Falklands/malvinas And Argentine Bombs

[swerve]

"The airstrip was strategically vital for air reinforcement and supply. Without it, it would have been impossible for any of the air operations which were mounted to occur."

 

Only air operations conducted out of Ascension were

 

1) the Vulcan raid - which while a great psychological blow, didn't do much else.

2) air resupply AFTER the islands were retaken.

3) Nimrod recce - which was a non-essential precaution.

 

As has been said, the Task Force was essentially self-contained. No plane from Ascension could land on either carrier. How could they reinforce or supply a fleet at sea? Parachute drops? All equipment, supplies & troops were transported by ships, all Harrier & helicopter operations conducted from ships.

 

However, I agree about NATO. Ascension is, like the Falklands, outside NATOs area, which is precisely defined. So no NATO response would have occurred. A raid on Gibraltar, on the other hand . . . .

[Old Bunyip]

An interesting discussion. Correct me if I'm wrong but weren't there some aerial resupply missions done from Ascension before the Falkands were recaptured? Something to do with the Rapiers if I recall correctly. Also didn't some Harriers fly out from the UK, via Ascension during the campaign? I think they were replacements for aircraft lost on the Atlantic Conveyer.

[JOE BRENNAN]

Correct me if I'm wrong but weren't there some aerial resupply missions done from Ascension before the Falkands were recaptured?    Also didn't some Harriers fly out from the UK, via Ascension during the campaign?  I think they were replacements for aircraft lost on the Atlantic Conveyer.

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Yes C-130's flew 19 airdrop missions (listed in "Falklands the Air War" by Burden et al) before the end of hostilities, some before the landings, key personnel and equipment dropped into the sea and recovered.

 

All the RAF Harriers used in the conflict flew to Ascension from the UK. The first six seeing action rode south from Ascension on Atlantic Conveyor. 4 of those were eventually lost though none in the sinking of that ship. Then 4 more did fly in pairs directly from Ascension to Hermes in the combat zone with Vulcan tanking support. 4 went south from Ascension on Contender Bezant but were disembarked after the war ended.

 

On Argentines attacking Ascension seems a bit far fetched given their actual approach to the war which was mainly to hope for British non-reaction and negotiation over a fait accomplit in the Falklands, as well as their real capabilties and risk tolerance later displayed when it came to their ships. Even after the British did send the task force they seemed to count on a kind of semi-war ROE. A task force of any size moving all the way up to Ascension risked being intercepted by nuclear subs, they couldn't know all the locations of the subs or all the Brit intel sources of their TF's departure on such a long trip. And as mentioned by others it would then have opened up the whole South Atlantic and their whole coast to the war which followed, without any plausibility of complaining about British inhumanity (as they later did, unconvincingly enough as it was, about the Belgrano sinking). And though a pre-emtive attack on Ascension wouldn't have brought a "NATO reaction" per se it would have sealed immediate and unconditional US support for a British military counter move; something the Argentines also clearly hoped wouldn't be so.

 

Joe

Edited January 16, 2005 by JOE BRENNAN

[swerve]

I wasn't aware of the airdrop missions, or that the RAF Harriers had flown to Ascension ((I've just slapped my own wrists). However, I don't believe 4 RAF Harriers (the 6 that flew to Ascension & then went by ship wouldn't have been delayed by runway damage) decided the war, & I doubt the small amount of supplies & few personnel air dropped were decisive. The lack of a few critical components may have caused higher casualties, but I can't see it changing the overall result.

 

In any case, the UK could always have delayed the assault on the Falklands until Ascensions essential facilities were repaired. It would have been retaken if the Argentineans had succeeded in capturing it (unlikely), & raiders who stayed around long enough to cause serious damage would probably have had heavy losses on the way home from UK subs.

 

A large-scale raid or attempt to seize the island before invading the Falklands might have cost the Argentinean navy enough to cause them to call off the Falklands invasion. After all, the rationale for it was that it would be a political triumph with few casualties, to boost the popularity of the government. Full-scale war was not on the agenda, because it was rightly considered likely to result in defeat, & win or lose, too expensive.

 

So why do something you're sure will fail to achieve your desired goal? War is a political act: if the political aim is not achieved, the war is lost (cf Vietnam), regardless of who wins the battles.

[hojutsuka]

I recall reading that in some cases the problem was not that the bombs were duds, but that the Argentine pilots dropped them so close to the target that they didn't have time to arm.  Can anyone confirm or disprove this?  I'm no expert on aerial bombs and I don't have time to look for sources right now.

133389[/snapback]

No one else seem to have responded to this, so I will try.

 

As I understand it, the Argentinians were faced with a choice between bad alternatives. All bomb fuses have arming delays for safety reasons. You are correct that the Argentinian A-4's were bombing from such low altitudes that the bombs were hitting the targets before they armed, but if they had bombed from higher altitudes to give the bombs time to arm, they would have faced possibly heavy losses from the British AA missiles like Seawolf, Seacat, and Rapier. Reducing the arming delay would have caused the bombs to go off as the plane was overhead. The real solution was a high drag bomb like Snakeye so that the bomber can fly on the deck and still be clear of the area by the time the bomb hits, but the Argentinians did not have enough of them (Snakeye was used by the Skyhawks of 3rd Naval Fighter and Attack Escuadrilla in the attack on HMS Ardent, 21 May, according to Jeffrey Ethell and Alfred Price, "Air War South Atlantic").

 

Hojutsuka

[vardulli]

The Falklands Seminar

 

a pdf file

 

by coincedence I came across this today whilst googling for something else

Edited January 16, 2005 by vardulli

[Rickshaw]

I wasn't aware of the airdrop missions, or that the RAF Harriers had flown to Ascension ((I've just slapped my own wrists).

 

Old Bunyip beat to the point, it would seem.

 

However, I don't believe 4 RAF Harriers (the 6 that flew to Ascension & then went by ship wouldn't have been delayed by runway damage) decided the war, & I doubt the small amount of supplies & few personnel air dropped were decisive. The lack of a few critical components may have caused higher casualties, but I can't see it changing the overall result.

I believe Old Bunyip mentioned that one of the resupply missions was to do with the Rapiers. IIRC it was to do with their guidance systems. If that was true, it would have indeed have a deletorious effect on the campaign, if it had been unable to occur. While the lack of reinforcing Harriers would have made the attrition casualties the Harrier force did suffer, impossible to replace.

 

In any case, the UK could always have delayed the assault on the Falklands until Ascensions essential facilities were repaired. It would have been retaken if the Argentineans had succeeded in capturing it (unlikely), & raiders who stayed around long enough to cause serious damage would probably have had heavy losses on the way home from UK subs.

 

Perhaps. I didn't say they would get away scot free. Casualties are nice to avoid but as we've seen, the British recognised that a certain level had to be considered sustainable to achieve their objectives, so why couldn't the Argentines have similar calculations?

 

As to the delay, you are aware what the South Atlantic is like in winter? The British were working with a fairly narrow time window of about 1-2 months. Any delay caused by the damage/destruction of facilities at Ascension would have meant that it was likely that the campaign would have had to be delayed to the next year - which could well have sapped the British will to attempt to recover the islands from the Argentines - its a bit hard to keep fervour like that displayed by the Poms whipped up to that level for more than a few weeks/months.

 

A large-scale raid or attempt to seize the island before invading the Falklands might have cost the Argentinean navy enough to cause them to call off the Falklands invasion.

Why? All they needed in reality was a small ferry carrying a company of infantry.

 

On a less flippant note, the Argentines did rather apply a bit of a sledgehammer against the Falklands/Malvinas garrison, don't you think?

 

After all, the rationale for it was that it would be a political triumph with few casualties, to boost the popularity of the government. Full-scale war was not on the agenda, because it was rightly considered likely to result in defeat, & win or lose, too expensive.

 

Just goes to show what a bunch of tossers the Junta was, if they had such unreal expectations, particularly from a personality like that of Thatcher's. If one goes into war, one should go with the knowledge that casualties are unavoidable and that it will be expensive. Any other idea is pretty unrealistic in my opinion.

 

So why do something you're sure will fail to achieve your desired goal? War is a political act: if the political aim is not achieved, the war is lost (cf Vietnam), regardless of who wins the battles.

134570[/snapback]

 

 

I think you're assuming that will automatically fail. I am pointing that I accept that there is risk in adopting such a strategy. I believe that risk is outweighed by the benefits but I do not guarantee that it would work nor even necessarily it is the correct strategy to adopt. I merely believe it is a better one than the Argentines did use. It would seriously inconvenience the British and buy time for the Argentines. As to whether or not the Argentines would do any better after that point, all things being equal, I have no idea. I suspect not as the Junta did have unreal expectations as to both their ability to force the British to accept the invasion as a fait accompli and to limit the scope of the conflict (both politically and geographically).

[swerve]

Baron Samedi,

 

you really are missing the point.

 

"Casualties are nice to avoid but as we've seen, the British recognised that a certain level had to be considered sustainable to achieve their objectives, so why couldn't the Argentines have similar calculations?"

 

Quick & cheap (especially in casualties!) was essential to Galtieris strategy. You're confusing a military victory with a political victory. The UK & France won a military victory at Suez, all military objectives achieved easily - and lost the war, utterly, abjectly, humiliatingly. The USA won almost every battle in Vietnam, but lost the war. Why? Because they failed to achieve their political oobjectives. Galtieris political objective was to quell increasing dissent at home. Significant casualties would increase dissent. British submarines prowling off the coast, (NB. Argentinas exports mostly go out by sea). the Argentinean navy humiliatingly penned helplessly in port, a few unanswered raids on the coast - these would have brought him down pretty damn quick, & he knew it. He needed, absolutely needed, a short victorious war. If we'd not invaded until next spring (a few months, not until next year - the invasion was at the beginning of winter), but retaliated against the Argentinean mainland, which would have been universally considered perfectly legitimate if Argentina had chosen to open the war up by attacking Ascension, Galtieri was done for.

 

 

"On a less flippant note, the Argentines did rather apply a bit of a sledgehammer against the Falklands/Malvinas garrison, don't you think?"

 

Oh yes. And I also agree entirely with you about "what a bunch of tossers the Junta was, if they had such unreal expectations, particularly from a personality like that of Thatcher's". The only thing that can be said in their defence there is that they'd deliberately dropped hints beforehand & got responses which they thought meant they'd been understood & were being told the British government didn't give a damn about the Falklands. Thatchers withdrawal of full British citizenship from the islanders (they lost their automatic right of entry to the UK), plan to withdraw the patrol ship, & rejection of the economic development plan (which would have paid for itself in fishing licences) at the same time as the Junta made belligerent noises were all taken by them as evidence of British willingness to abandon the islands & islanders. People hear what they want to hear. What they didn't understand was that their hints hadn't even registered on Thatchers consciousness.

[Rickshaw]

Baron Samedi,

 

you really are missing the point.

 

"Casualties are nice to avoid but as we've seen, the British recognised that a certain level had to be considered sustainable to achieve their objectives, so why couldn't the Argentines have similar calculations?"

 

Quick & cheap (especially in casualties!) was essential to Galtieris strategy.

 

As I've noted, it was an unrealistic expectation, as I'm sure you're well aware.

 

You're confusing a military victory with a political victory. The UK & France won a military victory at Suez, all military objectives achieved easily - and lost the war, utterly, abjectly, humiliatingly. The USA won almost every battle in Vietnam, but lost the war. Why? Because they failed to achieve their political oobjectives.

Well, it all depends, particularly with regard to Vietnam what the political objectives were - they were never clearly defined or articulated. In fact there is one line of argument that the US didn't lose the Vietnam War, the Republic of South Vietnam did. While that might be a bit of a sop to most Americans, the reality is that the US had withdrawn and before it had withdrawn, it had forced its enemy to the negotiating table. The problem was that the US failed to win the peace - an all to common failing I would suggest with US governments and its military (viz. end of WWII, end of ODS, etc).

 

Returning to the Argentines, their political objective was the retaking of the Malvinas. Their problem was, they didn't really think about what the possible British response was, nor take into consideration that there even could be a response. Therefore I would suggest, as I have, that their strategy was flawed. My suggested alternative addresses the likelihood of a British military response and makes an attempt to hamstring it.

 

Galtieris political objective was to quell increasing dissent at home. Significant casualties would increase dissent. British submarines prowling off the coast, (NB. Argentinas exports mostly go out by sea). the Argentinean navy humiliatingly penned helplessly in port, a few unanswered raids on the coast - these would have brought him down pretty damn quick, & he knew it. He needed, absolutely needed, a short victorious war.

 

Galtieri needed to look at the past history of such efforts. Sukarno is a good example and he'd have realised that it was more likely to fail, rather than succeed.

 

If we'd not invaded until next spring (a few months, not until next year - the invasion was at the beginning of winter), but retaliated against the Argentinean mainland, which would have been universally considered perfectly legitimate if Argentina had chosen to open the war up by attacking Ascension, Galtieri was done for.

Perhaps. However, one wonders if the British public would have been happy with the waging of even restricted submarine warfare against Argentina, considering the divisions which appeared over the Belgrano. One wonders if we'd have seen, as during Konfrantasi, with the Oberons, the hurried unearthing of old deck guns and their being welded onto the top of SSNK hulls?

 

"On a less flippant note, the Argentines did rather apply a bit of a sledgehammer against the Falklands/Malvinas garrison, don't you think?"

 

Oh yes. And I also agree entirely with you about "what a bunch of tossers the Junta was, if they had such unreal expectations, particularly from a personality like that of Thatcher's". The only thing that can be said in their defence there is that they'd deliberately dropped hints beforehand & got responses which they thought meant they'd been understood & were being told the British government didn't give a damn about the Falklands. Thatchers withdrawal of full British citizenship from the islanders (they lost their automatic right of entry to the UK), plan to withdraw the patrol ship, & rejection of the economic development plan (which would have paid for itself in fishing licences) at the same time as the Junta made belligerent noises were all taken by them as evidence of British willingness to abandon the islands & islanders. People hear what they want to hear. What they didn't understand was that their hints hadn't even registered on Thatchers consciousness.

134889[/snapback]

 

Yeah, well, as Saddam found with his "hints" over Kuwait, what governments say at one point in time is not necessarily what politicians do late, when they sniff political advantage in the air.

[swerve]

Baron, we agree that the Argentinean strategy was utterly unrealistic. Absolutely no argument there. Where we differ is that you suggest that a way out of that for them was to abandon the strategy & adopt a more agressive one, while I think that would have been even more stupid, & their only sane option was not to go to war at all. Shall we leave it at that? Except for one quibble -

 

"Returning to the Argentines, their political objective was the retaking of the Malvinas."

 

I'd say that was the means chosen to achieve their primary political objective, which was getting popular support for the armed forces & hence the military government. Of course, it'd also achieve an aim many of the military considered worthwhile for its own sake, & which was immensely popular within Argentina, the return of the islands to Argentina. But that was why it was chosen as the means.

[cheese possessed]

And I'll agree to leave it there apart from maintaining the Argies were not "re-taking the Malvinas".......

[Rickshaw]

Baron, we agree that the Argentinean strategy was utterly unrealistic. Absolutely no argument there. Where we differ is that you suggest that a way out of that for them was to abandon the strategy & adopt a more agressive one, while I think that would have been even more stupid, & their only sane option was not to go to war at all. Shall we leave it at that? Except for one quibble -

 

"Returning to the Argentines, their political objective was the retaking of the Malvinas."

 

I'd say that was the means chosen to achieve their primary political objective, which was getting popular support for the armed forces & hence the military government. Of course, it'd also achieve an aim many of the military considered worthwhile for its own sake, & which was immensely popular within Argentina, the return of the islands to Argentina. But that was why it was chosen as the means.

135747[/snapback]

 

No real disagreement. I think where we differ is that you are assuming the role of Galtieri whereas I'm assuming that of someone a little further down the heirachy who is handed the brief, "take the Malvinas back and stop the British from retaking them!" In otherwords, the decision to attack has been made, I'm just looking for a better strategy which will ensure the success of the mission. If that means being more aggressive, then so be it. Oh, and to add to that, I'd not have bothered with South Georgia, either (although upon reflection, its importance as a transhipping point for the big liners was greater than its actual strategic value to the Argentines).

[cheese possessed]

I've studied the campaign from all angles, and honestly can't see any way that the Argentines could have achieved any sort of decisive military advantage: whichever way you look at it, UK is/was a vastly more powerful combatant, with a full range of true strategic capabilities - only a fraction of which were brought to bear. Argentina was a very small second/third world country, with almost no capability outside its territorial waters. Given the geography of the campaign, Argentina would have needed a serious blue-water navy (e.g. like France or China) to have a made a go of it.

 

The end result may have varied in terms of time and casualty lists, but it would always have been the same result.

 

Argentina could conceivably won the campaign politically - taking advantage of a UK Foreign Office desperate to rid itself of dependant territories, a US government which could have been persuaded to strong-arm UK to "de-colonise" in the interest of keeping its right-wing client in Argentina, etc. Ironically, Argentina was well on the road to taking economic possession of the Falklands - it ran the air links, shipping links and most of the trade outlets. A better strategy might have been to push "settlers" into the Falklands - Argentines did have free access pre-war - and build a demographic weapon there. This might have led to "joint sovereignty", and then to eventual transfer (look what UK Govts are trying to do to get rid of Gibralter!!!),

[swerve]

No real disagreement.  I think where we differ is that you are assuming the role of Galtieri whereas I'm assuming that of someone a little further down the heirachy who is handed the brief, "take the Malvinas back and stop the British from retaking them!"   In otherwords, the decision to attack has been made, I'm just looking for a better strategy which will ensure the success of the mission.  If that means being more aggressive, then so be it. 

 

From that viewpoint, your musings are logical. But I think your lower level officer had probably been given a brief which excluded such options.

 

Ironically, Argentina was well on the road to taking economic possession of the Falklands - it ran the air links, shipping links and most of the trade outlets. A better strategy might have been to push "settlers" into the Falklands - Argentines did have free access pre-war - and build a demographic weapon there. This might have led to "joint sovereignty", and then to eventual transfer (look what UK Govts are trying to do to get rid of Gibralter!!!),

 

 

True. e.g. the oil storage tanks in Stanley belonged to YPF, who supplied all heating oil, petrol & diesel to the islands - at a loss. The islands economy was heavily subsidised by Argentina, & so many islanders had moved to Argentina (the population had been declining due to emigration since the 1930s - some to the UK, more to Argentina) that in 1980-81 there were more Argentinean residents with Falkland island ancestry than resident islanders.

 

The chief obstacle to a "demographic weapon" was the lack of incentive for imigrants. No jobs! Moving in Argentinean government employees was too obviously a takeover ploy, & private industry wasn't interested. However, quietly continuing, perhaps ramping up a bit, the integration of the islands into the mainland economy could well have worked eventually. A few rich sheep farmers might have been induced to diversify into the Falkland islands, & some fishing boats to register in Stanley. When there are 1000 islanders (it was heading that way - 1600 permanent residents & falling fast in 1981) & 500 work for Argentineans, what happens next?

 

Too late now.

Edited January 20, 2005 by swerve