Singapore Defense 1930's ?

[Rick]

Been reading Norman Friedman's "British Destroyers till W.W.2" and there are several discussions regarding defending Singapore from the growing Japanese threat. Was there any discussions in the British government that Singapore was not worth the expense of such a defense? 

[Burncycle360]

It seems as though everyone was operating by a playbook that didn't make that much sense, but still continued to operate under this playbook anyway even when it became more and more clear that the entire premise was flawed.  The video below goes into details. 

After the naval treaty,i f Britain really wanted Singapore to be the "Gibraltar of the pacific" with which to operate around as the fundamental part of the forward defense of the empire in the east,  I would have pushed very hard at immediately investing in a Fort Drum like fortress on Singapore. Now you have a battleship that's always on station, doesn't count against your capital ship totals, and cannot be destroyed through bombardment. This is a hard sell since the base ended up being more expensive than they thought by a large margin, but they ended up losing that investment anyway...

Scrapped 13.5" turrets would have been useful as is and could nearly cover the entire island as well as the sea approaches from Sentosa even with their limited 20 degree elevation, and if they wanted to splurge, custom mounts allowing 40 degrees of elevation would have been able to fire well into Malaysia, overmatching light artillery firing into Singapore. The only limiting factor would be barrel life. 
 

 

 

 

Edited October 7, 2025 by Burncycle360

[seahawk]

But then dive bombers would change the game. 

[Stuart Galbraith]

Considering Fort Drum did not (apologise for my bluntness) stop Japan invading the Phillipines, then replicating it to me doesnt seem to have an awful lot to commend it.

 

[alejandro_]

14 hours ago, Rick said:

Been reading Norman Friedman's "British Destroyers till W.W.2" and there are several discussions regarding defending Singapore from the growing Japanese threat. Was there any discussions in the British government that Singapore was not worth the expense of such a defense? 

I have never come across a discussion like this in the literature. Even in 1941 the British government was trying to reinforce the defenses. Singapore was supposed to get more Hurricanes, but the invasion of the Soviet Union led to a change in plans, as the aircraft ended up there.

[Stuart Galbraith]

Maybe we should have sent the Russians the Buffalos....

Though to be fair, if the Spitfire V was unable to do much against the Zero over Darwin, I dont think even Hurricanes would have made much difference.

[Rick]

2 hours ago, alejandro_ said:

I have never come across a discussion like this in the literature. Even in 1941 the British government was trying to reinforce the defenses. Singapore was supposed to get more Hurricanes, but the invasion of the Soviet Union led to a change in plans, as the aircraft ended up there.

 Why was Singapore deemed so valuable to the British Empire?  

[sunday]

1 hour ago, Rick said:

 Why was Singapore deemed so valuable to the British Empire?  

Singapore dominates the Strait of Malacca. Than strait is the lifeline for Hong Kong. Crossing from the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea is difficult when trying to use the straits between Indonesian islands.

[futon]

British Malay was a source for rubber.

[R011]

13 hours ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

Maybe we should have sent the Russians the Buffalos....

Though to be fair, if the Spitfire V was unable to do much against the Zero over Darwin, I dont think even Hurricanes would have made much difference.

A very serious issue was the lack of proper maintenance facilities.  More and better aircraft that couldn't be serviced wouldn't have helped. 

The RAF in Malaya needed better early warning than waiting until the bombs dropped, a dozen maintenance units rather than just two, and time and budget to train pilots and debug aircraft.

If course that doesn't help the issues for ground and naval forces.  The army needed training and realistic exercises, more artillery, more AT guns, at least a few tanks, and  at least another full infantry division.  The navy needed light forces and submarines to secure the coast and keep the Japanese from bypassing defensive lines and a carrier to accompany Force Z.  The British just couldn't stretch their resources enough for a backwater what with shooting war already in progress in Europe and the Med.

[R011]

The shield for Singapore from land attack was effectively French Indochina.  That France would fall so quickly leaving FIC free for Japan to occupy just didn't occur to anyone before it happened, not even the Axis.

[Captain Hurricane]

36 minutes ago, R011 said:

A very serious issue was the lack of proper maintenance facilities.  More and better aircraft that couldn't be serviced wouldn't have helped. 

The RAF in Malaya needed better early warning than waiting until the bombs dropped, a dozen maintenance units rather than just two, and time and budget to train pilots and debug aircraft.

If course that doesn't help the issues for ground and naval forces.  The army needed training and realistic exercises, more artillery, more AT guns, at least a few tanks, and  at least another full infantry division.  The navy needed light forces and submarines to secure the coast and keep the Japanese from bypassing defensive lines and a carrier to accompany Force Z.  The British just couldn't stretch their resources enough for a backwater what with shooting war already in progress in Europe and the Med.

In response to a request for more fighters Air Vice Marshal Popham, the Air Officer Commanding Malaya was offered the remaining 80 - 100 odd Gloster Gladiators still in use by the RAF in late 1941, (before 7/8th December IIRC).  

Unsurprising he declined this offer, instead choosing to wait till January 1942 when the first Hurricanes began to arrive in Singapore.   For  a good account of the Malayan campaign air war see Chris Shore's "Bloody Shambles" Volumes 1 and 2. It was, from the British point of view, almost exactly as the title suggests.  

[futon]

If keeping the number of forces constant, British Malaya ground forces may have been stationed too forward-heavy. As the Japanese penetrated lines of defense, they were able to cause havoc from within and keep pushing, catching many units out of position. British artillery was a serious concern. If the Japanese advance had been stopped, then attritional stalemate could whittle down Japanese ground strength and supply stocks. 

So in order to stop a sudden advance, pre-positioning some of the forces that were near the Malaya-Thai border area to somewhere futher south in the middle of the peninsula to make it stronger, with more heads up time, and thicker lines that can better absorb penetrating efforts. 

But saying so benefits in hindsight. That goes the same way for things that didn't work for the Japanese side as well. 

 

 

Edited October 8, 2025 by futon

[Burncycle360]

17 hours ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

Considering Fort Drum did not (apologise for my bluntness) stop Japan invading the Phillipines, then replicating it to me doesnt seem to have an awful lot to commend it.

It's a valid point, but it's not as though I hadn't considered it when I made the statement.  I agree it wouldn't change that Singapore falls ultimately, but it doesn't mean it would have been for naught. 

Malay is over 1,300 miles further than the Philippines.  That's not trivial, that's a very, very stretched logistics tail.  Yamashita left an entire division aside as a strategic reserve in part because a lighter leaner force required less logistics overhead to sustain and they were very concerned with forces being over-extended and tied up for too long.  They had no idea they would be so successful so fast in reality, and had no idea just how long the British pushed back relief efforts.

Something like Fort Drum, which cannot be bombarded into submission even with the Japanese capturing airfields in Malay, changes the calculations considerably.   It's quite possible the mere presence of such a fort might alter their strategic calculations, but I think Singapore was non negotiable for their overall plan and being tied down not only risks envelopment by any relief force (that they had to assume was coming), greater attrition than historical, and a delay in recommitting those forces to Phase II resulting in second order effects like a reduction of forces available for Burma, Dutch East Indies, and so on. 

Its presence would have extended the estimated operational timeline and number of required forces.  It would have likely meant committing the additional division, risking logistics failure or committing more ships which historically went to other operational areas, especially if supply caches were destroyed before being captured.    I think the operation would have lasted more like 180-240 days than the historical ~70.  It's not nothing.

Edited October 9, 2025 by Burncycle360

[Burncycle360]

19 hours ago, futon said:

If keeping the number of forces constant, British Malaya ground forces may have been stationed too forward-heavy. As the Japanese penetrated lines of defense, they were able to cause havoc from within and keep pushing, catching many units out of position. British artillery was a serious concern. If the Japanese advance had been stopped, then attritional stalemate could whittle down Japanese ground strength and supply stocks. 

So in order to stop a sudden advance, pre-positioning some of the forces that were near the Malaya-Thai border area to somewhere futher south in the middle of the peninsula to make it stronger, with more heads up time, and thicker lines that can better absorb penetrating efforts. 

But saying so benefits in hindsight. That goes the same way for things that didn't work for the Japanese side as well. 

 

 

Indeed. With the benefit of hindsight the British could have done quite a bit to disrupt Japanese advance.  Taking the concept of fighting withdrawal, Leave behind forces could have detonated buried artillery shells under aircraft revetments after the Japanese had moved in for instance, commanders could have cratered roads behind them to stop the Japanese tanks thunder running past their positions (there was no where to bypass such cratering, it was dense jungle immediately off the roads), and of course ammunition caches could have been destroyed upon retreat,  but such things would have required ahistorical levels of cooperation and coordination. 

Edited October 9, 2025 by Burncycle360

[Argus]

On 10/8/2025 at 8:57 PM, Rick said:

 Why was Singapore deemed so valuable to the British Empire?  

I think it helps to look at this on three heads. 

Politics
Imperial defence policy in terms of the Asia - Pacific region was based around the Singapore strategy. We're talking about Australia, NZ, India, the Pacific Islands and yes Canada to a point.  Note at this point Canada, Aust and NZ are Dominions, we're not under any duress here, our Imperial engagement is voluntary and cooperative, so in settling this strategy we've set national adgenda around this, its not something London can unilaterally play with. Once that ball got rolling, it had a lot of momentum and any change needed to provide a real alternative to address all the stake holders. 

Strategic Geography 
Things to keep in mind here are distances and levels of development. China had a lot more industrialisation than most people realise, and there were things happening all over the place. But regionally, for a full service industrial economy Japan was it. This is about more than just stuff its people too, local literacy rates in useful languages high enough you're not trying to hire the middle class to be storemen and account clerks were not common. So north of the DEI's there's just nodes, Singapore, Subic, Hong Kong, Saigon to a point, Shanghai, Canton, Wei-Hai-Wei, Dalian, Vladivostok. These are essentially islands of modern industrial society in a great big sea of 'not modern industrial society,' and circa 1939 most of them are under the geo-strategic thumb of the Japanese whoever else might 'own' them. So its not quite as bad as the Central Pacific after PH when the US had to bring EVERYTHING with them, but any military campaign towards Japan from any direction involved a lot of BYO infrastructure development for the aggressor. Which makes these existing nodes extra specially precious. 

Singapore Strategy 
a/ Britain had been a satisfied power in regional terms since 1900 odd, as an Empire we'd actually gone a bit over London's preferred limits with Aust and NZ snaffling odd bits of German stuff London would have happily traded to the Japanese. Yes there was power projection into China and grabbing Wei-Hai-Wei, but the Chinese trading concessions were about influence not territorial gain, and Wei-Hai-Wei was about stopping other people getting it more than wanting it for its own sake, Britain did not need another naval base in China. 
b/ Britain held little actual territory north of Singapore/Borneo, Wei-Hai-Wei and Hong Kong were not Indo China or the Philippians. Lots of exposure in terms of outposts and communities of ex-pats, but nothing to actually defend with any depth.
c/ So given a lack of ground to stand on, any defensive counter strategy against Japan was obviously going to be fundamentally naval, but was going to be played out at long range in strategic terms. The first tool out of the box was blockade and the global destruction of Japanese maritime commerce, which was was no great problem 6-8 months and any Japanese trade with most of the world would have been by carrier Pidgeon - it sounds arrogant, but the RN had the same degree of global maritime dominance the US holds today, and practically more so given the UK's dominance of the merchant fleet and marine finance, they had the triple whammy. But from then on, any way would not be quick or easy. The British would have to base build up the South China Sea, likely having to take Taiwan than start island hopping, fighting naval skirmishes the whole way. Again it sounds a little over the top, but without the historical WWII it wasn't beyond the resources of the Empire, an Empire that was still trading globally - and a total loss. Such a war would have been hellishly expensive with no real payoff, like the War of 1812, the only thing the British would have wanted out of this war, was for it not to have happened. Although Taiwan as Hong Kong Mk.II is an interesting idea.      
d/ But to do all this, obviously a base is needed and Singapore is/was the node that best fit the job. Nothing further forward was as defensible, noting further back covered enough geography - Ceylon doesn't cover Australia, Darwin doesn't cover Burma. The flip side to this being that if the Japanese could take Singapore, everything gets massively harder even if they don't take another step, and if they do... better stop them north of Singapore. 
e/ So Singapore was both an offensive and defensive key to a door no one in the empire wanted to see open. 

Other than declaring the Asian/Pacific side of the Empire indefensible, the only alternative to Singapore was signing a treaty with Japan or forming an alliance with the US against Japan predicated on Washington building up their node at Subic in place of Singapore, and even then they'd still have to invest in Singapore.