Scott Ritter Says Don't Even Bother

[bigfngun]

Well if Scott Ritter says the SS-27 Topol M will get through any US missile defense system it must be true.

http://www.businessweek.com/print/bwdaily/...38.htm?chan=db&

[bigfngun]

Full Article:

 

FEBRUARY 4, 2005

 

NEWS ANALYSIS

By Stan Crock

 

 

Star Wars Faces a Budget Hit

Unreliability is just one reason why funding is being cut. The other is the changing nature of potential threats to U.S. security

The Pentagon has eight missiles on the ground in Alaska and California, poised to shoot down any makeshift ballistic missile that comes our way. Trouble is, sometimes the interceptors stay on terra firma when they're launched. That's what happened in December in the latest Star Wars test, which came two years after a different snafu. A computer glitch was to blame in December, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) says.

 

Such woes could be part of the reason missile defense is heading toward a 10% cut in its 2006 budget, to $8.8 billion. MDA spokesman Rick Lehner, contacted before an embargo on the budget was broken, wouldn't comment on the projected spending. But outsiders have no such qualms. "It's a very complex program with a lot of technical issues," notes Steven Kosiak, a defense-budget analyst with the Center for Strategic & Budgetary Assessment, a Washington think tank. "It's hard to spend all that money efficiently."

 

ALTERED PRIORITIES. However, there's probably more than missile mishaps behind the dollar drop for Star Wars. The war on terror and Iraq may have taken their toll on missile defense and changed the way Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld assesses potential threats. He went into office worried about space issues, the ballistic-missile threat, and transforming the military.

 

Then came September 11, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

 

"The Rumsfeld vision of future warfare has had a severe collision with reality," says Loren Thompson, chief operating officer of the Lexington Institute, a conservative think tank in Arlington, Va. The problems facing missile defense, he says, are "the relatively weak case for the overall mission and the need to spend money in other ways."

 

Consider as well the difference between the 2000 election and last year's. Five years ago, missile defense was one of Bush's key issues, a surefire way to galvanize his conservative base. "America must build effective missile defenses based on the best available options at the earliest possible date," he declared during his first run for the White House.

 

"NO DEMONSTRATED CAPABILITY." Since then, despite the roughly $10 billion a year that has poured into the program, Rumsfeld has conceded the system doesn't have to be 100% effective. It just has to work well enough to change the calculation of an enemy thinking about lofting a missile at Los Angeles or New York. Problem is, it doesn't even seem capable of doing that, as the December test showed.

 

After more than 20 years of effort, major parts of the system are nowhere near ready for prime time, notes Philip Coyle, a top Pentagon weapons tester in the Clinton Administration. Neither the sophisticated X-band radar nor the Space-Based Infra-red System-High (SBIRS-High), both of which are critical to detecting and tracking incoming missiles, is close to operational. SBIRS-High is running into such difficulties that Lockheed Martin (LMT ) has agreed to defer a $10 million award -- its total profit on the project for 2004-2005. After a major restructuring in 2002, the cost of this one part of Star Wars was pegged at $4.4 billion -- and since then has swelled to $5.6 billion.

 

What's more, every time there is an attempt to intercept a missile, the target carries a beacon to tell the interceptor where it is -- a service an enemy isn't likely to offer. The bottom line: The system "has no demonstrated capability to defend against a realistic attack under realistic conditions," Coyle says.

 

NEW THREAT. And as the American program struggles, other countries are making headway in pursuing new technologies. Scott Ritter, the former arms inspector in Iraq who correctly concluded Baghdad had no weapons of mass destruction, now says Russia has tested an SS-27 Topol-M mobile ballistic missile that would render the current Star Wars scheme useless. It is too fast to hit right after takeoff unless the interceptor is lucky enough to be really close to the launch pad.

 

Also, the SS-27 is hardened against lasers, so the airborne laser -- a program already way behind schedule -- wouldn't work. And because it's maneuverable and capable of releasing three warheads and four decoys, it would be much harder to defeat as it falls in the terminal stage of flight.

 

MDA spokesman Lehner says Ritter's objection misses the point of his agency's goal, which is to address "the more rudimentary missiles North Korea and Iran are developing." But what if Pyongyang or Tehran buys an SS-27? "I don't know about that," he told BusinessWeek Online.

 

No wonder Bush changed the subject in 2004. "The domestic politics of it are less than they were," says Michael O'Hanlon, a defense expert at the Brookings Institution. "We went through an election campaign in which we barely heard mention of it." Even a strong backer of missile defense such as Frank Gaffney Jr., president of the Center for Security Policy, isn't overwrought by the cuts. According to Thompson, they most affect the kinetic-energy interceptor, which is supposed to collide with an incoming warhead in the boost phase.

 

UNTOUCHABLE TARGETS. While Gaffney would like more money spent on missile defense, he says his "strong preference would be to take money out of the kinetic energy interceptor, rather than other areas." The Northrop Grumman (NOC )-Raytheon (RTN ) program is the most recent addition to the missile-defense arsenal, and as a result, the most vulnerable, Thompson says.

 

A leaked December budget memo says the program faces further cuts of $800 million a year from projected spending through fiscal 2011. That could be just the start if Washington gets serious about the budget deficit. Congress isn't going to slash outlays for military pay, housing, medical care, or retiree benefits. It can't scrimp on operations and maintenance with forces under fire.

 

Procurement is all that's left. And if lawmakers protect C-130J transports, F/A-22 fighters, and ships, Star Wars' $9 billion budget -- and its dubious performance -- make it an inviting target. The way it's looking now, the proposed cuts in Star Wars may well have a better chance of succeeding than the system's missiles.

 

 

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

Crock is senior diplomatic correspondent for BusinessWeek, based in Washington, D.C.

Edited by Patricia O'Connell

[UN-Interested Observer]

Well, if it's true then there is no point getting angry at the messenger. If the system is already obsolete, then the money could be invested in other more effective ways to counter nuclear threats, maybe?

[R011]

Scott Ritter, the former arms inspector in Iraq who correctly concluded Baghdad had no weapons of mass destruction

 

This would be the same Scott Ritter who, when he was actually an inspector, claimed exactly the opposite and whose change of mind coincided with his taking money from a member of the Baathist nomenklatura to make an anti-American "documentary". He's also the same Scott Ritter who was picked up for trying to lure a thirteen year old girl on the internet.

 

His credibility level is as close to zero as one can imagine. He might be right, but only in the sense that a stopped clock is right twice a day. I don't thnk that is the case here.

 

Besides Ritter, an intelligence officer rather than a missile scientist, the author can only find one lone person to make any specific criticism of one part of the program and mixes it with some platidudinous generalities and discussons of politics.

Edited February 11, 2005 by R011

[T-44]

He's also the same Scott Ritter who was picked up for trying to lure a thirteen year old girl on the internet.

144263[/snapback]

 

Although that's clearly enough to condemn him as a person, it doesn't mean he's not credible as a weapon expert, however (although the other things brought up are more). For the same reason you could say that you don't believe some SS weapon designer because he's a nazi. Tackle on the subject, not the person.

[Chris Werb]

The whole limited ABM system programme was pitched as not undermining deterrence because it would never stop an all out Russian (or presumably Chinese) attack. So why does it need to work against the SS-27?

[Josh]

The fact that it doesn't work against anything is a bit more damning in my mind. I say put a nuke warhead on it and let it miss my a few hundred meters. Eat the EMP, its better than having a nuke hit the Conus, and it would probably be over the Pacific or Canada anyway

[PONGO_7409]

The fact that it doesn't work against anything is a bit more damning in my mind. I say put a nuke warhead on it and let it miss my a few hundred meters. Eat the EMP, its better than having a nuke hit the Conus, and it would probably be over the Pacific or Canada anyway

144318[/snapback]

 

over Canada at high altitude . . . by the time the radioactive cloud made ground contact, it would probably be over, hmmmm let me think about it, . . . hmmmm

 

New Haven ???

[Garth]

IIRC, at least one 1950s-era test of a nuclear-tipped Genie AAM involved having high ranking officials standing on the ground right BELOW the detonation.

 

From what I've read a low-yield airburst at altitude will have a negligable effect at ground level.

 

--Garth

 

 

 

over Canada at high altitude . . .  by the time the radioactive cloud made ground contact, it would probably be over, hmmmm let me think about it, . . .  hmmmm

 

  New Haven ???       

144331[/snapback]

[BP]

IIRC, at least one 1950s-era test of a nuclear-tipped Genie AAM involved having high ranking officials standing on the ground right BELOW the detonation.

 

--Garth

144345[/snapback]

 

 

Yikes! Must have been the Missippi Congressional delegation. "Hey ya'll. Watch this!"

[Guest aevans]

Let's look at the specific claims:

 

It is too fast to hit right after takeoff unless the interceptor is lucky enough to be really close to the launch pad.

What does speed have to do with hitting a missile "right after takeoff"? Even a relatively high acceleration booster is only going to shave seconds off of the boost phase. An ability to place the interceptor in the right place downrange would be a much more dominant factor, it seems to me.

 

Also, the SS-27 is hardened against lasers, so the airborne laser -- a program already way behind schedule -- wouldn't work.

 

Battleships and tanks have been hardened against the efforts of the enemy as well. Yet enemies find ways to make their weapons work against them. Making a job tougher does not make it impossible.

 

And because it's maneuverable and capable of releasing three warheads and four decoys, it would be much harder to defeat as it falls in the terminal stage of flight.

 

Harder to defeat, not impossible. Two things to note here. The first is that with curren or foreseen sensors and signal processing, decoys that do not have exactly the same mass, mass distribution, and shape as actual warheads are probably relatively easy to discriminate. Second, more targets just means you deploy more interceptors. If a small and threatening nuclear power acquires MIRV technology, you deploy more of them.

[Guest Mike Steele]

Although that's clearly enough to condemn him as a person, it doesn't mean he's not credible as a weapon expert, however (although the other things brought up are more).  For the same reason you could say that you don't believe some SS weapon designer because he's a nazi. Tackle on the subject, not the person.

144277[/snapback]

We've had this discussion before about this (expletive deleted). I wonder why is he credible at all? Ifd his tastes run to 13 year olds what's that say about his charecter? Probally the same as Mr. Blue dress I suppose.

[Guest aevans]

Well, if it's true then there is no point getting angry at the messenger. If the system is already obsolete, then the money could be invested in other more effective ways to counter nuclear threats, maybe?

144255[/snapback]

 

But that's not what the article says. All the article did was identify a single challenege out of many, and on the straw manized basis of a challenge being unconquerable simply because the author said so, declared the system entirely useless. He takes no notice that the system does have uses against lesser technical challenges and implies, without presenting any evidence, that it can't be improved.

[Josh]

over Canada at high altitude . . .  by the time the radioactive cloud made ground contact, it would probably be over, hmmmm   let me think about it, . . .  hmmmm

 

  New Haven ???       

144331[/snapback]

 

A small price to pay for the people of...Los Angeles? Nevermind, let 'em flatten the place.

Edited February 11, 2005 by jua

[Josh]

But that's not what the article says. All the article did was identify a single challenege out of many, and on the straw manized basis of a challenge being unconquerable simply because the author said so, declared the system entirely useless. He takes no notice that the system does have uses against lesser technical challenges and implies, without presenting any evidence, that it can't be improved.

144365[/snapback]

 

You mean, improved to the point of hitting something?

[Sparviero]

I've always been a tad curious why we are spending money on new ground based abm system and laser defense system. Seems like pouring money into the laser system, especially a mobile one would be the better bet and would provide the benefit of advancing our knowledge on energy based weapons for more conventional use. I realise it would still be long term however the national missile defense system seems to be acting as a long term project.

 

Just my uneducated foot in the mouth question.

[Garth]

It IS tempting to think that way, isn't it? I mean, if the NKs are going to take a shot at us chances are its going to hit a place with a population that's strongly in need of an education about concepts like "peace through strength" anyways ...

 

 

--Garth

 

A small price to pay for the people of...Los Angeles? Nevermind, let 'em flatten the place.

144373[/snapback]

[Harold Jones]

You are forgetting the ever so lovely people's paradise of North Korea. They have cobbled together a 'missile' that can just barely reach the US. Now that they have a nuclear payload for it, it isn't beyond the realm of possibility that their less than sane leader might some day wake up and think it's go time. This is the threat the ABMs are aimed at these days. As far as the new super missile goes I doubt that either the Russians are in a big rush to sell them to the NKs or the Iranians for that matter.

[Phil]

I think the real beauty in ABM defence lies in this:

 

You have your nuclear attack plan. You decide that you need to hit X number of targets and assign X number of warheads to do so. Fine.

 

Imagine you were launching against an ABM system that, for the sake of argument, can only knock down 20% of the incoming warheads. That means in an ideal world 20% of your warheads are going to get shot down. But which ones will they be? Suddenly the relative certainty (taking into projected failure rates that no doubt your attack plan takes into account) of a nuclear strike achieving its objectives is ended. Launch a limited strike and that is even less likely to completely succeed. You are left with two options as far as I see to make your nuclear deterrent credible again:

 

(a) Make sure any nuclear attack is made using everything you can throw. There are no half measures - no limited nuclear exchanges since you cannot guarantee to succeed in your objectives and the enemy will likely throw everything back at you. Pretty much what we have now. Except that in order to make up that 20% loss rate you build 20% more warheads (probably even more) yet it would prove much cheaper to expand the ABM system again to deal with those extra numbers. Put cheap decoys on the missiles that are essentially ballasted dud warheads you might. But each missile with an MIRV can only target multiple targets within a certain footprint and you still risk dud warheads thumping into targets - there's no effect except to take up space that might be used for real, far more expensive nuclear warheads.

 

( Divert funds from nuclear weapons into ones own ABM system thus diverting funding from offensive nuclear weapons into defensive conventional ones.

 

ABM systems force doubt into the equation and that is the very worst thing one can have with a nuclear attack plan - doubt. It needs to work - the enemy needs to think it will work otherwise your deterrent force ceases to be such a deterrent.

 

ABM creates doubt, uncertainty. And that's where it strengths lie. That and the ability to deal with the odd rogue, or accidental launch.

[Garth]

Spoken like someone who's in the potential footprint of the NK's nuke-tipped ICBMs.

 

So, how's Denver these days, Harold?

 

 

You are forgetting the ever so lovely people's paradise of North Korea.  They have cobbled together a 'missile' that can just barely reach the US.  Now that they have a nuclear payload for it, it isn't beyond the realm of possibility that their less than sane leader might some day wake up and think it's go time.  This is the threat the ABMs are aimed at these days.  As far as the new super missile goes I doubt that either the Russians are in a big rush to sell them to the NKs or the Iranians for that matter.

144436[/snapback]

[lastdingo]

Let's look at the specific claims:

What does speed have to do with hitting a missile "right after takeoff"? Even a relatively high acceleration booster is only going to shave seconds off of the boost phase. An ability to place the interceptor in the right place downrange would be a much more dominant factor, it seems to me.

144362[/snapback]

 

I remember theoretical analysises from aroun 1982 that were on the possible countermeasure of shorter-burning rockets that give the missile greater acceleration.

 

Basically the argument was that the infrared emissions were important for taget confirmation, targeting an so on. It was also about decision-making time-lags.

[Guest Mike Steele]

I can help but think this is all missing the point. Its a little developing a new kind of reactive armour to defeat Longbow Arrows

 

Im sure thats is technically feasible to develop a shield that will defeat all known kinds of ballistic missile impacting the united states. The problem is that its yesterdays war. Unless China or Russia suddenly become testy, your real problem is Iran (for which you have excellent means of destroying launch vehicles before they are even built) or somebody smuggling  a weapon into the country in a Boeing 727 or a cargo container. All this system will do is consume valuable funds need to deal with those threats, and fight the war on terror.

144409[/snapback]

Stewart.

As a point of fact. There is $$$ to do just what you describe as an alternative means.

[Harold Jones]

Spoken like someone who's in the potential footprint of the NK's nuke-tipped ICBMs.

 

So, how's Denver these days, Harold?

 

144446[/snapback]

 

Pretty good actually. I'm sure my brother in LA is a bit more concerned than I am about NK and their toys. However, King may be the Tanknettter who should most urgently reviewing the duck and cover. Although, to be honest I'm not sure that their missiles are even capable of hitting this continent consistently today.

[Guest aevans]

Stuart,

 

BMD, as currently conceived, is an insurance policy against irrational behavior. Going by the economic damage caused by the conventional destruction of a relatively small part of an important business center -- estimated at right around $100B -- the expenditure of even $1T on ballistic missile defense seems a good insurance investment.

[Brasidas]

Although that's clearly enough to condemn him as a person, it doesn't mean he's not credible as a weapon expert, however (although the other things brought up are more).  For the same reason you could say that you don't believe some SS weapon designer because he's a nazi. Tackle on the subject, not the person.

144277[/snapback]

 

 

Which is incorrect on it's face. I so like these types of assertions that try and claim lack of character and integrity in the personal life has no bearing on professional conduct or judgement.

 

It is well known in Scott Ritter's home country, the United States, that attempting to sexually assault 13 year old girls is a big no no. He has to be willing to use deception, both of the girl, and the public at large, since any relationship with her must be kept secret. Not only that, it bespeaks a lack of moral character, in which it shows he cannot even be trusted with the emotional and physical welfare of a child who he would willingly abuse. To then say he can be trusted to be truthful regarding a topic that affects hundreds if millions based on his "professional" characteristics as if they belonged to another person is not very logical in my experience. The lying deceiver that would endanger the welfare of a girl to get his way, would be the same lying deceiver telling an audience his opinion on any topic he claims to be an expert in.