Did The Us Army "refuse" British Funnies?

[Rich]

So it is a subject that appears time after time. I even find it on page 58 of our own Bill Buckingham's excellent D-Day book (D-Day, the First 72 Hours, p.58) where he says “the British factored the Funnies and their various capabilities into their assault plan, and demonstrated the vehicles to the commander of the US 1st Army, Lieutenant-General Omar Bradley. Bradley rejected them all except one….”

 

Seems unequivocal, yes? And yet, these allegations never seem to have a firm basis, or at least not a referenced one (BillB didn't footnote his passage, Bill do you have a reference for that?). But the evidence seems to indicate that even if such an offer was made, it was a spurious one, to say the least. And the allegation always seems to contain a thinly veiled sense that if only the American officers had been less parochial, thick-headed, yadda-yadda, then there would have been fewer casualties at OMAHA and so on.

 

So what say you all? Did it happen? If so, when and where?

[franko]

I had watched a program on history telivision and they were basically saying the same. The US didn't want the "funnies".... probably because they didn't think they would hold up to the terrain on the Omaha beach and surrounding hills.

 

I know the "funnies" were employed on Juno and the....IIRC "Sword" (Brit) landing and they worked very well.

 

I don't think that there was a really good reason given....just unproven technology jitters perhapse.

 

Just my 2 cents....

 

Regards

[thomas.tmcc]

hello it was the same the us marines offered the use and show the us army to assault a fortitfied (sorry on spelling) beach with armoured amtracs but the us army didnt want to know .

 

Thomas

 

I had watched a program on history telivision and they were basically saying the same. The US didn't want the "funnies".... probably because they didn't think they would hold up to the terrain on the Omaha beach and surrounding hills.

 

I know the "funnies" were employed on Juno and the....IIRC "Sword" (Brit) landing and they worked very well.

 

I don't think that there was a really good reason given....just unproven technology jitters perhapse.

 

Just my 2 cents....

 

Regards

132749[/snapback]

[Colin Williams]

So what say you all? Did it happen? If so, when and where?

132728[/snapback]

 

In my copy of Chester Wilmot's "The Struggle for Europe", Chapter XIII, page 265 is the following -

 

Beginning of Wilmot quote -

There might have been some justification for the policy of direct assault if the Americans had accepted Montgomery's plan for landing armour en masse at the start of the attack, and for using the specialized equipment of Hobart's 79th Armoured Division to deal with the fortifications and the underwater obstacles. When Montgomery first saw this equipment he ordered Hobart to make one-third of it available to the Americans, and set himself to interest Eisenhower and Bradley in its revolutionary employment. Hobart's account of the reaction of the three generals is illumintating. (footnote - 'This account was given to me by General Hobart on November 10th, 1946.')

 

"Montgomery," he says, "was most inquisitive. After thoroough tests and searching questions he said in effect: 'I'll have this and this and this; but I don't want that or that.' Eisenhower was equally enthusiastic but not so discriminating. His response was, 'We'll take everything you can give us.' Bradley appeared to be interested but, when asked what he wanted, replied, 'I'll have to consult my staff.'"

 

Bradley and his staff eventually accepted the 'DDs' but did not take up the offer of 'Crabs', 'Crocodiles', 'AVREs' and the rest of Hobart's menagerie. - End of Wilmot quote

 

Earlier in the book, on page 182, is the statement that the DD tank was demonstrated to Eisenhower on January 27, 1944, and that Ike sent a British engineer to Washington by air the next day with blueprints to get DDs produced in the US. Presumably this came from Hobart also. Although the timeline for DDs may not have matched the timeline for evaluating other funnies, it seems that Hobart at least began the process of showing specialized assault tanks to Eisenhower and company in January. Wilmot finished his book in 1951, so I expect he was first off the mark in discussing these issues, unless the semi-official history of the 79th Armoured Division also addressed them.

[thomas.tmcc]

Hello yes it did happen check ospreys books on d-day they tell you the same thing .

 

Thomas

 

I had watched a program on history telivision and they were basically saying the same. The US didn't want the "funnies".... probably because they didn't think they would hold up to the terrain on the Omaha beach and surrounding hills.

 

I know the "funnies" were employed on Juno and the....IIRC "Sword" (Brit) landing and they worked very well.

 

I don't think that there was a really good reason given....just unproven technology jitters perhapse.

 

Just my 2 cents....

 

Regards

132749[/snapback]

[Ken Estes]

Think of the US Army as Luddites, trusting only in hand placed charges to clear obstacles. MajGen Corlett, who commanded 7th ID at Kwajalein, was a corps cdr, but his suggestions for amtracs, other PacWar TTP were just not welcome. It is true that landings on continental shores are different than isolated islands and atolls, but many common threads remain. For one thing, there can be no liesurely 3-7 days bombardment, like in POA...thirty minute of prep and get ashore before the enemy can reinforce is the norm in ETO landings.

[Tony Williams]

It's the refusal to use amtracs that surprises me more than rejecting the funnies. In fact, some genuinely amphibious AFVs with tank turrets so they could fire while swimming (rather than those vulnerable and helpless DD tanks) would have made a lot of sense IMO.

 

At least, that what the Allies use in my novel 'The Foresight War'

 

Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition website and discussion

forum

[LucaJJ]

Interesting...if we want to get into D-Day historiography (not to talk down to anyone but...that means the history or development of how history or an event in history has been convered through time), I have a strong impression that the 'funnies' issue arose partly as a reaction to some basic, divulgative works on D-Day which impleid or even stated (no soruces at hand, sorry) that the US did 'the ahrd fighting' becuase Omaha and Utah had such worse casualtiesd than Juno and Sword. The counter then becase: they ahd the casualties 'casue they didn't have the funnies.

 

Another, not historigraphical but rather 'techncial' point. With all due admiration for Hobart etc., many of hsi famous funnies, IIRC, were of greater use in the cmaapoign ing eneral than on the beach itself. The most useful thigns on teh ebach were immediate tank support (dd, limited though it was) and the obbin track-laying vehicle, right? As for the Amtracks, I thought even the 79th only strated using those in crossing the Rhine? (DARN, I've got a book on the 79th at home...).

 

Footnote: at the Royal Hospital in Chelsea (for non-Brits, that's the world's second-oldest 'old soldiers home') I once met an old WW II vet who showed me around some. As we got to the commemorative plaques, when we got to Percy (?)Hobart's one, he was delighted that I knew something about the 79th and the funnies as he had served with them!

[Icicle]

I was under the impressions that one of the reasons Omaha had such high casualties is the fact that the Germans were on an invasion drill that morning. So most of the positions were already fully manned and ready for an "invasion".

 

Also, considering the problems on Omaha with the Dual Drive Tanks, and the problems of Utah with the currents how effective would the "funnies" hae been had they gotten into the fight.

 

As I recall, Utah especially was relatively flat, without the obstactles that the funnies were designed to deal with.

[Redbeard]

So it is a subject that appears time after time. I even find it on page 58 of our own Bill Buckingham's excellent D-Day book (D-Day, the First 72 Hours, p.58) where he says “the British factored the Funnies and their various capabilities into their assault plan, and demonstrated the vehicles to the commander of the US 1st Army, Lieutenant-General Omar Bradley. Bradley rejected them all except one….”

 

Seems unequivocal, yes? And yet, these allegations never seem to have a firm basis, or at least not a referenced one (BillB didn't footnote his passage, Bill do you have a reference for that?). But the evidence seems to indicate that even if such an offer was made, it was a spurious one, to say the least. And the allegation always seems to contain a thinly veiled sense that if only the American officers had been less parochial, thick-headed, yadda-yadda, then there would have been fewer casualties at OMAHA and so on.

 

So what say you all? Did it happen? If so, when and where?

132728[/snapback]

 

As long as our agenda is not to just find excuses for the US Army officers and negate any responsibility of theirs, we will have to look at this in a sober way.

 

First, we can see that the US Army didn't have the "funnies" (apart from DD), but the British did. If our conclusion after that is, that the US Army didn't need the funnies, well then the issue really is settled.

 

If we assume that the funnies would have been of good use, then the good question of course is why the US Army didn't have them, and that question can only be directed to the US responsible. It was their responsibility to to arm the US Forces, and whether the British actually offered some "funnies" can't be the main issue, but rather a potential reinforcing factor in the question of irresponsiblity in the ranks of US decision makers.

 

And in that question I really think there has been enough smoke to conclude that there must be fire somewhere. In this context the storries, to the degree they can be confirmed, about offers from USMC also being rejected, really underlines claims of the US Army top brass not having "listening to good advice" as a main virtue.

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

[Rich]

Think of the US Army as Luddites, trusting only in hand placed charges to clear obstacles. MajGen Corlett, who commanded 7th ID at Kwajalein, was a corps cdr, but his suggestions for amtracs, other PacWar TTP were just not welcome.  It is true that landings on continental shores are different than isolated islands and atolls, but many common threads remain. For one thing, there can be no liesurely 3-7 days bombardment, like in POA...thirty minute of prep and get ashore before the enemy can reinforce is the norm in ETO landings.

132956[/snapback]

 

Where to start? And I'm not trying to pick on you Ken.

 

If the US Army were Luddites, then so was the British Army. The Funnies were designed to get the Army off the beach, rather than through the beach obstacles. For removing beach obstacles the British and Americans used exactly the same system, demolition charges, hand-placed by Navy (in the case of US) and RN and RM divers (in the case of the British) for the seaward obstacles, and hand-placed by Army engineers for the landward obstacles. Augmenting this hand work were D7 armored bulldozers (on British and American beaches) and M4 tankdozers (on the American beaches, although the conversion kits were available to the British - a total of 100 kits had arrived in the ETO - I am unsure that they were used in the assault, and certainly were not used by the British in the inintial assault waves). So that issue appears to be moot at best and a smokescreen at worst.

 

And the Corlett argument has some problems as well. The Kwajalein assault as executed 29 January-7 February 1944, at which time the Normany assault plan and resource allocations were already in place. It is unclear to me how the "Pacific" TTPs were to be melded into an existing assault plan as complex as NEPTUNE-OVERLORD, in a little over two months (if the initial May schedule was to have a chance).

 

As regards the LVT, aside from the argument as to whether or not they would have been of any actual benefit (it is questionable whether they could have traversed the shingle any better than the tanks actually could or mounted the seawalls), it is simply questionable whether sufficient were available to even send to Europe. By November 1943, at Tarawa, even though in theory 2,272 unarmoured and 348 armored LVT had been produced (through 1 November 1943), there were insufficient available to land more than two BLT? So what's wrong with that picture?

 

The answer is, quite simply, that demand for the LVT was always higher than the availability. Further, only the LVT (A) were really suitable for assault operations (the unarmored LVT at Tarawa lost heavily, the primary reason that the following waves went ashore in LCVP) and production of that type had just begun, by 1 June 1944 just 1,298 had been built. Which leads to the next problem. Just to replace the LCA and LCVP used in the UTAH and OMAHA assaults (560 not including the 22 LCA at Pointe du Hoc) would have required 560 ramped LVT 4 or LVT 4 (A), which had just begun production, the LCVP and LVT 4 both had a capacity of essentially 30 troops. But all earlier model LVT carried just 20 troops, which meant that you would have needed one-third again as many, would have had to screw with your assault organization again, and would have had to find additional deckage to stow those additional small craft, meaning that you would have had to decide which 280 other small craft to eliminate from the assault?

 

Hmm, no, I don't think the "Luddite" or "ignore Corlett and LVT" argument really holds water Ken.

[thomas.tmcc]

Where to start? And I'm not trying to pick on you Ken. 

 

If the US Army were Luddites, then so was the British Army. The Funnies were designed to get the Army off the beach, rather than through the beach obstacles. For removing beach obstacles the British and Americans used exactly the same system, demolition charges, hand-placed by Navy (in the case of US) and RN and RM divers (in the case of the British) for the seaward obstacles, and hand-placed by Army engineers for the landward obstacles. Augmenting this hand work were D7 armored bulldozers (on British and American beaches) and M4 tankdozers (on the American beaches, although the conversion kits were available to the British - a total of 100  kits had arrived in the ETO - I am unsure that they were used in the assault, and certainly were not used by the British in the inintial assault waves). So that issue appears to be moot at best and a smokescreen at worst.

 

And the Corlett argument has some problems as well. The Kwajalein assault as executed 29 January-7 February 1944, at which time the Normany assault plan and resource allocations were already in place. It is unclear to me how the "Pacific" TTPs were to be melded into an existing assault plan as complex as NEPTUNE-OVERLORD, in a little over two months (if the initial May schedule was to have a chance).

 

As regards the LVT, aside from the argument as to whether or not they would have been of any actual benefit (it is questionable whether they could have traversed the shingle any better than the tanks actually could or mounted the seawalls), it is simply questionable whether sufficient were available to even send to Europe. By November 1943, at Tarawa, even though in theory 2,272 unarmoured and 348 armored LVT had been produced (through 1 November 1943), there were insufficient available to land more than two BLT? So what's wrong with that picture?

 

The answer is, quite simply, that demand for the LVT was always higher than the availability. Further, only the LVT (A) were really suitable for assault operations (the unarmored LVT at Tarawa lost heavily, the primary reason that the following waves went ashore in LCVP) and production of that type had just begun, by 1 June 1944 just 1,298 had been built. Which leads to the next problem. Just to replace the LCA and LCVP used in the UTAH and OMAHA assaults (560 not including the 22 LCA at Pointe du Hoc) would have required 560 ramped LVT 4 or LVT 4 (A), which had just begun production, the LCVP and LVT 4 both had a capacity of essentially 30 troops. But all earlier model LVT carried just 20 troops, which meant that you would have needed one-third again as many, would have had to screw with your assault organization again, and would have had to find additional deckage to stow those additional small craft, meaning that you would have had to decide which 280 other small craft to eliminate from the assault?

 

Hmm, no, I don't think the "Luddite" or "ignore Corlett and LVT" argument really holds water Ken. 

133028[/snapback]

 

Hi rich the marines offered the amtracs as early as 1943 when the planning for overlord was ongoing ,also how many waves were there in the assualt landings ,LVTs could have replaced the first two waves then the rest as LCVPs or LCAs which the marines used in the pacific ,I heard there was a few hundred LVTs ( about 600-700 )in the uk in storage in 1944 .

 

Thomas

Edited January 12, 2005 by thomas.tmcc

[Rich]

In my copy of Chester Wilmot's "The Struggle for Europe", Chapter XIII, page 265 is the following -

 

132775[/snapback]

 

Colin, the problem that I have is that this is the only "documented" evidence that I have ever found for the claim that an offer was made and refused. Eisenhower's papers do remark about the DD demonstration of 27 January (and it did result in US production of DD kits, none of which were used in the invasion), but he does not mention any of the other Funnies, or of any meeting between he, Montgomery, Bradley, and Hobart, nor have I been able to find mention of any such meeting in Bradley's papers, or in the papers of the AFV&W Section of SHAEF or First Army. Call me suspicious, but when the "father" of the Funnies starts making comments from memory to a reporter postwar about such a pivotal decision (after all, it "caused" those horrific losses on OMAHA) occuring in a meeting whose existance can't be independantly verified, and I start asking questions?

 

And no, I don't have an "agenda" here Redbeard - I have a question, that so far seems unanswered.

[JohnB]

If no offer of 'Funnies' was made it seems quite gratuitous to have demonstrated them to the American brass in the first place.

 

Amusing anecdote from Patrick Delaforce's 'The Story of Hobart's Funnies'

 

"Major Roland Ward of 617 Assault Squadron relates: 'Dick Staffords AVRE fell over upside down off an Assault bridge in trying to climb over a wall in the Orford battle area. Eisenhower ran forward quite concerned for the crew, but 'Hobo' said 'Don't worry - they do it every day".'

 

Delaforce then adds "Although Eisenhower was impressed with 'Funnies' and Montgomery offered them to the American forces on D-Day, General Bradley turned the offer down."

 

If Monty had made the offer it was most likely verbally and thus probably not recorded. Anyway surely the onus would be on Bradley to have requested 'Funnies' if he thought they were needed?

[Rich]

Hi rich the marines offered the amtracs as early as 1943 when the planning for overlord was ongoing ,also how many waves were there in the assualt  landings ,LVTs could have replaced the first two waves then the rest as LCVPs or LCAs which the marines used in the pacific ,I heard there was a few hundred LVTs ( about 600-700 )in the uk in storage in 1944 .

133034[/snapback]

 

Hi Thomas. I think you may misunderstand. How can an "offer" have any meaning of it has no substance? An LVT 1, 2, or 3 would have likely been unarmored (only the cabs were armored as produced, beginning in March 1944, otherwise bolt-on armor was available that was resistant to rifle bullets, but then, so were LCA and LCVP) and would have had insufficient capacity to carry the troops needed, unless the entire assault plan was restructured. An LVT 4 had the requisite capacity, but was just beginning serial production in 1944 (virtually the entire production was utilized at Saipan, contemporaneous with D-Day), but also had little or no armor protection. And the specialized "armored" LVT with 37mm gun or 75mm howitzer were in even shorter supply.

 

BTW, the LVT in the UK were not exactly "in storage" - they were part of Lend-Lease and were used by 79th Armoured Division post invasion (there were about 190 with 1st Assault Brigade by early October) - in other words the US Army didn't "own" them so couldn't use them. However again, all of those were LVT 2 AFAIK, with some LVT 4 arriving later in the year, also it appears that there was some resistance to using them in the invasion due to concerns about their capabilities in the sea conditions found in the Channel, but those were probably unfounded.

[Rich]

If no offer of 'Funnies' was made it seems quite gratuitous to have demonstrated them to the American brass in the first place.

 

Amusing anecdote from Patrick Delaforce's 'The Story of Hobart's Funnies'

 

"Major Roland Ward of 617 Assault Squadron relates: 'Dick Staffords AVRE fell over upside down off an Assault bridge in trying to climb over a wall in the Orford battle area. Eisenhower ran forward quite concerned for the crew, but 'Hobo' said 'Don't worry - they do it every day".'

 

Delaforce then adds "Although Eisenhower was impressed with 'Funnies' and Montgomery offered them to the American forces on D-Day, General Bradley turned the offer down."

 

If Monty had made the offer it was most likely verbally and thus probably not recorded. Anyway surely the onus would be on Bradley to have requested 'Funnies' if he thought they were needed?

133038[/snapback]

 

Okay, to the meat of the matter. Is there a date for that event? You see 617 Squadron was part of 42 Assault Regiment, which was in "reserve" during the invasion. And it was "in reserve" for very good reasons, that AVRE they turned upside down was likely one of the few that they had available to turn upside down "every day."

 

On D-Day the actual availability of AVRE were SWORD Beach 34, JUNO Beach 47, and GOLD Beach 40, for a total of 121. This may be compared to the distribution as given in the Engineer Outline Plan (WO 205/1170), which were SWORD Beach 30, JUNO Beach 28, and GOLD Beach 44, for a total of 102. In other words 19 more AVRE were actually landed than were originally planned. Furthermore, the original engineer plan called for arrival of the “residue” of 5th and 6th Assault Regiments by D+27 with an additional 104 AVRE and the arrival of the reserve 42nd Assault Regiment with 104 more on D+30 “or later.”

 

But balanced against this are a number of hard realities. For one thing by D-Day just 180 AVRE conversions had been completed, meaning that over two-thirds of those theoretically available were committed to the assault. For another, the theoretical war establishment for the squadrons was intended to be 26, which would have meant that the 6 squadrons deployed on D-Day, should have had 156 AVRE and the full brigade (12 squadrons) 312. By that measure the squadrons landed on D-Day were actually 35 short of establishment, while the 180 actually produced left the brigade 132 short of establishment. It is also problematic whether or not all of the AVRE produced up to D-Day had been in fact delivered to the brigade (see below).

 

Finally, the 1st Assault Brigade History (WO 205/1160) makes clear the hurried nature of the brigade organization. Initially conceived in May 1943 after exercise KRUSCHEN in March had illustrated the shortfalls in engineer assault technique, personnel organization wasn’t complete until the end of October 1943 with the assignment of 26 Field Squadron, RE (Guards Independent Brigade), 222 Field Company, RE (47th Infantry Division), 284th Field Company, RE (38th Infantry Division), and 557th Field Company (55th Infantry Division) to the brigade. During the winter of 1943-44 and early spring 1944 the brigade was fully occupied in organization, training and experimentation. But the process was badly restricted in that only 36 “decrepit Churchill gun tanks” and 51 RAC personnel had been assigned to the brigade for training, experimentation and familiarization. The Brigade History noted “many of these R.A.C. personnel were not themselves Churchill trained, and in consequence had to be sent off at once on courses together with a large proportion of the Sapper officers and N.C.O.s.” The first completed AVRE conversion did not arrive until early April 1944 and even then many did not arrive with Petards installed, a task that was added to the regular maintenance jobs of the Brigade R.E.M.E. Company.

 

It is also notable that the Assault Brigade never actually was able to achieve its planned war establishment. By 1 September, with all 12 squadrons on the continent, the brigade only fielded 217 AVRE, still 95 short of establishment. Partly in response to tactical requirements, but also apparently in response to the limited number of AVRE available, the brigade establishment was changed, so that by VE-Day it comprised eight assault squadrons, each with 20, and one experimental squadron with 26 AVRE, for a brigade total of 186.

 

It appears incredible that, given these circumstances, any realistic “offer” of AVRE for use on the American beaches could ever have been made, or how a demonstration could have been given to Eisenhower, Bradley, et al, until after the AVRE had begun to be issued - in April? And yet the claim that such an “offer” was made and “refused” (usually General Omar Bradley is the scapegoat) appears time after time. One may perhaps be forgiven for wondering how exactly the US forces were to have been organized, trained and equipped with AVRE when there was barely time for the British to complete such an organization. And one also may wonder where exactly these additional AVRE were to come from, since the numbers supplied were inadequate for equipping the British units already organized?

[JohnB]

Eisenhower's papers do remark about the DD demonstration of 27 January (and it did result in US production of DD kits, none of which were used in the invasion), but he does not mention any of the other Funnies,

 

Alan Brooke's diary entry for the 27th January

"Eisenhower met me at the station last night and we travelled up by special train through the night. Hobart collected us at 9 am and took us first to his HQ where he showed us his models, and his proposed assault organisation. We then went on to see various exhibits such as the Sherman tank for destroying tank mines, with chains on a drum driven by an engine, various methods of climbing walls with tanks, blowing up of minefields and walls, flame throwing Churchill tanks, wall destroying engineer parties, floating tanks, teaching men how to escape from sunken tanks, etc, etc. A most interesting day, and one which Eisenhower seemed to enjoy thoroughly. Hobart has been doing wonders in his present job and I am delighted that we put him into it."

[Rich]

Alan Brooke's diary entry for the 27th January

"Eisenhower met me at the station last night and we travelled up by special train through the night. Hobart collected us at 9 am and took us first to his HQ where he showed us his models, and his proposed assault organisation. We then went on to see various exhibits such as the Sherman tank for destroying tank mines, with chains on a drum driven by an engine, various methods of climbing walls with tanks, blowing up of minefields and walls, flame throwing Churchill tanks, wall destroying engineer parties, floating tanks, teaching men how to escape from sunken tanks, etc, etc. A most interesting day, and one which Eisenhower seemed to enjoy thoroughly. Hobart has been doing wonders in his present job and I am delighted that we put him into it."

133046[/snapback]

 

Yes, fine. The Sherman Crab was a development of the well-known Matilda Baron and Crab, so I am unsure what "new" vehicle beyond the DD was demonstrated. He also "demonstrated" methods, not existing vehicles for "climbing walls" and "blowing up" walls. Hobart also displayed "models" and a "proposed" organization - in other words at that time the actually functioning vehicles and an actual assault organization did not exist, confirmation of what is said in the 1st Assault Brigade War Diary.

 

And, BTW, where is the "offer" and the "refusal" in this account?

[JohnB]

Yes, fine. The Sherman Crab was a development of the well-known Matilda Baron and Crab, so I am unsure what "new" vehicle beyond the DD was demonstrated. He also "demonstrated" methods, not existing vehicles for "climbing walls" and "blowing up" walls. Hobart also displayed "models" and a "proposed" organization - in other words at that time the actually functioning vehicles and an actual assault organization did not exist, confirmation of what is said in the 1st Assault Brigade War Diary.

 

133062[/snapback]

 

Slow down a bit. Again from Delaforce's book (as in the previous account, on the demonstration of 27th Jan. '44)

 

"The AVREs were shown off by 617 Assault Squadron RE. Bill Wood in No. 2 Troop 'dropped a fascine in a ditch, took it [AVRE 2 Fox] in my stride, like a Grand National Runner, swung round to a pill box and as the demolition NCO opened the pannier door to place a Wade charge, I saw to my surprise, one of the observers was General Eisenhower...'"

 

On D-Day the actual availability of AVRE were SWORD Beach 34, JUNO Beach 47, and GOLD Beach 40, for a total of 121. This may be compared to the distribution as given in the Engineer Outline Plan (WO 205/1170), which were SWORD Beach 30, JUNO Beach 28, and GOLD Beach 44, for a total of 102. In other words 19 more AVRE were actually landed than were originally planned.

<snip>

For one thing by D-Day just 180 AVRE conversions had been completed, meaning that over two-thirds of those theoretically available were committed to the assault.

If the British had stuck with Engineer Outline Plan, it seems that the possibility of US forces having one-third of the AVREs is definitely ON, with a 15-20% reserve to cover vehicles unserviceable and replacements.

 

It appears incredible that, given these circumstances, any realistic “offer” of AVRE for use on the American beaches could ever have been made, or how a demonstration could have been given to Eisenhower, Bradley, et al, until after the AVRE had begun to be issued - in April? And yet the claim that such an “offer” was made and “refused” (usually General Omar Bradley is the scapegoat) appears time after time. One may perhaps be forgiven for wondering how exactly the US forces were to have been organized, trained and equipped with AVRE when there was barely time for the British to complete such an organization. And one also may wonder where exactly these additional AVRE were to come from, since the numbers supplied were inadequate for equipping the British units already organized?

 

Well AVREs were certainly in existence before April (without the Petard?) and there were enough Churchills knocking about in England to train the crews and maintenance people. I am certain if Bradley has actually asked for AVREs for US forces the request would not have been refused, regardless of whether the British had 'enough' for their own organisation.

[Rich]

Slow down a bit.    Again from Delaforce's book (as in the previous account, on the demonstration of 27th Jan. '44)

 

"The AVREs were shown off by 617 Assault Squadron RE. Bill Wood in No. 2 Troop 'dropped a fascine in a ditch, took it [AVRE 2 Fox] in my stride, like a Grand National Runner, swung round to a pill box and as the demolition NCO opened the pannier door to place a Wade charge, I saw to my surprise, one of the observers was General Eisenhower...'"

133082[/snapback]

 

Sorry, but I'm afraid I remain sceptical as to how many AVRE - of any flavor - were available for issue by 27 January 1944. The Brigade History is quite clear that regular issues to the assault squadrons preparing for the invasion did not occur until early April and even those were delivered with many unarmed. The various specialty equipments were still being rounded up and mounted as of the day the brigade closed in the embarkation areas.

 

If the British had stuck with Engineer Outline Plan, it seems that the possibility of US forces having one-third of the AVREs is definitely ON, with a 15-20% reserve to cover vehicles unserviceable and replacements.

133082[/snapback]

 

Well, in theory if we assume that all 180 AVRE completed through 1 June were in the hands of troops, then we could also assume that the US forces having one-third (well, 32.77777 percent ) was ON, but then where are the residues and reserves for 1st Assault Brigade to come from?

 

Well AVREs were certainly in existence before April (without the Petard?) and there were enough Churchills knocking about in England to train the crews and maintenance people. I am certain if Bradley has actually asked for AVREs for US forces the request would not have been refused, regardless of whether the British had 'enough' for their own organisation.

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It appears that the evidence is that they were in existence in mock up and prototype before April, but were unavailable for general issue and training until April. And the "number of Churchills knocking about in England" that were actually delivered to the brigade for familiarization and for use as those prototype testbeds was 36, i.e., six for each of the first six squadrons as initially organized, and three for each of the 12 squadrons as finally organized in October 1943. That's getting a little thin.

 

And this all still doesn't answer the question as to whether a "request" was ever made - from either side - or ever refused? Frankly, I still think that the evidence points to there having been barely enough AVRE conversions completed to meet actual requirements for the British beaches in the assault, with a few left over for the reserve squadrons to train and fimilarize themselves on while awaiting actual equipping. This of course could be more definitely answered if we could locate the actual monthly completion figures for the conversions rather than the total completed through 1 June. Sadly, like many British production data, they remain ephemeral.

[Colin Williams]

Rich,

 

We know Monty became familiar with the "funnies" after his return from the Med. We also know that Eisenhower saw them about the same time, specifically on January 27th. We have to assume Bradley saw at least the DD tanks at some point as I can't believe he would have used them in the assault without familiarizing himself with them first. Considering that Ike saw most or all of the "funnies" at one place and time and not just the DDs, it is logical to assume Bradley received the same treatment, particularly as that is the most straightforward interpretation of Hobart's comments in 1946. Assuming the Bradley show happened at some unknown date, the question is (a) whether the other "funnies" were offered and ( if so, whether they were turned down for legitimate reasons (e.g. the training issue cited in Wilmot).

 

Even if the Wilmot/Hobart story is 100% true, the validity of the training excuse depends entirely on the timing, which we don't know. On the other hand, the lack of available AVREs does not necessarily mean the offer was not made, or if made, was not legitimate. For example, in January Hobart and company may well have believed they would have sufficient AVREs to provide Bradley with 1/3 by early June.

 

Finally, the limited number of tanks provided for training is not inconsistent with British practice I've found in a number of unit war diaries. When transitioning to a new tank, the most common circumstances seemed to be for a handful to arrive for training, followed some time later by a ramp up to full unit complement. Whether in every case this reflected limited availability or simply the belief that a unit needed only a small number for familiarization, I can't begin to speculate.

[BillB]

Rich, I'll have rummage and see if I can come up with where I saw the Bradley comment. I must have seen it somewhere or I would not have put it in.

 

Good topic BTW.

 

BillB

[Rich]

Assuming the Bradley show happened at some unknown date, the question is (a) whether the other "funnies" were offered and ( if so, whether they were turned down for legitimate reasons (e.g. the training issue cited in Wilmot).

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Exactly! And to date I haven't seen much in the original WO documentation to lead me to think they were "offered" - at least in any concrete way such as "we can give you X number to beginning training on Y day and have an addtional X1 available by Y1." And yet AFAICS ever since Wilmot everybody simply assumes that is exactly what happened, but that poor dumb colonial Bradley/Eisenhower was too ignorant to take us up on the offer.

 

Even if the Wilmot/Hobart story is 100% true, the validity of the training excuse depends entirely on the timing, which we don't know.

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Again I agree completely. But also again, all evidence points to the fact that the timing was extremelly tight, as it was in every aspect of OVERLORD-NEPTUNE.

 

On the other hand, the lack of available AVREs does not necessarily mean the offer was not made, or if made, was not legitimate. For example, in January Hobart and company may well have believed they would have sufficient AVREs to provide Bradley with 1/3 by early June.

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This could also quite probably be true. But if so, it again invalidates the rather simplistic assumption that it was Ludditism or sheer willfulness that scotched the plan.

 

Finally, the limited number of tanks provided for training is not inconsistent with British practice I've found in a number of unit war diaries.

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Yes, and the same occurred with American and German (and I expect, Soviet) units when transitioning to new units. But the fact that it appears that 36 gun-armed Churchill's were all that 1st Assault Brigade had available for familiarization and developing the new systems, until the actual conversions began to arrive less than two months prior to the invasion is what catches my eye. That again points to a very tight schedule for getting these units operational.

 

And, BTW, in the same vein, there is no indication that any of the squadrons participating at D-Day ever took part in a full dress exercise with their AVRE. That is, I am not sure that any of them had ever loaded onto an LCT, sailed about, landed on a beach, and attempted to get their vehicles off and onto a simulated obstacle barrier. What makes that so striking is the number of accounts of AVRE on D-Day that became jammed in their LCT and either landed late or never landed at all. I haven't finished going through them yet, but the number does appear to be rather large. Could that be associated with the hurried nature of their preparation?

[Rich]

Rich, I'll have rummage and see if I can come up with where I saw the Bradley comment. I must have seen it somewhere or I would not have put it in.

 

Good topic BTW.

 

BillB

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Thanks, it does give a break from the run of the mill "what if Napoleon had had a B52 at Waterloo" thread eh?

[Colin Williams]

And, BTW, in the same vein, there is no indication that any of the squadrons participating at D-Day ever took part in a full dress exercise with their AVRE. That is, I am not sure that any of them had ever loaded onto an LCT, sailed about, landed on a beach, and attempted to get their vehicles off and onto a simulated obstacle barrier. What makes that so striking is the number of accounts of AVRE on D-Day that became jammed in their LCT and either landed late or never landed at all. I haven't finished going through them yet, but the number does appear to be rather large. Could that be associated with the hurried nature of their preparation?

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A couple of things have come to light. First, while looking around on the web I found this narrative from A.E. Younger, commander of 26 Assault Squadron, Royal Engineers, - http://search.eb.com/normandy/pri/Q00341.html

 

Here is the most relevant part - "We were all very new to driving tanks around. To start with, we had to practice the launching, the command of tanks, use of wireless, keeping together, and so on. Then we started to do assault landings, both to get to know the naval people who would take us and also to do some practice in that type of warfare, which none of us had ever done before. And we did the first of these in the winter in Scotland, two quite major assaults on beaches along the coast there. The Navy took us somewhere out into the North Sea in mid-winter--it wasn't a particularly attractive experience--and then back towards the coast during the night. We landed about dawn on some isolated beach, area of Elgin. Most of these were pretty catastrophic exercises; all sorts of things went wrong. Vehicles broke down. Coming off a landing craft when the sea is rough isn't particularly easy, and sometimes we'd get an AVRE broken down in the entrance of the landing craft, and it had to be towed off, and so on. Everything that you can think of went wrong. But we were learning all the time and getting better. And by the time D-Day came around, we were really quite good."

 

Second, is material from Fletcher's Universal Tank. Fletcher mentions that design work on an Engineering Tank began in 1942, with the early lessons of Dieppe in mind. A modified Churchill was used to deploy engineers during an exercise in February, 1943. A Churchill with a Petard was demonstrated at the same time. According to Fletcher "Some 700 Churchill Mark III and Mark IV were converted to AVREs, initially by REME workshops and subsequently by MG Cars of Abingdon using parts supplied by Cocksedge and Co. of Ipswich." (the palindrome of Bolton)

 

Fletcher also states that there was a plan to build Ram AVREs for Sherman units, but this was cancelled once it was realized that Rams were no longer being produced with side doors (a requirement).

 

In light of this I wonder if the REME AVREs were those available for training and experimentation before D-Day and the MG Car AVREs were those issued to units.