Did The Us Army "refuse" British Funnies?

[Rich]

IMHO the genesis of the 79th Armoured Division can be traced to the British genesis of the tank in WW1, which first and foremost saw the tank as a tool for dealing with the barbed wire, trenches and machine guns of the German defenses, not as a tool for exploitation.

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Colin, indirectly, all tank development stems from the genesis of the tank in World War I. But the actual genesis of and development of the 79th Division as an assault formation was as a result of the peculiar requirements seen for the Normandy invasion.

 

Just because something walks looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and talks like a duck doesn't make it a duck, it could be a goose.

[Rich]

As I said, the Funnies were largely of use as gun tanks "contributing to the attack by knocking out pillboxes and gun emplacements". That could have neen done by regular gun tanks, and a lot of obstacle clearing could have been done with US M4 tank-dozers. I think there were tank-dozers scheduled with the assault waves (and I'm sure Rich will correct me if I'm wrong). Having a slit trench dozed under is surely as effective as flailing it to death...

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Sarge, as far as I've been able to reconstruct the situation was this. Sometime in May 100 tankdozer conversion kits were received by ETOUSA (this conversion kit was one of the most requested and hotly desired items in the ETO, they were in short supply for the entire war). Some of these were allocated to British forces and some to the armored divisions and tank battalions of First and Third Army assigned as part of the "Build-Up" Forces. It appears that a total of at least 42 were assigned to the Assault and "Follow-On" Forces. Specifically, six each were assigned to the 70th, 741st, 743rd, 745th, 746th, and 747th Tank Battalions. Another six were assigned two each to the three Engineer Light Equipment Companies assigned to the Engineer Special Brigades at UTAH and OMAHA.

 

At OMAHA and UTAH, the six tankdozers of the ESB were specifically assigned to aide the Beach Obstacle Demolition Party (UTAH) and the Special Engineer Task Force (OMAHA), along with a number of D7 armored bulldozers and then as later waves arrived, D4 unarmored bulldozers. The same task was done on the British beaches by D7 and D4 bulldozers alone, because there had been no time to outfit British tankdozers (it appears they arrived much later, as Crusader and Centaur tankdozers, which were acknowledged to be useful, but less useful than Sherman tankdozers). It appears that the total number assigned to the task were roughly the same on the British and American beaches (SWORD 8 D7, JUNO 8 D7, GOLD 1 D4 and 1 D7, UTAH 2 tankdozers and 4 (?) D4, OMAHA, 4 tankdozers and 8 D4).

 

The tankdozers assigned to the tank battalions (and manned by the crews of the Assault Gun Platoon and the assault gun assigned to the medium companies - they didn't have M4-105mm yet, so why not?) were assigned to act as the US equivalent of the Funnies in that they were to land with the standard M4 off of LCT (A) and clear a path forward to the edge of the beach, then bulldoze paths over the seawall or embankment, and then doze in the tank ditches. Of course on OMAHA, assuming they weren't shot up, then they were pretty much stuck until the antitank walls at Vierville and St Laurent were demolished, which required hand emplaced explosives (BTW, the other draws weren't considered viable exits, even for tracked vehicles, which was essentially correct).

 

In retrospect it would have been better of course to equip all of the tanks of the US assault battalions with dozer blades, at least the non-DD ones. That would have been a requirement for an additional 78 though, 20 more than what was available though. But if that had been done, then in theory there would have been - allowing for rounding - perhaps 30 in each sector of the American beaches instead of 8, quite possibly enough to have made something of a differance at OMAHA - if the Germans had refrained from shooting them up or had conventiently neglected to build their antitank walls.

[dazz]

Just jumping into this - sorry if its already been covered, but while watching a docu on D-day and seeing how many US soldiers got killed by a couple of pillboxes, it made me wonder

1. Why didn't they think of deploying some kind of bullet proof shields in the first waves?

2. or why didn't they use armoured boats with canon on them to deal with these things?

[Colin Williams]

Furthermore, the major obstacles at OMAHA were the two antitank walls at the Vierville and St Laurent draws, neither of which would have been susceptible to "machines" (the Vierville wall required the hand emplacement of 1,100 pounds of explosive by the 121st CIB to demolish it, followed by bulldozers to clear the debris).

 

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I don't know. This one doesn't look AVRE-proof -

 

[KingSargent]

Just jumping into this - sorry if its already been covered, but while watching a docu on D-day and seeing how many US soldiers got killed by a couple of pillboxes, it made me wonder

1. Why didn't they think of deploying some kind of bullet proof shields in the first waves?

 

They did. The shields were called "tanks." Had things gone as planned, the tanks would have been on the beach before the infantry.

 

2. or why didn't they use armoured boats with canon on them to deal with these things?

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They did that, too. USN DDs went in until they were scraping bottom to provide fire support, and there were LCI gunboats and all sorts of support vehicles. The problem is that the shores off an amphibious landing are very crowded, and fitting all this stuff in a limited area gets a bit tricky. Also the smoke and stuff makes it difficult to see things like small slits in bunkers from ships offshore.

 

One of the DDs mentioned above cooperated very well by watching one of the few Shermans on OMAHA. The M4 would fire at an obstacle, the DD would spot where the tank's shell hit, and then smother it with 5"/38 and 40mm fire. The German MG positions on the bluffs were definitely unthrilled when a few hundred 40mm Bofors shells landed on them.

 

"No plan survives contact with the enemy," and "No one can see everything that is going on on a battlefield," are quotes that should be remembered when one asks, "Why didn't they...?"

[Rich]

I don't know. This one doesn't look AVRE-proof -

 

Gee, why was I just waiting for that one to come up?

 

Actually it's a very curious question - and AFAIK unexplained - as to what was in the Germans head on this one. The antitank wall at the Vierville exit looked very similar, but was in reality completely different. For some reason the St Laurent wall was constructed without any rebar, and as a consequence was first "cracked" by a small amount of explosive and then cleared by simple bulldozing. OTOH the Vierville exit required 1,100 pounds of explosive to "crack" it, followed by extensive bulldozing and regrading of the exit road. All told it took about three hours IIRC.

 

So yes, the St Laurent wall probably could have been breached by a Petard and a bulldozer combo, but then the Allies did not know that, did they?

Edited January 21, 2005 by Rich

[Rich]

They did that, too. USN DDs went in until they were scraping bottom to provide fire support, and there were LCI gunboats and all sorts of support vehicles. The problem is that the shores off an amphibious landing are very crowded, and fitting all this stuff in a limited area gets a bit tricky. Also the smoke and stuff makes it difficult to see things like small slits in bunkers from ships offshore.

 

One of the DDs mentioned above cooperated very well by watching one of the few Shermans on OMAHA. The M4 would fire at an obstacle, the DD would spot where the tank's shell hit, and then smother it with 5"/38 and 40mm fire. The German MG positions on the bluffs were definitely unthrilled when a few hundred 40mm Bofors shells landed on them.

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Sadly, the story of the effectiveness of the destroyers on D-Day appears to have grown a bit over the years. In fact, as best I have been able to make out, the closing in of the DD's actually occurred after the first troops got off the beach and over the bluffs and quite possibly after the first WN fell. They do appear to have had a material effect supporting the assault of the 16th Infantry on WN 61 nad 62 though, but at the same time also inflicted a number of fratricidal casualties. Surprisingly, perhaps some of the most effective support given on that day has been missed in most accounts, that of the GMC of the 197th and 497th AAA (AW-SP) Battalions landed at roughly H+120. They suffered pretty heavy casualties, but fought their multiple mounts from the waters edge and effectively silenced a number of the German positions. Evidently the Germans were also unthrilled to have a few thousand .50-caliber and a few hundred Colt 37mm shells landed on them.

 

The real problem at OMAHA was the basic plan, which placed the assaulting troops directly against the German defenses under the misplaced assumption (misplaced, but repeated over and over again in amphibious assaults) that the preassault aerial bombardment would "shock" the defenders into docility. This also placed the assault craft effectively in the line of supporting fire for the flanking LCG, LCF and DD of the bombardment force, which had to check fire when the assault waves approached the beach. The DD tanks were supposed to deal with this problem, but we know what happened there.

[JohnB]

Actually it's a very curious question - and AFAIK unexplained - as to what was in the Germans head on this one. The antitank wall at the Vierville exit looked very similar, but was in reality completely different. For some reason the St Laurent wall was constructed without any rebar, and as a consequence was first "cracked" by a small amount of explosive and then cleared by simple bulldozing. OTOH the Vierville exit required 1,100 pounds of explosive to "crack" it, followed by extensive bulldozing and regrading of the exit road. All told it took about three hours IIRC.

 

So yes, the St Laurent wall probably could have been breached by a Petard and a bulldozer combo, but then the Allies did not know that, did they? 

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How does rebar make a concrete wall Petard proof?

 

Edited January 21, 2005 by JohnB

[Rich]

How does rebar make a concrete wall Petard proof?

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John, to clear the Vierville exit required 1,100 pounds of explosive. That amount, placed against the base of the wall, completely destroyed a section approximately 8 feet wide, 8 feet high, and 3 feet thick, cutting all of the extensive rebar, and excavating about a 2" deep drench along the road way. Is a forty-pound Petard round cpable of that? And if not, how many are?

 

It is not a question of being "Petard proof" it is a question of what was required to effectively demolish such a structure so as to make it passable for vehicles?

[JohnB]

John, to clear the Vierville exit required 1,100 pounds of explosive. That amount, placed against the base of the wall, completely destroyed a section approximately 8 feet wide, 8 feet high, and 3 feet thick, cutting all of the extensive rebar, and excavating about a 2" deep drench along the road way. Is a forty-pound Petard round cpable of that? And if not, how many are?

 

It is not a question of being "Petard proof" it is a question of what was required to effectively demolish such a structure so as to make it passable for vehicles?

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I thought I already posted on this, but:

 

WO 232/55 Reduction of concrete defences by arty and bombs

"Hits per standard breach" are quoted as being 54 for Petard

and

WO 291/598 Attack of Concrete Walls by Petard

"In two trials, at Foulness and Hankley Common, the number of effective rounds required to demolish a

concrete wall 12 feet high and 9feet 6 inches thick were:

Location Effective rounds Cubic feet removed

Foulness 54 1091

Hankley Common 50 780

 

A half troop of AVREs firing 'dustbins' at a rate of 2 per minute each could cause a breech in a concrete wall 3 metres thick in 10 minutes or so.

[Rich]

I thought I already posted on this, but:

 

WO 232/55 Reduction of concrete defences by arty and bombs

"Hits per standard breach" are quoted as being 54 for Petard

and

WO 291/598 Attack of Concrete Walls by Petard

"In two trials, at Foulness and Hankley Common, the number of effective rounds required to demolish a

concrete wall 12 feet high and 9feet 6 inches thick were:

Location Effective rounds Cubic feet removed

Foulness 54 1091

Hankley Common 50 780

 

A half troop of AVREs firing 'dustbins' at a rate of 2 per minute each could cause a breech in a concrete wall 3 metres thick in 10 minutes or so.

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Thanks John, but a couple of questions.

 

Were the walls tested simple concrete structures or reinforced concrete structures?

 

That is the requirement for demolition. What was the requirement for clearing the demolished area to make it passable?

 

If the above is correct the best time for a passable breech (1,091 cubic feet yields a breech roughly 9.5 feet wide, so just about wide enough for a tank ), then at the best rate of fire, in theory 27 minutes would be occupied by a single AVRE to get the result, two of course could do it faster, and three faster still. But not by a factor of two and three respectively, nor do I think the 27 minutes by a single one is really viable. Given the blast and obscuration, and thus the effect in aiming, I believe that the practical time to acheive a workable breech would probably be higher. But lets call it, 30, 20 or 10 minutes, depending on the number firing. Which leads to:

 

What are the Germans doing in the meantime? Specifically those manning the casemated 88 adjacent to the wall, the 50mm in the casemate that can bear from the western part of WN 72, and the 50mm that could fire down from the bluff to the east of the wall in WN 71. Those pieces knocked out a lot of tanks before they succumbed, why couldn't they hit a couple of AVRE standing stationary 50-60 yards from them for 10 minutes or more? Or are they already conveniently knocked out in this scenario? And if so, whats the point of the Petard anyway, you may as well emplace the explosives by hand?

 

Oh, and in connection with the above, I assume your AVRE have also crossed the sand and shingle that resulted in so much bogging and tracking, then surmounted the 6-8 foot seawall there, gotten past the antitank ditch cut in the roadway, and so on, also without casualties to the antitank defenses?

 

BTW, in the closest analog to the Vierville situation at Le Hamel, all three of the gapping teams landed were ineffective. Although one of the three AVRE landed intact there eventually did take out the rather elderly 75mm that had caused all the trouble.

[JohnB]

Thanks John, but a couple of questions.

 

Were the walls tested simple concrete structures or reinforced concrete structures?

 

That is the requirement for demolition. What was the requirement for clearing the demolished area to make it passable?

 

On Hankley Common at least the concrete wall was a specially built reinforced type. The initial requirement for breaching is if a Churchill could pass through, once through the AVREs would Petard from the other side.

 

If the above is correct the best time for a passable breech (1,091 cubic feet yields a breech roughly 9.5 feet wide, so just about wide enough for a tank  ), then at the best rate of fire, in theory 27 minutes would be occupied by a single AVRE to get the result, two of course could do it faster, and three faster still. But not by a factor of two and three respectively, nor do I think the 27 minutes by a single one is really viable. Given the blast and obscuration, and thus the effect in aiming, I believe that the practical time to acheive a workable breech would probably be higher. But lets call it, 30, 20 or 10 minutes, depending on the number firing.  Which leads to:

 

What are the Germans doing in the meantime?   

 

Ahead of you Rich, rather drily put from WO 291/598

"Presumably if three or four AVREs are allowed by the enemy to stand in a group 80 yards or so from the front of the wall for a period of about 10 minutes while making a breach, they would have a good chance of passing through and firing for a further 4 or 5 minutes from the other side."

 

Specifically those manning the casemated 88 adjacent to the wall, the 50mm in the casemate that can bear from the western part of WN 72, and the 50mm that could fire down from the bluff to the east of the wall in WN 71. Those pieces knocked out a lot of tanks before they succumbed, why couldn't they hit a couple of AVRE standing stationary 50-60 yards from them for 10 minutes or more? Or are they already conveniently knocked out in this scenario? And if so, whats the point of the Petard anyway, you may as well emplace the explosives by hand?

If the Petard can't reach the casemates then the DDs or Crabs will have to 'post' them a 75 first.

When the A/Tk weapons have been disposed of the Engineers can perform their breaching tasks relatively immune from shell and small arms fire.

 

Oh, and in connection with the above, I assume your AVRE have also crossed the sand and shingle that resulted in so much bogging and tracking, then surmounted the 6-8 foot seawall there, gotten past the antitank ditch cut in the roadway, and so on, also without casualties to the antitank defenses?

 

Bobbins, log carpets, fascines, bangalores, Boase torpedos, Beehives, Wade charges and SBGs were designed with the defeat of those sort of obstacles in mind. No one is saying there won't be casualties, which is why the armour was intended to be used en masse.

 

BTW, in the closest analog to the Vierville situation at Le Hamel, all three of the gapping teams landed were ineffective. Although one of the three AVRE landed intact there eventually did take out the rather elderly 75mm that had caused all the trouble.

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In what timescale? AIUI one breach was in use on Jig Green in the morning. The draw at Vierville was only breached and cleared by 1700 or so?

[Mk 1]

A half troop of AVREs firing 'dustbins' at a rate of 2 per minute each could cause a breech in a concrete wall 3 metres thick in 10 minutes or so.

 

How many "flying dustbins" did an AVRE carry as an average load-out?

 

Did they carry 1,000lbs worth of projectiles each?

 

It must have been some kind of sight to see a troop, half troop, or any combination of AVRE's "have at" against a wall. Once they were into the "fire at will" part, it must have been a steady streem of bombs flying one way, and big chunks of concrete flying all the others.

 

-Mark 1

[KingSargent]

The real problem at OMAHA was the basic plan, which placed the assaulting troops directly against the German defenses under the misplaced assumption (misplaced, but repeated over and over again in amphibious assaults) that the preassault aerial bombardment would "shock" the defenders into docility. This also placed the assault craft effectively in the line of supporting fire for the flanking LCG, LCF and DD of the bombardment force, which had to check fire when the assault waves approached the beach. The DD tanks were supposed to deal with this problem, but we know what happened there.

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Not trying to be snide, but what choice was there other than, "placed(ing) the assaulting troops directly against the German defenses"? OMAHA was one of those places that you couldn't go around. I've been there and done lots of map studies, and if you have to have OMAHA and those bluffs, there just isn't another way to do it other than head-on.

 

The planners felt that they had to have OMAHA. Even with all the FUBARs (everybody landing in the wrong spot, DD tanks sinking etc) it woulld have basically been a walk if the 352nd hadn't decided to play wargames just there and just then.

 

And again, even with the FUBARs the men of the 1st and 29th took the place. They didn't make it as far inland as the phase lines on the planning maps said, but nobody else did either. Funnies didn't get the Brits to Caen on D-Day, did they? {not Brit-bashing, just trying to get back into the topic perspective of "would the Funnies have helped?"}

 

IMHO, the biggest problem on OMAHA was the unexpected current that swept everybody off their planned landing areas. The men had rehearsed exactly what they were supposed to do on their objectives and all of a sudden they were acting on a different stage. If everybody else was in the wrong place, any Funnies present would have been in the wrong place too. Suppose there had been Petards to blast gaps in a draw. They would not have landed where they were supposed to, so they would have had to figure out where they were and how to get to someplace where they could be useful.

 

The infantry on OMAHA wasn't so much "pinned down" as reassessing and reorganizing to make new assaults in new areas where they hadn't studied photos and models of the defences. Even if their support had made the beaches, they still would have had to do that.

[JohnB]

How many "flying dustbins" did an AVRE carry as an average load-out?

 

Did they carry 1,000lbs worth of projectiles each?

 

It must have been some kind of sight to see a troop, half troop, or any combination of AVRE's "have at" against a wall.  Once they were into the "fire at will" part, it must have been a steady streem of bombs flying one way, and big chunks of concrete flying all the others. 

 

-Mark 1

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ISTR the basic load of an AVRE was 26 Petards of 40lbs (26lb charge) each.

They could also carry a number of 'Beehives' (70lb charge) but I don't know if that was in addition to or instead of 'Dustbins'.

[Rich]

Not trying to be snide, but what choice was there other than, "placed(ing)  the assaulting troops directly against the German defenses"? OMAHA was one of those places that you couldn't go around. I've been there and done lots of map studies, and if you have to have OMAHA and those bluffs, there just isn't another way to do it other than head-on.

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Not to be snide for my own part Sarge, but where have I ever posted anything that would make you think that I was idiot enough not to realize that? I'm talking tactically here, not operationally. The landing plan at OMAHA placed C, 2nd Rangers and the 1st, 116th Infantry on CHARLIE and DOG GREEN beaches, directly opposite WN 70, 71, 72, and 73 (Charlie Company, 2nd Rangers objective was WN 73, the "Stone House"). The 2nd, 116th Infantry was to land on DOG RED and WHITE and EASY GREEN.EASY GREEN and DOG RED were immediately opposed by WN 66 and 68. The 2nd, 16th Infantry were to land on EASY RED, directly opposite WN 64 and 65. And, finally, 3rd, 16th Infantry was to land on FOX GREEN, immediately opposite WN 61 and 62.

 

The problem, like much of the OVERLORD planning, was that it focused on two phases, the "getting the troops to the beach" part and the "getting the troops inland on the Calvados plateau" part, and paid little attention to the "getting the troops off the landing craft, over the beach, and onto the Calvados plateau" part. As a consequence the planning focused on getting the troops in neatly organized bunches onto land at the exits so that they could form up and march inland (the bombing and naval bombardment would have rendered most of the Germans hors de combat by that time, with the DD tanks picking off any pesky survivors).

 

But of course the exits were really only neccessary for vehicles, the infantry found it difficult, put practical to scale the lightly defended bluffs, eventually taking the exits from the flanks and rear. And that was done, in virtually every case, by troops that either mistakenly landed between the exits (and the German WN) or were intentionally directed to land between the the exits. As an example, BG Cota with C, 116th Infantry, elements of B and H, 116th Infantry and the reinforced 5th Ranger Battalion eventually seized Vierville and the Vierville exit, as well as Ormel Farm, by landing on DOG WHITE, between WN 68 and 70.

 

Is it so far a stretch to think that a better plan would have been to land the assault troops midway between the heaviest concentrations of German defenses that were at the exits, rather than directly opposite to them? In other words to land columns of battalion teams in the gap between WN 60 and 61, between WN 62 and 64, between WN 65 and 66, and between WN 68 and 70, with the better protected armor landing on their flanks and engaging the defenses directly along with the LCG, LCF and DD? That would have placed the landing troops closer to the extreme range of the German machine guns that were the deadliest killers at OMAHA, and would have concentrated the armor to protect their flanks rather than strung along the entire beachfront.

 

IMHO, the biggest problem on OMAHA was the unexpected current that swept everybody off their planned landing areas. The men had rehearsed exactly what they were supposed to do on their objectives and all of a sudden they were acting on a different stage.

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That of course is the wildcard working against any "plan" at OMAHA. It is also why I say that my "plan" was probably more logical and doable - in theory - but would have suffered from the same mischances that effected the actual plan (there was also the little last minute problem of the tidal obstacles to deal with). So it is possible that my "better" plan could have resulted in placing the assault troops opposite the German defenses anyway, with quite possibly worse results. It is why I am so loath to actually "second guess" Gerow.

[Rich]

If the Petard can't reach the casemates then the DDs or Crabs will have to 'post' them a 75 first.

When the A/Tk weapons have been disposed of the Engineers can perform their breaching tasks relatively immune from shell and small arms fire.

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Well yeah. Of course if the defenses are surpressed, then why are armored vehicles neccessary?

 

Bobbins, log carpets, fascines, bangalores, Boase torpedos, Beehives, Wade charges and SBGs were designed with the defeat of those sort of obstacles in mind. No one is saying there won't be casualties, which is why the armour was intended to be used en masse.

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Hand carried bangalores were common on all the beaches, and beehive and General Wade charges were also hand emplaced. Meanwhile, the log carpets (also known as "Roly Poly's") all failed, emplacing them at the waters edge meant that invariably the buoyant logs simply floated away after being layed. By the "Boase torpedos" I think you refer to the "flying bangalore"? So far, there most notable use was in killing Lt.Col. Cocks and his Signal Sergeat at SWORD, I have yet to find another reference to their critical use. The Bobbins at least worked as intended, sadly though despite their employment carpeting the soft clay patches, most of the CRABs that became bogged did so in the soft sand built up along the edge of the seawall, or just past it, so the neccessity of the Bobbin may be questioned. None of the Fascines employed to breach the seawall were usable, although a number of SBG were successfully used for that purpose. However, Fascines were successful in breaching a number of ditches and the major crater blocking the beach road at GOLD.

 

So, in retrospect a number of SBG would have been useful at OMAHA, but it is doubtful they could have traversed the shingle to get their bridges in place, unless a large number of Bobbins could have been successfully employed. Wheter or not that was practicable or not is questionable though, again given the defenses the Germans could bring to bear at the critical points (quite simply, the antiarmor gun defenses at the OMAHA exits were not matched in any of the other beach sectors).

 

In what timescale? AIUI one breach was in use on Jig Green in the morning. The draw at Vierville was only breached and cleared by 1700 or so?

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Sorry, you are only partly correct.

 

At JIG GREEN West the LCT carrying the party for Lane 1 was struck by the German gun at Le Hamel, and the first vehicle jammed the exit ramp. The LCT broached to, but eventually managed to withdraw and did not land its load until 1330. Lane 2 failed completely, while Lane 3 was open to the beach road by 0840. Of course in the process, 1 of the 2 CRABs was mined and lost as was the Plough AVRE. The Bobbin AVRE bogged after jettisoning its mat (it was thought to be unneccessary ). And the last AVRE was hit as it came out of the LCT, wounding the driver and killing the commander. When they were replaced it laid its fascine at the seawall and then overturned when trying to climb it. Luckily, the single CRAB left and an AVRE that managed to get forward from the Lane 2 party, finally got to the beach road and were able to support the assault at Le Hamel at 1345, eventually clearing the position by 1600.

 

The three lanes at JIG GREEN East fared a bit better. Lane 4 failed completely, but lane 5 and 6 were succesful in clearing access to the beach road. But then they encountered a huge crater which required considerable resources (3 Fascine AVRE) to breech. However, by the time the lateral was open and vehicles could proceed to help at Le Hamel the battle there was already over. The lateral beach road was open through to Le Hamel by about 1800.

 

At Vierville in contrast, the majority of the opposition was subdued by infantry attacking from the rear and right flank, over the bluffs. Patrols got into the village by 1000 and it was clear enough by 1300 that the 121st Engineers began to emplace the explosives at the antitank wall, blowing it at 1400. The road was declared open for traffic through to Vierville at 1800.

 

Overall, it appears that the difficulty in breeching the crater in the lateral road at JIG GREEN was about as difficult as breeching the wall at Vierville (it effectively took an hour less since the landing at GOLD were an hour later than at OMAHA). Both roads were open effectively at the same time, although the Vierville exit required more brute work to make it passable (the four hours between 1400 and 1800 were occupied in bulldozing the debris, filling the antitank ditch, breeching the seawall, and clearing AT mines on the verges.

[DB]

Well yeah. Of course if the defenses are surpressed, then why are armored vehicles neccessary?

[snip]

The three lanes at JIG GREEN East fared a bit better. Lane 4 failed completely, but lane 5 and 6 were succesful in clearing access to the beach road. But then they encountered a huge crater which required considerable resources (3 Fascine AVRE) to breech. However, by the time the lateral was open and vehicles could proceed to help at Le Hamel the battle there was already over. The lateral beach road was open through to Le Hamel by about 1800.

 

At Vierville in contrast, the majority of the opposition was subdued by infantry attacking from the rear and right flank, over the bluffs. Patrols got into the village by 1000 and it was clear enough by 1300 that the 121st Engineers began to emplace the explosives at the antitank wall, blowing it at 1400. The road was declared open for traffic through to Vierville at 1800.

 

Overall, it appears that the difficulty in breeching the crater in the lateral road at JIG GREEN was about as difficult as breeching the wall at Vierville (it effectively took an hour less since the landing at GOLD were an hour later than at OMAHA). Both roads were open effectively at the same time, although the Vierville exit required more brute work to make it passable (the four hours between 1400 and 1800 were occupied in bulldozing the debris, filling the antitank ditch, breeching the seawall, and clearing AT mines on the verges.

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OK, so the time taken to breach was similar. Were the casualties similar as well? I'm learning a lot from this discussion. Having been to the beaches a couple of times, I confess to not having really considered the operational art required to take them.

 

David

[KingSargent]

Not to be snide for my own part Sarge, but where have I ever posted anything that would make you think that I was idiot enough not to realize that?    I'm talking tactically here, not operationally. The landing plan at OMAHA placed

---SNIP to tidal drift---

That of course is the wildcard working against any "plan" at OMAHA. It is also why I say that my "plan" was probably more logical and doable - in theory - but would have suffered from the same mischances that effected the actual plan (there was also the little last minute problem of the tidal obstacles to deal with). So it is possible that my "better" plan could have resulted in placing the assault troops opposite the German defenses anyway, with quite possibly worse results. It is why I am so loath to actually "second guess" Gerow.

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Okay, I gotcha, and I agree with what you are saying about the tactical placement. Still, given the restricted area, the troops were going to take fire from somewhere once the bombardment had failed to render the area sterile of hostile life.

 

And I also agree about the drift, that your "change" might have put everyone right back where they were.

 

I wonder what would have happened if the sea had been calm and the 352nd off drinking in barracks....

[Rich]

OK, so the time taken to breach was similar. Were the casualties similar as well? I'm learning a lot from this discussion. Having been to the beaches a couple of times,  I confess to not having really considered the operational art required to take them.

 

David

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Casualties on JIG Beach were about 438 and were almost identical at MIKE Beach, 434. That includes the casualties of the infantry battalions and other 50th Infantry Division troops attached to 69th and 231st Brigades and the 6th Assault Regiment, RE, but does not apparently include those of the LCOCU or the 8th Armoured Brigade.

 

In contrast, on OMAHA losses of the 116th Infantry were 797, so were nearly twice that as at either JIG or MIKE. If the loses of units attached to the 116th are included, then the losses are well over twice those on MIKE.

 

OTOH, there were a total of just six German WN opposing the British at GOLD, while there were at least 12 and as many as 14 (depending on whether or not you include WN 60 and 74 at the extremities of OMAHA) opposing the Americans at OMAHA, with a comensurately higher number of troops and especially heavy weapons.

[Rich]

I wonder what would have happened if the sea had been calm and the 352nd off drinking in barracks....

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Well, there were no "barracks" the troops were simply quartered in the local villages and units rotated through the WN as garrisons on a regular basis, in between working on improving the obstacle plan. So it isn't like the elements of 352 ID wouldn't have been there. And if you have a calm sea and no 'drift' then the result is the landings occur nearly exactly as planned, which could have resulted in a worse bloodbath and possibly (remote) the failure of the landing at OMAHA. The only thing to mitigate that would have been that an additional 27-odd DD tanks would have landed with the 16th Infantry, but given the experience of the 116th Infantry there is no real reason to think that would have had a major result in reducing casualties there.

[Colin Williams]

Ahead of you Rich,  rather drily put from WO 291/598

"Presumably if three or four AVREs are allowed by the enemy to stand in a group 80 yards or so from the front of the wall for a period of about 10 minutes while making a breach, they would have a good chance of passing through and firing for a further 4 or 5 minutes from the other side."

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Sorry John, but as much as I am a supporter of the AVREs and some other Funnies (and as much as I enjoy butting heads with Rich!), I don't think one could count on more than one or two AVREs being at the same place at the same time. The record of knocked out, bogged, and drowned tanks of all sorts on the British beaches clearly shows that it was usually a relatively small number of vehicles that did most of the work clearing obstacles and helping the infantry forward.

 

OTOH it should be remembered that one of the primary jobs of the AVRE was to provide armored transport for engineers with demolition charges. I'm sure they didn't carry 1000 pounds of explosive, but at least the petard wasn't the only option. At Omaha I can see the AVREs and Crabs being of particular utility in eliminating the strongpoints below the bluffs, such as Les Moulins, bridging or filling the antitank ditches, and clearing mines. No matter what covering fire or engineering support was available, the strongpoints at the various beach exits were best tackled by flanking infantry assaults from across the bluffs rather than frontal assault through the obstacles. Presumably the presence of large numbers of tanks working their way through toward the beach exits would have drawn German attention away from some of the infantry and reduced casualties.

[JohnB]

quote=Rich,Mon 24 Jan 2005 1639]

Well yeah. Of course if the defenses are surpressed, then why are armored vehicles neccessary?

 

Sorry, I think you're looking at it the wrong way, the question should be - why NOT use armoured vehicles?

 

 

By the "Boase torpedos" I think you refer to the "flying bangalore"? So far, there most notable use was in killing Lt.Col. Cocks and his Signal Sergeat at SWORD, I have yet to find another reference to their critical use.

From 'Blowing our Bridges: Major-General Tony Younger' "..we found that soft sand dunes presented a problem, so Dickie Boase, who commanded 3 Troop [26 Assault Squadron] , tried using a tank to push a steel pipe loaded with explosive into a dune and then detonating it. The result was successful, so the Boase Bangalore became part of our equipment."

Obviously just as achievable by hand.

 

At JIG GREEN West the LCT carrying the party for Lane 1 was struck by the German gun at Le Hamel, and the first vehicle jammed the exit ramp. The LCT broached to, but eventually managed to withdraw and did not land its load until 1330. Lane 2 failed completely, while Lane 3 was open to the beach road by 0840. Of course in the process, 1 of the 2 CRABs was mined and lost as was the Plough AVRE. The Bobbin AVRE bogged after jettisoning its mat (it was thought to be unneccessary  ). And the last AVRE was hit as it came out of the LCT, wounding the driver and killing the commander. When they were replaced it laid its fascine at the seawall and then overturned when trying to climb it. Luckily, the single CRAB left and an AVRE that managed to get forward from the Lane 2 party, finally got to the beach road and were able to support the assault at Le Hamel at 1345, eventually clearing the position by 1600.

 

At least part of the problem on JIG and a cause of the heavy casualties to the AVREs and Crabs was that they landed first, ahead of the DDs. Arguably the rough seas of June 6th had more effect on the British beaches, because of their greater sophistication of their plans, than on the American ones.

[JohnB]

OK, so the time taken to breach was similar.

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Not really, as I understand it GOLD beach had at least five exits off the beach, out of the twelve attempted, by the morning. The lead elements of 50th Division and 8th Armoured Brigade penetrating 6 miles or so inland.

[KingSargent]

So it isn't like the elements of 352 ID wouldn't have been there. And if you have a calm sea and no 'drift' then the result is the landings occur nearly exactly as planned, which could have resulted in a worse bloodbath and possibly (remote) the failure of the landing at OMAHA. The only thing to mitigate that would have been that an additional 27-odd DD tanks would have landed with the 16th Infantry, but given the experience of the 116th Infantry there is no real reason to think that would have had a major result in reducing casualties there.

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You should have also had naval gunfire and aerial bombing on target, the DD tanks hitting the beach first (presumably with greater effect than coming in later off the LCTs), and troops landing where they were familiar with the terrain and objectives. The biggest delay on the beach was the troops having to start all over again from scratch to reconnoiter, plan, and execute attacks on unfamiliar objectives. The fact that the units were mixed up and intermingled didn't help either.