Did The Us Army "refuse" British Funnies?

[Rich]

In light of this I wonder if the REME AVREs were those available for training and experimentation before D-Day and the MG Car AVREs were those issued to units.

133522[/snapback]

 

Thanks Colin, interesting account. So the squadrons did get a chance at practicing assault landings, that's something that doesn't come out in the brigade history.

 

And from what I can gather the first 180 AVRE delivered "by D-Day" were all REME conversions from standard Mark III and IV, whereas the 574 addtional built after D-Day (through VE-Day???) were "purpose-built" by MG. But again, accounts conflict on this.

 

Rich

[Colin Williams]

Rich,

 

I suggest you contact the British MG car club, as they seem to have knowledge of or access to the records of MG production activities at Abingdon until the plant closed in 1980. From this site comes the following - http://www.mgcars.org.uk/mgcc/sf/000101.htm

 

DESCRIPTION

QUANTITY

DATE

 

Converting Sherman Tanks to O.P.

103

18/7/43 - 25/3/44

Converting Churchill Tanks to A.V.R.E.

518

20/11/43 - 26/4/45

Converting Churchill Tanks to ARK

24

14/3/44 - 6/5/44

Converting Centaurs to Taurus

9

15/5/44 - 8/12/44

Converting Crusader Tanks to Bulldozers

Centaur 37

6

19/6/44 =>

Making Wading Equipment for Tanks

3000 sets

March 1944 =>

 

"Converting Churchill Tanks to AVRE (flail tanks for mine clearance)

The A.V.R.E. tank was designed by the 79th Armoured Division after their

experiences at Dieppe. A 6pdr gun was replaced by a Petard gun which fires

a 40pdr charge. Side armour of the hull and turret was increased by the

fitting of 20mm Applique Armour, this necessitated training welders for

vertical and overhead Arc Welding. An urgent call for these tanks was made

by the Ministry of Supply to take part in the operations on D Day. During

this rush work, production of 30 tanks per week was required and this

necessitated working 12 to 15 hours a day. These attachments were fitted to

carry Flail devices."

 

"Converting of Churchill Tanks to ARK

The ARK Bridge was a special device fitted to the top of the tank to enable

the standard tanks to be driven over the top of blockhouses. This was done

by running the ARK tank up to the side of a blockhouse and lowering its

ramps, thereby holding the bridge in position."

 

"The post war report of the activities concerning the various products

continues with a number of other snippets as follows:"

 

"Our job in life was to produce as many and as quickly as possible

Churchill Tanks converted to A.V.R.E. (Armoured Vehicle Royal Engineers), a

special purpose job for mine detection, road block destruction and fitted

with a special mortar known as the Petard Gun. A Captain J. Donovan, a

Canadian, was responsible for this weapon of terrific destruction and he was a frequent visitor in the early stages of our production. Life soon

became extremely hectic and production of 30 tanks a week was attained, and

maintained until we outstripped Vauxhall and Broome and Wade's production

of basic vehicles. An extremely tight target of 208 vehicles by the end of

March was set by the Ministry and we hit the target to the day!"

 

"To add to our difficulties, we had to sandwich the 24 Churchill ARK, mobile

bridges, in between the A.V.R.E.. The 24 ARK were completed by April 25th."

 

Also see this article - http://www.mgcars.org.uk/mgcc/sf/991002.htm

[Rich]

Rich,

 

An extremely tight target of 208 vehicles by the end of

March was set by the Ministry and we hit the target to the day![/b]"

 

"To add to our difficulties, we had to sandwich the 24 Churchill ARK, mobile

bridges, in between the A.V.R.E.. The 24 ARK were completed by April 25th."

 

Also see this article - http://www.mgcars.org.uk/mgcc/sf/991002.htm

133532[/snapback]

 

Thanks Colin, excellent and interesting, but....

 

It leads to some other questions. It would appear then that the figure of 180 completed by 1 June is in fact incorrect. But, how many more than the 208 "by the end of March" were available? And, working backwards, if "30 per week" was acheived it couldn't have been much earlier than mid February 1944. All of which still tends to point at some very tight time schedules.

 

BTW, no Churchill ARK were used for D-Day, all the AVRE bridging equipment were SBG, a total of 19 being used.

Edited January 13, 2005 by Rich

[Colin Williams]

Thanks Colin, excellent and interesting, but.... 

 

It leads to some other questions. It would appear then that the figure of 180 completed by 1 June is in fact incorrect. But, how many more than the 208 "by the end of March" were available? And, working backwards, if "30 per week" was acheived it couldn't have been much earlier than mid February 1944.    All of which still tends to point at some very tight time schedules.

 

BTW, no Churchill ARK were used for D-Day, all the AVRE bridging equipment were SBG, a total of 19 being used.

133568[/snapback]

 

Rich,

 

It seems even more complicated. MG converted 574 by April 26, 1945, with 208 by the end of March, 1944. Fletcher mentions 700 converted Mark III and Mark IV. If 700 is accurate, that equates to 126 by the REME. When were they converted? Further, the MG publication mentions outstripping Vauxhall deliveries of basic vehicles. Vauxhall was making Mark VIIs and VIIIs, not Mark IIIs and IVs, in 1944. Mark VII AVREs were produced and available postwar, so does this comment mean that some of the MG conversions after D-Day were Mark VIIs? If so, that would raise the number of Mark III and IV converted by the REME. The other possibility is that Vauxhall was reworking the Churchills before they were sent to MG.

[DB]

Exactly!    And to date I haven't seen much in the original WO documentation to lead me to think they were "offered" - at least in any concrete way such as "we can give you X number to beginning training on Y day and have an addtional X1 available by Y1." And yet AFAICS ever since Wilmot everybody simply assumes that is exactly what happened, but that poor dumb colonial Bradley/Eisenhower was too ignorant to take us up on the offer.    [snip]

133428[/snapback]

 

Rich, whilst attempting to verify everything with physical evidence is definitely the way to go, it may well be that in certain circumstances there is no paperwork.

 

Oral or memoir accounts have their place in the historical record, too, although one would of course be wise to attempt to cross-check them against the documentary evidence.

 

For example, if Bradley had a demonstration and immediately said that he wasn't interested, who would waste their time creating a letter that offered him what you seem to be wanting above?

 

The only documentary evidence might then be a written invitation to the demonstration, and much muttering in the memoires about "American Arrogance" costing lives, simply because of the (hypothetical) rebuff.

 

I have no opinion on this matter, incidentally, the above is just a fairly simple suggestion.

 

David

[Guest phil gollin]

Following on from DB, it is almost impossible to verify this sort of claim. One can only look at the way things were done and were people around after the claim was published who were able to critise or dimiss it ?

 

Also, re. the offer of AVREs, etc.... the much better known offer of Fireflies would presumably fail by the same standard of accounting due to the small number available to the British by D-Day.

 

I haven't heard anyone say what the biggest problem would be from my LIMITED reading of the period would be and that is the absorbtion of a very limited number of British tanks (Churchill AVRE, bobbins, etc....) into the US Army system which seemed obsessed with standardisation (not in itself a bad thing). Whereas Sherman Crabs (and IF Sherman Crocodilles were acceptable) would have seemed much easier to absorb.

[Rich]

Rich, whilst attempting to verify everything with physical evidence is definitely the way to go, it may well be that in certain circumstances there is no paperwork.

133649[/snapback]

 

David, I understand and agree completely with your remarks - to a degree. In fact though, that is rarely the way a bureaucracy operates. Rather, a memo for record, letter, endorsement, concurrence or something would have found its way into a record file. For instance, there are entire file folders dealing with the transactions surrounding the distribution of Sherman dozer kits. There are multiple file folders on every aspect surrounding the distribution of CDL vehicles. There are reams of correspondence, memos, teletypes filed regarding arming US M4 with 17-pdr. The documents of the AFV&W Section alone fill 10 archival records boxes, and I've gone through every one of them and have yet to find even a word of such an exchange.

 

In other words, every substantial transaction generated large amounts of paperwork, which is not usually reflected in the day to day exchanges between senior officers or in their memoirs. And yet this transaction regarding US use of AVRE was evidently so insubstantial that the only record of its occurrence is the second hand report by Wilmot of a conversation that he had with Hobart, postwar?

 

Something fishy there?

[Rich]

Also, re. the offer of AVREs, etc.... the much better known offer of Fireflies would presumably fail by the same standard of accounting due to the small number available to the British by D-Day.

133795[/snapback]

 

That's another thread. Or do you have documentary evidence you can present for such an offer? I warn you though, the situation with regards to Firefly is even more clear cut.

 

I  haven't heard anyone say what the biggest problem would be from my LIMITED reading of the period would be and that is the absorbtion of a very limited number of British tanks (Churchill AVRE, bobbins, etc....) into the US Army system which seemed obsessed with standardisation (not in itself a bad thing).  Whereas Sherman Crabs (and IF Sherman Crocodilles were acceptable) would have seemed much easier to absorb.

133795[/snapback]

 

There is some evidence for this as well of course. Further, it appears that it was originally planned to utilize US armored mine exploders inthe assault. However, the US equipment was delayed repeatedly in manufacture and shipment, as were the troops trained to use them, and when it became apparent that they would not be available by D-Day it was simplt too late to do anything about it - the British resources were stretched to the limit (about two-thirds of the available equipment and the two orgnaizations that had completed training - 22nd Dragoons and Westminster Dragoons - were already committed to the British beaches). And much the same occurred with other US counterparts, 100 US tankdozer conversion kits arrived in may, 24 were converted just in time and used in the assault at OMAHA and UTAH. And the Sherman flamethrower conversion kits (ther were a number of types) simply weren't ready, the first arrived in theater in August and were used in September (BTW, only 6 Crocodiles were used in the assault, without notable effect).

[DB]

David, I understand and agree completely with your remarks - to a degree.    In fact though, that is rarely the way a bureaucracy operates. Rather, a memo for record, letter, endorsement, concurrence or something  would have found its way into a record file. For instance, there are entire file folders dealing with the transactions surrounding the distribution of Sherman dozer kits. There are multiple file folders on every aspect surrounding the distribution of CDL vehicles. There are reams of correspondence, memos, teletypes filed regarding arming US M4 with 17-pdr. The documents of the AFV&W Section alone fill 10 archival records boxes, and I've gone through every one of them and have yet to find even a word of such an exchange.

 

In other words, every substantial transaction generated large amounts of paperwork, which is not usually reflected in the day to day exchanges between senior officers or in their memoirs. And yet this transaction regarding US use of AVRE was evidently so insubstantial that the only record of its occurrence is the second hand report by Wilmot of a conversation that he had with Hobart, postwar?

 

Something fishy there?

133862[/snapback]

 

Presumably there *is* record of the demonstrations, to who, what and when? If not, but we are certain that they occurred, then one could speculate that a dossier on the whole sorry matter could have quietly dissolved in a Whitehall sewer in 1953, in the very best traditions of Sir Humphrey

 

But then, that would be wild speculation.

 

David

[Mk 1]

And now for something completely different ... a man with THREE bu[snip]

 

The topic of any alleged refusal of "funnies" for D-Day always leaves me scratching my head.

 

I can't understand why it matters. I mean, if it is a question of inter-allied co-operation, yes I can see how the Brits would wish to demonstrate that they were being friendly and helpful and all. So ... um ... why is that worthy of a debate? Has anyone suggested that the British and the Americans were NOT close allies? Has anyone suggested that even with that alliance there were not some oversights and tension points?

 

More interesting to me seems to be the question of whether the US Army would have done BETTER at Omaha and/or Utah if they HAD some funnies?

 

I don't believe they could have.

 

Why not? Because the problem at Omaha, as I understand it, was that almost NO tanks made it to the beach.

 

Having NO funnies is not a superior solution to having NO regular gun tanks.

 

The US was counting on the early presence of armor to provide on-beach support for the assault waves. The one funny that the US Army seemed most interested in, the DD Sherman, was supposed to address just this point. However, at Omaha it failed.

 

The precious few DDs that actually made it to shore gave a pretty good account of themselves. But most never got that far. If the US could not get its armor to the beach, it does not seem to really matter what armor they were not able to get to the beach. Crabs, Bobbins, AVREs or Crocodiles don't float any better than swamped DD Shermans.

 

If I look back to my readings about Omaha, I do not see much indication that regular gun tanks were unable to contribute to the battle once they were present. But during the critical early phases of the assault it was an all-infantry story. That was the time when Omaha beach stood on the brink.

 

Seems to me that the US focus on DD was the right focus. But rough seas, rough weather, and tactical errors on the part of the participants (dropping too far off-shore) really screwed the DD drivers.

 

-Mark 1

[thomas.tmcc]

And now for something completely different ...  a man with THREE bu[snip]

 

The topic of any alleged refusal of "funnies" for D-Day always leaves me scratching my head.

 

I can't understand why it matters.  I mean, if it is a question of inter-allied co-operation, yes I can see how the Brits would wish to demonstrate that they were being friendly and helpful and all.  So ... um ... why is that worthy of a debate?  Has anyone suggested that the British and the Americans were NOT close allies?  Has anyone suggested that even with that alliance there were not some oversights and tension points?

 

More interesting to me seems to be the question of whether the US Army would have done BETTER at Omaha and/or Utah if they HAD some funnies?

 

I don't believe they could have.

 

Why not?  Because the problem at Omaha, as I understand it, was that almost NO tanks made it to the beach.

 

Having NO funnies is not a superior solution to having NO regular gun tanks.

 

The US was counting on the early presence of armor to provide on-beach support for the assault waves.  The one funny that the US Army seemed most interested in, the DD Sherman, was supposed to address just this point.  However, at Omaha it failed.

 

The precious few DDs that actually made it to shore gave a pretty good account of themselves.  But most never got that far.  If the US could not get its armor to the beach, it does not seem to really matter what armor they were not able to get to the beach.  Crabs, Bobbins, AVREs or Crocodiles don't float any better than swamped DD Shermans.

 

If I look back to my readings about Omaha, I do not see much indication that regular gun tanks were unable to contribute to the battle once they were present.  But during the critical early phases of the assault it was an all-infantry story.  That was the time when Omaha beach stood on the brink.

 

Seems to me that the US focus on DD was the right focus.  But rough seas, rough weather, and tactical errors on the part of the participants (dropping too far off-shore) really screwed the DD drivers.

 

-Mark 1

134114[/snapback]

 

Hi the problem with DD tanks is the crews were told to head for a certain point or prominent landmark ,a church spire I think it was ,so therefor the DD tanks were going against the current and with it this is why so many of them did not make it to the beach ,the tanks were overwhelmed by the currents and sunk ,this was a gravely tactical error in judgement and common sense .

[Ken Estes]

The answer is, quite simply, that demand for the LVT was always higher than the availability. Further, only the LVT (A) were really suitable for assault operations (the unarmored LVT at Tarawa lost heavily, the primary reason that the following waves went ashore in LCVP) and production of that type had just begun, by 1 June 1944 just 1,298 had been built. Which leads to the next problem. Just to replace the LCA and LCVP used in the UTAH and OMAHA assaults (560 not including the 22 LCA at Pointe du Hoc) would have required 560 ramped LVT 4 or LVT 4 (A), which had just begun production, the LCVP and LVT 4 both had a capacity of essentially 30 troops. But all earlier model LVT carried just 20 troops, which meant that you would have needed one-third again as many, would have had to screw with your assault organization again, and would have had to find additional deckage to stow those additional small craft, meaning that you would have had to decide which 280 other small craft to eliminate from the assault?

 

Hmm, no, I don't think the "Luddite" or "ignore Corlett and LVT" argument really holds water Ken. 

133028[/snapback]

Rich, I could not agree more on the LVT availability problem, just lack the numbers at hand to make it. Usually I point out that the Marianas and Neptune are done nearly simultaneously, so there could not have been enough LVTs in each pond. My source on the Luddites [my choice of term] and Corlett comes from Russ Weigley, who notes Corlett and also the army preference for hand engineering as more trustworthy in his Eisenhower's Lieutenants, and some other work. Cheers, Ken

 

 

[Edit to add note: The LVT(A)1, (A)4 and (A)5 were armored ambibious tanks, carrying no troops. The LVT-2 design also provided for bolt-on armor protection for the cab and there was also limited production (450 vehicles) of an armored cargo carrier for the Army, called LVT(A)-2 . This vehicle had the armor and driver periscopes of the gun version but alone of the “(A)” versions, retained its cargo compartment and carried no turret. ]

Edited January 17, 2005 by Ken Estes

[Colin Williams]

...More interesting to me seems to be the question of whether the US Army would have done BETTER at Omaha and/or Utah if they HAD some funnies?

 

I don't believe they could have.

 

Why not?  Because the problem at Omaha, as I understand it, was that almost NO tanks made it to the beach.

 

Having NO funnies is not a superior solution to having NO regular gun tanks.

 

The US was counting on the early presence of armor to provide on-beach support for the assault waves.  The one funny that the US Army seemed most interested in, the DD Sherman, was supposed to address just this point.  However, at Omaha it failed.

 

The precious few DDs that actually made it to shore gave a pretty good account of themselves.  But most never got that far.  If the US could not get its armor to the beach, it does not seem to really matter what armor they were not able to get to the beach.  Crabs, Bobbins, AVREs or Crocodiles don't float any better than swamped DD Shermans.

 

If I look back to my readings about Omaha, I do not see much indication that regular gun tanks were unable to contribute to the battle once they were present.  But during the critical early phases of the assault it was an all-infantry story.  That was the time when Omaha beach stood on the brink.

 

Seems to me that the US focus on DD was the right focus.  But rough seas, rough weather, and tactical errors on the part of the participants (dropping too far off-shore) really screwed the DD drivers.

 

-Mark 1

134114[/snapback]

 

IIRC (will have to look up the exact numbers), about half of the DDs made it to one of the two Omaha landing beaches because they were landed rather than launched. I have not seen a detailed analysis of how the presence of that tank force on one beach affected the battle compared to the other beach. Also, in our own BillB's book he notes that the British and Canadians, through their combination of DD's, directly landed gun tanks, and funnies, achieved a concentration of approximately twice as many tanks per beach as the Americans.

 

The only way the question can be addressed completely is through a detailed analysis of the Bigot maps of German fortifications, records of who/what got ashore when/where, who was manning the German fortifications when/where, and how the Allied units worked through the German defenses. Of course, if an AFV did little beyond breaking down and providing cover to the exposed infantry on the beach it would still be a significant contribution under the right circumstances.

 

If a single thread can be drawn through works like Wilmot's, Weigley's and BillB's, as well as dozens of others, it is that the US Army appears to have relied too much on the combination of infantry and firepower and too little on machines for direct fire/engineering support in either opposed landings or other prepared assaults. By contrast, the British and Canadians, partly because of the emphasis in prewar doctrine on the combined tank-infantry assault, partly because of the Dieppe experience, and partly because of their limited manpower, seem to have paid particular attention of the benefits of AFV support. This doesn't mean that the British efforts always paid dividends. Some of Hobart's funnies were of doubtful value or at least may have been better replaced by standard gun tanks. Nor does it mean that the Americans were reluctant to use machines in warfare. As everyone knows, the US Army in WW2 was the most mechanized in history. It does mean, perhaps, that when it came to mechanization the Americans placed a tad too much emphasis on mobility and too little on fighting power.

[Rich]

IIRC (will have to look up the exact numbers), about half of the DDs made it to one of the two Omaha landing beaches because they were landed rather than launched. I have not seen a detailed analysis of how the presence of that tank force on one beach affected the battle compared to the other beach. Also, in our own BillB's book he notes that the British and Canadians, through their combination of DD's, directly landed gun tanks, and funnies, achieved a concentration of approximately twice as many tanks per beach as the Americans.

135251[/snapback]

 

Actually, the numbers were effectively:

 

UTAH - 32 DD and 34 standard M4 in the assault wave. 10 tanks were lost in the sinking of three LCT to mines, apparently 4 other DD were lost "on land" either to enemy action or swamping (accounts differ), and 2 non-DD were lost to enemy action (mines) and one to an AT gun. So of 56 landed, at most 7 were lost to enemy action.

 

OMAHA - 64 DD and 60 standard M4 in the assault wave. In one battalion 29 of 32 DD were sunk or swamped and 3 landed directly along with the 27 standard tanks (3 were lost when their LCT sank). The 30 tanks landed had 8 more lost to enemy action (AT guns and mines), 5 tracked or bogged (not to enemy action), and 9 lost to unknown causes, leaving 8 operational. The other battalion landed all 62 tanks (directly landing the DD) and lost 22 to enemy action or other causes on the beach.

 

For the British beaches I have less complete information on losses, but the landing plan was:

 

GOLD - 80 DD, 40 RM Support tanks (Centaur and Sherman, 24 Crabs, and 40 AVRE, a total of 184 "tanks" in the assault waves as compared to OMAHA with 124. But due to many problems, only 7 RM tanks were landed in the assault (of which 2 broke down and 1 was knocked out). Also, at least 7 DD sank and of the 40 AVRE, 2 were lost to enemy action, 5 drowned and 1 capsized when landed. So the actual number of tanks landed were about 140.

 

JUNO - 80 DD were planned, but 1 LCT returned to England with engine trouble, leaving 76 to launch. Of those, 19 were launched, and 8 sank, leaving 68. There were again 40 RM tanks, but in this case only 5 landed in the assault. There were 19 Crabs and 47 AVRE, so a total of about 139 total.

 

SWORD - 40 DD were planned, along with 20 RM tanks (this time 14 managed to land, although 4 were drowned), 26 Crabs and 33 AVRE (4 returned to England after a mortar round exploded the Bangalores on one, killing Colonel Cocks (commander 5 ARRE) and his Signal Sergeant. Of the 40 DD, one got stuck in its LCT and was returned to England, 5 were landed directly and 34 swam in, with 3 sinking. So 36 DD landed, 10 RM Tanks, 29 AVRE and 26 Crabs, a total of 101 tanks.

 

So at GOLD and JUNO, about the same number of tanks landed 139-140, compared to the 92 at OMAHA. At SWORD about 101 landed, compared to the 56 at UTAH.

 

I will try to do a comparison of the losses to enemy action later, but at first glance it is very apparent that the level of resistance at OMAHA, vis a vis tanks, was much higher than at any of the other beaches. If so, that simply confirms that the real reason for the losses at OMAHA was the scale of the resistance rather than some assumed "American" doctrinal failure, as is recounted in Lewis' "Omaha, A Flawed Victory" (which could be described as "Tempest in a Teapot, A Flawed Analysis" ).

 

If a single thread can be drawn through works like Wilmot's, Weigley's and BillB's, as well as dozens of others, it is that the US Army appears to have relied too much on the combination of infantry and firepower and too little on machines for direct fire/engineering support in either opposed landings or other prepared assaults. By contrast, the British and Canadians, partly because of the emphasis in prewar doctrine on the combined tank-infantry assault, partly because of the Dieppe experience, and partly because of their limited manpower, seem to have paid particular attention of the benefits of AFV support. This doesn't mean that the British efforts always paid dividends. Some of Hobart's funnies were of doubtful value or at least may have been better replaced by standard gun tanks. Nor does it mean that the Americans were reluctant to use machines in warfare. As everyone knows, the US Army in WW2 was the most mechanized in history. It does mean, perhaps, that when it came to mechanization the Americans placed a tad too much emphasis on mobility and too little on fighting power.

135251[/snapback]

 

Sorry, but this is pretty much incorrect, in virtually all particulars.

 

As I have stated before, the use of the British "machines" was to get the landing force off the edge of the beach and onto the beach roads, thus the emphasis on the AVRE with SBG bridge (19 were employed on the three British beaches), which were meant to establish exits over the seawall. But they were not meant to clear the tidal obstacles on the beaches. That was done primarily by hand, in exactly the same manner as on the US beaches. On the US beaches that task was done by either the Beach Obstacle Demolition Parties (UTAH) or the Special Engineer Task Force (OMAHA), comprised of combined teams of US Naval Combat Demolition Units and Army Engineers. At the British beaches it was done by Landing Craft Obstacle Claering Units comprised of - guess what - Royal Navy and Royal Marine combat demolition divers, augmented by Army Engineers. They did the majority of clearing of the beach obstacles, and in both the US and British cases, suffered heavily in the process. Furthermore, the major obstacles at OMAHA were the two antitank walls at the Vierville and St Laurent draws, neither of which would have been susceptible to "machines" (the Vierville wall required the hand emplacement of 1,100 pounds of explosive by the 121st CIB to demolish it, followed by bulldozers to clear the debris).

 

Nor have I found any evidence for a British-Canadian "prewar doctrine" on combined tank and infantry assault that was anything other than a theoretical construct. And I have never seen any evidence for much practice in such having occurred prewar, certainly it did not in the Canadian Army, which barely existed, nor I expect in the British Army (IIRC the 1st Tank Brigade at Arras had never worked with infantry before, having been in exist just some short months, OTOH the experience in the desert was better, but that benefited from two months practice prior to Sidi Barrani). There is also no evidence that any of the RE Assault Squadrons had much time to practice with their infantry counterparts and it appears that actual coordination between the two on D-Day was pretty poor overall.

 

Finally, this whole "the US Army was focused on mobility over combat power" is pretty much a result of Russell Weigley's interpretation of prewar doctrinal thought in the Army. Sadly, it is an interpretation that upon analysis rests on some pretty shakey ground (primarily his assumption that the US Army had a history if being a military constabulary that emphasized cavalry mobility, which is true if you assume that US Army history consists only of the Indian Wars ). It is also an analysis that ignores the actual doctrinal development interwar, which built almost entirely from the Great War firepower experience, while incorporating - slowly - the possibilities for maneuver resting in the modern AFV.

 

Anyway, I'll see if I can flesh this out more as I go along.

[JohnB]

Furthermore, the major obstacles at OMAHA were the two antitank walls at the Vierville and St Laurent draws, neither of which would have been susceptible to "machines" (the Vierville wall required the hand emplacement of 1,100 pounds of explosive by the 121st CIB to demolish it, followed by bulldozers to clear the debris).

 

Do you know the dimensions of the antitank walls Rich?

 

'WO 291/598 Attack on Concrete Walls by Petard' gives the number of effective rounds required to demolish a concrete wall of 12 feet high by 9'6" thick, in two trials as 54 and 50 Petard rounds.

 

 

Re the offer of 'Funnies'; Hobart, in a letter to Liddell Hart, shortly after the demonstrations in Sudland Bay, wrote of Monty saying "[the]Americans must have a fair share of everything".

 

 

One place to look at the offer/refusal of specialised armour is a meeting of 10th February where major decisions were taken, according to Hobart: "Today were the important ones. Who made decisions. Monty's CGS and Brig. S.D. and Chief Engr; 2nd Br Army Comdr; Comdr USA Army Group and his Chief of Staff and an Arm Div Comdr; Engineer in Chief, and DCIGS .... got definite decisions on a whole number of points that have been hanging fire for months."

Wouldn't know if any records or minutes have been kept of the meeting.

[KingSargent]

1) There appears to have been no record of any specific offer by the British to "give" Funnies to the US. They were demonstrated, but the production records would indicate that it would not have been possible in late January for Montgomery and/or Hobart to say, "We will have X of these available by Y, you can have X/3 of them, and we can provide instructors to assist with training." (Monty and Hobo themselves couldn't know how many there would be, and even 79th Armor was still experimenting with them.)

 

2) Even if an offer was made, I do not see how there could have been vehicles and trained personnel available 90 days after the demonstration (going to the original D-date of early May). Bradley was well-acquainted with the difficulties of "crash" training and what happened when inadequately-trained men went into action with unfamiliar equipment. IF he indeed "refused" them, very possibly it was because he didn't think they could be ready in time.

 

3) All production would have had to come from the UK, there just wasn't time to procure them from the US. The British apparently (from posts here) were unable to equip their own units to full strength in time, and were even less ready to meet the May dates.

 

4) Having machines "available" (IE on record as delivered from the factory, or in depot, or whatever "available" means) does not equate to units trained, ready to go, and loaded on the beaching craft on the same day. IOW, saying '200 XVs were available by D-Day' does not mean they could have been used on D-Day.

 

5) As has been noted, the US planned to use armor, indeed the first waves were supposed to be the DD tanks, which would suppress defences to cover the infantry in the next waves. The DD tanks would have swum in relying on defenders not knowing what those liferaft-looking things were to make it - if the Germans had known what the DDs were, they could have been sunk by small-arms fire. As we know this plan was scuttled (literally) by the weather.

 

6) The problems were different on the US beaches and UK beaches, and Funnies being successful (if they actually were) on UK beaches does not automatically mean they would have been of any use at all (more than standard tanks) on the US beaches.

6a) I do not see how any of the Funnies would have gotten troops up the bluffs at OMAHA, and that was the main challenge there. LVTs certainly were not going to climb the OMAHA bluffs, and I doubt that many would have survived the weather if they were used as an assault wave - they were definitely less seaworthy than landing craft. IOW, infantry losses might have been more severe if the LVTs sank on the way in.

6b) At UTAH the problem was getting across the flooded areas behind the beach - again, nothing for Funnies to do. LVTs to ferry supplies and troops across the flooded areas would definitely have helped, but this is the only place that I can see LVTs really making a lot of difference, by enabling the troops to bypass the causeways.

[Colin Williams]

Sorry, but this is pretty much incorrect, in virtually all particulars.

 

As I have stated before, the use of the British "machines" was to get the landing force off the edge of the beach and onto the beach roads, thus the emphasis on the AVRE with SBG bridge (19 were employed on the three British beaches), which were meant to establish exits over the seawall. But they were not meant to clear the tidal obstacles on the beaches. That was done primarily by hand, in exactly the same manner as on the US beaches. On the US beaches that task was done by either the Beach Obstacle Demolition Parties (UTAH) or the Special Engineer Task Force (OMAHA), comprised of combined teams of US Naval Combat Demolition Units and Army Engineers. At the British beaches it was done by Landing Craft Obstacle Claering Units comprised of - guess what - Royal Navy and Royal Marine combat demolition divers, augmented by Army Engineers. They did the majority of clearing of the beach obstacles, and in both the US and British cases, suffered heavily in the process. Furthermore, the major obstacles at OMAHA were the two antitank walls at the Vierville and St Laurent draws, neither of which would have been susceptible to "machines" (the Vierville wall required the hand emplacement of 1,100 pounds of explosive by the 121st CIB to demolish it, followed by bulldozers to clear the debris).

 

Rich, I think in this case you are simply wrong. First, where in my original post is there a reference to the use of the funnies being focused on "tidal obstacles"? Everyone understands that the primary purposes of the specialized vehicles were to clear beach exits and to assist the infantry with tackling enemy strong points. Still, you are wrong with respect to the use of AVREs in clearing "tidal obstacles". Specifically,

 

"For the engineer clearance teams the first priority was the removal or destruction of explosive charges on top of the beach obstacles to create cleared lanes for the follow-up waves. Army engineers were tasked to clear these obstacles above and below the high water mark. As Lt. IC Dickinson MC explained: 'Obstacles from a depth of ten feet to four feet six inches were the responsibility of the Landing Craft Obstacle Clearance Units of the Royal Navy and those from four feet six inches to 0 feet were a sapper responsibility. Each Beach White and Red, was allotted five AVREs for obstacle clearance...'" in Dunphie and Johnson, Gold Beach.

 

Nor have I found any evidence for a British-Canadian "prewar doctrine" on combined tank and infantry assault that was anything other than a theoretical construct. And I have never seen any evidence for much practice in such having occurred prewar, certainly it did not in the Canadian Army, which barely existed, nor I expect in the British Army (IIRC the 1st Tank Brigade at Arras had never worked with infantry before, having been in exist just some short months, OTOH the experience in the desert was better, but that benefited from two months practice prior to Sidi Barrani).  There is also no evidence that any of the RE Assault Squadrons had much time to practice with their infantry counterparts and it appears that actual coordination between the two on D-Day was pretty poor overall.

 

Although it is true that British armored formations had little or no training experience at the brigade level and above outside of the tank brigade exercises on the Salisbury Plain in the 1930s, this does not mean that there was no training at all. In particular, the 4th Battalion RTC, later 4th RTR, was converted specifically to tank-infantry cooperation and based in Catterick to train for this purpose in 1935. The 7th RTR joined the 4th RTR in this role when it formed, as did the 8th RTR. Annual training for at least 1 of the 6 territorial RTR battalions formed in the late 1930s was held at Catterick with the 4th RTR. Certainly all of these units lacked for proper tanks. At one point in the 1930s Carden-Lloyd carriers were used to represent infantry tanks, and when those tanks first appeared they were the inadequate A11 Matilda 1s.

 

Of course, no knowledgeable student of military history would confuse lack of proper equipment or inadequate training for the absense of doctrine. IIRC Guderian and his colleagues were working out the organization and purpose of the panzer division while German soldiers on exercise were still using wooden representations tanks. In the British case the change in function of the 4th RTC reflected the recommendations of the Kirke Committee and the Field Service Regulations of 1935 for close infantry-tank cooperation with an original specification of one tank battalion for each infantry division. Overall, there was enough training and thinking prewar to establish a doctrine, one which the 4th and 7th RTR tried to follow at Arras, Sidi Barrani and Halfaya Pass, even though the infantry units involved had essentially zero prior experience training with tanks. If anything the British prescription for a combined infantry-tank assault was the only element of armored doctrine clearly spelled out before the war. All the rest was relatively vague and lacked a firm basis in battlefield realities (except perhaps in the early days of combat against the Italians in North Africa).

 

Finally, this whole "the US Army was focused on mobility over combat power" is pretty much a result of Russell Weigley's interpretation of prewar doctrinal thought in the Army. Sadly, it is an interpretation that upon analysis rests on some pretty shakey ground (primarily his assumption that the US Army had a history if being a military constabulary that emphasized cavalry mobility, which is true if you assume that US Army history consists only of the Indian Wars  ). It is also an analysis that ignores the actual doctrinal development interwar, which built almost entirely from the Great War firepower experience, while incorporating - slowly - the possibilities for maneuver resting in the modern AFV.

 

Anyway, I'll see if I can flesh this out more as I go along.

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Overall I agree that Russell Weigley's thesis is overstated, but I think there is some truth in the observation that the US Army emphasized mobility at all levels in anticipation of moving large forces across the Atlantic Ocean and English Channel for a fluid battle that reflected the campaign of 1940. There was a great deal of wisdom in that approach, but it does seem that the greater British focus on "set-piece" assaults as reflected in the separate infantry tank-cruiser tank doctrine, flawed as it may have been in the overall scheme of things, led directly to the creation and deployment of the specialized assault vehicles in the 79th Armoured Division. Certainly, in the narrow focus of specialized armor, let alone armor in general, the US Army built and tested a wide array of vehicles but produced and deployed very few, while the British Army seems to have been more prolific in both testing and deploying. Note that this does not necessarily mean that the effort devoted to the Funnies paid off in every instance.

[Colin Williams]

1) There appears to have been no record of any specific offer by the British to "give" Funnies to the US. They were demonstrated, but the production records would indicate that it would not have been possible in late January for Montgomery and/or Hobart to say, "We will have X of these available by Y, you can have X/3 of them, and we can provide instructors to assist with training." (Monty and Hobo themselves couldn't know how many there would be, and even 79th Armor was still experimenting with them.

 

2) Even if an offer was made, I do not see how there could have been vehicles and trained personnel available 90 days after the demonstration (going to the original D-date of early May). Bradley was well-acquainted with the difficulties of "crash" training and what happened when inadequately-trained men went into action with unfamiliar equipment. IF he indeed "refused" them, very possibly it was because he didn't think they could be ready in time.

 

3) All production would have had to come from the UK, there just wasn't time to procure them from the US. The British apparently (from posts here) were unable to equip their own units to full strength in time, and were even less ready to meet the May dates.

 

4) Having machines "available" (IE on record as delivered from the factory, or in depot, or whatever "available" means) does not equate to units trained, ready to go, and loaded on the beaching craft on the same day. IOW, saying '200 XVs were available by D-Day' does not mean they could have been used on D-Day.

 

I don't think most of this is necessarily inconsistent with Hobart's story. According to the the historical record, the whole effort to develop Funnies took off in 1943 when Brooke appointed Hobart to convert 79th Armoured Division to an armored assault engineer unit, although vehicles like the DD tank and flail had been under development in one form or another for some time before this. At this time Lt. General Morgan was in charge of the D-Day planning at COSSAC, Monty and Ike were in the Med, and the Normandy invasion was planned as a 3 division landing. I have no idea to what degree the original COSSAC plan incorporated any of the Funnies, although I suspect DDs were involved at some level given the large scale conversion of Valentines to the DD role. Perhaps Rich or someone else can enlighten us on this point, although perhaps the original COSSAC plan was not so detailed.

 

At this point Ike and Monty are appointed to lead the invasion. While still in the Med they decide that the landing should be expanded to 5 divisions, even if that means a delay until June. Upon his return to the UK, Monty talks to Hobart about the Funnies (about January 5, 1944) and decides on his preferences for their use. Ike and Brooke are given a demonstration on January 27th, and, according to Hobart's letter, Ike is enthusiastic about everything. Hobart also reports that Monty instructed him to offer the Americans 1/3 of the available Funnies. Hobart further reports that he also held subsequent demonstrations for Bradley, who expressed enthusiasm for the DDs but equivocated on the FOTDDs (Funnies Other Than DDs), later declining them for unspecified logistical and training reasons. In the event, DDs are distributed all around at almost exactly Hobart's 1/3 ratio (200 British/Canadian vs. 96 American - see Rich's post below), but the FOTDDs are deployed only on Juno, Gold and Sword.

 

In light of all this, I have no problem believing that Hobart was either telling the truth or most of the truth. The original plan to build FOTDDs may have been based on a 3-division landing, essentially equivalent to the number actually landed with the 3 British/Canadian divisions on Juno, Gold, Sword. Alternatively, Monty simply may have been willing to lower the number of Funnies on the British and Canadian beaches in order to provide some to the Americans. Or, in January, 1944 Monty and Hobart may have been wrong in their estimate of the rate of FOTDD production. All perfectly reasonable explanations, which don't necessarily mean Bradley was wrong to reject the FOTDDs, particularly those based on the Churchill tank, for all the training and logistical reasons you cite.

 

 

6) The problems were different on the US beaches and UK beaches, and Funnies being successful (if they actually were) on UK beaches does not automatically mean they would have been of any use at all (more than standard tanks) on the US beaches.

6a) I do not see how any of the Funnies would have gotten troops up the bluffs at OMAHA, and that was the main challenge there. LVTs certainly were not going to climb the OMAHA bluffs, and I doubt that many would have survived the weather if they were used as an assault wave - they were definitely less seaworthy than landing craft. IOW, infantry losses might have been more severe if the LVTs sank on the way in.

6b) At UTAH the problem was getting across the flooded areas behind the beach - again, nothing for Funnies to do. LVTs to ferry supplies and troops across the flooded areas would definitely have helped, but this is the only place that I can see LVTs really making a lot of difference, by enabling the troops to bypass the causeways.

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I don't believe there is an open and shut case either way, even with a very detailed analysis (although that would help a lot). Of the various accounts I've seen of action on the British and Canadian beaches, there are many examples of tanks failing to land, breaking down, and getting knocked out or disabled. There are also many examples of tanks, particularly Funnies, contributing to the attack by knocking out pillboxes and gun emplacements, clearing obstacles, and in one case clearing German slit trenches by driving over them with the flail turning! Perhaps the most important question is whether FOTDDs on Omaha Beach could have reached the German defenses as they did on Juno, Gold and Sword. I think we need to "borrow" an old Churchill, take it to Normandy and drive around on the beaches for a few days. Any volunteers?

 

 

[Rich]

Rich, I think in this case you are simply wrong. First, where in my original post is there a reference to the use of the funnies being focused on "tidal obstacles"? Everyone understands that the primary purposes of the specialized vehicles were to clear beach exits and to assist the infantry with tackling enemy strong points. Still, you are wrong with respect to the use of AVREs in clearing "tidal obstacles". Specifically,

 

"For the engineer clearance teams the first priority was the removal or destruction of explosive charges on top of the beach obstacles to create cleared lanes for the follow-up waves. Army engineers were tasked to clear these obstacles above and below the high water mark. As Lt. IC Dickinson MC explained: 'Obstacles from a depth of ten feet to four feet six inches were the responsibility of the Landing Craft Obstacle Clearance Units of the Royal Navy and those from four feet six inches to 0 feet were a sapper responsibility. Each Beach White and Red, was allotted five AVREs for obstacle clearance...'" in Dunphie and Johnson, Gold Beach.

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Sorry, but I am not wrong, but I think we are suffering from a lack of understanding. Referring to WO 205/1170 “Chief Engineer, 21 Army Group, RE Report on the Battle of Normandy” we find:

 

Section 2, page 29 “….obstacles were in two categories, (i) those on the beach below water and (ii) those on the beach above water….(i) were intended to incapacitate craft before beaching whilst those under (ii) were designed to delay personnel and vehicles after landing….an organization with special equipment, namely the ARE [Assault Royal Engineers] had been developed to deal with obstacles above water and it was not until February that anti-craft obstacles commenced to appear on the beaches.”

 

The units actually organized and utilized for clearing (i) were the LCOCU and Royal Engineer Field Companies, who worked by hand emplacing explosives, removing booby traps, and with the aide of bulldozers (D4 unarmored and D7 armored types, no tankdozers were allotted to the British beaches) cleared gaps in the beach obstacles.

 

The primary task for (ii) - the ARE - remained that of getting the troops off the beach and through the fortification zone. For that purpose the gapping teams were variously organized, but in general were set so that:

 

A “Roly Poly” AVRE laid a log carpet to allow vehicles to exit the LCT to the dry beach above the tide line (universally acknowledged as being useless and unnecessary in practice),

 

Two or sometimes just one, Crab (Flail) then cleared a path to the seawall (in some cases a “Bobbin” AVRE was allotted to lay a mat carpet over predetermined clay patches) (unfortunately, many of the Crabs became bogged in the sand, and apparently few exploded any mines on the beach proper),

 

Depending on what was believed required as judged from the aerial photography and other reconnaissance, either an AVRE laid a fascine at the seawall (none of these worked to enable a vehicle to cross) or an AVRE laid an SBG on the wall (a number of these were successful),

 

When the seawall was bridged (in a few cases drifted sand provided an exit and in a few other cases there was no seawall to bridge) the Crabs (those that had not bogged) crossed and again flailed to the next position (quite a few becoming bogged or being mined),

 

Then more AVRE with fascines were to fill in tank ditches, craters and so on, enabling them to finally engage beach defenses with their Petards. Also, throughout, when not flailing the Crabs were to provide gunfire support with their 75mm.

 

Of course few gaps were made like this. Most were improvisational in nature as casualties and unexpected obstacles caused problems.

 

Throughout though, the most distinguishable difference between operations on the British beaches and those on OMAHA (UTAH is essentially moot) was the number of armored vehicles (AVRE and CRABs) on the British beaches that were not put out of action by enemy fire, compared to the number that were lost on OMAHA. And it is on GOLD, opposite Le Hamel, where the British assault most resembles OMAHA, and not so coincidentally, it is also at GOLD where the heaviest losses in the CRABs, AVRE and LCOCU and Royal Engineer clearance teams appears to have occurred. In other words, it remains the scale of opposition that was critical, not the mechanization of the assault units.

 

One of course could also point to OMAHA’s two landings, that of the 116th Infantry and the 16th Infantry. The first was more heavily supported by armor (that is where the bulk of the DD were directly landed) than the second (that is where 29 of the 32 DD were lost) and yet it is also where the heavier casualties were incurred.

 

Of course, no knowledgeable student of military history would confuse lack of proper equipment or inadequate training for the absense of doctrine.

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But they are two very different things, and with different meanings and implications. My readings as a “student of military history” indicate to me that prewar the British made little use of the term “doctrine.” It does not appear in its accepted meaning – that I am aware of – in the Field Service Regulations, which were the closest to a all encompassing “doctrinal” document in the British Army prewar. Specifically in this case, the experimentation of individual units may be considered as part of “doctrinal” development, that is, new tactical methods that utilize new (or old) equipment in new ways and that then become accepted as “normal” operational methodology throughout an army, usually through changes in training, education and official publication. But AFAIK there is no evidence of a general dissemination of this new “doctrine” throughout the British Army as a whole prewar, nor evidence that any such thing occurred at anything other than a local unit level until the establishment of the various “battle schools” during the war.

 

Overall I agree that Russell Weigley's thesis is overstated, but I think there is some truth in the observation that the US Army emphasized mobility at all levels in anticipation of moving large forces across the Atlantic Ocean and English Channel for a fluid battle that reflected the campaign of 1940. There was a great deal of wisdom in that approach, but it does seem that the greater British focus on "set-piece" assaults as reflected in the separate infantry tank-cruiser tank doctrine, flawed as it may have been in the overall scheme of things, led directly to the creation and deployment of the specialized assault vehicles in the 79th Armoured Division. Certainly, in the narrow focus of specialized armor, let alone armor in general, the US Army built and tested a wide array of vehicles but produced and deployed very few, while the British Army seems to have been more prolific in both testing and deploying. Note that this does not necessarily mean that the effort devoted to the Funnies paid off in every instance.

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Actually Colin, if you look more closely you will find that the British regulations defining the “tank” and “cruiser” dichotomy (it wasn’t quite “doctrine”) was mirrored in the US armor doctrine, and that both in turn were similar to the dichotomies found in German and Soviet (and Italian and Japanese AFAIK) doctrinal thought. The difference was that in the US the actual distinction between an Infantry and Cruiser tank disappeared quite early on (although the weight classification distinction between a light and medium remained), in favor of an organizational distinction. That is, it was intended that the GHQ Reserve Tank Battalions (later Tank Battalions, Separate) would fulfill the “Infantry” tank role, while the tank battalions of the Armored Division would fulfill the “Cruiser” tank role. Further, the catalyst for the development of the specialized assault vehicles was not the non-existent infantry tank-cruiser tank doctrine, it was the tactical requirements found necessary for assaulting the sophisticated prepared defensive systems evolved by the Germans during the war.

 

And if you look closely you will find that the development of US armor of all type was simply handicapped by a late start, coupled with little direct experience. Development of “specialized” vehicles initially concentrated on specific requirements (primarily for SP artillery of all types and ARV), while everything was subordinated to the requirements for mass production of basic systems. Development of specialized assault systems began quite late (in 1943) with the result that they simply were unable to develop and produce such systems, organize and train the units to use them, and get them overseas prior to the execution of OVERLORD. In fact there is some evidence that mine-clearing tanks were initially planned for the assault, but the units simply didn’t arrive in time (IIRC the first shipments came in July-August and were on the continent in September).

 

And I am unsure that the fact that the British were “prolific in both testing and deploying” equipments was such a plus. That policy led to the early problems with the Churchill, the Covenanter and the “Roly Poly” AVRE (which was widely deployed for D-Day and which was totally unsuccessful).

[Rich]

In light of all this, I have no problem believing that Hobart was either telling the truth or most of the truth. The original plan to build FOTDDs may have been based on a 3-division landing, essentially equivalent to the number actually landed with the 3 British/Canadian divisions on Juno, Gold, Sword. Alternatively, Monty simply may have been willing to lower the number of Funnies on the British and Canadian beaches in order to provide some to the Americans. Or, in January, 1944 Monty and Hobart may have been wrong in their estimate of the rate of FOTDD production. All perfectly reasonable explanations, which don't necessarily mean Bradley was wrong to reject the FOTDDs, particularly those based on the Churchill tank, for all the training and logistical reasons you cite.

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I think we are actually in pretty close agreement here, even if you don't seem to realize it.

 

I don't believe there is an open and shut case either way, even with a very detailed analysis (although that would help a lot). Of the various accounts I've seen of action on the British and Canadian beaches, there are many examples of tanks failing to land, breaking down, and getting knocked out or disabled. There are also many examples of tanks, particularly Funnies, contributing to the attack by knocking out pillboxes and gun emplacements, clearing obstacles, and in one case clearing German slit trenches by driving over them with the flail turning! Perhaps the most important question is whether FOTDDs on Omaha Beach could have reached the German defenses as they did on Juno, Gold and Sword. I think we need to "borrow" an old Churchill, take it to Normandy and drive around on the beaches for a few days. Any volunteers?

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Well, I'm working on it, but it takes time.

[Colin Williams]

...Throughout though, the most distinguishable difference between operations on the British beaches and those on OMAHA (UTAH is essentially moot) was the number of armored vehicles (AVRE and CRABs) on the British beaches that were not put out of action by enemy fire, compared to the number that were lost on OMAHA. And it is on GOLD, opposite Le Hamel, where the British assault most resembles OMAHA, and not so coincidentally, it is also at GOLD where the heaviest losses in the CRABs, AVRE and LCOCU and Royal Engineer clearance teams appears to have occurred. In other words, it remains the scale of opposition that was critical, not the mechanization of the assault units.

 

One of course could also point to OMAHA’s two landings, that of the 116th Infantry and the 16th Infantry. The first was more heavily supported by armor (that is where the bulk of the DD were directly landed) than the second (that is where 29 of the 32 DD were lost) and yet it is also where the heavier casualties were incurred.

 

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Rich,

 

Now we're getting somewhere! I agree that many specialized vehicles were lost and many of the gaps weren't made according to plan, but presumably these failures simply reflected the "friction of war" and were the reason so many vehicles and engineering parties were landed in the first place. (IOW, if the British only really needed X vehicles to clear Y gaps, it seems they landed NX vehicles to try to clear NY gaps, thereby allowing for potential losses.) On GOLD, my understanding is that part of the problems stemmed from the late landing of the DD tanks. IIRC the Navy decided to land directly rather than launch but by the time this was sorted out the LCTs ended up at the back of the assault wave, with the DDs landing after the supporting tanks had come ashore. A second factor was the presence of a powerful AT gun in Le Hamel that knocked out a number of tanks on the beach before it and a number of associated strong points were taken with the help of an AVRE's petard mortar. The one detailed narrative I have read attributes the heavier casualties and problems getting off the beach to the loss of specialized tanks on the beach, the delay in landing the DDs, and the presence of formations from the 352nd Infantry Division.

[Colin Williams]

But they are two very different things, and with different meanings and implications. My readings as a “student of military history” indicate to me that prewar the British made little use of the term “doctrine.” It does not appear in its accepted meaning - that I am aware of - in the Field Service Regulations, which were the closest to a all encompassing “doctrinal” document in the British Army prewar. Specifically in this case, the experimentation of individual units may be considered as part of “doctrinal” development, that is, new tactical methods that utilize new (or old) equipment in new ways and that then become accepted as “normal” operational methodology throughout an army, usually through changes in training, education and official publication. But AFAIK there is no evidence of a general dissemination of this new “doctrine” throughout the British Army as a whole prewar, nor evidence that any such thing occurred at anything other than a local unit level until the establishment of the various “battle schools” during the war.

 

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Just because the British didn't use the term much doesn't mean that they didn't have doctrines, even if their dissemination of doctrine through the Army wasn't particularly effective. Considering the US Army definition of doctrine as a set of "fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.", I see no reason to question the existence of such "fundamental principles" in the British Army. Neither for that matter does Timothy Harrison Place, whose work "Military Training in the British Army, 1940-44" uses the word "doctrine" throughout and sets it out in the Introduction as follows. "This book compares doctrine for the attack with the training actually carried out in units and formations. Doctrine...existed on many different levels. For the purpose of this study it means the officially sanctioned doctrine of the British Army as expressed in the many manuals and pamphlets published by the War Office and other military authorities." Later in the book he even cites the last pre-war Infantry-tank doctrine, MTP No. 22, "Tactical Handling of Army Tank Battalions" from September, 1939.

 

The MTP, or Military Training Pamphlets, were not always disseminated far outside of a given branch of service. One could reasonably expect officers in I-tank units to be familiar with MTP No. 22 and to train according to its prescriptions, but probably few infantry officers outside of Divisional HQs would have read the pamphlet or done any training with tanks until combined arms exercises became commonplace starting in 1941. It is also clear that Cavalry regiments never practiced the infantry-tank attack, although many of the cruiser-equipped RTR battalions seem to have been moderately familiar with the tactics.

 

Although the lack of training in infantry support operations (let alone the complete unsuitability of cruiser tanks for this sort of work) among the cruiser regiments led to many tragic results at Abbeville, Gazala, Alamein and elsewhere, the lack of equivalent training among the infantry was not a handicap to the same degree. This is because the classic I-tank attack essentially conformed to the standard British infantry attack, with variations only in the placement and pace of the advancing I-tank echelons relative to the infantry. The infantry and artillery knew full well how to conduct this sort of attack and could proceed with some confidence (however misplaced!).

[Colin Williams]

Further, the catalyst for the development of the specialized assault vehicles was not the non-existent infantry tank-cruiser tank doctrine, it was the tactical requirements found necessary for assaulting the sophisticated prepared defensive systems evolved by the Germans during the war.

 

 

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Rich,

 

I'll address American/British/German/Soviet armored doctrine later, but this particular point needs clarification. IMHO the genesis of the 79th Armoured Division can be traced to the British genesis of the tank in WW1, which first and foremost saw the tank as a tool for dealing with the barbed wire, trenches and machine guns of the German defenses, not as a tool for exploitation. Although Fuller, Liddel Hart and others soon took the Royal Tank Corps off into the realm of the "expanding torrent" and other theories of mobile warfare, there remained a large community within the British Army as a whole (and a smaller community within the Tank Corps) that perceived the need for tanks that would repeat the service of the rhomboid tanks of WW1. One can see this in Elles specification for heavily-armored infantry tanks (with Hobart providing the initial design specifications for the Matilda 1). The TOG group followed on in this vein during the war, and the Churchill itself clearly owes much of its design to ideas about the kind of tank needed to operate on a WW1-style battlefield. Although one doesn't need to be "trench-centric" to see the advantages of using tanks in amphibious operations, the menagerie of Funnies, with their fascines, Petard mortars, portable bridges, flails and flamethrowers, look just like what one would get from a British tank pioneer who was an engineer in WW1, which is exactly what Hobart was. Take away the I-tank culture bred in the trenches of France, particularly the persistent idea that tanks can deal with obstacles and lead the infantry onto the objective, and I don't think you would get the 79th Armoured Division.

[KingSargent]

I don't believe there is an open and shut case either way, even with a very detailed analysis (although that would help a lot). Of the various accounts I've seen of action on the British and Canadian beaches, there are many examples of tanks failing to land, breaking down, and getting knocked out or disabled. There are also many examples of tanks, particularly Funnies, contributing to the attack by knocking out pillboxes and gun emplacements, clearing obstacles, and in one case clearing German slit trenches by driving over them with the flail turning! Perhaps the most important question is whether FOTDDs on Omaha Beach could have reached the German defenses as they did on Juno, Gold and Sword. I think we need to "borrow" an old Churchill, take it to Normandy and drive around on the beaches for a few days. Any volunteers?

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As I said, the Funnies were largely of use as gun tanks "contributing to the attack by knocking out pillboxes and gun emplacements". That could have neen done by regular gun tanks, and a lot of obstacle clearing could have been done with US M4 tank-dozers. I think there were tank-dozers scheduled with the assault waves (and I'm sure Rich will correct me if I'm wrong). Having a slit trench dozed under is surely as effective as flailing it to death...

 

I think the question of whether Funnies could have goten at the defences on OMAHA and UTAH can be answered by a visit to the beaches (although I would like the tank idea... ). Most of the defences on OMAHA were atop the bluffs, and Funnies couldn't get up there without using the draws - and getting up the draws meant the defences were overcome, so then you didn't need Funnies. The defences on UTAH were behind the flooded areas, and I don't see how Funnies in single file would have been a lot of help on the causeways.

 

Another factor in the "Funny adoption saga" is that the DD, which was based on the US Sherman was adopted, while the FOTDDs based on Churchill were not. The British Army had lots of experience operating Shermans (more than the Yanks, really), I doubt there was time to teach US tankers to operate Churchills, which took a lot of babying.

However, the US did a lot of experiments with FOTDDs based on Sherman chassis, but the need was gone by the time they got anything going. So the US didn't really reject the idea of the Funnies, they just thought (speculating here) that trying to have US troops operate Churchills was a good idea.

[Rich]

Rich,

 

Now we're getting somewhere! I agree that many specialized vehicles were lost and many of the gaps weren't made according to plan, but presumably these failures simply reflected the "friction of war" and were the reason so many vehicles and engineering parties were landed in the first place. (IOW, if the British only really needed X vehicles to clear Y gaps, it seems they landed NX vehicles to try to clear NY gaps, thereby allowing for potential losses.)

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Sorry, but this seriously puts the cart before the horse. And there may not even be a horse in this case. The landing plans were intended to be anything but improvisational nor, given the sheer nagnitude of the forces involved, could they have been. The intention was to execute the number of gaps neccessary to fulfill the landing plan, no more and no less. Eight at UTAH, 16 at OMAHA, 12 at GOLD, 8 at JUNO, and 8 at SWORD. These plans reflected the different requirements and obstacles at the beaches. Now of course it wasn't truly expected that the Germans would role over and play dead, but it was after they failed to do so, and when the sacrosanct plan began to unravel, that improvisation began to occur. But until that point each gapping team was a self-contained organism designed to acheive its specific gap, no more and no less.

 

On GOLD, my understanding is that part of the problems stemmed from the late landing of the DD tanks. IIRC the Navy decided to land directly rather than launch but by the time this was sorted out the LCTs ended up at the back of the assault wave, with the DDs landing after the supporting tanks had come ashore. A second factor was the presence of a powerful AT gun in Le Hamel that knocked out a number of tanks on the beach before it and a number of associated strong points were taken with the help of an AVRE's petard mortar. The one detailed narrative I have read attributes the heavier casualties and problems getting off the beach to the loss of specialized tanks on the beach, the delay in landing the DDs, and the presence of formations from the 352nd Infantry Division.

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No, the problems at GOLD (actually, JIG GREEN) were directly a product of the position and fields of fire and exposure of the 75mm at Le Hamel (WN 37) and the 5cm gun at Cabane des Douanes (WN 36), which caused havoc very akin to that wrought by the much stronger defenses at either end of OMAHA (JIG GREEN) was roughly equivalent to either the 116th or 16th Infantry zone at OMAHA, both of which had combinations of 8.8cm, 7.5cm and 5cm guns to contend with in positions only rivalled by Le Hamel.

 

But I think we are refining - however grudging on your part - some agreement here.