Did Bomber Command Lose Its War?

[Ivanhoe]

As a side not for those advocates of CAS in lieu of SBC.  Isn't one of the faults many find of the 3rd Reich, the lack of strategic vision, in part evidenced by concentrating almost exclusively on tactical as opposed to strategic aircraft? 

 

That drum gets beat pretty often, but I believe its a weak argument. The Allies could engage in strategic warfare while somewhat neglecting tactical proficiency, simply because of our massive resources. We could play for a tactical draw, so to speak, until the Axis was weakened enough to assure a victory for the Allies' killshot. Germany, on the other hand, needed tactical dominance because its economic machine was going to get steamrolled by the Allied economies in a strategic (read logistic) war.

 

This is all hindsight, of course; I would expect that German economists in the mid/late 1930s projected substantial domestic GNP growth thru the projected war, versus assumptions of weak growth in Britain and America.

 

How does, or when does, Britain, with a defensive tactical airforce figure out how to switch gears to an offensive strategic force?  Or perhaps you're suggesting it does not.  In any case, how can you be sure that concentrating on CAS wouldn't have some unintended consequence, perhaps even initiated by Germany?

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Nothing would have required Britain's tactical air force to be defensive, in fact CAS and light/medium interdiction are maybe most effective on the offensive. As for unintended consequences, of course nobody can be sure. All we can do is argue a case with data and analysis; there's no right or wrong, which is why so many thousands of enthusiasts are still fighting WWII.

[hojutsuka]

Well, actually I would have thought that the logic in my post made a clear enough argument

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While I expect that the Mossie will do better, there are some factors that need to be considered:

 

1. Loss of Window efficiency. The heavies can carry more Window, and a larger crew to toss it out continuously. The navigator in a Mossie will be seriously overworked if he has to Window throughout a mission.

 

2. To balance somewhat against 1, a much smaller radar signature and faster cruise.

 

3. Higher losses over target simply because of larger number of aircraft. Includes higher losses to collision and own bombs.

 

4. Higher non-operational losses. The Mossie was not an easy plane to fly for pilots with less experience IIRC. Single-engine control speed was quite high.

 

5. Targeting. LNSF was essentially harassment force, so did not need this, but an all Mossie force will need some form of targeting. Clearly Mossies could do the initial target marking using visual or OBOE; PFF used Mossies for this later in the war. But can Mossies carry enough TIs to keep the marking clear? Especially as the increased number of aircraft might mean that the target must be marked for longer. What to do beyond OBOE? Mossies can't carry H2S.

 

6. Electronic support aircraft, jammers and deception radio aircraft of 101 Squadron will need to be heavies since Mossies clearly cannot carry the equipment and crew. But now the ES aircraft can't keep up with the Mossies, making it difficult to provide continuous coverage and making the ES aircraft more vulnerable.

 

Any comments by the knowlegeable people on the forum will be appreciated!

 

Hojutsuka

[Tony Williams]

A few responses.

 

While I expect that the Mossie will do better, there are some factors that need to be considered:

 

1. Loss of Window efficiency.  The heavies can carry more Window, and a larger crew to toss it out continuously.  The navigator in a Mossie will be seriously overworked if he has to Window throughout a mission.

 

The Germans developed an answer to Window - the Wűrz-Laus switch which was effectively a moving target indicator, allowing the radar to separate out the bombers from the Window. In any case, blocking or deceiving the radar is a much more important issue for a big, slow target than for a small, fast one. And automatic Window machines were developed which chopped off and ejected the foil as required. I'm not sure if they were available in WW2, but if the need arose...

 

3. Higher losses over target simply because of larger number of aircraft.  Includes higher losses to collision and own bombs.

I doubt it. BC crews were initially concerned about such matters when the concept of close bomber streams was introduced, so Operational Research did an analysis and demonstrated that the statistical risk of such events was too low to be an issue. It probably happened far more often to the day bombers, which attacked all together in dense groups rather than a long stream.

 

5. Targeting.  LNSF was essentially harassment force, so did not need this, but an all Mossie force will need some form of targeting.  Clearly Mossies could do the initial target marking using visual or OBOE;  PFF used Mossies for this later in the war.  But can Mossies carry enough TIs to keep the marking clear?  Especially as the increased number of aircraft might mean that the target must be marked for longer.  What to do beyond OBOE?  Mossies can't carry H2S.

 

The B Mk IX could, and did, carry H2S Mk VI - as well as a 4,000lb bomb.

 

The RAF's fully developed night bombing techniques didn't necessarily require continuous marking, as a Master Bomber cruised around telling each incoming bomber where to place their bombs relative to the growing conflagration.

 

6. Electronic support aircraft, jammers and deception radio aircraft of 101 Squadron will need to be heavies since Mossies clearly cannot carry the equipment and crew.  But now the ES aircraft can't keep up with the Mossies, making it difficult to provide continuous coverage and making the ES aircraft more vulnerable.

 

See my response above re. Window. It was the heavy bomber streams which needed as much protection as they could get. In any case, I don't see why the Mossie couldn't carry the jamming and deception equipment required; the one thing they couldn't easily do was carry an extra German-speaking crew member to send false messages.

 

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[Tony Williams]

To move back for a moment onto a previous discussion in this thread - on the differences between the RAF and USAAF approaches to the strategic bombing of Germany.

 

I have just finished reading the latest proceedings of the RAF Historical Association, of which I am a member. They have seminars each year on specific topics, and publish the transcripts of both the presentations and the discussion. These often make fascinating reading, because the speakers are not only the best and most serious historians of the subjects, but the audiences are heavily RAF or ex-RAF, and include many people who knew the famous individuals being discussed (incidentally, the meetings are't exclusively British - they had the German historian Horst Boog there recently). The latest proceedings include a long session of the Bomber Command Association (I think that's the right title) specifically on the above subject. Some of the contributors to the discussion were survivors of WW2 BC.

 

A few snippets caught my eye. One concerned the USAAF's bombing raids on Germany. We all know that precision bombing, whether by night or day, was only possible if you could see the target. Blind bombing using electronic aids was by definition area bombing, as the CEP was a mile or more. Yet our lovely weather over NW Europe was such that during the whole period from September 1944 to April 1945, the USAAF bombers were only able to utilise visual bombing for 30 percent of their raids. In other words, 70% of the time they bombed blind - by definition, area bombing.

 

There was some more on this subject, basically concluding that the greatest difference between USAAF and RAF bombing, certainly in the later phases of the war, was in the presentation. The USAAF would say that they attacked a communications centre or factory in a given town, while neglecting to mention that they flattened the town in the process. The RAF would be more likely to say that they hit the town, which had factories and a communications centre. One gets described as a precision attack, the other area bombing, but the inhabitants of the town wouldn't have known the difference.

 

Another fascinating contribution came from a member of the crews from 617 Squadron which sank the Tirpitz. It was a difficult target, tucked underneath high cliffs and surrounded by smoke generators which rapidly obscured the target at the first sign of attack. On the day of the successful raid, they achieved surprise and the first nine bombers had a clear view of the target. They dropped their 12,000lb Tallboy bombs and scored two direct hits and three very near misses, which in combination capsised the ship. Not bad precision from 15,000 feet.

 

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[Tony Williams]

Tony, sounds like interesting transcripts. Do they do much on the coldwar, particularly the V force?

 

Very probably - there are more than 30 volumes of them...

 

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[Colin Williams]

I asked my grandmother about that a year ago and IIRC she at least found the V1 much more trying. With the V2 there was nothing to be done, it couldn't be heard approaching. The V1 on the other hand had that nasty approach sound and people would listen waiting for it to cut off, whereupon there was just enough time to dive under a table, etc.

 

The blast effect from the V1 was also horrific, from what I understand worse than the V2 as it was all on the surface. Houses were damaged for considerable distance around the actual impact zone. The closest hit she remembered was quite a long way away and the blast still bulged in all the windows in the house.

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Interesting insight Paul. I'll have to look into this more.

[Colin Williams]

I can think of three ways to look at the effectiveness of the RAF strategic bombing campaign.

 

First is whether the effort expended in terms of aircraft, personnel, ordnance, supplies, research and development, etc. equalled or exceeded the effort expended by the Germans in defensive measures plus the losses by the Germans in production, personnel, etc. I don't know if anyone can answer this definitively for Bomber Command alone, but while the SBC as a whole wasn't a war-winner, it certainly seems that, on balance, the expended resources were at least in the neighborhood of German losses.

 

Second is whether the cost of Bomber Command, successful or not in the balance above, could have been more helpful to the war effort if redirected to other efforts either in whole or part. Given Britain's limited strategic options in 1940-43, I don't see how more than a fraction of Bomber Command's resources could have been deployed in other useful ways. Certainly Coastal Command could have benefitted from more and better aircraft, but even if by some miracle Bomber Command's resources were transformed into CAS aircraft and a larger army I don't see where those additional assets could have been deployed in any effective way before 1944.

 

Third, and I think most important, is the question of whether the British SBC achieved some results of significance in winning the war. In other words, given the limited options available to Britain and the Allies in 1940-43, did the actions of Bomber Command help advance the war effort? In 1941-43 the key problems facing the Allies were (1) diverting German forces and resources away from Russia, (2) weakening the German war machine, (3) defeating the U-boats, (4) building up American forces for the opening of a Second Front. From my perspective, the SBC was about the only way, outside of the relatively modest effects on the Germans of the North African campaign and the commando raids in Europe, of making progress in (1) and (2). For all the embarrassing mistakes of the early years and the heavy losses throughout, the SBC diverted German resources to air defense and weakened German war production. Although Albert Speer's accomplishments in rejuvenating German war production in 1944 are often cited as highlighting the failure of the SBC, I shudder to think what Speer would have accomplished if the damage had been far less, or what problems the Allies would have encountered both West and East if the Luftwaffe had been more powerful and the thousands of men and hundreds of guns deveoted to air defense had been deployed in support of ground forces.

[Guest aevans]

Ooooh...now you've done it...

[PONGO_7409]

I can think of three ways to look at the effectiveness of the RAF strategic bombing campaign.

 

First is whether the effort expended in terms of aircraft, personnel, ordnance, supplies, research and development, etc. equalled or exceeded the effort expended by the Germans in defensive measures plus the losses by the Germans in production, personnel, etc. I don't know if anyone can answer this definitively for Bomber Command alone, but while the SBC as a whole wasn't a war-winner, it certainly seems that, on balance, the expended resources were at least in the neighborhood of German losses.

 

Second is whether the cost of Bomber Command, successful or not in the balance above, could have been more helpful to the war effort if redirected to other efforts either in whole or part. Given Britain's limited strategic options in 1940-43, I don't see how more than a fraction of Bomber Command's resources could have been deployed in other useful ways. Certainly Coastal Command could have benefitted from more and better aircraft, but even if by some miracle Bomber Command's resources were transformed into CAS aircraft and a larger army I don't see where those additional assets could have been deployed in any effective way before 1944.

 

Third, and I think most important, is the question of whether the British SBC achieved some results of significance in winning the war. In other words, given the limited options available to Britain and the Allies in 1940-43, did the actions of Bomber Command help advance the war effort? In 1941-43 the key problems facing the Allies were (1) diverting German forces and resources away from Russia, (2) weakening the German war machine, (3) defeating the U-boats, (4) building up American forces for the opening of a Second Front. From my perspective, the SBC was about the only way, outside of the relatively modest effects on the Germans of the North African campaign and the commando raids in Europe, of making progress in (1) and (2). For all the embarrassing mistakes of the early years and the heavy losses throughout, the SBC diverted German resources to air defense and weakened German war production. Although Albert Speer's accomplishments in rejuvenating German war production in 1944 are often cited as highlighting the failure of the SBC, I shudder to think what Speer would have accomplished if the damage had been far less, or what problems the Allies would have encountered both West and East if the Luftwaffe had been more powerful and the thousands of men and hundreds of guns deveoted to air defense had been deployed in support of ground forces.

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Excellent summary. I have also often wondered what would have happened if the Germans could have deployed the hundreds of thousand of Flak crew and their guns to the East., or Normandy.

 

Would have made quite a PAK Front.

 

Does anyone have a count of 88's deployed on Flak duty in homeland defense ? . . Must have been a huge number.

[KingSargent]

DK Tanker:

"As a side not for those advocates of CAS in lieu of SBC. Isn't one of the faults many find of the 3rd Reich, the lack of strategic vision, in part evidenced by concentrating almost exclusively on tactical as opposed to strategic aircraft?"

 

The Luftwaffe was designed as a strategic bomber force. The problem was that the strategy at time of inception (1935-6) was purely Central European. The LW's twin-engine bombers had all the range necessary to hit strategic targets in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and France. Had the war been a reprise of WW1 as so many expected, that would have been their role.

 

The Germans certainly used their bombers for tactical support, but except for the Stukas they were not designed as CAS a/c. Doing effective ground attack with a single flexibly-mounted forward-firing MG is difficult.

[Guest phil gollin]

A couple of points :

 

RAF CAS in 1940 even with decent aircraft which didn't exist would have required more fighters. There were more fighters available, but they weren't sent to France because they were kept for UK defence. The RAF of 1939/40 didn't have any "heavies". It had the Wellington and some other even less impressive mediums and large numbers of "lights". (Never too sure what the lights were really meant for).

 

One thing that I can't get tied down is the supposition that the USAAF day raids blooded the Luftwaffe. I have seen claims that this is correct, I have seen claims that it was the Eastern Front, neither seems to refute the other's position. The Eastern Front people point out that the 1943 USAAF raid did not cause large losses to the Luftwaffe (indeed the boot seems to be on the other foot) and that it was in 1943 and early 1944 that large numbers of Luftwaffe fighters (including experienced pilots) were lost on the Eastern Front (admittedly causing greater losses on the Russians). When the USAAF strategic raids re-started in earnest after D-Day the German fighters not only had much fewr experienced pilots, but also reduced training.

 

There is lots of justifiable (even though with the benefit of hindsight) criticism of Bomber Command from the after the barge busting requirement until the beginnings of decent radio aids meant that at least area targets could be hit reasonably often, but what else should the RAF do ? At the very least they had to build the bombing force (and its infrastructure) and then what ? Better resources to Coastal Command and fighters (if free) to the Far East take some of the slack, but what else ?

[Paul F Jungnitsch]

Excellent summary.  I have also often wondered what would have happened if the Germans could have deployed the  hundreds of thousand of Flak crew and their guns to the East., or Normandy. 

 

Would have made quite a PAK Front.

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One German general was quoted with saying that if they had been able to echelon PAK guns in depth, there would have been no Cobra breakout. OTOH many home defense Flak were manned with prisoners of war, young boys and other people who were probably not well suited for frontline service. One aunt of mine for example ran AA searchlights apparently, not sure what kind of a PAK gunner she would have made.

 

About the bombing campaign, from what I can see it did do enough damage to be well worthwhile, but IMO it could have been much more effective by concentrating on oil, transportation, power generation, and U-boat killing than Harris's de-housing obsession.

 

IIRC power generation especially was a huge vulnerability apparently that was hardly touched.

[MiloMorai]

Luftwaffe Aircraft Losses By Theatre September 1943 - October 1944

 

Please examine the table and draw your own conclusions, but here are some highlights

 

1.

During the period in question, a constant 21-24% of the Luftwaffe's day fighters were based in the East - but only 12-14% of the Luftwaffe day fighter "losses" occurred in this theater.

 

2.

During this period, a constant 75-78% of the day fighters were based in the West. The turnover was enormous: 14,720 aircraft were "lost", while operational strength averaged 1364.

 

3.

During this period, 2294 day fighters were "lost" in the East; the ratio of western "losses" to eastern "losses" was thus 14,720/2294 = 6.4 to one.

 

4.

During this period, a constant 43-46% of all of the Luftwaffe's operational aircraft were based in the East. It should be noted that these included entire categories (for example, battlefield recce, battle planes, dive bombers) that were used exclusively in the East, because they couldn't survive in the West..

 

5.

During this period, a total of 8600 operational aircraft were "lost" in the East, while 27,060 were "lost" in the West; the ratio of western "losses" to eastern "losses" was thus 27,060/8600 = 3.41 to one.

 

 

from http://jg26.vze.com/

 

Please read the article under the heading 'Luftwaffe Aircraft Losses By Theatre September 1943 - October 1944'.

[Guest phil gollin]

Thank-you MiloMorai

[Tony Williams]

I can think of three ways to look at the effectiveness of the RAF strategic bombing campaign. (snip)

 

Agreed. Professor Richard Overy presented a paper on this issue at that Bomber Command Association Symposium reported to the RAF Historical Society, and finished off with the following:

 

"Bombing: The Balance Sheet

 

The effects of the bombing campaign went far beyond the mere physical destruction of factories and dwelling-houses, although these effects should not be underestimated in a complex and technically sophisticated industrial economy stretched taut by the demands of war. The bombing produced serious social dislocation and a high cost in terms of man-hours (or woman-hours in many cases). Evacuation, rehabilitation and welfare provision were carried out on the largest scale in an economy struggling with serious manpower losses and cuts in civilian production. Bombing also encouraged a strategic response from Hitler which placed a further strain on the war economy by diverting vast resources to projects of little advantage to the German war effort.

 

The net effect of the many ways in which bombing directly or indirectly impeded economic mobilisation cannot be calculated precisely. But in the absence of physical destruction and dislocation, vvithout expensive programmes for secret weapons and underground production and without the diversion of four-fifths of the fighter force, one-third of all guns and one-fifth of all ammunition to the anti-bombing war the German armed forces could have been supplied with at least 50% more equipment in the last two years of war, perhaps much more. In an environment entirely free of bomb attack the German authorities and German industrial managers would have had the opportunity to exploit Germany’s resource-rich empire in Europe to the full. In 1942 the air force had begun to plan the production of 7000 aircraft a month, yet at the peak in 1944 a little over 3000 were produced, of which one-quarter were destroyed before even reaching the front-line.

 

Bombing took the strategic initiative away from German forces, and compelled Germany to divert an ever-increasing share of its manpower and resources away from production for the battlefield. As it was, German forces proved a formidable barrier to the end of the war. With more men, more heavily armed, an intact transport system and an uninterrupted flow of industrial resources Germany might well have kept the Allies at bay in 1945. Then the Allies would have faced the agonising decision about whether or not to drop atomic weapons on German cities rather than on Hiroshima and Nagasaki."

 

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[Colin Williams]

BTT