Did Bomber Command Lose Its War?

[Brian Kennedy]

Not trying to start another Brit/US-bashing thread at all, but after cursory study of Bomber Command's history in WWII, it does seem like its efforts by-and-large failed, at least compared to the USAF. The British bombers sustained incredible losses to night-fighters, lost the Battle of Berlin, etc. Discuss?

 

Also, see http://www.yarchive.net/mil/bomber_command.html

[KingSargent]

I would say the US failed also, at least in the stated aims and promises of the Air Enthusiasts. Douhetian doctrine about bombing winning wars quickly and relatively cheaply by breaking enemy morale were thoroughly discredited, no matter who was on the giving and receiving ends.

 

This is not to say that there was no worth in the SBCs, but they failed to perform to promises and were incredibly costly in resources and expensively-trained manpower.

 

They did draw a lot of Axis resources from other activities (as in 88s used as AAA in Germany instead of AT guns in Russia), but they drew a lot of Allied resources as well. One example is Coastal Command, which was starved of ASW and anti-shipping strike a/c, when the obsolescent bombers that were deathtraps over Germany could have been used by Coastal Command to the great advantage of the Allies in the Battle of the Atlantic (and were, when they were finally withdrawn from the Bomber Offensive).

 

The difference of course is that the Allies had the resources to play Strategic Bomber after the US entry and the Axis never did have the resources for a Strategic Bombing Campaign.

 

The emphasis on Bomber Command by the RAF's Bomber Barons and the Air Ministry also led to a British neglect of Ground Support air power, and would have lost the UK the Battle of Britain if Hugh Dowding hadn't practically single-handedly built up Fighter Command against opposition from the Bomber Barons of the Air Staff and the Air Ministry. In that respect, Bomber Command was a negative influence on the British war effort.

 

However Bomber Command was the only way the UK had of striking the Axis from mid-1940 to mid-1942, and they at least showed that Britain was not going to give up.

 

Things might have gone better without Bomber Command, but only if the British made a whole lot of correct decisions (and no blunders) as to what to do with the resources freed if Bomber Command did not exist.

[Lev]

Not trying to start another Brit/US-bashing thread at all, but after cursory study of Bomber Command's history in WWII, it does seem like its efforts by-and-large failed, at least compared to the USAF. The British bombers sustained incredible losses to night-fighters, lost the Battle of Berlin, etc. Discuss?

 

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Bomber Command laid waste to most of Germany, so it wasn't a total waste.

 

Also a comparison with the USAF is by neccesity skewed, the USAF only started regularly operating over Germany when escort was available. Bomber Command simply couldn't wait 3 years before mounting operations against germany.

[Lev]

One example is Coastal Command, which was starved of ASW and anti-shipping strike a/c, when the obsolescent bombers that were deathtraps over Germany could have been used by Coastal Command to the great advantage of the Allies in the Battle of the Atlantic (and were, when they were finally withdrawn from the Bomber Offensive).

 

Coastal Command started getting ex-BC planes as early as 1940, and given the modest size of Bomber Command I don't think they could have siphoned off more planes from Bomber Command without effectively terminating Bomber Command.

 

The emphasis on Bomber Command by the RAF's Bomber Barons and the Air Ministry also led to a British neglect of Ground Support air power, and would have lost the UK the Battle of Britain if Hugh Dowding hadn't practically single-handedly built up Fighter Command against opposition from the Bomber Barons of the Air Staff and the Air Ministry. In that respect, Bomber Command was a negative influence on the British war effort.

 

Makes you wonder who appointed Dowding and gave him the power to do those things.

Also I seriously doubt that not having Bomber Command would mean more attention to ground support, this wasn't a particular obvious way to go. Nor do I see any obvious candidates for ground support planes (maybe a Fairey Battle replacement?).

[swerve]

Bomber Command laid waste to most of Germany, so it wasn't a total waste.

 

But a great deal of the laying waste occured in the last few months of the war, & most of that was militarily pointless. From February to April 1945, Bomber Command & the USAAF had far more resources than targets, but leaving bombers idle when there was a war on wasn't even considered. A lot of Germany was flattened just to keep the bombers busy. That was a total waste.

 

The air war caused the collapse of German military production, eventually, but not until the Wehrmacht was already fighting on German territory. I think that more resources for Coastal Command, Fighter Command, naval air, a lot more for close air support & a lot less for Bomber Command would have been better. I'm no expert, but it looks to me as if the RAF was a late convert to close air support. Fighter Command saw its job as shooting down planes, Bomber Command saw its as doing Douhets thing & bombing cities in the blithe expectation that armies would collapse when bombs had wrecked the country behind them. Both neglected CAS - much to the detriment of the army. With good CAS more fighter cover, maybe the faults on the ground wouldn't have been fatal in 1940.

[swerve]

Also I seriously doubt that not having Bomber Command would mean more attention to ground support, this wasn't a particular obvious way to go. Nor do I see any obvious candidates for ground support planes (maybe a Fairey Battle replacement?).

 

Why not? It was obvious to the Germans. And CAS had proved itself in WW1, so it should have been obvious to the RAF. It was only the RAFs determination not to be subordinated to the army or navy that led to its neglect of CAS, along with naval aviation (including Coastal Command). It was a bloody obvious way to go, unless you were of the "We're the RAF: we're independent, we have our own aims, we'll win any war by bombing, we will not get involved with those khaki people" persuasion. Unfortunately, they were in charge.

 

As for a plane - well, depends on when you start. If CAS had proper attention by 1934 or 1935, there would have been time to develop adequate ground attack planes by the time they were needed.

[Tony Williams]

I think it's generally accepted that strategic bombing failed to deliver on its promises, although as KingSargent says it was politically important in 1940-42 in showing that the UK wasn't giving up, and in 1943 to prove to the Russians that we were doing something to help them (and thereby staving off pressure for an early D-day).

 

One positive aspect of the US daylight bombing offensive, once they had long-range escort fighters available, was that it sucked in the Luftwaffe fighters and resulted in them being so badly mauled that they were able to do little about helping to resist the Allied advances into Europe.

 

I also agree with KS that one disadvantage of the strategic bombing emphasis in the RAF was a deliberate downplaying of any other roles which might detract from this. In particular, anything which might lead to close links between the RAF and the other services (and thereby might threaten the independence of the RAF) was fiercely resisted.

 

So while the British aircraft industry produced a perfectly good dive bomber (the Hawker Henley) the RAF only used it as a target tug. Fortunately, there were some more sensible senior officers who got army cooperation to work properly - they had to relearn many lessons which had been well understood in 1918 but forgotten since.

 

Similarly, Coastal Command was starved of resources for much of the war, although that wasn't only the RAF's fault. Churchill thought that the big planes would at least be doing something aggressive in dropping bombs on Germany and didn't seem to appreciate that an MR plane, which may have spent a day stooging around seeing nothing, might by its presence have kept u-boats submerged and thereby greatly limited their effectiveness.

 

Needless to say, in my novel 'The Foresight War' this all turns out rather differently.

 

Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition website and Discussion forum

[Ken Estes]

Sarge, Correct me if I'm off, but I wonder if the 1940-41 a/c would have not done enough for Coastal Command. Only with the issue of the B24 is the Air Gap closed for No. Atl. ASW. A bunch of Whitleys, Hampdens, etc. would provide lots of local patrols, but the U-boats were out of the coastal waters by late 1940, no?

 

In one sense, strategic bombing does not have a chance to show its effectiveness until late 1944, when the right aircraft, escorts, radars, pathfinders, etc. are all in place. even then, the targeting strategy is out of whack, as we have little idea of how hard it is do knock out machine tools and shredded factory buildings do not mean production stoppages. So the allies change the priority too many times, allowing German industries, transport, etc. to recover in sequence after even the most effective raids. In the end, a combination of attacks on fuel, ball bearings and rail yards causes the collapse of German transportation in 1945, leaving lots of finished products at the factories (many dispersed and underground) but no way to ship them to the users, and anyway no fuel in the hands of the users either.

[Richard Lindquist]

As for a plane - well, depends on when you start. If CAS had proper attention by 1934 or 1935, there would have been time to develop adequate ground attack planes by the time they were needed.

 

Or just have many more squadrons of Fairey Battles.

[swerve]

Or just have many more squadrons of Fairey Battles.

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I just looked up the Hawker Henley Tony referred to. Looks like quite a decent plane for CAS, by 1939-40 standards. I'd say it qualified as a Battle replacement. Faster & more agile, for a start. More guns for strafing might have been worthwhile.

[JOE BRENNAN]

Bomber Command laid waste to most of Germany, so it wasn't a total waste.

 

Also a comparison with the USAF is by neccesity skewed, the USAF only started regularly operating over Germany when escort was available. Bomber Command simply couldn't wait 3 years before mounting operations against germany.

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I'm not sure it's so skewed, not by 3 yrs anyway. British efforts before 1943 were pretty negligible compared to those after, likewise USAAF before/after early 1944. We could quibble about those exact pivot points but they were substantially less than 3 years apart.

 

Also the British call off of night operations due to excessive losses to nightfighters was in early '44, pretty much exactly the same time the USAAF was mastering the LW in daylight.

 

I think overall the Allied bombing effort eventually was successful. This doesn't contradict saying it failed to meet some pie in sky Douhetian ideal. German loss of synfuel plants in spring 1944 was quite devastating for example; and in general the campaign substantially hastened the German collapse, while bringing to bear industrial resources the Allies had but which were otherwise bottlenecked before mid 1944 by not being on the Continent, or which would have been ultimately highly counterproductive to bring to bear otherwise (as for example by helping Stalin a lot more instead of building so many bombers).

 

Within that overall late success I think it's overstating to say RAF "lost" but the USAAF effort was ultimately the more successful of the two IMO.

 

Joe

[JOE BRENNAN]

1. The Cologne raid occured in 1942, and IMHO marks the real begining of Bomber commands success.A Thousand bomber raid at that time was pretty much in excess of what anyone else could have achieved at the time.

 

2.  A recent documentary highlighted an important fact. USAAF may have set itself up for  pinpoint bombing , but considering weather over target was very often marginal, when they bombed on radar they were no more accurate than bomber command.

 

3.  In actual fact, If precision bombing was so effective, why did lemay move to area bombing tactics over Japan?

 

4. Such arguments overlook an important point. Post 1944 the RAF was increasingly bombing by day,and in fact by the end, over Germany in daylight even with Lancasters.

 

1. If you look at tonnages, and especially factor in the horrendous inaccuracy of night bombing til pretty late, I think again the midpoints of the greatest effect of the two efforts would be somewhere around a year apart.

 

2. This is repeated a lot on this forum, accuracies were about the same, but I doubt it's a representative statement. And again, in 1944 pre D-day the Germans basically mastered the night bomber threat, just as their effective resistance to day bombers began to collapse, so bombing in daylight by radar became more survivable even if accuracy was the same, though again I very much doubt that's a true statement averaging all bombing in the key period of ETO, day was more accurate on average.

 

3. I wouldn't state categorically day bombing or night was more effective in the WWII era always. And diversifying effort might be good, but I just said that USAAF bombing in the critical period ETO was more effective than the RAF, which I think is fairly clear. Which tactic would be emphasized depends on targets, defenses, etc. The B-29 campaign v Japan was vastly more efficient in results per unit of time and planes lost than either US or British bombing of Germany, day and night, but it wasn't the same target with the same defenses, nor same level of capability of the bombers. Also with B-29's we can "denationalize" day v. night. Nobody believed night radar bombing by B-29's against a broad range of targets (against some like "Eagle" B-29's v. refineries it was, but that was much superior radar to H2S) was just as accurate as day bombing even at times supplemented by radar, adding to the questionability of such statements applied to ETO. Night was for area targets in Japan much more vulnerable than those in Germany. And daylight B-29 bombing turned out considerably more effective that what was known at the time, it caused Japan's a/c industry to unravel; the opposite of usually overoptimistic assessments of Allied bombing v. Germany v. real results.

 

4. RAF 1944 day bombing outside Germany was because the Germans had gained mastery of the night sky over Germany, so not a strong argument argument for night bombing against that particular target. In 1945 removal of elements of the German defensive system outside Germany plus ability to place short range escort fighters on Continent (plus collapse of LW fighter force)... 1945 really was too late to matter much. I'd argue the bomber offensive, USAAF more than RAF but both, had war altering success late though not too late, in 1944.

 

Joe

[KingSargent]

Sarge, Correct me if I'm off, but I wonder if the 1940-41 a/c would have not done enough for Coastal Command. Only with the issue of the B24 is the Air Gap closed for No. Atl. ASW. A bunch of Whitleys, Hampdens, etc. would provide lots of local patrols, but the U-boats were out of the coastal waters by late 1940, no?

Prior to the invasions of Norway and the conquest of France, the only way for the U-boat to GET to the Atlantic was out the gap between the Orkneys and Norway. A CC Anson couldn't cover this, but a Whitley could. FTM, even after bases opened in France new U-boats had to use the gap to get to the N.Atl. and French bases. Had the Brits been able to keep the North Sea corked (which MIGHT have been possible given enough resources), the Germans could have built U-boats up the Kazoo and not been able to do anything with them.

You are correct that VLR a/c like the B-24 were necessary to close the Atlantic gap, but enough CC a/c to close the North Sea and the Bay of Biscay approaches of the U-boats could have accomplished a lot - if you can sink a target near its port, you don't have to worry about what it would have done in mid-ocean.

One possibility is that if the U-boats suffered heavy losses to Coastal Command ASW in 1939-40 (this assumes a dedicated ASW development effort BTW), Hitler might have had one of his tantrums and abandoned the effort (like he did Abn after losses in Crete).

In one sense, strategic bombing does not have a chance to show its effectiveness until late 1944, when the right aircraft, escorts, radars, pathfinders, etc. are all in place. even then, the targeting strategy is out of whack, as we have little idea of how hard it is do knock out machine tools and shredded factory buildings do not mean production stoppages. So the allies change the priority too many times, allowing German industries, transport, etc. to recover in sequence after even the most effective raids. In the end, a combination of attacks on fuel, ball bearings and rail yards causes the collapse of German transportation in 1945, leaving lots of finished products at the factories (many dispersed and underground) but no way to ship them to the users, and anyway no fuel in the hands of the users either.

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Agreed on that. A concentrated attack on the electrical system might have achieved even more.

 

The thing the Bomber Barons FAILED to do was come up with an inexpensive("the Bomber will always get through" - which was true enough before radar) quick war-winning strategy. The only "Advance" they made in their strategy was to go to area bombing of cities.

[KingSargent]

4. RAF 1944 day bombing outside Germany was because the Germans had gained mastery of the night sky over Germany, so not a strong argument argument for night bombing against that particular target. In 1945 removal of elements of the German defensive system outside Germany plus ability to place short range escort fighters on Continent (plus collapse of LW fighter force)... 1945 really was too late to matter much. I'd argue the bomber offensive, USAAF more than RAF but both, had war altering success late though not too late, in 1944.

 

Joe

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Not to mention GROUND advances that took out most of the German EW net. Besides having no fuel, LW fighters found it hard to intercept bombers that they couldn't see coming from a long ways off.

[Argus]

Whitly or Anson it makes bugger all difference if the aircraft don't have an effective ASW weapon, and the RAF didn't get airborne depthcharges untill what 41-42?

 

What I really don't understand, is WHY all the reaserch and experience from WWI was neglected AFTER 1939. By 1918 the RAF (RFC/RNAS) had the airborne ASW idea pretty much stiched up given the Mk.1 eyeball level of sensor technology.

 

They also had a specification and (IIRC) trials examples of a BETTER depthcharge than was deployed in WWII! Yet all this just gathered dust, until all the leasons had been re-learned the hard way.

 

I'm not a great fan of the 'Blunder' theory of British military history, but this was one of those cockups that just makes me fume.

 

shane

[Guest aevans]

I think it's important to remember in discussions like this one that gaging performance by the standards of the pre-war promisses made by various services would lead to an analysis that the Allies won the war pretty much in spite of themselves. (Which is true to some degree, but does not in any way rising to the level of any of the services being abject failures.) The service that came closest to achieving its pre-war goals and objectives -- the US Navy in the Pacific -- was plagued by significant conceptual failures at all levels, and even more by failures of execution. This service met the goals that it did, in the ways that it did, despite these misconceptions and blunders, by way of overcoming them through perseverence and experience.

 

The same can be said of the various strategic air campaigns, including Bomber Command's. Just because this command didn't achieve stated pre-war goals, or even wartime promisses does not mean that it wasn't performing a mission that needed to be done. Nobody knew you couldn't bomb an industrial state into submission, and given the perceived alternatives, it was certainly worth trying. On the way to not bobming Germany into submission, the RAF did cause a significant degree of dislocation and destruction -- mostly repaired over time, to be sure, but involving relative opportunity costs the British could much more afford to pay than the Germans.

 

BTW, I find it puzzling this idea that bombing in the last year of the war was a waste. I've thought a bit about it and I can't think of reason for not bombing more concrete than the idea that you don't kick a fellow while he's down. Now, that may be a fine principle for sporting contests -- though I would note insurance runs and points, punching away till the oponent is lying flat on his back, and other like phenomena of regulated sports -- but in war it is precisely when the other guy is down that the kicking is most effective. I can understand that less destruction and displacement might be a good thing in the post-war environment, but not doing what you can with available resources on that reasoning is taking criminal risks with the likelihood of a achieving a favorable end state, even if victory for your side seems a foregone conclusion. My sense is that Stuart is right -- not bombing would have been rightly seen by all concerned as a criminal enterprise of the most dastardly concoction, and would not have been tolerated, for good and sufficient reason.

[larrikin]

Joe, where are you getting this 'BC gave up night bombing of Germany in 1944' bit from? I'm sure my father and his mates would be very interested to know they were'nt bombing Germany by night, but some other country with black out curtains on their planes

[JOE BRENNAN]

Joe, where are you getting this 'BC gave up night bombing of Germany in 1944' bit from?  I'm sure my father and his mates would be very interested to know they were'nt bombing Germany by night, but some other country with black out curtains on their planes

 

Bomber Command shifted to prep for D-day after excessive losses in the "Battle of Berlin" in March of '44. It conducted only limited raids into Germany from then until land advances began to break down the German AD system later in the year, as was mentioned. Specifically, day bombing against non-German targets which was mentioned and I responded to was a result of that diversion of effort, partly to support the land war, partly as a respite against unsustainable losses, 9% in the Battle of Berlin at a time USAAF losses over Germany had fallen to indefinitely sustainable levels; latter continued a heavier emphasis on Germany diverted to D-day prep to a lesser degree.

 

The oft cited quote from the RAF official history: "it [battle of Berlin] was more than a failure, it was a defeat". I think that's the thread, a defeat overall for RAF? Not IMO, but BC certainly pulled back from emphasis on German targets from March 1944 til the AD system was compromised by land advances, that's just a fact AFAIK.

 

Joe

[KingSargent]

Whitly or Anson it makes bugger all difference if the aircraft don't have an effective ASW weapon, and the RAF didn't get airborne depthcharges untill what 41-42?

 

What I really don't understand, is WHY all the reaserch and experience from WWI was neglected AFTER 1939. By 1918 the RAF (RFC/RNAS) had the airborne ASW idea pretty much stiched up given the Mk.1 eyeball level of sensor technology. 

 

They also had a specification and (IIRC) trials examples of a BETTER depthcharge than was deployed in WWII! Yet all this just gathered dust, until all the leasons had been re-learned the hard way.

 

I'm not a great fan of the 'Blunder' theory of British military history, but this was one of those cockups that just makes me fume.

 

shane

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I had specified an ASW R&D program pre-war, IYWRC. Presumably that would include airborne weapons and detection devices.

 

However, you are quite right, the British virtually abandoned ASW weapons (they did ASDIC research) BTW. In addition to what you have mentioned the RN was working on an Anti-Submarine Mortar that was quite similar to Squid in 1918. That was abandoned, as was mine warfare development.

 

The major reason for the "cockup" was the British putting their faith in all the disarmament conferences and treaties. The submarine was going to be outlawed "next year" the diploidiots assured the services every year BTW, so nothing was done with ASW R&D because it would be a waste when submarines disappeared at the stroke of pen "next year."

[Tony Williams]

I have a copy of Harris' 'Despatch on War Operations' in front of me. One has to bear in mind that he was justifying his actions, but even so a couple of things are clear:

 

1. From 1944 onwards there was a major diversion of BC effort into day bombing in support of the D-day landings and the resultant fighting, with communication nodes being especially important.

 

2. The night bombing of Germany continued, with particular emphasis on fuel supplies, in parallel with USAAF daylight attacks on the same targets. BC dropped 96,000 tons of bombs on oil targets from D-day to the end of the war, and Harris quotes Speer as saying that BC's night attacks "were more effective in their results than (the USAAF's) day attacks by reason of the fact that the superheavy bombs caused shattering damage to these plants".

 

Tony Williams: Military gun and ammunition website and Discussion forum

[KingSargent]

Bomber Command shifted to prep for D-day after excessive losses in the "Battle of Berlin" in March of '44.

 

<snip>

 

I think that's the thread, a defeat overall for RAF? Not IMO, but BC certainly pulled back from emphasis on German targets from March 1944 til the AD system was compromised by land advances, that's just a fact AFAIK.

 

Joe

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I don't think the RAF switched to transportation targets in France because of losses over Germany, I think they switched because they were ORDERED TO by Ike and the political superiors (read WSC) as part of the D-Day preparations.

 

OVERLORD was originally scheduled for May, and given 'iffy' Spring weather a 60-day 'Transport Offensive' does not seem extreme.

 

IOW, Bomber Command was not "defeated" (in their view anyway) they were given new priorities by their superiors.

[Argus]

Sarge, my problem wasn't between the wars, although it was stupid etc etc. As you said they had reasons that seemed sensiable at the time.

 

My beef is the POST 1939 neglect to do some basic reaserch in their own archives. Thanks to the locust years the RAF ASW was starting almost from scratch in WWII, but they didn't even bother to consult the textbook's that were available.

 

HMS Vernon seems to have retained some institutional memory at any rate. IIRC they pulled the 1918 pattern magetic sweeps out of the store the day after the first ship was sunk by a magnetic mine, not that it worked, but it was at least there.

 

shane

[Redbeard]

I have never seen any convincing arguments or evidence about BC or USAAF being the most effective - they appear both to have been incredibly expensive weapons achieveing only marginal results.

 

But where USA had the resources to waste in strategic bombers and still conquer the planet, the British didn't.

 

I see the point of the British after 1940 needing to do something, not at least to show the Americans that they hadn't given up, but most of the expansion of BC happened after 11th of December 1941.

 

The problem was, that Harris and a lot other actually believed that the war could be won by a strategic bombing campaign. Had they had more realistic views the political aim in "doing something" could have been achieved by a far smaller force and some good old spin.

 

The British in early WWII calculated that building and keeping 40 bombers (twin engine?) operational was equivalent to the same for one battleship. AFAIK BC peaked at some 1000 operational bombers (not counting trainers) and by halving that we free resources equivalent to double the number of modern BB's built by UK (incl. Vanguard). Cashing it all in BB's would of course not be wise, but I'll claim that there will be plenty for UK to pursuit her own interests in the Far East - i.e. a campaign on Singapore/DEI to name one important.

 

And the 500 bombers left is more than enough for the "we do something" show.

 

BC didn't loose the war - it lost UK it's Empire.

 

Regards

 

Steffen Redbeard

[Ken Estes]

Uh, Isn't some of this the ramp-up in production beginning with 1938? I recall that the Brits are already out producing the Germans in a/c in 1940. They had to be producing something, and there was no need for CAS aircraft since the British Army was not in action anyplace against the Germans by end of May. The bomber program surely has more supporters than just Harris! What else was there to assemble?

[swerve]

Uh, Isn't some of this the ramp-up in production beginning with 1938? I recall that the Brits are already out producing the Germans in a/c in 1940. They had to be producing something, and there was no need for CAS aircraft since the British Army was not in action anyplace against the Germans by end of May. The bomber program surely has more supporters than just Harris!  What else was there to assemble?

 

The British army was fighting in France until July 1940, not May. It had been lined up against the Germans, planning to attack when it & the French army were good & ready, since the previous year. Aircraft built in summer 1940 were ordered before the German attack on France. Wouldn't we have been better off with CAS aircraft for that planned offensive? And for resisting the German attack in May?

 

You're thinking with hindsight. You can't justify decisions made long before by the existence of a situation which those decisions had contributed to, by leaving British troops exposed to German CAS & our forces inadequately equipped to do the same to their troops. Also, you're forgetting about fighters, which we desperately needed more of, but which had taken second fiddle to bombers.