using the Indian army. However, I can't see anyone seriously planning anything more. We might have had to accept the temporary loss of Ontario & Quebec, due to lack of anything capable of opposing the Union army. To be frank, our army wasn't only small, it wasn't much good: superbly disciplined, excellent at drill, terribly old-fashioned tactics & lack of markmanship. Good for colonial wars against numerous but technologically outclassed enemies.

 

In the highly unlikely event of us, holding our noses, backing the Confederates, I think we'd have tried to minimise land fighting, & used the navy. Sink the US navy (at that time the Royal Navy probably had the greatest margin of superiority over the rest of the worlds navies it ever had) if it tried to fight, & if it tried to hide, methodically blast US ports to smithereens until it no longer had any bases. Would have given HMS Warrior something to do. Blockade the North. Meanwhile, escort convoys of everything the Confederacy needs into its ports, take every ounce of cotton & tobacco it can get to a dockside in part payment & a mortgage on the country for the rest.

 

Sound likely?

[PCallahan]

In the highly unlikely event of us, holding our noses, backing the Confederates, I think we'd have tried to minimise land fighting, & used the navy. Sink the US navy (at that time the Royal Navy probably had the greatest margin of superiority over the rest of the worlds navies it ever had) if it tried to fight, & if it tried to hide, methodically blast US ports to smithereens until it no longer had any bases. Would have given HMS Warrior something to do. Blockade the North. Meanwhile, escort convoys of everything the Confederacy needs into its ports, take every ounce of cotton & tobacco it can get to a dockside in part payment & a mortgage on the country for the rest.

 

Sound likely?

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I don't know a lot about the Royal Navy during the time period, but they would face several problems. Did they have sufficient ships to both counter the US navy, escort confederate convoys, move troops to Canada and protect their own shipping? Was their naval superiority sufficient to contend with the defensive batteries around most US ports (assuming there would be an effort to knock US bases out). Were they capable of dealing with coastal monitors? Were they capable of doing all this in a manner that wouldn't result in the Royal Navy losing much of its war-making capacity?

 

The real question, however, is whether the British would be interested in continuing their involvement in the war if it was costing the government a great deal (to fund the military), was seeing their trade lines at least somewhat disrupted by privateers, losing them Ontario and Quebec, and potentially much of the rest of Canada, and making themselves a mortal enemy?

 

Pat Callahan

[Reiver]

I don't know a lot about the Royal Navy during the time period, but they would face several problems.  Did they have sufficient ships to both counter the US navy, escort confederate convoys, move troops to Canada and protect their own shipping?  Was their naval superiority sufficient to contend with the defensive batteries around most US ports (assuming there would be an effort to knock US bases out).  Were they capable of dealing with coastal monitors?  Were they capable of doing all this in a manner that wouldn't result in the Royal Navy losing much of its war-making capacity?

 

The real question, however, is whether the British would be interested in continuing their involvement in the war if it was costing the government a great deal (to fund the military), was seeing their trade lines at least somewhat disrupted by privateers, losing them Ontario and Quebec, and potentially much of the rest of Canada, and making themselves a mortal enemy?

 

Pat Callahan

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The RN had experience of dealing with coastal fortifications in the Crimean War less than 10 years earlier. I'm not aware of how formidable the US coastal defences were, but this at least suggests that the RN would be able to attempt to deal with them.

 

I think that for the British, the major problems are land-based; although the Maritime provinces of Canda could probably be held, upper Canda is probably going to be lost. All in all, I think British intervention risks unnecesarily antagonising the Union for little tangible benefit.

[JohnB]

On land, Britain would have had difficulty finding enough troops for anything except raiding and a holding campaign in Canada, except by using the Indian army. However, I can't see anyone seriously planning anything more. We might have had to accept the temporary loss of Ontario & Quebec, due to lack of anything capable of opposing the Union army. To be frank, our army wasn't only small, it wasn't much good: superbly disciplined, excellent at drill, terribly old-fashioned tactics & lack of markmanship. Good for colonial wars against numerous but technologically outclassed enemies.

 

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Britain managed to send five Infantry divisions and one Cavalry division to the Crimea 6 years earlier. I doubt the Russians shared that low opinion of their capabilities.

[Burncycle360]

Even if the British did not have the ability to sustain offensive operations from Canada, shouldn't that still require the north to send a disproportionate number of forces to ensure that? Or would it be a drop in the bucket of the union forcepool at that time?

Edited April 20, 2005 by Burncycle360

[KingSargent]

Even if the British did not have the ability to sustain offensive operations from Canada, shouldn't that still require the north to send a disproportionate number of forces to ensure that? Or would it be a drop in the bucket of the union forcepool at that time?

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British studies on Imperial Defence in the 19th Century were universally adamant that war with the US meant 'Bye-Bye, Canada.' The "Two Front War" scenario would not mean much - there were a whole bunch of Northerners who were less than enthusiastic about fighting the South but who would have turned like pitbulls on Limeys butting in.

 

The only real benefit for the South would have been the US blockade wouldn't have been so tight. OTOH, the UK at war with the US means less materiel to send to the South, and the USN (and possibly privateers; the US had not signed treaties abolishing privateering in 1850s) having a field day on the British Merchant Marine. And the British had a lot more to lose than the North did at sea; the US was internally self-sufficient, the UK was not. The Empire lacked facilities (mainly coaling stations) to handle a trade-raid war with the US (another determination of the several Committees on Imperial Defence).

 

In the short term the RN was comparatively tiny; most of their ships were in Reserve or Ordinary. It would have taken months before enough could be manned and equipped to even escort (unavailable) Army units to Canada before the US could take the St Lawrence and cut off further reinforcement from the UK to Canada. The British Army was engaged in adventures in China, India, and Burma at the time; not much would be available to send to Canada in time to do any good.

 

Also, the Confederacy had no aggressive designs on the North. The Union could have screened the South, taken Canada, and the dealt with Secession. As a 'wild card" a US flush with taking Canada might have said, "What do we want with those a**holes now, we've got most of the continent.... "

[John Dudek]

British studies on Imperial Defence in the 19th Century were universally adamant that war with the US meant 'Bye-Bye, Canada.' The "Two Front War" scenario would not mean much - there were a whole bunch of Northerners who were less than enthusiastic about fighting the South but who would have turned like pitbulls on Limeys butting in.

 

The only real benefit for the South would have been the US blockade wouldn't have been so tight. OTOH, the UK at war with the US means less materiel to send to the South, and the USN (and possibly privateers; the US had not signed treaties abolishing privateering in 1850s) having a field day on the British Merchant Marine. And the British had a lot more to lose than the North did at sea; the US was internally self-sufficient, the UK was not. The Empire lacked facilities (mainly coaling stations) to handle a trade-raid war with the US (another determination of the several Committees on Imperial Defence).

 

In the short term the RN was comparatively tiny; most of their ships were in Reserve or Ordinary. It would have taken months before enough could be manned and equipped to even escort (unavailable) Army units to Canada before the US could take the St Lawrence and cut off further reinforcement from the UK to Canada. The British Army was engaged in adventures in China, India, and Burma at the time; not much would be available to send to Canada in time to do any good.

 

Also, the Confederacy had no aggressive designs on the North. The Union could have screened the South, taken Canada, and the dealt with Secession. As a 'wild card" a US flush with taking Canada might have said, "What do we want with those a**holes now, we've got most of the continent.... "

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The author Shelby Foote said in his three volume narrative of the Civil War.

 

"I think the North fought that war with one hand tied behind its back. Much of its population and industry were completely unaffected by the war. Had the South scored more major military victories against the North, I think the North would simply have used both hands." ..dipping into and mobilizing its deep, manpower and industrial reserves for the prosecution of the war.

 

The U.S. Navy was not the "paper tiger" that it might have seemed. By 1864, it was a battle tested, modern navy, consisting of NUMEROUS "traditional, wood-walled, warships and dozens of Ironclads of many types, many of them fully capable of giving the HMS. Warrior a run for its money.

 

Most major Northern sea-ports were protected by belts of fortifications, not by just one fort. Running the gauntlet to get into Boston or New York harbor would result in taking heavy cannon fire from dozens of forts. The Crimea would have been a cakewalk in comparrison.

[John Dudek]

It would have been very hard for Britain to go to war against the Union. There was public dislike of the South, because of slavery, to the extent that attempts by cotton manufacturers to mobilise laid-off (because of cotton shortages) to pressure the government to break the blockade of the confederacy could not find support. Unemployed workers wouldn't rally for their jobs if it meant seeming to support slavery.

 

On land, Britain would have had difficulty finding enough troops for anything except raiding and a holding campaign in Canada, except by using the Indian army. However, I can't see anyone seriously planning anything more. We might have had to accept the temporary loss of Ontario & Quebec, due to lack of anything capable of opposing the Union army. To be frank, our army wasn't only small, it wasn't much good: superbly disciplined, excellent at drill, terribly old-fashioned tactics & lack of markmanship. Good for colonial wars against numerous but technologically outclassed enemies.

 

In the highly unlikely event of us, holding our noses, backing the Confederates, I think we'd have tried to minimise land fighting, & used the navy. Sink the US navy (at that time the Royal Navy probably had the greatest margin of superiority over the rest of the worlds navies it ever had) if it tried to fight, & if it tried to hide, methodically blast US ports to smithereens until it no longer had any bases. Would have given HMS Warrior something to do. Blockade the North. Meanwhile, escort convoys of everything the Confederacy needs into its ports, take every ounce of cotton & tobacco it can get to a dockside in part payment & a mortgage on the country for the rest.

 

Sound likely?

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As it was, Britain sent 11,000 troops, (5,000 of them Royal Engineers) 16 batteries of artillery, 50,000 rifles and 2-1/4 millions rounds of ammunition to reinforce Canada.

 

In the end, England realized the hopelessness of the situation of trying to hold onto Canada. This hastened Canada's Confederation and brought about the birth of its military.

[JOE BRENNAN]

The RN had experience of dealing with coastal fortifications in the Crimean War less than 10 years earlier. I'm not aware of how formidable the US coastal defences were, but this at least suggests that the RN would be able to attempt to deal with them.

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US coast defences in that period as mentioned were quite formidable, as evidenced by the USN's difficulties in dealing with US forts that had fallen into CSA hands, esp. when augmented by ad hoc earthwork batteries. The RN and French results against the Russian forts don't suggest easy success either, I think that example goes against your conclusion actually. The big naval bombardment of 17 Oct 1854 hardly damaged the Russian forts and resulted in much higher (though moderate) allied damage and casualties than (trifling) Russian losses: the typical ships v forts outcome throughout most of history. It took overwhelming gun ratio's as the USN's second attack on Fort Fisher in 1865 to have a reasonable chance of reducing strong forts with ships alone, even in that period against "obsolete" masonry forts (which could always add earth or separate earthworks) with "modern" rifles. It generally required complimentary large scale land attack, and/or establishing land siege artillery as at Sevastopol in 1855.

 

I think the Crimean War overall, including political context, is an indication of Britain's relatively low tolerance in that period for losses and expenditure in wars not critically affecting its interests. And as history showed, the US Civil War did not, cotton can be grown lots of places, not a sufficient cause for war.

 

Joe

Edited April 23, 2005 by JOE BRENNAN

[Reiver]

US coast defences in that period as mentioned were quite formidable, as evidenced by the USN's difficulties in dealing with US forts that had fallen into CSA hands, esp. when augmented by ad hoc earthwork batteries. The RN and French results against the Russian forts don't suggest easy success either, I think that example goes against your conclusion actually. The big naval bombardment of 17 Oct 1854 hardly damaged the Russian forts and resulted in much higher (though moderate) allied damage and casualties than (trifling) Russian losses: the typical ships v forts outcome throughout most of history. It took overwhelming gun ratio's as the USN's second attack on Fort Fisher in 1865 to have a reasonable chance of reducing strong forts with ships alone, even in that period against "obsolete" masonry forts (which could always add earth or separate earthworks) with "modern" rifles. It generally required complimentary large scale land attack, and/or establishing land siege artillery as at Sevastopol in 1855.

 

I think the Crimean War overall, including political context, is an indication of Britain's relatively low tolerance in that period for losses and expenditure in wars not critically affecting its interests. And as history showed, the US Civil War did not, cotton can be grown lots of places, not a sufficient cause for war.

 

Joe

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As a matter of interest, how did US coastal fortifications compare to Russian fortifications in terms of size and complexity? And how extensive were the defences to major cities such as Washington and New York?

[swerve]

The U.S. Navy was not the "paper tiger" that it might have seemed.  By 1864, it was a battle tested, modern navy, consisting of NUMEROUS "traditional, wood-walled, warships and dozens of Ironclads of many types, many of them fully capable of giving the HMS. Warrior a run for its money.

 

Yes, John, but the Trent affair was November 1861. The US navy had no ironclads then. I think by then it had about 30 steamships of all kinds available of the 40 on strength at the outbreak of war. Not all ended up usable & in federal hands. In 1861 the Royal Navy had about 150 ocean-going unarmoured screw steamships, not counting transports, gunboats, & minor vessels, plus Warrior in service, 3 other ironclads fitting out. & a few more on the stocks. Not to mention all the paddle & sailing ships. A considerable advantage in ships in the RNs favour, more in tonnage & firepower, & one (to be 4 by the time the first US ironclad monitor was ready for use) ocean-going ironclad battleship for which the USA had no match. By 1864 the RN, building at peacetime rates while British shipyards built ironclad warships for export, had 12 ironclad battleships with 6 fitting out & several more building, plus one coastal defence ironclad with one fitting out. While fewer in number than the US navys ironclads, their combined tonnage was greater.

 

By end-1864 the USN had, AFAIK, exactly one ocean-going ironclad, which was half the size of any of the RN ironclad battleships. 26 monitors had been commissioned, & 31 more were under construction. Dangerous in harbours & sheltered waters, but harmless to the RN battleships in the open sea.

 

Not that it matters, since if there really had been a war, both sides building programmes would have been different. All we can really know is the end 1861 state, before the war began.

Edited April 23, 2005 by swerve

[JOE BRENNAN]

As a matter of interest, how did US coastal fortifications compare to Russian fortifications in terms of size and complexity? And how extensive were the defences to major cities such as Washington and New York?

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The US ones as of the 1860's had mainly heavier guns. The Sevastopol forts had mainly 32#'ers (6.4") with some 68 (8"). The typical 3rd system defenses in US a decade later had mainly 10" and 8" Rodmans and pre CW era "columbiads" plus 42# and some 32#, as well as 24# landward defense guns.

 

The individual major US 3rd system forts were generally bigger, design gun complement in low-mid 100's was typical (famous Ft. Sumter, little damaged materially in furious CSA land and USN sea bombardments, was 135 for example) though some were much larger, 450 for Ft. Jefferson Dry Tortugas FL. The permanent Russian ones at Sevastopol, Constantine and Alexander had 97 and 51 respectively. But they were supplemented by many improvised forts and batteries. But then so could the US ones have been.

 

The walls of the Russian forts are quoted as 14-18ft, US ones 7-30 depending on which one and what tier, some as tall as four tiers. But in any case again earth protection and outer earthworks could be added (as they were by the Confederates to US forts they defended).

 

Washington was not practically attackable by ships once Federal defenses were built up just after the start of the war, a long run up the relatively shallow Potomac against earthwork batteries incl. 15" Rodmans among other guns.

 

NY is not an easy harbor to attack either, naturally, with the narrows between Staten Island and Brooklyn covered by two large forts at that time, Richmond (later and now Wadsworth) and Hamilton. Likewise the back door at Throgs Neck (which leads to a difficult to navigate channel anyway) and older inner works.

 

Readiness and timing is an issue, the US forts had had far below their alloted gun complements, and not all 42 newer forts of the 3rd system program were complete, but this was being made good just as the 60's started (even aside from the CW). And as mentioned we shouldn't imagine the RN was kept in a state of continuous high readiness in the mid 19th century, there would have been time to prepare for any British raids, but against the major fortified harbors they would have been impractical I think, as they were generally judged to be even in 1812 by ships alone. The success against Washington in 1814 involved landing fairly large land forces implying more time to prepare and transport them. And the only assault on a large fort by ships in that war, after a land assault had been checked, at Baltimore, failed, as ship attacks on forts usually did except if they had truly overwhelming weight of fire superiority.

 

Joe

[Reiver]

Readiness and timing is an issue, the US forts had had far below their alloted gun complements, and not all 42 newer forts of the 3rd system program were complete, but this was being made good just as the 60's started (even aside from the CW). And as mentioned we shouldn't imagine the RN was kept in a state of continuous high readiness in the mid 19th century, there would have been time to prepare for any British raids, but against the major fortified harbors they would have been impractical I think, as they were generally judged to be even in 1812 by ships alone. The success against Washington in 1814 involved landing fairly large land forces implying more time to prepare and transport them. And the only assault on a large fort by ships in that war, after a land assault had been checked, at Baltimore, failed, as ship attacks on forts usually did except if they had truly overwhelming weight of fire superiority.

 

Joe

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Thanks for that, it's very informative. What size were fortress garrisons at this period typically? I tend to think that British coastal raids a la 1812 would be less successful in this era too, partially because railways would allow much more rapid transit of troops to threatened areas than would have been possible in the War of 1812. If we postulate a British involvement in the war, and the British attempt to utilise their naval advantage to carry out raids against coastal targets, what forces were available to counter such raids (in addition to static fortifications), and what if any, effect would this have upon the combat against the Confederacy?

 

Cheers

 

Paul

[gewing]

The author Shelby Foote said in his three volume narrative of the Civil War.

 

"I think the North fought that war with one hand tied behind its back.  Much of its population and industry were completely unaffected by the war. Had the South scored more major military victories against the North, I think the North would simply have used both hands." ..dipping into and mobilizing its deep, manpower and industrial reserves for the prosecution of the war.

 

The U.S. Navy was not the "paper tiger" that it might have seemed.  By 1864, it was a battle tested, modern navy, consisting of NUMEROUS "traditional, wood-walled, warships and dozens of Ironclads of many types, many of them fully capable of giving the HMS. Warrior a run for its money.

 

Most major Northern sea-ports were protected by belts of fortifications, not by just one fort.  Running the gauntlet to get into Boston or New York harbor would result in taking heavy cannon fire from dozens of forts.  The Crimea would have been a cakewalk in comparrison.

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I remember reading the comments of a post war RN Admiral on the event of a Monitor maing a show the flag visit (by barge:)) "That little ship putt putting around in my harbor could sink my entire fleet and I couldn't stop it." Or something to that effect.

 

Was it an exageration? I don't know. But How many warships of the time would have survived trying to break past a Monitor defending a harbor?

 

With land based support, fleets could die that way.

[KingSargent]

Thanks for that, it's very informative. What size were fortress garrisons at this period typically? I tend to think that British coastal raids a la 1812 would be less successful in this era too, partially because railways would allow much more rapid transit of troops to threatened areas than would have been possible in the War of 1812. If we postulate a British involvement in the war, and the British attempt to utilise their naval advantage to carry out raids against coastal targets, what forces were available to counter such raids (in addition to static fortifications), and what if any, effect would this have upon the combat against the Confederacy?

 

Cheers

 

Paul

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The Britsh ships for attack would be a problem. They had built a large fleet of gun- and mortar-boats to attack Russian fortifications (the Russians gave up before the small craft could get to the Baltic). These possibly would have been effective in America (they were at what is now Helsinki), but they were all laid up. Getting them manned and operational would have been a major feat, and getting the small craft across the Atlantic a miraculous one. The big Brit ironclads would have had problems with US forts - they had no deck armor and the US was very fond of heavy Coast Defence mortars and high-angle guns. The approaches to the major ports were surveyed and fires were pre-planned. IOW, it would have been a bytch...

 

One BIG lesson the Brits learned from Crimea was just how much it cost to move an army and keep it supplied. It took months to get a comparatively small expeditionary force through the Med and Black Sea to Crimea. The stops at Scutari, etc were necessary to try to consolidate the forces and coordinate supplies. The lack of staff and planning was infamous, and matters had not improved much six years later.

Virtually every large steamer in the British Merchant Marine was hired to support the Crimean move and ISTR that more coal was bought to make the move than had ever been bought at one time in the history of the world.

As it was, the transports needed numerous coaling stations along the route from Blighty to the Black Sea. Trying to make such a move across the Atlantic was impossible; very few ships had the range for a Trans-Atlantic steam crossing in those days and they would be empty of fuel when they got to the other side.

Ditto the RN combat ships: Warrior could probably have waxed the whole USN in 1861-2 (the USN was just starting its build-up), but there were no docks in British North American and Caribbean possessions large enough to take Warrior; there were not sufficient coal stocks to keep a British steam fleet operating in US/Canadian waters - unless they bought coal from the US . Getting rations for the move would have been a problem; there were very few 7-11s floating in mid-Atlantic in 1862 (all the stops during the Crimean move had been to get rations as well as coal).

As I mentioned previously, much of the Crimean army had gone to Asia between 1855 and 1862. Trying to get them back, re-organized, and sent to America would not have been possible before Canada was overrun (unless of course McClellan and Ben Butler were put in charge of the invasion of Canada). And the Crimean army amounted to about five divisions - not a large force by ACW standards.

If the Army had gotten to Canada, there would have been no local re-supply of ammunition and ordnance parts, and the ability of Canada to feed a large army was doubted by the Committees on Imperial Defence. If they could have grown the food, how would they transport it to the army?

It seems that Nasty Old Logistics would have put a spoke in the works of a British campaign in North America.

 

And please, don't tell me the British supported armies across oceans in the Napoleonic wars; those armies were much smaller, the distances were much shorter, they didn't have to worry about fuel, and the British had had 20+ years to learn how to do it. The Crimea showed that they had forgotten how since 1815. They weren't even too swift at it in 1915 at Gallipoli, again a shorter move.

[Burncycle360]

--

Edited April 24, 2005 by Burncycle360

[Guest phil gollin]

Troop carrier

 

By 1860 the British would have had access to the Great Eastern, with 4,000 passenger cabins and easy trans-Atlantic range. Trooper estimates were between 10 to 15,000 per trip (she took 10,000 on one trip)..

 

Warrior by her self would be able to deal with the whole of the USN IF she could reach them, and of course there were the other British ironclads.

 

Most RN warships were sail or sail and steam so coal would nt be too much in demand and supplie would be available in Canada, Bahamas and the Carribean.

 

The RN wouldn't, in general perform forced raids against heavy targets, they would do what they historically did, land raiding parties.

 

The two big factors, as have already been noted, was a dislike of slavery and a desire for trade not war. There was almost no way that war (as opposed to threats) would have come about.

 

The dislike of slavery was an intrinsic part of the RN, the RN having had a strong and continuous presence in anti-slaving patrols for 50-plus years. Indeed, one of the big causes of annoyance between the British (and especially the RN) and the US was the activities of the US slaving ships and their objections to searches.

[Gabe]

I played Britain in Victoria: Empire Under the Sun and went to war over the Trent Affair. The RN easily wiped out the union navy and was soon unchallenged. There was however no way to move enough troops in Canada to prevent the union troops from taking half of it. I did take Liberia as a concilation prize.

[Richard Lindquist]

Britain managed to send five Infantry divisions and one Cavalry division to the Crimea 6 years earlier. I doubt the Russians shared that low opinion of their capabilities.

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Except that the Indian Mutiny and the invasion of China had moved a lot of the Brit army assets to Asia. The Indian Mutiny had happened only five years earlier and they needed to keep a large force in india to assure they could subdue the sepoys if it happened again. The march to Peking and the destruction of the summer palace were also quite recent.

[Richard Lindquist]

I played Britain in Victoria: Empire Under the Sun and went to war over the Trent Affair. The RN easily wiped out the union navy and was soon unchallenged. There was however no way to move enough troops in Canada to prevent the union troops from taking half of it. I did take Liberia as a concilation prize.

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The RN at this time was huge. There was a large fleet of wooden screw ships of the line backed by screw frigates, corvettes, and sloops. It dwarfed the USN. Three warrior types would have been available to send off any USN ironclads.

[Richard Lindquist]

As a matter of interest, how did US coastal fortifications compare to Russian fortifications in terms of size and complexity? And how extensive were the defences to major cities such as Washington and New York?

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Because of British depredations in 1812-1815, the US had mounted a coastal fortification program in the 1820 to 1850 era and had constructed a large number of masonry and earth/masonry fortifications. All of the seaports on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts were well protected by these fortifications. Note that the Union navy was never able to reduce the forts in Wilmington, Charleston, or Savannah. All of these places fell as a result of sherman coming up behind them. The forts at new orleans and Mobile were "run past" and then reduced at leisure from the inside. The union was lucky to retain control of Fort Monroe.

[swerve]

I remember reading the comments of a post war RN Admiral on the event of a Monitor maing a show the flag visit (by barge:)) "That little ship putt putting around in my harbor could sink my entire fleet and I couldn't stop it."  Or something to that effect.  

 

Was it an exageration?  I don't know.    But How many warships of the time would have survived trying to break past a Monitor defending a harbor? 

 

With land based support, fleets could die that way.

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If he didn't have any of the 20 or so ironclad battleships in RN service by 1866 (All built since 1859) in his fleet, or the two ironclad monitors, entirely true. I don't know how the ironclad battleships would have fared in the confined waters of a harbour against a monitor: possibly not very well. But in the open sea, any one of the aforementioned 20 or so ironclad battleships could have slaughtered the entire US navy.

 

Only Warrior was in service at the time of the Trent incident, but Black Prince was working up, & two others were launched & fitting out. ca 9000 tons each, vs average US monitor size of ca 1500 tons, 2-3 times the speed, immensely greater firepower. The monitors had the advantage of better manoueverability in confined waters & guns which were more easily trainable & very effective at point-blank range. Target practice for Warrior et al anywhere except in a harbour, dangerous there.

Edited April 24, 2005 by swerve