naval warfare 3rd WW, battle for the Mediterranean (Cold war period)

[Jaroslav]

Jordan BAEV

Bulgarian Intelligence Estimates on NATO's Maritime Power in the Eastern Mediterranean (1955-1975)

The establishment of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in May 1955 does not cause any significant changes in the position of dependence of the smaller East-European Kremlin allies set up during Stalin’s rule. At the very moment of its creation the organization assigns specific observation and analysis tasks to each of its member states in regard of the fighting capacity and military power of their neighboring states - members of the hostile NATO bloc. Thus Bulgaria and Romania share the charge to study the NATO intentions and actions in South Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Owing to the deterioration of the Moscow - Bucharest relations by the end of the 1960-ies this task becomes mainly a responsibility of the Bulgarian Intelligence Services.

The Bulgarian and other East European archives declassified in the last decade show the channels of information exchange regarding the state of the NATO Armed Forces. This is a priority target for the Bulgarian State Security intelligence and counter-intelligence departments [KDS] and the Military Intelligence [RUMNO]. Part of the summarized collected information is discussed at multilateral Warsaw Pact meetings. It is explicitly agreed to send such intelligence analyses to the allied neighboring states for their information and assessment. Thus, for instance, in fulfillment of a bilateral agreement, signed in 1963, in the course of the next decade, till 1974 [when the contacts between the two countries were frozen], the State Security agencies of Bulgaria and Romania exchange about 200 information reports on NATO of 1500 pages total volume. Each week Sofia receives from Moscow reports, analyses and reviews of KGB and GRU regarding the political and military situation in various crisis regions all over the world. “Special Intelligence” Bulletins are also sent by the Unified Command of the Warsaw Pact Allied Forces.

The key issues for the political and military leaders of the East-European Bloc are the NATO policy and strategy, the dislocation of its nuclear and missile weapons and the stationing of the US troops in Europe, the interdependence and contradictions among the members of the North-Atlantic Alliance. With no fail a place of importance is always given to the condition of all types of armed forces and their participation in NATO joint maneuvers and exercises. A valuable information about East-European military leaders’ assessments and forecasts can be discovered in the overview of the tasks assigned during joint military exercises of the Warsaw Treaty members. The importance of the new evidence and estimates of the NATO historical development discovered in the East-European archives requires a more detailed and profound analysis of the authentic data accumulated during the period of the Cold War. Regardless the case, however, one should always take into consideration the influence of the ideological, political and strategic concepts in the Soviet Bloc at the time as well as the relative trustworthiness of the Intelligence sources used.

In compliance with the Warsaw Pact Allied Military Command’ strategic concepts in regard of the “missile nuclear war”, at the end of the 1950-ies the attention of the Bulgarian military and political intelligence services is aimed predominantly at the discovery of missile and nuclear NATO and US bases in Turkey and Greece. This tendency becomes particularly obvious during the flare-up of acute global and regional crises [ the Lebanon crisis in 1958, the Berlin crisis in 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis in 1962].

In a special military-political information of theirs dated 26th April 1957, the Allied Military Command of the Warsaw Pact in Moscow notifies the General Staff of the Bulgarian Armed Forces of the opening of the US-Greek talks regarding the creation of a nuclear base on the island of Crete. The same information points out that missiles have been delivered to the Turkish Armed Forces1. Similar reports arrive through diplomatic channels as well. The Bulgarian Embassy in Athens in their respective comments on the matter explicitly reports that during Admiral Burke‘s visit in June, 1957 and Admiral Brisco’s visit in November of the same year in Greece the establishment of nuclear bases in Greece and the supply of medium-range missiles for the Greek Armed Forces were discussed2. On its turn, the Embassy in Ankara makes known the delivery of medium-range missiles ”NIKE” in Turkey, which are to be allegedly used for the defense of the Gyuldjuk naval base. According to the Bulgarian experts it is more of a ”dangerous offensive weapon rather than a defensive one”3. All this information is used as a motive for the Bulgarian Government to request Kremlin to deliver free of charge patrol and torpedo boats and submarines for the defense of the Bulgarian Black Sea Coast. At the consultations with Rear Admiral Branimir Ormanov, Bulgarian Fleet Commander, in Moscow in December 1957 it is proposed to create new organizational forms of interconnection among the Black Sea fleets of Bulgaria, Romania and the USSR since, considering “the character of a contemporary war initial period”, organizing such cooperation after the beginning of the war would be too late4.

At the height of the Berlin crisis in the summer and autumn of 1961 the Bulgarian Military Intelligence prepares a number of analyses and information reports on the co-relation between the intensification of the global military and political tension and the increased activity of NATO ships in the vicinity of the Black Sea. A report dated 5th August 1961 states that the US Government has requested Turkey to close the Black Sea Straits, should the USSR not accept a compromise on the Berlin issue. According to another information from the Intelligence Department of the Defense Ministry [RUMNO] dated 1st September, 1961 the commandment of the Egerli Black Sea naval base was put at advanced alert and was ordered to present everyday reports on the Black Sea coast situation to the Turkish Navy Staff in Ankara5.

NATO’s military exercises in the Mediterranean in September - October 1961, i.e. - RED FOX, MANZIP CONVOY and CHECKMATE are not only most attentively followed, they are also analyzed from the Berlin crisis development perspective. The reports state that the main goal of the exercises was holding the Black Sea Straits by the NATO forces, a successful coastal landing with 5 000 marines in the region of the Saros Bay under the umbrella of the naval aviation and artillery and a preparation for a counter-offensive to the North6. One of the Bulgarian counter-intelligence reports makes the ridiculous statement that “the Turkish Fleet Commander has entered the port of Burgas disguised as a senior assistant of a merchant ship”7. A diplomatic airgram from Istanbul informs that in case of military confrontation in relation to the Berlin issue, the Armed Forces of Turkey and Greece are to subordinate to the NATO Supreme Allied Command. Another source, close to American diplomatic officer stationed in Istanbul, informs of plans for quick building of military facilities at the Black Sea coast since the ones existing at the moment “could not secure effective defense in case of eventual hostile offensive”8. Allegedly, an urgent delivery of 10 American submarines, “built especially to suit the Black Sea specifics”, was planned. In April 1962 during his visit in Turkey General Lauris Norstad, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, discusses the matter of an overall reorganization and modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces9.

The Cuban missile crisis also has an indirect influence on the situation at the Balkans and the Mediterranean area. Just before the crisis started, from 15th to 19th October 1962 an operational and tactical Warsaw Pact exercise takes place in Romania and Bulgaria and their contiguous Black Sea aquatory. At this exercise overview Marshal Grechko, Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact Allied Armed Forces gives a place of special attention to the NATO Forces on the Balkans and the Mediterranean. He states that the Sixth US Fleet and the British Mediterranean Navy are the backbone of the NATO naval power in the region. The Sixth US Fleet allegedly has in its possession up to 50 warships and its two aircraft carriers are with up to 250 airplanes, and both - between themselves - 1030 nuclear warheads. Marshal Grechko stresses in particular the entrance of US warships in the Black Sea basin during the recent years and qualifies that as a deliberate “military demonstration” close by the Bulgarian, Romanian and Soviet coasts. According to him that underlines the importance of the Black Sea Straits in the NATO geo-strategic plans as a crossing point of three continents and an approach toward the most important Mediterranean lines of communication10.

A typical piece of the period is a report of the Bulgarian counter-intelligence describing how during the days of the Cuban Missile Crisis the US Defense Attaché has initiated a sequence of confidential meetings with the Military Attaches of France, Italy, Greece and Turkey, the aim of those meetings being to coordinate the collection of intelligence data related to the Bulgarian Armed Forces and the possible movement of Soviet troops in the Balkans11.

The story of the withdrawal of the Russian SS-4 [8 K 63] missiles from Cuba in exchange of the US ballistic missiles “Jupiter” from Turkey has been most carefully studied in the relevant research literature12. After the Cuban crisis is settled, the attention of the East-European Secret Services is redirected towards the replacement of the “Jupiter” IRBMs with the more modern “Polaris” ballistic missiles, based on the US submarines in the Mediterranean as well as toward the discussions within NATO regarding the building up of the Allied Nuclear Forces. Early in February 1963 Bulgarian diplomatic sources in Turkey inform that three US submarines with “Polaris” missiles operationally attached to the Sixth US Fleet and permanently based in Rota, Spain, were sent to the East Mediterranean not far from Turkish territory. Following a number of reports of later dates, at a meeting of the General Staff Chiefs of Turkey and Greece, the Greek party made clear that it was not prepared to accept submarines with nuclear ballistic missiles “Polaris” in Greek territorial waters. The Turkish party replied that they would accept the American submarines but in this case those should be used exclusively for the defense of Turkey.

In regard to the NATO multinational nuclear forces the Turkish government declares that Turkish officers and seamen are to be included in the teams of those forces but it makes clear that Turkey is not in a position to have a financial participation in the realization of the plan. At his visit in Athens General Lemnitzer, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe makes at his turn clear to his Greek hosts that the territory of Greece will have a full nuclear umbrella. In the months following the Cuban missile crisis both - the Greek and the Turkish sides, make efforts to get new submarines from the USA and when that is delayed, they secure for themselves the alternative military support of the FRG13.

According to the press of the two Balkan NATO members states, to compensate for the three US submarines with “Polaris” missiles on board sent towards the Turkish coast, the Soviet Union sends a nuclear submarine of theirs in the Mediterranean and organizes the delivery of more modern armament to Bulgaria14. This is an argument often used at the time to secure more military support from the USA and the West-European allies.

Indeed, after the first visit of Admiral Gorshkov, Commander of the Soviet Navy, in Egypt in 1961, the presence of Soviet military vessels in the region is significantly increased. That comes not only as a result of the increase of the NATO maritime power in the Mediterranean but is also connected with the change of the political regimes of some Arab and African states and the sharpening of the Near East situation. In November 1962 three Soviet guided missile boats 183-R are delivered to the naval base in Alexandria which makes possible the formation of the first guided missile boats battalion of the Egyptian Navy. As a commander of the group of the Soviet naval experts in Alexandria Rear Admiral Vassiliev is sent next year. By the end of the 1960-ies other Soviet naval bases are created - in the Syrian ports of Latakia and Tartus and the Somali port of Berberra. In the period 1967 - 1972 there are about 400 Soviet military advisers in all types of armed forces in Egypt only, and Rear Admiral Sutyagin is the chief military adviser for the Navy15. According to Western sources, after the Six-day War in the Middle East in June 1967 Moscow has at its permanent disposal about 50 combat and auxiliary ships and 9-10 submarines in the Mediterranean, and during the October War in 1973, the Soviets double the number of their vessels in the region. As the London daily - The Times, ironically pointed out in its editorial, the participants in the NATO naval exercises in the Mediterranean are very often with one more than it has originally been planned as Soviet warships and submarines are all the time located very near by16.

Both - the Western and Eastern assessments show that throughout the whole Cold War period the NATO Naval Forces on the Southern European Flank are nearly twice the number of the Warsaw Pact maritime power. The summary intelligence estimates of the power and fighting efficiency of the NATO Naval Forces during this period are of particular interest. An evaluation report of the Romanian General Staff’ Operational department of April 1965 states that the NATO Naval Forces have at their disposal a total of about 1 500 warships and auxiliary ships of which -370 main combat ships; 45 naval aviation squadrons with more than 680 assorted aircraft; 8 battalions of marines. The main NATO naval group, comprising the naval forces of the USA, the Great Britain, France, Italy, Turkey and, Greece, is concentrated in the Mediterranean. The NATO Naval Forces combat unit in the region is the Sixth US Fleet which has 3-4 aircraft carriers with nuclear warheads of types A-3B and A-4B with 300 kt equivalent and 2400 to 1500 km tactical radius. At the same time 3-4 other US nuclear submarines with “Polaris-A2” missiles of 2800 km range patrol in the Mediterranean17. According to official Sovet data of 1970 the Allied NATO Naval Forces in the Mediterranean [of which the French Navy is no more a member], have at their disposal 260 ships and up to 120 airplanes and helicopters. The Naval Forces combat unit is the 16th Squadron of US nuclear submarines, based in Rota, Spain. Apart of that, the Sixth US Fleet has about 60 ships, 2 aircraft carriers of 180-200 airplanes, 20 destroyers, 1-2 missile cruisers as well as marine units18.

The Bulgarian and Romanian intelligence estimates concentrate especially on the potential of the Greek and Turkish naval forces and their participation in NATO maneuvers and military exercises. In the summary study of the Intelligence department at the General Staff of Bulgarian Armed Forces under the title: ”Conclusions from the NATO Allied Military Forces’ exercises at the South-European war theater in the period 1960 - 1972” major NATO military exercises are analyzed, such as “DANCE CROP”, “DAWN PATROL”, “SOUTH EXPRESS”, ”FALLEX” as well as special naval exercises like “MEDSABEX”, “MEDTAXEC” “AHOY NEPTUNE”, “FADEN ESCORT”, “AGGRAVATE ESCORT”, etc. The study points out that in the early 1960-ies the tasks to be worked out were concerned predominantly with organizing an initial defensive operation with a subsequent surprising nuclear thrust at the enemy, carrying out a coastal landing and an air-landing and then taking the offensive. In the early 1970-ies the use of strategic nuclear weapons becomes more and more limited. The allied troop formation time is changed from 3-5 hours after opening the hostilities in 1963-1966, to 2,5 - 4 hours in 1972. ”As a rule the naval units of the USA, Great Britain, Italy, Turkey and Greece permanently placed in the Mediterranean always participate in the amphibious operations at the South European War Theater accompanied by US marines19.”

At the Bulgarian General staff a special analysis of the operational-tactical and the combat training of the Turkish and Greek naval forces in the period 1969 - 1973 is prepared. It points out that in the period stated both countries’ participation in NATO naval exercises keeps on increasing all the time. For instance, while in 1969 Turkey takes part in 3 naval exercise of the Alliance in 1971 their number is already 7, and in 1972 - 10. In 1972 only, Greece takes part in 3 international and 5 national landing exercises in which the new sabotage-reconnaissance groups “commandos” and the 32nd marines regiment participate. Usually the Greek navy draws for participation in these exercises up to 25-30 war ships and 10-15 auxiliary ships. After a permanent Soviet naval presence has been established in the Mediterranean, the Greek Navy is assigned new combat tasks against the Soviet war ships and submarines.

The Black Sea Strait Zone is defined in the report as a chief strategic goal at the South-European Theater of operations, “the strategic stability of the whole South Flank, NATO believes, will depend on its being held.” The participation of the Turkish Navy in “DENIS KURDU” [SEA WOLF], “TYPHOON” and other naval exercises is analyzed too. The main tasks assigned to the Turkish naval forces are the defense of the Black Sea Straits, anti-submarine warfare, strategic coastal landing and torpedo-rocket strikes. About 50 Turkish war ships and auxiliary ships, tactical and naval aviation participate usually in those exercises. After 1967 one third of Turkish Naval Forces within the NATO complement are based on the Black Sea - mainly torpedo and missile cruisers and submarines.20

In a subsequent similar estimate regarding the Greek and Turkish Armed Forces exercises carried out in the period 1972 - 1981 a new accent, related to the Cyprus crisis development, is accounted for. For the first time in the national military exercises of both - Greece and Turkey, respectively - “PTOLEMEOS”, ‘PHILIPOS” and “YALDURUM”, “BARUSH” and so on, the tasks of assaults repulsing worked on are not only for an aggression from the “North” but also for such threat that might eventually be launched by a neighboring country - an ally. Another new tendency of the 1970-ies is an extended non-nuclear initial warfare period in case of a global military confrontation. During the special military exercises “PARMENION”, “DENIS KURDU”, etc. the idea of missile-strike groups is also considered. Now, the use of nuclear strike is foreseen not in relation to the danger of penetration but as “a response to a mass use of chemical weapon by the Warsaw Pact”. In those exercises the previously set numbers of troops for both blocs are nearly the same. Thus, for instance, at the first strategic echelon at the destination Bosphorus - Dardanelles the collision expected is of 12 Warsaw Pact formations against 11 NATO formations21.

During the 70-ies the East-European Intelligence Services show anticipated keen interest in the development of the Cyprus conflict. In the intelligence information received from KGB in the early 1970-ies there are two invariably dominating topics in regard of the Mediterranean - the Middle East and the Cyprus conflicts. The situation in Greece after the military coup of April 1967 and the development of the Cyprus crisis are a main issue in the Intelligence information exchange of the Bulgarian and Romanian State Security Services too. In 1975 a special study is prepared by the Operations Department of the Bulgarian General Staff focused on the military aspects of the Cyprus crisis. In it an important place is given to the assessment of the Turkish amphibious operation “CHAKMAK” of July 1974. The study also points out that the Turkish General Staff shows superiority in men and equipment over the Greek military formations - from 2 to 9 times for the different branches of forces22.

The available Intelligence data of the assumed intentions and operations of the NATO countries are used for planning the operational-tactical and staff exercises involving the Warsaw Pact Black Sea Fleets. The operational and tactical exercise on the largest scale in the Balkans area within the stated period is carried out in August 1967, its code name is “RODOPI”. This exercise covers nearly the whole territory of Bulgaria and the West Black Sea coast from Sevastopol to Sozopol. One of the main tasks set to the Bulgarian and Romanian Naval forces and the Soviet Black Sea Fleet is to off a coastal landing after enemy’s nuclear missile strike. In it all available naval forces of Bulgaria, 12 Romanian war ships, 139 ships and submarines and the whole combat aviation of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet take part. The following is explicitly stated in the “RODOPI” military exercise overview: “An air-dropping coastal landing and its deterrence is the most complicated of the military actions not only on sea but in any case of military hostilities whatsoever” it is also “an unavoidable element” of a future war23.

In preparation of this significant military exercise on the Bulgarian territory the military counter-intelligence carries out a special operation called “MALNIA” [THUNDERBOLT]. This counter-operation is aiming to accomplish a set of desinformation measures against the military attaches of the NATO countries in Bulgaria and neutralize their intelligence activities in the regions of the exercise “RODOPI”. The movements of the Greek, Turkish, British and Italian military attaches in the Burgas coastal area as well as in the areas of other towns in Southern Bulgaria were closely followed. The Bulgarian counter-intelligence services report to the Ministers of Defense and Interior that the bigger part of data collected about the “RODOPI” exercise by the Western military representatives are “inaccurate”. The conclusive report on the “MALNIA” operation points out: ”The data gathered by the enemy parties and their assessment of the beginning of the exercise, the Danube forcing, the airdrop landings in the Ruse and Sarafovo areas and the D-day in Sozopol are really far from the truth… Even now the military attaches are aware of nearly nothing in regard of such important operations like the air landings in Kondofrei and Bezmer …”24

By the end of the 1960-ies following the experience resulting from of the Near East and Indochina wars, the Unified Allied Command of the Warsaw Treaty Organization change their previous strategic concepts in regard of the inavoidability of a “nuclear missile war”. In exercises and maneuvers, carried out from that time on, a participation in “local wars” with of conventional armament is foreseen. Thus, for instance, the Directive for the Training of the Warsaw Pact Allied Armed Forces of 1969 points out as an important weakness in the military training before that time the fact that ”… the possibilities of conducting continuous fight without the use of nuclear weapon are not considered…”25 When analyzing the naval exercises carried out on the Black Sea in March and June 1970 a point is explicitly made of the fact that the military leadership of NATO takes particular care of the development of the organizational structures of its Armed Forces and with their being supplied with new types of conventional arms applicable in local wars26.

When the naval staff exercise “VAL-72” held in February 1972 under the command of Rear Admiral Vassil Yanakiev, Commander of the Bulgarian Navy, is planned, two new points are introduced. The information that the Turkish Navy is increased with 23 new vessels and that there are plans to eventually base the Sixth US Fleet in the immediate proximity of the Black Sea Straits, is interpreted as an indication of the increased strategic importance of the Strait Zone for the NATO Naval Command in South Europe. On the other hand, the Cyprus situation is for the first time included in the military exercise scenario. The hypothetical variant of “overthrowing the Cyprus government and creating possibilities to turn the island into a NATO military base” is considered as well27. In the analysis of another staff exercise, held in April 1973 near to the Bulgarian Black Sea coast in which 36 ships and two submarines of the Bulgarian Navy and 6 ships of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet participated, it is once again underlined: “Following the assessment of the NATO Allied Command the Black Sea Straits - Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, shall be the most important regions of hostilities at the South-European war theater.”28

The data and the estimates of the eventual intentions of the NATO Allied Command in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea area determine the tasks set to the Warsaw Pact Black Sea fleets. These tasks are most clearly explained in the Letter of Instruction for a tactical Soviet-Bulgarian naval exercise in May 1975, performed under the command of Rear Admiral Hovrin, Commander of the USSR Black Sea Fleet. The exercise task is formulated in such a way: ”Securing operational deployment of allied countries’ Black Sea Fleets and participation in a blockade of the Straits Zone for keeping enemy’s warship combat groups and landing teams away from the Black Sea.”29

The above presented new documentary evidences visibly illustrate the views and estimates of the Warsaw Pact member-states concerning the plans, operational-tactical concepts and the combat potential of the NATO Naval Forces in the East Mediterranean and the Black Sea area till the mid-1970-ies. These “visions from the North” in respect of the possibilities and intentions of the NATO Allied Command at the Southern Flank are meant to improve the environmental background of those times and to contribute for establishment of a more differentiated picture and understanding of the Cold War years’ bi-polar confrontation. They might as well help the joint efforts to throw more light on the half Century contemporary history of the North Atlantic Treaty as the most effective and long lasting military and political alliance of our times.

 

This paper has been presented at the 4th Pelagic Maritime Conference in May 2001 in Kefalonia Island, Greece, and was published in Bulgarian in Godishnik na Voennomorskija Muzej, Vol. 1, Varna 2001.

 

[1] Central Military Archive [CVA], Veliko Tarnovo, Fond 1, Opis [Record] 3, File 42, p. 126-128.

[2] Diplomatic Archive [DA], Sofia, Opis 3s, File 129, p. 91, 153, 194, 313, 328.

[3] DA, Opis 3s, File 212, p. 75-76.

[4] CVA, Fond 1, Opis 3, File 44, p. 26; Fond 22, Opis 2, File 15, p. 35-41.

[5] Archive of the Ministry of Interior [AMVR], Sofia, Fond 1, Opis 10, File 73, p. 29, 77-78.

[6] AMVR, Fond 1, Opis 10, File 73, p. 7-9, 20, 22, 30, 51; DA, Opis 3s, File 433, p. 222-224.

[7] AMVR, Fond 1, Opis 10, File 72, p. 126.

[8] DA, Opis 3s, File 433, p. 197, 263.

[9] DA, Opis 4s, File 52, p. 23.

[10] Vojensky Historicky Archiv [Military History Archive], Praha, MNO-1963, 65/65, sf. 17/1.

[10] AMVR, Fond 1, Opis 10, File 83, p. 97.

[12] Criss, N., “Strategic Nuclear Missiles in Turkey: The Jupiter Affair, 1959-1963”, The Journal of Strategic Studies, London, No. 3, September 1997, p. 97-122.

[13] DA, Opis 5s, File 10, p. 78; File 26, p. 196, 211; File 56, p. 115; File 59, p. 34, 294; File 155, p. 329; File 208, p. 176.

[14] DA, Opis 5s, File 26, p. 290.

[15] Voennie Znania, Moscow, 1994, No. 7, p. 8; Voennoistoricheskij Zhurnal, Moscow, 1994, No. 4, p. 36-42; No. 5, p. 53-60.

[16] The Times, London, No. 59 406, 27 May 1975.

[17] Archivele Militare Romane, Bucharest, Marele Stat Major, Directia Operatil, Fila 110-119, 17/04/65.

[18] DA, V/I/4, 1970.

[19] RUMNO. “Conclusions from the NATO Allied Military Forces’ exercises at the South-European war theater in the period 1960 – 1972”, Sofia 1972.

[20] RUMNO. “Analysis of the operational-tactical and the combat training of the Turkish and Greek naval forces in the period January 1969 – May 1973”, Sofia 1973.

[21] RUMNO. “Conclusions from the Greek and Turkish Armed Forces’ exercises in the period 1972 – 1981”, Sofia 1981.

[22] General Staff. Ministry of Defense. “The Military Conflict in Cyprus”. Sofia 1975.

[23] CVA, Fond 1027, Opis 12, File 101, p. 73-90.

[24] AMVR, Fond 1, Opis 10, File 258, p. 112-138.

[25] CVA, Fond 1027, Opis 13, File 7, p. 72.

[26] CVA, Fond 1027, Opis 13, File 13, p. 62-65; File 35, p. 60.

[27] CVA, Fond 1027, Opis 16, File 44, p. 121, 129; File 45, p. 47.

[28] CVA, Fond 1027, Opis 19, File 21, p. 2; File 22, p. 94.

[29] CVA, Fond 1027, Opis 24, File 47, p. 6-8.

http://www.coldwar.hu/publications/int_estim.html

Edited June 28 by Jaroslav

[Jaroslav]

Declassified: US nuclear weapons at sea during the Cold War

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2016.1124664

[Jaroslav]

Clemenceau-class aircraft carrier

Air group

Designed from the outset as multi-role fleet carriers, the two Clemenceau-class ships initially in 1961 had an air group with ten aircraft each of the IVM attack version and IVP reconnaissance version of the Dassault Étendard IV strike fighter, a squadron of up to eight Breguet Alizé aircraft were embarked for the antisubmarine warfare mission, and in the air-defense role a squadron of Sud Aviation Aquilon (license-built de Havilland Sea Venom) fighters. They were also used for French amphibious assault operations with up to 30–40 helicopters (normal helicopter wing is 4 helicopters) deployed; just prior to the 1991 Gulf War as part of Operation Salamandre (the air component of Operation Daguet), Clemenceau ferried 30 Aérospatiale Gazelles and 12 Aérospatiale SA 330 Pumas to Saudi Arabia. The planned size of the total air wing was originally 60, but the increasing size of carrier-based aircraft in the late 1950s reduced that number to approximately 40.

The more capable, missile-armed Vought F-8E(FN) Crusader was soon deployed, with a squadron of eight aircraft embarked, starting 2 years later from 1963. The Crusader served with both carriers until Foch was decommissioned in 2000. The Dassault-Breguet Super Étendard entered service on both ships in 1978. The Super Étendard could carry both the Exocet missile and the Air-Sol Moyenne Portee (ASMP) nuclear missile, giving these ships a stand-off nuclear strike ability lacking in the earlier Étendard IV (equipped with free-fall nuclear bombs only).

Clemenceau and Foch were modernized during September 1977 – November 1978 and July 1980 – August 1981 (Foch). This mid-life upgrade cleared them for the new Super Étendard (along with several other upgrades, like the SENIT C3 system). Then they had up to 40 aircraft: 10 F-8FN, 15–16 Super Étendard and 3–4 Étendard IVP, 7 Alizé, 2 Super Frelon and 2 Alouette III. Their hangar measured 152 × 24 × 7 meters (3,648 square meters). Clemenceau's fuel depots were 1,200 mc (JP5) and 400 mc (AVGAS). Foch increased this amount up to 1,800 and 109 respectively.

The Dassault Rafale was test flown from Foch after deck modifications in 1992 and operated from this carrier after further 1995–1996 deck modifications.

Between 1980 and 1981, it underwent an IPER which equipped it with a naval tactical information exploitation system, an inertial unit for recalibrating the aircraft platform before catapulting, missile bays for AM-39 Exocet missiles and the tactical nuclear weapon. It can thus accommodate four or five AN-52s then the ASMP project.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clemenceau-class_aircraft_carrier

Edited July 3 by Jaroslav

[RETAC21]

2 hours ago, Jaroslav said:

Can @RETAC21, @sunday and other Spaniards help with Spanish navy OOB for 1980s and other question that I have or would have regarding Spanish navy during 80s?

Any help is welcomed.

This is for Italian and French navy to. Greeks and Turks are mainly covered.

Sure, the Spanish Navy AOR was the axis Canaries-Gibraltar-Balearics, at the time, deployments beyond this area were extremely rare. The Armada was set up around an aircraft carrier group and an amphibious group. The following administrative squadrons existed

11th (Ferrol): 5 Churruca (Gearing FRAM 1) destroyers + Roger de Lauria (decomm 1982)

21st (Cartagena): 6 Descubierta class corvettes

31st (Ferrol): 5 Asturias (Modified Knox) class

41st (Rota): 4 Santa Maria (FFG-7) frigates (Reina Sofia was commissioned in 1990, 2 more were added in the 90s)

Submarine flotilla (Cartagena) 4 Delfin (Daphne), 4 Galerna (Agosta)

Alpha group (Rota): Dédalo until 1988, then Principe de Asturias (also, Navy flagship) + any number of escorts from the above (usually, 1-2 Asturias, 1 Descubierta, 1 Churruca)

Delta group (Rota): 2 Paul Revere class assault transports, 3 Terrebone Parish class LST and one Casa Grande class LSD (Decomm 1988)

Aircraft flotilla (Rota):

3rd squadron: AB-204/AB-212 ASW helicopters  

5th squadron: SH-3D Sea King

6th squadron: MD-500 

7th squadron: AH-1G Cobra (decomm 1987)

8th squadron: AV-8S Harrier

9th squadron: AV-8B Harrier II (from 1988)

10th squadron: SH-60B Seahawk (also from 1988 or so)

Logistics were a weak point in this era, there was only one oiler, Teide A-11, that was decommissioned in 1988 and not replaced until 1991, in the meantime, a civilian tanker was used.

Maritime zones (had one older destroyer as flagship plus patrol boats and such: zone (Sp name) ship name (class)

Canary islands (Canarias): DD Almirante Ferrandiz (Fletcher) 

Mediterranean (Mediterraneo): DD Valdes (Fletcher)

Gibraltar (Estrecho): Lepanto, then Jorge Juan (Fletcher)

Bay of Biscay (Cantabrico) Alcala Galiano (Fletcher) then Marques de la Ensenada (Oquendo)

[Jaroslav]

15 minutes ago, RETAC21 said:

Sure, the Spanish Navy AOR was the axis Canaries-Gibraltar-Balearics, at the time, deployments beyond this area were extremely rare. The Armada was set up around an aircraft carrier group and an amphibious group. The following administrative squadrons existed

11th (Ferrol): 5 Churruca (Gearing FRAM 1) destroyers + Roger de Lauria (decomm 1982)

21st (Cartagena): 6 Descubierta class corvettes

31st (Ferrol): 5 Asturias (Modified Knox) class

41st (Rota): 4 Santa Maria (FFG-7) frigates (Reina Sofia was commissioned in 1990, 2 more were added in the 90s)

Submarine flotilla (Cartagena) 4 Delfin (Daphne), 4 Galerna (Agosta)

Alpha group (Rota): Dédalo until 1988, then Principe de Asturias (also, Navy flagship) + any number of escorts from the above (usually, 1-2 Asturias, 1 Descubierta, 1 Churruca)

Delta group (Rota): 2 Paul Revere class assault transports, 3 Terrebone Parish class LST and one Casa Grande class LSD (Decomm 1988)

Aircraft flotilla (Rota):

3rd squadron: AB-204/AB-212 ASW helicopters  

5th squadron: SH-3D Sea King

6th squadron: MD-500 

7th squadron: AH-1G Cobra (decomm 1987)

8th squadron: AV-8S Harrier

9th squadron: AV-8B Harrier II (from 1988)

10th squadron: SH-60B Seahawk (also from 1988 or so)

Logistics were a weak point in this era, there was only one oiler, Teide A-11, that was decommissioned in 1988 and not replaced until 1991, in the meantime, a civilian tanker was used.

Maritime zones (had one older destroyer as flagship plus patrol boats and such: zone (Sp name) ship name (class)

Canary islands (Canarias): DD Almirante Ferrandiz (Fletcher) 

Mediterranean (Mediterraneo): DD Valdes (Fletcher)

Gibraltar (Estrecho): Lepanto, then Jorge Juan (Fletcher)

Bay of Biscay (Cantabrico) Alcala Galiano (Fletcher) then Marques de la Ensenada (Oquendo)

Thanks @RETAC21, as allways you are helpfull 🙂

Do you know what are the chances, possibilities and probabilities of the Spanish Navy using two aircraft carriers, the Dedalo (I know she has been withdrawn from service, but could it have been kept in service?) and the Principe? My scenario envisages the use of the Dedalo as an anti-submarine ship (perhaps patroling the area of the Strait of Gibraltar) and the Principe as support, for the amphibious landing, with the Herriers. And do you know which civilian ships were used and which could have been used as support?

[RETAC21]

3 hours ago, Jaroslav said:

Thanks @RETAC21, as allways you are helpfull 🙂

Do you know what are the chances, possibilities and probabilities of the Spanish Navy using two aircraft carriers, the Dedalo (I know she has been withdrawn from service, but could it have been kept in service?) and the Principe? My scenario envisages the use of the Dedalo as an anti-submarine ship (perhaps patroling the area of the Strait of Gibraltar) and the Principe as support, for the amphibious landing, with the Herriers. And do you know which civilian ships were used and which could have been used as support?

On the peacetime Navy, none, there wouldn't be men or machines to man the Dedalo, but with mobilisation, a crew could be put together from the retired and officers could be scrounged up to man the air wing.

For a time, there were a lot of Harriers, with the survivors of the AV-8S and and the new AV-8B operating together. The Army operated the AB-212 as a troop transport and these were compatible with the navy version (so much that they went to the navy and then back to the army)

Regarding transports, the navy has until recently a small transport, the Contramaestre Casado and the army back in 1990 bought a ro-ro ferry, the Martin Posadillo. If commercial ships are needed, there will be plenty of similar ro-ro ships available as they connect to the Canary, Balearic, Ceuta, Melilla and Tanger.

See here: http://www.buques.org/Navieras/Armas/Armas-1_E.htm

Or here for examples: http://www.buques.org/Navieras/Trasmediterranea/Trasmediterranea-06_E.htm

[lucklucky]

15 hours ago, Jaroslav said:

Is there any source to back this bolded data for fleet air arm? I didnt find any data that Italian naval aviation was so strong during Cold war. Only that I could find is this:

It is incorrect. G91Y had no anti ship missiles, neither AMX albeit  Marte probably could be adopted or F104(they used them also for attack until Tornados.) Tornado is correct with German Kormoran. 

The Italian Navy was nevertheless heavy with anti ship missiles including in its helicopters both SH3 and AB 212(the ASuW version) could carry Marte and they could do OTH targetting to the Otomat 180km range missile. 8 Otomat in each Lupo Frigate,  4 in ASW Mastrales frigates, 2 in each Sparviero hydrofoil also there 4 i think in late cold war Saetta corvette. 4 in Guiseppe Garibaldi light carrier. Ardito class 2 destroyers were also updated with Otomat as the helicopter cruiser Vittorio Veneto.

Edited June 29 by lucklucky

[Jaroslav]

Thanks mates, @RETAC21 and @lucklucky. Feel free to write and comment on Spanish and Italian navy during Cold war.

[Jaroslav]

Spanish navy:

Flota
(a) Grupo Aeronaval Alfa (based at Rota)
Principe de Asturas with appropriate escorts
(b) Escuadrillas de Escoltas
1 1 th Squadron, 4 "Gearing " class (based at Ferrol)

21 St Squadron, 6 "Descubierta " class (based at Cartagena)
31 St Squadron. 5 "Baleares" class (based at Rota)
(c) GrupoAnfibio Delta (based at Puntales, Cadiz)
All Amphibious Forces
(d) Fuerza de Medidas contra Minas (based at Palma de
Mallorca) 8 MSCs and 4 MSQs
(e) Flotilla de Submarinos (based at Cartagena)
All submarines
2 Support units,

Cantabrian Zone
1 "Gearing " class, 1 Ocean Tug, 1 Water-boat, 8 Tugs, 4
Patrol Ships, 5 Large Patrol Craft, 7 Coastal Patrol Craft, 1 Inshore Patrol Craft, 1 Inshore/River Patrol Launch, 1 Royal Yacht, 1 Sail Training Ship, 3 Training Craft 3 Support units.

Straits Zone
2 "Atrevida" class (PA-64 / 65), 6 Oceanographic Ships, 1 Sail Training
Ship, 8 Fast Attack Craft, 1 Transport, 1 Ocean Tug, 7 Tugs,
3 Water boats, 13 Coastal Patrol Craft, 6 Inshore Patrol Craft 4 Support units,

Mediterranean Zone
4 Fast Attack Craft, 1 Boom Defence Vessel, 1 Water-boat,
1 Large Patrol Craft, 2 Inshore/River Patrol Launch, 11 Coastal Patrol Craft, 14 Inshore Patrol Craft, 7 Tugs, 1 Frogman Support Ship
5 Support units.

Canaries Zone
2 "Atrevida" class (PA-61 / 62), 1 Water boat, 2 Ocean Tugs, 4 Large
Patrol Craft, 7 Coastal Patrol Craft, 2 Tugs.

 

This data is from Jane's fighting ships 1989.-1990.

Edited July 30 by Jaroslav

[Jaroslav]

Spanish Navy (Armada) - 1975-1989 - Late Cold War

Entering the post-Franco period, the navy may have been even more antiquated than the army. While it was of impressive size with 26 major surface combatants, all but five of these were ofworld War II vintage or older. The navy's solution was the Plan del Alta Mar (High Seas Plan).

In 1980 Spain was not a member of NATO, but coordinated her defenses with some NATO countries by means of bilateral agreements. The primary mission of the Spanish navy was to help maintain sea control in three key areas: the Mediterranean west of the Balearic and Alboran Islands, the Straits of Gibraltar, and the Atlantic between Spain and the Canary Islands. The large number of old ships that were in the Spanish navy in the 1950s had only partially been replaced. In the early 1950s it had six cruisers, 21 destroyers, 18 gunboats and minelayers which served as large frigates, and nine 1400-ton torpedo boats in service or under construction.

By 1980 it had one light carrier, 13 destroyers, six large frigates and eight light frigates, of which all but five large missile frigates of the Baleares class and three new light frigates of the Descubierta class would have to be retired in the near future due to age. Spain was completing five more light frigates of the Descubierta class and plans to build a light carrier and three Peary-class large missile frigates, but these will not compensate numerically for the losses.

Spain's submarine force had remained relatively constant at eight ships, and she was building four French Agosta-class ships which would replace four World War II US boats.

Her force of nine fast attack craft declined to two by 1974, but since then she has built 12 new ones of the Lazaga and Barcelo classes which, however, were used on patrol duties and do not regularly carry missiles or torpedoes. Spain retained all but one of the 12 MSC she received from the U.S. in the 1950s, and in 1971-72 added four ex-US MSO with some mine locating capability.

Since 1976 Spain's carrier operated seven Harrier V/STOL aircraft (called Matadors) in addition to helicopters. The Spanish Air Force operated six P-3A maritime patrol aircraft.

By 1983 the aircraft carrier Prince Asturias , three submarines ("Agosta" class) and three guided missile frigates ("Oliver H. Perry" class) were under construction. The ships of the last two classes were being constructed under license. In the future, the Navy command intended to add to the Navy eight more guided missile frigates (two "Oliver H. Perry" class and six "Descubierta" class) and two guided missile destroyers.

Transfer of the light aircraft carrier "Prince Asturian" to the navy was anticipated in the first half of 1988; the obsolete aircraft carrier "Dedalo", built in 1943, would be dropped from the inventory subsequently. The regular navy had received two "Oliver H. Perry" class guided missile frigates (four in the series; one more may be ordered). They were being built in Spain under an American license.

The ship building program foresaw commissioning the following by 1996: three submarines of a new design, one or two guided missile destroyers with a displacement of 6,500 tons, five frigates, including guided missile frigates, four minehunters and eight coastal minesweepers, a helicopter dock landing ship and four tank landing ships, three patrol ships, six missile boats, a cargo transporter and a general-purpose supply transporter.

The main attention would be devoted to building submarines (type S80, with French design participation) and "Descubierta" class guided missile frigates, and to purchasing deck-landing AV-8B Harrier strike fighters and helicopters.

The first three airplanes of 12 ordered from the USA had already entered the naval aviation inventory. Portugal An order for construction of three type MEK0200 guided missile frigates in the FRG was placed in July 1986. Two antisubmarine helicopters (of as yet unknown type) would be based on them. Their transfer to the navy was anticipated prior to 1992.

There were plans for modernizing frigates presently in the inventory. Thus the forward 100-mm artillery mounts on "Comandante Joao Belo" class ships were to be replaced by a helicopter pad and hangar for a helicopter (for two helicopters), and by antiship missile launchers (also two). The frigates "Baptista de Andrale" and "Joao Coutinho" (10 units) were to be armed with Sea Sparrow antiaircraft missile systems and antiship missile systems. Obsolete "S. Roque" class coastal minesweepers built in 1956-1957 were to be replaced by six new minesweepers; construction of the latter was to begin after completion of the program of construction of type MEK0200 guided missile frigates.

By the end of the Cold War, the Spanish navy (Armada) was relatively large, ranking second in total tonnage, after the British navy, among European NATO nations in the late 1980s. Its ship inventory, although aging, was being upgraded through a construction and modernization program. The total strength of the navy in 1986 was 57,000 personnel,broken down as follows: 44,800 fleet and naval aviation personnel and 12,200 marines. As part of its personnel reorganization, its strength was reduced by 10,000 to 47,300 personnel, including marines, as of 1987. Of this number, about 34,000 were conscripts. Obligated service was 18 months.

Ship strength of the navy in the late 1980s was about 60 combat ships, including 1 general-purpose aircraft carrier, 8 diesel submarines (torpedo attack), 5 DDGs, 7FFGs, 9 amphibious ships, 12 minesweepers and 4 corvettes. In addition, the navy had more than 60 combat cutters of various designations and more than 100 various amphibious landing craft in their amphibious flotilla. The Spanish Navy had more than 140 auxiliary ships.

Operational naval units were classified by mission, and they were assigned to the combat forces, the protective forces, or the auxiliary forces. The combat forces were given the tasks of conducting offensive and defensive operations against potential enemies and of assuring maritime communications. Their principal vessels included a carrier group, naval aircraft, transports and landing vessels, submarines, and missile-armed fast attack craft.

The protective forces had the mission of protecting maritime communications over both ocean and coastal routes and the approaches to ports and to maritime terminals. Their principal components were destroyers or frigates, corvettes, and minesweepers as well as marine units for the defense of naval installations. The auxiliary forces, responsible for transport and for provisioning at sea, also had such diverse tasks as coast guard operations, scientific work, and maintenance of training vessels. In addition to supply ships and a tanker, the force included older destroyers and a considerable number of patrol craft.

The Fleet Command (headqartered at El Ferrol) includes aircraft carrier forces, and flotillas of escort ships and amphibious forces. A flotilla of submarines, consisting of two divisions, was under the Submarine Force Commander (Cartegena Naval Base), while the Mine Force Command (also at Cartegena) was represented by a flotilla of mine forces (two divisions). Subordinate to the commander in chief of the fleet, with his headquarters in Madrid, were four zonal commands: the Cantabrian Maritime Zone with its headquarters at El Ferrol del Caudillo (Ferrol) on the Atlantic coast; the Straits Maritime Zone with its headquarters at San Fernando near Cadiz; the Mediterranean Maritime Zone with its headquarters at Cartagena; and the Canary Islands Maritime Zone with its headquarters at Las Palmas de Gran Canaria.

The fleet of eight submarines was built, based on French designs, with extensive French assistance. Four submarines of the Agosta class were constructed in Spain between 1983 and 1985. They were equipped with the submarine-launched version of the Exocet antiship missile. Four submarines of the Daphne class had been completed between 1973 and 1975.

The largest vessel of the navy was the 15,000-ton aircraft carrier, Principe de Asturias, which had entered service in 1988 as a replacement for the carrier R01 Ddedalo after completing sea trials. Built in Spain with extensive United States engineering assistance and financing, it was designed with a "ski-jump" takeoff deck. Its complement would be six to eight Harrier vertical (or short) takeoff and landing (V/STOL) aircraft and as many as sixteen helicopters designed for antisubmarine warfare and support of marine landings.

The new carrier was to have as its escort group four frigates of the United States FFG-7 class, built in Spain and armed with Harpoon and Standard missiles. The first three were commissioned between 1986 and 1988; construction on the fourth was begun in 1987. Also in the inventory were five frigates, commissioned between 1973 and 1976 and built in Spain with United States assistance.

A number of United States destroyers of the Gearing and the Fletcher classes, constructed at the close of World War II, were also in the 1988 inventory, although the three remaining Fletcher class vessels were scheduled to be retired by 1990.

Six slightly smaller vessels of Portuguese design, classified as corvettes, were constructed in Spain between 1978 and 1982. Four ATREVIDA-Class corvettes were reclassified from the frigate designation in 1980. Their full displacement was 1,135 tons, standard is 1,031 tons; length, 75.5 m; beam, 10.2 m; draft, 3 m. After removing their ASW armament, the only remaining ship's armament were a 76-mm gun each and three 40-mm gun installations each. They can also carry up to 20 mines.

The mine forces were represented by four ocean-going Aggressive-Class minesweepers and eight Adjutant-Class inshore minesweepers built in the US in the 1950s, and later transferred to the Spanish Navy. They had a limited capability to search and sweep mines.

Landing ships and craft include a Cabildo-Class landing ship, dock, two Paul Revere-Class transports, three Terrebone Parish-Class tank landing ships (all of US construction and transferred to Spain in the period from 1971 to 1980) and three Spanish-built LCT-Class tank landing ships.

Of their patrol boats, the most combat-capable appears to be the six Lazaga-Class guard ships (PC01-06) built in 1975-77. They have a fulldisplacement of 399 tons; length, 58.1 m; beam, 7-6 m; draft, 2.6 m. The power of their propulsion plant is 8,000 hp with a maximum speed of 30 kts and a cruising range of 6,100 mi at 17 kts. Each ship is armed with one 76-mm and one 40-mm and two 20-mm guns. In 1986-87, these ships were be equipped with the Harpoon anti-ship missile.

Naval Aviation was organizationally structured into an aviation flotilla, which had seven squadrons: the 8th Fighter Bomber Squadron with AV-8S Matador aircraft; the 7th Fire Support Helicopter Squadron with AH-1G Huey Cobra; the 1st Training Squadron (AB.47G helicopters); the 4th Communications Squadron; the 3rd (AB.212 ASW helicopters), 5th (SH-3D Sea King) and the 6th (Hughes 500M) ASW helicopters. In operational relationships, the air force's 22nd Patrol Air Wing, equipped with 6 P-3A Orion maritime patrol aircraft, was subordinated to the Navy.

The marines, numbering about 12,000 troops, were divided into base defense forces and landing forces. One of the three base defense battalions was stationed at each of the headquarters at Ferrol, Cartagena, and San Fernando. "Groups" (midway between battalions and regiments) were stationed at Madrid and at Las Palmas de Gran Canaria. The fleet tercio (equal to a regiment), available for immediate embarkation, was based at San Fernando and subordinated to the fleet commander. Marine equipment included M48 tanks, 155-mm self-propelled howitzers, 105-mm self-propelled and towed cannon, 120-, 81-, and 60-mm motars, 106-mm recoilless rifles, TOW and Dragon anti-tank missiles and LVTP-7 amphibian armored personnel carriers.

Training wss aimed at increasing the combat readiness of fleet aviation and marine forces and systems, and, in light of the broadening military ties with NATO, at exercising joint operations with fleets of the other members. In 1985, the Spanish Navy participated in one exercise of the national armed forces. The fleet took on more than 60 national and joint exercises of various levels with the navies of the US, France, Portugal, Italy, Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, Greece and Morocco. Marine amphibious forces carried out 12 exercise-training landings and 9 exercises to practice combat operations of marines on the shore. Elements of the naval defense force participated in 85 tactical and 5 command post exercises.

Overall, in combat training, they executed over 134 combat drills for organization for air-defense of ships at sea using tactical air force aviation and 62 with aircraft and helicopters of naval aviation; 25 times, the forces of the navy dispersed for the operational security and combat readiness and more than 40 times in the support of ground forces. In 1985, the total at-sea time for Spanish submarines (submerged) was about 7,000 hours, and general naval aviation flight time, 13,000. In addition, the Spanish Navy underwent 80 deployments (total duration, 762 days) for patrol duties in the economic and fishing zones. Auxiliary ships deployed more than 70 times in support of the continuous navy operations.

As of 1986, by 1996 Spain was planning to build three submarines, one or two DDGs, five frigates and FFGs, four minesweeper-minehunters and eight inshore minesweepers, six missile boats, a supply ship, an aircushion dock landing ship, four tank landing ships, three corvettes and one training sailing ship. Completion of these programs could move the Spanish Navy into the list of capable and powerful navies of Western Europe.

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/es-navy-bourbon3.htm

[Jaroslav]

Spanish naval aviation

Naval Air Service 
Type     Escuadrilla

AB212ASW(with AS 12 missiles) 3
Piper Comanche
Twin Comanche
Cessna Citation

Sikorsky SH-3D/G Sea King (with AS 1 2 missiles) 5

Hughes 500M (ASW) 6

Matador AV-8A (Harrier) 8

Matador TAV-8A (Harrier) ] Matador II EAV8B 12

S-70LSeahawk 10
 

Data is from Jane's fighting ships 1989.-1990.

Edited November 2 by Jaroslav

[Jaroslav]

Spanish naval infantry

Marine Corps
This consists of four "Tercios " (intermediate between a Regiment
and a Brigade) based at Ferrol, Cartagena and Cadiz (two) Two
Groups (intermediate between a Battalion and a Regiment) are based in Madrid and Las Palmas (Canary Islands). These Tercios and Groups are charged with the protection of their naval bases and establishments The Tercio de Armada is based at San Fernando, Cadiz and is the landing force available for immediate embarkation. The Tercio de Armada, brigade-sized, consists of two landing battalions plus a special operations unit, a support logistic battalion, a communications company, a tank company (with 1 7 M-48E and one M-88 recovery vehicle, plus 17 Scorpion light tanks), one
amphibious tractors company (19 LVT-7 in three versions), one
artillery battalion (six M109A2 with six M-992 ammunition
vehicles, 12 towed QTQ Melara 105 mm LI 4 howitzers), one
anti-tank company with 12 TQW and 16/18 Dragon missile launchers. Infantry support weapons include 106 mm M40
recoilless rifles, 1 20, 81 and 60 mm ECIA mortars, Instalaza 90 mm
and LAWS 72 mm anti-tank rocket launchers, Rasura infantry locating radars Also armoured Pegaso BLR 400 infantry carriers
(riot in Tercio de Armada) and Pegaso 3550 three ton amphibious
trucks.
 

Data is from Jane's fighting ships 1989.-1990.

[RETAC21]

7 hours ago, Jaroslav said:

Spanish naval infantry

Marine Corps
This consists of four "Tercios " (intermediate between a Regiment
and a Brigade) based at Ferrol, Cartagena and Cadiz (two) Two
Groups (intermediate between a Battalion and a Regiment) are based in Madrid and Las Palmas (Canary Islands). These Tercios and Groups are charged with the protection of their naval bases and establishments The Tercio de Armada is based at San Fernando, Cadiz and is the landing force available for immediate embarkation. The Tercio de Armada, brigade-sized, consists of two landing battalions plus a special operations unit, a support logistic battalion, a communications company, a tank company (with 1 7 M-48E and one M-88 recovery vehicle, plus 17 Scorpion light tanks), one
amphibious tractors company (19 LVT-7 in three versions), one
artillery battalion (six M109A2 with six M-992 ammunition
vehicles, 12 towed QTQ Melara 105 mm LI 4 howitzers), one
anti-tank company with 12 TQW and 16/18 Dragon missile launchers. Infantry support weapons include 106 mm M40
recoilless rifles, 1 20, 81 and 60 mm ECIA mortars, Instalaza 90 mm
and LAWS 72 mm anti-tank rocket launchers, Rasura infantry locating radars Also armoured Pegaso BLR 400 infantry carriers
(riot in Tercio de Armada) and Pegaso 3550 three ton amphibious
trucks.
 

Data is from Jane's fighting ships 1989.-1990.

Marine Corps (Infanteria de Marina) pretty much had 2 components, the Marine Brigade (Tercio de Armada or TEAR) with the following OOB:

HQ, which included

- Special operations unit 

- Communications company,

two landing battalions

Mechanised battalion, which included:

- Tank company (with 1 7 M-48E and one M-88 recovery vehicle, plus 17 Scorpion light tanks)

- Amphibious tractors company (19 LVT-7 in three versions),

Support logistic battalion,

Artillery battalion (six M109A2 with six M-992 ammunition vehicles, 12 towed QTQ Melara 105 mm LI 4 howitzers),

Anti-tank company with 12 TQW and 16/18 Dragon missile launchers. 

The other Tercios (Norte, Levante, Sur) and Grupos (Madrid and Canarias) are charged with security and protection of naval installations and ships, for which they had a handful of BLR APCs

The Pegaso 3550 was a failure and was w/o in 1985: https://rusadiryelmar.com/2022/07/15/camion-anfibio-pato/

[Stuart Galbraith]

That's interesting, I didn't know Spain used Scorpion..

[RETAC21]

34 minutes ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

That's interesting, I didn't know Spain used Scorpion..

Only the Marines, who had always been "speshiul"

https://www.defensa.com/espana/pequeno-pero-maton-carro-combate-scorpion-infanteria-marina

15 were given to Chile, 2 preserved

Interestingly enough, the Marines also had the "other" Scorpion

These went to Morocco, apparently

[Jaroslav]

Tu-22 Operations Against US 6th Fleet

v.1.0 September 23, 2001

Translated by Constantine Pehlivan from www.airforce.ru

 

This article is translated from a Russian website, with permission. Unfortunately, the source was lost in the transmission of the email message containing the article. We will provide the source as soon as possible.

46 Air Army of Soviet Strategic Aviation (Russ. Long-Ranged Aviation, Dalnaya Aviatzia) had two main missions: attack on important NATO targets in European territory and attacks on carrier battle groups of 6th Fleet in Mediterranean. Initial reconnaissance was due to be hold by two recce regiments with Tu-22R: 199th and 290th. 199th was based in Nezhina, Ukraine, and its zone of responsibility included Central Europe, including Germany and Austria, and southern regions, including Turkey, Greece, Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean. Zone of 290th Regiment, based in Zubrovka, Russia, included Baltic, Denmark and Scandinavia, around Kola Peninsula and coastal waters of Norwegian Sea. In peacetime, those regiments were training over Volga and Caspian Sea. Caspian Sea was also used for training of missile strikes on target ships. Those regiments also were due to scout the routes before missile strikes, especially for 15th Bomber Division, aimed at carrier battle groups. 15th Bomber Division incorporated 121st and 203rd Long-Ranged Heavy Bomber Regiments in Machulishti and Baranovichi respectively, Belarus, and 341st in Ozerno, Ukraine

The strikes should be aided and guided by different recce equipment, including land-based HF targeting radars, recce "trawlers", like a shadow following US ships, and other seabed, including submarines. Those aids could give approximate targeting only, but precise targeting with acquisition of carriers among the rest ships was needed. This was the complex mission of Tu-22Rs. A basic task against 6th Fleet should be fulfilled by 4 Tu-22Rs, coming from friendly Balkan states. If necessary, for some section of the route fighter cover should be provided. To avoid early warning, planes should approached carrier battle group at low altitude. Near the target a pair had to climb up sharply, the other pair had to enter the center of the group. First pair had to jam the radars and provide retranslation of data, provided by second pair. The second one had the most dangerous mission – to locate precisely the carrier among the group. That often needed visual contact, because the radar in surface scanning mode had difficulties. Immediately after acquisition data should be translated via the first pair to attacking Tu-22Ks. Tu-22Ks of 15 Bomber Division had to attack in regiments – groups of 24 – 30 planes plus 4 – 8 Tu-22Rs ECM.

The attack should be launched outside air defense range, theoretically from 550 km., if bomber flew at 14-km. altitude and 1720 km/h, or 400 km. at 10-km. altitude and 950 km/h respectively. Practically, missiles were due to be launched from 250 – 270 km. because radar guidance was necessary. For long-ranged attacks missile’s autopilot was programmed for flight at 22.5-km altitude and sudden turn to the target at speed of 1400 – 1720 km/h. and active radar seeker turned on at the terminal stage. If nuke was used, radar seeker was not necessary. X-22/AS-4 Kitchen air-to-surface missile had liquid-fueled engine with hydrazine fuel and nitrogen acid oxidizer. After launch pre-programmed autopilot, radio altimeter and Doppler gauge guided missile to the target. In intermediate stage gyro-stabilized autopilot took control.

There were two basic models of attack up to the target. For low altitude attack AS-4 climbed up to 12 km but in terminal stage dived to altitude below 500 m with M=1,2. Against sea targets AS-4 climbed up to 27 km and dived with M=2,5. Impact fuse was used for conventional warhead, for nuclear different fuses were available. Even conventional warhead caused hole of 20-m2 area and 12 m depth.

While Tu-22Ks were getting ready for attack, Tu-22Rs had to disguise the attack by different ECM systems. That should prevent launch of Standard SAMs to bombers and missiles.

In early 1970s this tactic was questioned because E-2C/F-14 duo entered service. F-14 was specially designed to face Soviet air launched anti-shipping missiles threat. The long ranged patrols of Tomcat, the powerful radar and inventory forced Soviet bombers to attack within the coverage of AIM-54 Phoenix.

https://web.archive.org/web/20110811063526/http://orbat.com/site/history/historical/usa/tu22.html

 

http://orbat.com/site/history/historical/usa/tu22.html

[Jaroslav]

1 hour ago, RETAC21 said:

Only the Marines, who had always been "speshiul"

https://www.defensa.com/espana/pequeno-pero-maton-carro-combate-scorpion-infanteria-marina

15 were given to Chile, 2 preserved

Interestingly enough, the Marines also had the "other" Scorpion

These went to Morocco, apparently

What was Infanteria marina capabilities for large operations in oposite side of Mediterranean. Scenario include Spanish, French and Italian naval infantry amphibious landing on Crete alongside with paratroopers. USMC would contribute only with 6th fleet asociated unit

Edited June 29 by Jaroslav

[Jaroslav]

Hiding in Plain Sight—The U.S. Navy and Dispersed Operations

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1533&context=nwc-review

[Jaroslav]

6 minutes ago, Jaroslav said:

Hiding in Plain Sight—The U.S. Navy and Dispersed Operations

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1533&context=nwc-review

 

Hiding in plain sight: the U.S. Navy and dispersed operations under EMCON, 1956-1972.

 

The ability to operate freely, unthreatened by adversaries seeking to track and target them or interfere with their communications, that the U.S. Navy's air craft carriers have enjoyed for the last two decades is unlikely to continue. China has been developing an antiaccess/area-denial capability, centered on antiship ballistic missiles, that may soon be able to locate and attack U.S. carriers at considerable distances. (1) The Chinese People's Liberation Army has also developed concepts for information warfare that integrate computer network operations, electronic warfare, and kinetic strikes to degrade an opponent's ability to collect, process, and disseminate information. (2) If combined effectively, antiship ballistic missiles and attacks on information networks could endanger the U.S. Navy's command of the sea. (3)

Although the specific problems presented by antiship ballistic missiles and information warfare are new, the broader operational challenges are not. During the Cold War, the threat posed by Soviet naval aviation and submarines prompted the U.S. Navy to stage a number of experiments examining the con duct of dispersed operations at sea. Spreading out across a wide area, it was believed, would make U.S. naval forces harder to detect, identify, and target. In order to lessen the chance of detection further, the U.S. forces in the experiments strictly limited their communications. Dispersed operations under emission control (EMCON) represented a significant departure from more active and overt methods of operation and posed new operational challenges.

Navy experiments like the HAYSTACK and UPTIDE series therefore offer collectively an excellent opportunity to study organizational adaptation and change in response to new technologies and threats and to consider the conduct of distributed operations in the absence of a network.

THE U.S. NAVY IN THE 1950S

One of the primary challenges facing the U.S. Navy in the early years of the Cold War was how to employ its command of the sea to influence events ashore. The Soviet Union was essentially a land power; it did not possess a fleet capable of challenging American maritime supremacy. Instead, American and Western European policy makers expected a land attack against Western Europe and the Middle East to constitute the Soviets' principal offensive thrust in any future conflict. (4) As early as 1948, the U.S. Navy began envisaging an offensive strike force that would seek to slow the Soviet ground advance across Western Europe. (5) By 1956, the carriers of the Navy's Mediterranean-based Sixth Fleet were tasked with not only slowing any Soviet attack headed west and south but also striking key targets in the southern European part of the Soviet Union. (6)

In order for their aircraft to reach their targets, however, the Sixth Fleet's carriers had to move into the eastern Mediterranean, close to the Soviet Union, and survive there long enough to conduct launch operations. In the mid-1950s, the carriers' chances of doing so appeared slim. A series of air-defense exercises over the preceding years had demonstrated the fleet's inability to defend itself against even relatively small Soviet air raids. (7) In 1956, Admiral John H. Cassady, Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, conceded in his annual report, "It is widely recognized that a carrier task force cannot provide for its air defense under conditions likely to exist in combat in the Mediterranean."(8)

The Haystack Concept

When Vice Admiral Harry Felt assumed command of Sixth Fleet in 1956, the fleet's ability to perform its primary mission was therefore questionable. Perhaps as a consequence, Sixth Fleet had the reputation of being a social rather than an operational fleet. Felt sought to change that reputation and improve the effectiveness of his new command by infusing the fleet s staff with new blood. (9)

One of the young officers Felt brought in was Lieutenant Jeremiah Denton. (10) Denton's background was in lighter-than-air aviation and electronic warfare. He had tested large airborne radars in blimps and served as the project officer for the WV-2, one of the Navy's first airborne-early-warning radar aircraft. Denton thus possessed a solid understanding of air defense operations, Soviet aerial attack capabilities, and airborne radar systems. (11)

Drawing on his extensive experience looking at radar scopes, Denton had developed an idea of how to extend the survival time of the Sixth Fleet's carriers during a general war. (12) He joined forces with Ralph Beatty, the Operations Evaluation Group analyst attached to Sixth Fleet, who had been working on mathematical techniques for calculating how a fleet of aircraft could find a carrier in a background of similar targets. Together, they began developing the new concept. (13)

Denton and Beatty argued that the Soviet bombers' greatest challenge was finding and identifying the Sixth Fleet's carriers. The fleet should therefore do everything in its power to "thwart and delay" recognition of the carriers. It should disperse widely and intermingle with commercial shipping in order to eliminate the unmistakable appearance on airborne radar scopes of the standard close, circular ("bull's-eye") formation. All nearby supporting units, including the destroyers serving as plane guards and screening the carriers against submarines, should disperse, and the carriers should operate independently. Strict control of all electronic emissions and the widespread use of deception would increase the effectiveness of the concept, which Denton dubbed "Haystack," because of its emphasis on making the carriers difficult to find. (14)

When Felt left Sixth Fleet after just six months to become Vice Chief of Naval Operations, he made a point of praising Denton, Beatty, and the Haystack concept in front of his successor, Vice Admiral Charles "Cat" Brown, and the entire Sixth Fleet staff. (15) Under Brown's command, Sixth Fleet began conducting experiments to test the Haystack concept. Small-scale tests began in October 1956.

The HAYSTACK Exercises

The first major exercise testing the Haystack concept, HAYSTACK CHARLIE, was conducted in January 1957 in the Mediterranean Sea about a hundred miles west of Sardinia. The primary objective of the two-day exercise was "to test the effectiveness of tactical deception as a method of striking force air defense." The exercise pitted two aircraft carriers, USS Coral Sea (CVA 43) and USS Randolph (CVA 15), their escorts, and their logistical support ships against a conventional submarine and land-based snooper and attack aircraft flying out of Naples and Malta. The carriers, which operated up to 250 miles apart, conducted simulated nuclear strikes against wartime targets and then retired, while the aggressor force tried to find and attack them as soon as possible. (16)

The exercise results suggested that tactical deception was effective. The carriers were able to avoid detection long enough to launch thirty to thirty-five simulated atomic strikes each day before being "attacked" by "aggressor" aircraft. Small groups of ships were employed effectively as decoys; they attracted attacks from several aircraft searching for the carriers. In particular, the guided-missile cruiser USS Boston (CAG 1) and two destroyers acted as an effective "missile trap" early in the exercise, shooting down several snooper aircraft trying to investigate the three closely packed radar blips. (17)

The results indicated, however, that the Haystack concept was still imperfect. Destroyers were frequently too close to the carriers. The three destroyers escorting Coral Sea were within ten miles of the carrier when the exercise began, enabling a snooper aircraft to detect the carrier in the first five minutes. The destroyers accompanying Randolph remained more distant, but they were still close enough to attract attention from snooper aircraft soon after the exercise started. Aircraft also tended to operate too close to the carriers. Aggressor aircraft attacked Randolph after intercepting the radar of an antisubmarine patrol plane circling the carrier. A snooper aircraft also detected the radar signal of an airborne-early-warning plane operating near a carrier. (18)

HAYSTACK DELTA, a seventeen-hour exercise, was held on 2 March 1957 in the Mediterranean Sea southeast of Malta and Sicily. The exercise emphasized passive air defense using traps and decoy groups. It matched two carriers, USS Forrestal (CVA 59) and USS Lake Champlain (CVA 39), against two conventional submarines and land-based attack, snooper, and electronic countermeasure (ECM) aircraft operating out of Naples and Malta. (19)

The exercise results again suggested that tactical deception was successful. The strike aircraft experienced significant problems identifying targets due to heavy cloud cover and squalls, careful emission control, and deceptive formations. Learning from past exercises, the destroyers in HAYSTACK DELTA remained farther away from the carriers and often paired with other ships to simulate carriers. The eight aggressor strikes detected thirteen possible military targets, but only one correctly identified a carrier (Forrestal) and its plane guard. Three strikes detected Boston and two accompanying destroyers, which were stationed in the expected direction of attack in order to draw strikes away from the carriers, and closed to investigate or attack. Two other strikes attacked oilers, which were paired with destroyers and being used as decoys for the first time. (20)

Emission control also proved effective. Only radar picket destroyers and sector air-defense ships, not carriers, used navigation aids. The aggressor ECM aircraft located the task force's operating area but could not locate or identify individual units, due to the suppression of electronic signals characteristic of particular ships. (21)

In order to experiment with the use of islands to hinder the identification of surface units by aggressor aircraft, the venue for HAYSTACK ECHO was moved to the Aegean Sea. The exercise, which was held from 9 to 11 April 1957, pitted Forrestal, Lake Champlain, and their escorts against two submarines and land-based snooper, ECM, and attack aircraft operating from Athens. The primary objective, again, was to practice tactical control and air defense in a dispersed disposition. (22)

Postexercise analysis was to indicate that it had not realistically tested the Haystack concept, because of the requirement for nighttime air operations and the consequent need for the carriers to employ plane guards and tactical air navigation systems (TACANs). An aggressor ECM aircraft had intercepted Lake Champlain's TACAN emissions shortly after the exercise began and vectored in snooper aircraft to track the carrier and strike aircraft to attack it. The initial two attacks had been successful, as were two later strikes; snooper aircraft had tracked Lake Champlain almost continuously for the rest of the exercise. Forrestal had been detected visually at 7:14 AM on 10 April and had been tracked continuously thereafter, although it had not been attacked successfully until 3:01 PM. ECM aircraft had also detected and successfully attacked the carriers on several other occasions during the exercise. The analysis concluded, "Air control without the use of TACAN by carriers is essential." (23)

Other attempts at deception in HAYSTACK ECHO were only moderately successful. The heavy cruiser Salem (CA 139) and two destroyers decoyed snooper aircraft into shadowing them for several hours, until daybreak revealed that the group was not a carrier and its escorts. The many islands in the operating area, however, did not appear to hinder the aggressor force's ability to find the carriers. Instead, they complicated the task force's efforts to defend itself. Landlocking of radars (the tendency of radar return from landmasses to mask contacts around them) severely handicapped the ability of the task force to detect aggressor aircraft and control its own aircraft. Moreover, once the carriers and decoy groups were located, they were unable to relocate quickly. The aggressors could thus ignore the decoys and concentrate their efforts on the carriers. (24)

The purpose of the Haystack concept was to develop tactics that would extend the survival time of U.S. carriers in the Mediterranean during the initial period of a nuclear exchange. After the conclusion of HAYSTACK ECHO, Brown declared the exercises a success. In a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) that also went to all the major commands in the Navy, Brown claimed, "Haystack tactics have been proved effective in increasing the critical survival time available for launching counter strikes against aggressor bases under today's war conditions in this area." (25) When the exercise series began, the expected survival time for carriers in the Mediterranean had been less than two hours. During HAYSTACK CHARLIE, DELTA, and ECHO, the carriers, with one exception, survived for at least eight hours; half of the participating carriers survived for over fifteen hours. (26) Extending the survival time of the carriers by even a few hours gave them enough time to hit Soviet airfields and ports, thereby reducing the threat they faced thereafter. "As each hour without attack passes," Brown explained, "the chances of continued survival increases many fold." (27)

THE U.S. NAVY IN THE 1960S

The Sixth Fleet focused most of its attention on the threat posed by Soviet long-range aviation in part because there was no significant Soviet naval presence outside home waters at the time. In the mid-1950s Soviet surface combatants started to visit foreign ports occasionally, and they began conducting annual exercises in the North and Norwegian Seas in the late 1950s, but there were still relatively few Soviet submarines operating in the Mediterranean. The commander of the Sixth Fleet from 1958 to 1959, Vice Admiral Clarence E. Ekstrom, felt the submarine threat facing Sixth Fleet was "quite manageable." (28)

The developers of the Haystack concept expected that dispersing the destroyers screening the carrier would increase the carrier's vulnerability to submarine attack but considered the risk acceptable in areas where the submarine concentration was low or when the air threat exceeded the submarine threat. (29) By 1961 they were confident that the combination of dispersion, deception, and emission control would enable U.S. carriers to survive against enemy submarine attack long enough to conduct their retaliatory nuclear strikes, even in areas of relatively high concentrations of submarines, so long as those submarines were conventionally powered. Beatty estimated that a carrier could survive for an average of five days in a ten-thousand-square-mile area containing two conventional submarines. (30)

The introduction of the nuclear-powered submarine in the mid-1950s, however, revolutionized undersea warfare. (31) The first Soviet nuclear submarines began entering service in 1958 and soon threatened to render the Haystack tactics obsolete. By the early 1960s leading Navy officials were increasingly focused on how to counter the potential threat of nuclear submarines. A paper, "The Strategic Concept for Antisubmarine Warfare," circulated by the CNO, Admiral Arleigh Burke, identified hostile submarine activities as "foremost among the threats to our use of the seas." (32)

Compounding the challenge was the equipping of nuclear submarines with antiship cruise missiles. As early as 1960, Rear Admiral Jimmy Thach, one of the Navy's leading antisubmarine warfare (ASW) experts, predicted that submarine forces would increasingly rely on missiles as their primary weapons, even against shipping. (33) The Soviet Echo II class, a nuclear-powered submarine equipped with eight SS-N-3A (Shaddock) missiles, entered service in 1962. The SS-N-3A missile was, with the exception of certain aircraft, the longest-ranged antiship weapon in the world; it was capable of striking targets at sea from a distance of 250 nautical miles. Since the typical defensive perimeter of an American carrier battle group extended only a hundred nautical miles from the center, an Echo II could remain outside the perimeter and potentially launch an attack undetected. After an exercise to test performance against Soviet nuclear submarines firing "standoff" missiles, one U.S. Navy commander concluded, "It is evident that the force would have had essentially no capability against such an attack." (34)

Although the cruise missile-firing submarine presented dangers, it also had weaknesses. Its chief problem was detecting and identifying its targets while preserving its own stealth. As Beatty observed, "The ability of a submarine to identify carriers by sonar alone in large dispersed dispositions is poor. Visual identification is usually necessary." (35) He recommended testing the effectiveness of dispersed formations against nuclear submarines and placing an increased emphasis on the development of acoustic deception tactics and equipment, particularly expendable acoustic decoys. (36)

The UPTIDE Concept

By the late 1960s, the Navy increasingly emphasized improving its ability to defend against missile-firing nuclear submarines. In June 1968, the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral John J. Hyland, initiated Project UPTIDE (Unified Pacific Fleet Project for Tactical Improvement and Data Extraction). One of the primary objectives of UPTIDE was to devise and evaluate tactics Pacific Fleet antisubmarine warfare groups (typically an ASW carrier, its air wing, and a destroyer squadron) could use to frustrate and defend against missile and torpedo attacks by enemy submarines within moving or static areas of high tactical interest. (37)

The driving force behind the UPTIDE series was Vice Admiral E. P. "Pete" Aurand. An innovator and iconoclast, Aurand suggested shifting the focus of the ASW effort from killing submarines to reducing their effectiveness by preventing encounters. (38) Echoing Beatty, Aurand argued that although the nuclear submarine was very fast and could remain submerged indefinitely, it was still essentially blind. An unassisted submarine relied heavily on passive acoustic sensors to detect, classify, track, and localize carriers and other high-value targets. Degrading the information the submarine received could significantly reduce its effectiveness.

The UPTIDE experiments focused on reducing the probabilities that the submarine would detect, identify, and localize its target. The probability that the submarine would detect its target could be reduced by strict acoustic and electromagnetic emission control. Aurand may have drawn inspiration from his previous observation of Soviet naval operations in the Sea of Japan. Aurand had noticed that Soviet radar antennas neither rotated nor emitted. He speculated that the Soviet navy's policy was to leave its radars turned off unless there was no other way to obtain desired information. Although it denied the Soviets early warning, Aurand believed, "such a policy has merit, especially when compared to the predominant practice of most U.S. ships to emit constantly." He concluded, "Finesse in the handling of emitters, electronic, visual, and acoustic should be developed by our ships, especially in the vicinity of Soviet ships." (39)

The probability that the submarine would successfully identify a detected target could be decreased through acoustic deception. The probability that the submarine would localize it (i.e., close to within range of its weapons) could be diminished by forcing the submarine to move slowly, by deploying good passive acoustic systems in all antisubmarine vehicles, especially helicopters and destroyers. (40)

The UPTIDE Experiments

Project UPTIDE developed in three phases from January 1969 to November 1972. In each phase, an ASW group examined various dimensions of the challenge presented by nuclear submarines firing cruise missiles. (41) The purpose of Phase I was to lay the foundation for Phases II and III by exploring the broad outlines of the problem, refining the experimental design and methodology, and developing procedures for processing and analyzing data. It examined the situation from the perspective of the enemy submarine and derived data on the submarine's capabilities to detect, identify, and fire its missiles at high-value targets. Phase I also established a baseline for comparison of conventional antisubmarine warfare tactics with UPTIDE tactics. (42)

Phase I consisted of three continuous free-play experiments (each a Hunter-Killer Antisubmarine Warfare Exercise, or HUKASWEX), which took place from January to March 1969. In each exercise, USS Kearsarge (CVS 33), its aircraft, and Destroyer Squadron 23, constituting Antisubmarine Warfare Group 1, tried to defend Kearsarge against two opposing submarines with simulated cruise-missile capabilities. The submarines participating in Phase I were USS Pomodon (SS 486) and Medregal (SS 480) for HUKASWEX 1-69 and USS Snook (SSN 592) and Scamp (SSN 588) for HUKASWEX 2-69 and 3-69. The results of Phase I underscored the magnitude of the threat posed by the cruise-missile submarine and established the key metric that would be used in Phase II--the survival time of the carrier. In 144 exercise hours, the submarines conducted three torpedo attacks and nineteen launch events simulating the firing of seventy-eight missiles at the carrier. Eighty-seven percent of the missiles were judged to have met the bearing parameters for acquisition of their targets. The average survival time of the carrier was nine hours. (43)

Phase II was the major data-collection and tactical-evaluation phase of Project UPTIDE. It consisted of four major experiments from September 1969 to January 1971. The experiments were devoted to examining the effectiveness of dispersion, acoustic and electromagnetic emission control, simulation of the high-value target by surface escorts, and active acoustic deception against cruise missile-firing submarines in a scenario involving a carrier operating within a fixed area and simulating the launching of strike aircraft. (44)

The initial Phase II experiment, UPTIDE 2-B, took place in late September and early October 1969 and pitted Antisubmarine Warfare Group 3--consisting of USS Hornet (CVS 12), its aircraft, and Destroyer Squadron 31--against USS Sculpin (SSN 590) and Razorback (SS 394). By employing a dispersed formation, steaming below propeller cavitation speed (i.e., the speed at which the collapse of bubbles behind the blades becomes detectably loud), controlling emissions, and using escorts as "wolf trap" units to lure the submarines away, Hornet was able to avoid identification for the entire seven-day exercise. The submarines were deceived, lured, or confused for the majority of the exercise and spent nearly all the rest of the time in unproductive searches. Toward the end of the exercise, in frustration, Sculpin used strategic information to fire a spread of eight missiles at a range of two hundred miles. Significantly, two of them could have met the bearing parameters to acquire Hornet. Nevertheless, the commander of Antisubmarine Warfare Group 3 described the exercise as "an unprecedented success against the undersea adversary by an ASW group using a totally new concept in communications, formations, tactics, deception, and electronic/ acoustic emission control." (45)

UPTIDE 2-C, held in January and February 1970, marked the introduction of a new tactical element--the acoustic deception device. The minesweeper USS Leader (MSO 490) was equipped with an active acoustic simulator called "Tergiversator," developed by the Naval Underwater Sound Center in New London, Connecticut. Tergiversator transmitted into the water carrier and escort propulsion noises and active sonar transmissions. Working together, Leader and the guided-missile cruiser USS Chicago (CG 11) were able to deceive the submarines USS Plunger (SSN 595) and Snook. After listening to the deception device's output for three hours, Plunger concluded that it was a heavy warship and fired two missiles at it. Meanwhile, Hornetwas able to survive undetected for eighty-seven hours. Only when the carrier operated independently at high speed were the submarines successful in making a coordinated missile attack. (46)

The number and range of acoustic deception devices expanded significantly in UPTIDE 2-D, which was held in October 1970. Seven devices were employed, including an updated version of Tergiversator; two SADSAC (Small Acoustic Device Simulating a Carrier) buoys, developed by the Naval Underwater Research and Development Center; and four NYVOs (Nymph's Voices), developed by Magnavox. Once again the devices proved effective. They were able to mask the identity of USS Ticonderoga (CVS 14) for the first ninety-three hours of the exercise and induce Sculpin and Snook to dedicate two of their four launch events and nine of their sixteen missiles to them. (47)

The final exercise of Phase II, UPTIDE 2-E, underscored the dramatic impact that the experimental tactics could have on carrier survivability. Using UPTIDE tactics, Ticonderoga was able to avoid detection by Plunger and USS Haddock (SSN 621) for the entire 140 hours of the regularly scheduled exercise. On the last day, the carrier reverted to conventional tactics; it was targeted for simulated missile attacks within four and a half hours.

The principal finding from Phase II was that UPTIDE dispersion and deception tactics allowed carriers and their escorts to avoid consistently encounters with submarines. In nearly 650 exercise hours, there were just fourteen launch events, simulating the firing of fifty-six missiles. Moreover, less than one-third of the missiles met the bearing parameters for acquisition. On average, the submarines went a hundred hours between valid fire-control solutions on the carrier and were unable to conduct any torpedo attacks. In the four week-long exercise periods of UPTIDE Phase II, the "Blue" (i.e., U.S.) force achieved an average survival time of almost five and a half days for the high-value target between submarine-launched missile firings--an improvement by a factor of eighteen over Phase I results using conventional tactics. (48)

Phase III of UPTIDE, in two experiments from October 1971 to November 1972, examined transit scenarios and used a new measure of performance--miles safely traveled. The challenges the ASW group faced were increased to include integrated surface, subsurface, and air threats, but they were offset by corresponding increases in the group's capabilities. Among the new capabilities introduced were land-based patrol aircraft, towed passive sonar arrays, and helicopter-equipped destroyers. Acoustic deception devices were also used extensively, and with considerable success. Combining these new capabilities with UPTIDE tactics, the ASW group in UPTIDE 3-A was able to make good 86 percent of the nine hundred miles it attempted without a successful attack by a submarine. Only when three of the five acoustic deception devices being used broke down was the carrier detected and successfully targeted. (49)

The final exercise of the UPTIDE series, UPTIDE 3-B, occurred in October and November 1972. It added several new capabilities to the Blue forces, including two squadrons of land-based patrol aircraft and a helicopter-equipped destroyer. The Blue forces also successfully made tactical use of towed sonar arrays and Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) information, although the slow towing speed of the towed arrays limited their utility in transit scenarios. (50)

DISPERSED OPERATIONS UNDER EMCON

The forces participating in the HAYSTACK exercises and those conducting the UPTIDE series struggled to command and control widely dispersed forces under EMCON. During the HAYSTACK exercises, Sixth Fleet sought to exploit "every available method of delivering message traffic that will permit the originating ship to maintain the highest practicable degree of electronic silence." (51) The fleet forbade the commanding officers of ships to use electronic means of communication unless absolutely necessary. (52) Instead, they were to employ visual signals, such as flag hoists or blinkers, to control flight operations and transmit messages. (53)

The fleet also urged the use of helicopters and airplanes to carry messages between ships. There was always the possibility of missing a message drop, but the helicopter or aircraft would typically carry extra copies of messages. The messages, enclosed in the equivalent of a buoy, would also float and could therefore be retrieved. Aircraft could also deliver messages to shore-based radio stations for relay to their ultimate destinations. (54)

In cases where electronic communication was necessary, the fleet relied on airborne relay of ultrahigh-frequency (UHF) transmissions, which are typically limited to horizon ranges and so are more difficult to detect than high-frequency transmissions. Although Soviet aircraft, submarines, and surface ships could intercept UHF transmissions, they had to be fairly close to the task force to do so. UHF was thus seen as a "relatively secure means of communication." (55)

Many of the methods UPTIDE forces employed were similar to those used during the HAYSTACK exercises. Among these were "bean-bag communications" (delivery of messages by helicopter) and airborne UHF relay. A central element of UPTIDE was the extensive use of an airborne-early-warning aircraft to relay UHF communications from the carrier to its escorts and other ships. During UPTIDE 3-A, antisubmarine aircraft and the carrier's combat information center used UHF so heavily that they nearly saturated the available circuits. (56)

The restriction to alternative methods and the near saturation of available circuits produced significant delays in communications. In HAYSTACK CHARLIE, inexperience with the alternative radio techniques used and the existence of too many units on the nets in each sector combined to produce long communications delays. (57) In UPTIDE 3-A, the delay times for messages with immediate operational relevance ranged from ten to 318 minutes. Even flash-precedence messages were delayed for up to sixty minutes. (58)

Diminished communications capabilities placed a premium on planning. To implement the Haystack concept, Sixth Fleet relied more heavily on doctrine and fixed plans. (59) According to the concept, "Movements of the fleet will be preplanned and promulgated as much in advance as possible, to allow maximum practicable electronic silence." (60) Before every port visit, Sixth Fleet would disseminate the "position and intended movement" (PIM), or route, that task forces would follow should there be a warning that nuclear war was imminent. To reduce the number of PIM-change messages, task force commanders were instructed to plan ahead and cover several days' movements with one message if possible. (61)

To minimize the volume of electronic emissions, Sixth Fleet also adopted a set of basic communications procedures. Preassigned alphanumeric groups indicated desired PIM changes or changes in ship stations. Simple aircraft codes were used to transmit classified information. Recipients of messages did not "Roger" or acknowledge receipt. (62)

UPTIDE similarly emphasized planning. Just prior to UPTIDE 3-A, the commander of Antisubmarine Warfare Group 3, Rear Admiral Carl J. Seiberlich, gave commanding officers of all his units the opportunity to work with his staff on the development of plans and options. The detailed and inclusive planning process produced significant benefits. As Seiberlich later explained to Aurand, he and his staff received valuable inputs, while "the commanding officers all feel that they have had a piece of the planning action, and understand our philosophy and objectives." (63) One of the focal points of the planning process was minimizing opportunities for detection of the carrier. UPTIDE tactics tried to reduce acoustic detectability through the use of noncavitating speeds where possible. Implementing the tactic required, according to the UPTIDE 3-A report, "judicious planning of the time and location when cavitating speeds were required." (64)

"THERE MIGHT BE SOME USEFUL IDEAS THERE"

As Ralph Beatty once noted, interest in deceptive formations and dispersed operations under emission control seems to be cyclical. Every few years a version of the same basic idea emerges. Each iteration of the concept has been a response to a different specific threat--such as nuclear attack by land-based aviation in the HAYSTACK series, cruise-missile attack by submarines in the UPTIDE series--and has therefore approached the problem with little reference to past efforts. Yet the basic challenge has remained the same: How can naval forces conduct effective operations while dispersing widely and minimizing communications in order to avoid detection and attack? Since the U.S. Navy is likely to face similar challenges in the future, it might do well to heed Beatty's suggestion: "Pay attention to what's happened before. There might be some useful ideas there." (65)

One of the useful ideas highlighted by a review of the U.S. Navy's experiments with dispersed operations under EMCON during the Cold War is the utility of alternative methods of communication. During the HAYSTACK and UPTIDE exercises, the participating forces chose to limit their communications in order to minimize the adversary's ability to detect and identify them. They experimented with a wide variety of methods--both low-tech (flag hoists) and high-tech (airborne UHF relay). The ability to communicate and exchange information using a range of different methods and to relay communications from platform to platform proved invaluable.

As the participants in HAYSTACK and UPTIDE discovered, however, alternative communication methods typically have less capacity than more traditional ones. Consequently, it is important to develop detailed procedures for operating with diminished network capacity. Sixth Fleet included comprehensive appendices in its operations orders outlining the specific instructions for operating with diminished communications. The instructions spelled out which messages and which users should receive priority under various conditions and which procedures should be employed. (66)

It was also important to practice employing alternative means of communication. The forces participating in HAYSTACK CHARLIE experienced what analysts described as "excessive" delays, due in part to inexperience with the communications method employed. Similarly, air control in HAYSTACK DELTA was unsatisfactory due in part to controller inexperience. (67)

Even with the development of appropriate procedures and extensive practice, forces using alternative methods of communication experienced delays. According to the UPTIDE 3-A exercise report, the reduction in communications capabilities and use of alternative methods "extracted a price from the BLUE forces in terms of inadequate information exchange between the BLUE OTC [officer in tactical command] and his dispersed forces." "Information of value to the OTC from outlying units is often received late or not at all," the report explained, "and outlying units often lack the 'big picture' information held by the OTC." (68)

The delays and diminished flow of information inherent in the use of alternative communications methods underscored the importance of planning and decentralized decision making. The promulgation of plans as far in advance as possible enabled the commanders of the forces participating in the HAYSTACK and UPTIDE series to convey their intents before communications were diminished. The unit commanders, thus fully aware of their mission, were able to take the initiative, make decisions quickly, and implement them aggressively.

As U.S. naval forces increasingly operate under the threat of antiship ballistic-missile attack while relying on rapid communication and information exchange, potential adversaries are likely to seek to detect, track, and target those forces and disrupt their communication and information networks. In future contests for control of information, as Beatty warned a decade ago, it will be important to understand what works and what does not work. (69) The principles and practices the U.S. Navy developed while experimenting with dispersed operations under EMCON appear to fall in the former category. As Rear Admiral George P. Steele told Aurand after receiving a briefing on UPTIDE, "I was able to make use of a great deal of it [the UPTIDE concept], and I am a believer; it works, and very well." (70)

NOTES

This article will appear as chapter 11 of Selected Papers from the Sixteenth Naval History Symposium Held at the United States Naval Academy 10-11 September 2009, edited by Craig C. Felker and Marcus O. Jones, forthcoming in 2011 from the Naval War College Press, as the twentieth title in the Historical Monograph Series. It appears here by permission of the author and editors.

(1.) Andrew S. Erickson, "China's Evolving Anti-access Approach: 'Where's the Next (U.S.) Carrier?'" China Brief 10, no. 18 (10 September 2010), pp. 5-8; Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang, "Using the Land to Control the Sea? Chinese Analysts Consider the Antiship Ballistic Missile," Naval War College Review 62, no. 4 (Autumn 2009), pp. 53-86; Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin, "China's Antiship Ballistic Missile: Developments and Missing Links," Naval War College Review 62, no. 4 (Autumn 2009), pp. 87-115.

(2.) Bryan Krekel, Capability of the People's Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation, prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (McLean, Va.: Northrop Grumman Corp., 2009); Timothy L. Thomas, "China's Electronic Long-Range Reconnaissance," Military Review (November-December 2008), pp. 47-54; Timothy L. Thomas, "Chinese and American Network Warfare," Joint Force Quarterly, no. 38 (3rd Quarter 2005), pp. 76-83.

(3.) Robert C. Rubel, "Talking about Sea Control," Naval War College Review 63, no. 4 (Autumn 2010), pp. 38-47.

(4.) Jakub J. Grygiel, "The Dilemmas of US Maritime Supremacy in the Early Cold War," Journal of Strategic Studies 28 (April 2005), pp. 191-206; Philip Alphonse Dur, "The Sixth Fleet: A Case Study of Institutionalized Naval Presence" (PhD diss., Harvard University, 1975), p. 72.

(5.) Dur, "Sixth Fleet," pp. 21, 33, 39.

(6.) Grygiel, "Dilemmas of US Maritime Supremacy in the Early Cold War," pp. 191-206; Dur, "Sixth Fleet," p. 72.

(7.) Adm. Jeremiah Denton, telephone interview, 26 and 27 May 2009.

(8.) Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, to Chief of Naval Operations [hereafter CNO], ser. 00285, "Report of Operations and Conditions of Command, 1 July 1955-1 May 1956," 1 May 1956, quoted in Dur, "Sixth Fleet," pp. 76-77.

(9.) Adm. Harry Donald Felt, Reminiscences of Admiral Harry Donald Felt, Oral History (Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, 1974), p. 274.

(10.) Edward A. Smyth and Eugene P. Visco, "Military Operations Research Society Oral History Project Interview of Dr. Ralph Beatty, Jr.," Military Operations Research 9, no. 3 (2004) [hereafter "Interview of Dr. Ralph Beatty, Jr."], p. 66.

(11.) Denton, interview.

(12.) Smyth and Visco, "Interview of Dr. Ralph Beatty, Jr.," p. 66; "Men and Machines," Naval Aviation News (September 1974), p. 24.

(13.) Smyth and Visco, "Interview of Dr. Ralph Beatty, Jr.," pp. 66-67.

(14.) Operations Evaluation Group [hereafter OEG], The Sixth Fleet Concept and Analysis of Haystack Operations, OEG Report 77 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the CNO, 24 January 1958), pp. 3-4; "The Haystack Concept," Vice Adm. C. R. Brown, Commander U.S. Sixth Fleet [hereafter COMSIXTHFLT], to Adm. A. Burke, CNO, encl. 1, "Haystack Concept of Striking Forces; Report On," declassified, 2 November 1957, pp. 2-3, Sixth Fleet Files, 1957, Post-1946 Command File, Operational Archives, Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington, D.C. [hereafter OA, NHHC].

(15.) Felt, Reminiscences of Admiral Harry Donald Felt, pp. 282-83.

(16.) OEG, Sixth Fleet Concept and Analysis of Haystack Operations, p. 5; "Haystack Concept," in Brown to Burke, "Haystack Concept of Striking Forces," p. 3.

(17.) OEG, Sixth Fleet Concept and Analysis of Haystack Operations, pp. 13-14.

(18.) Ibid., pp. 14, 16, 19, 23.

(19.) Ibid., p. 25.

(20.) Ibid., pp. 27-31.

(21.) Ibid., pp. 25, 28.

(22.) Ibid., pp. 37, 42.

(23.) Ibid., pp. 42-46.

(24.) Ibid.

(25.) Brown to Burke, "Haystack Concept of Striking Forces," p. 3.

(26.) Ibid., p. 2.

(27.) Ibid., pp. 3, 6-7.

(28.) Vice Adm. C. E. Ekstrom to Philip Alphonse Dur, 3 January t975, quoted in Dur, "Sixth Fleet," p. 75.

(29.) R. E. Beatty and L. S. Pocinski, Submarine Opposition to Carriers in Large Dispersed Dispositions, Operations Evaluation Group Study 642 (Washington, D.C.: OEG, Office of the CNO, 13 February 1961), p. 4.

(30.) Denton, interview; Beatty and Pocinski, Submarine Opposition to Carriers in Large Dispersed Dispositions, pp. 3, 10.

(31.) Owen Cote, The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy's Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines, Newport Paper 16 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2003), p. 52.

(32.) Adm. Arleigh Burke, CNO, "The Strategic Concept for Antisubmarine Warfare," declassified, 15 January 1960, file 3300, AntiSubmarine Operations, 1960, p. 1, Immediate Office Files of the CNO, OA, NHHC.

(33.) Rear Adm. J. S. Thach, "The Trend in ASW," declassified, 22 January 1960, file 3300, Anti-Submarine Operations, 1960, p. 3, Immediate Office Files of the CNO, OA, NHHC.

(34.) Jan Breemer, Soviet Submarines: Design, Development, and Tactics (Surrey, U.K.: Jane's Information Group, 1989), pp. 91,103-106, 113, 117, 119; John Jordan, Soviet Submarines, 1945 to the Present (London: Arms and Armour, 1989), pp. 74-84, 103-108; Malcolm Muir, Jr., Black Shoes and Blue Water: Surface Warfare in the United States Navy, 1945-1975 (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 1996), pp. 74, 115-16, 135-36, 172; Norman Polmar and Jurrien Noot, Submarines of the Russian and Soviet Navies, 1718-1990 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991), pp. 155-56, 166, 177, 186-87, 333-34; Cote, Third Battle, pp. 60-61.

(35.) Beatty and Pocinski, Submarine Opposition to Carriers in Large Dispersed Dispositions, p. 3.

(36.) Ibid.

(37.) Vice Adm. Turner Caldwell, Director of ASW Programs, to CNO, "Comments on COMASWFORPAC's UPTIDE Proposals," declassified, 11 July 1969, Antisubmarine Warfare Folder, Immediate Office Files of the CNO, OA, NHHC; Capt. W. E. Sims to CNO, "Brief of Project UPTIDE Presentation to CAB," declassified, 23 November 1970, Antisubmarine Warfare Folder, Immediate Office Files of the CNO, OA, NHHC; R. F. Cross Associates, Sea-Based Airborne Antisubmarine Warfare, 1940-1977, vol. 2, 1960-1977, 2nd ed., declassified (Alexandria, Va.: 1978), p. 102. For more on UPTIDE, see Robert G. Angevine, "Innovation and Experimentation in the US Navy: The UPTIDE Antisubmarine Warfare Experiments, 1969-72," Journal of Strategic Studies 28 (February 2005), pp. 77-105.

(38.) Vice Adm. Eli T. Reich, Reminiscences of Vice Admiral Eli T. Reich, Oral History (Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, 1982), vol. 2, p. 617; Robert H. Smith, "Remembering Admiral Pete Aurand," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (December 1989), p. 108; Rear Adm. E. P. Aurand, "An Approach to Thinking about ASW Problems," declassified, [1966] file "An Approach to Thinking about ASW Problems," E. P. Aurand Papers, OA, NHHC.

(39.) Commander, Antisubmarine Warfare Group 1, "Report of Operations Northeast of Luzon to Conduct Overt Surveillance of Soviet Forces Which Had Exited the Sea of Japan," set. 072, 26 February 1966, ASWGRU 1, 1966, p. 5, Post-1946 Command File, OA, NHHC.

(40.) Vice Adm. E. P. Aurand, "Speech to Destroyer Conference," declassified, 22 September 1971, COMASWFORPAC, 1969-1972, box 8, Aurand Office Files, OA, NHHC; Vice Adm. E. P. Aurand, "ASW in the Pacific," declassified, 20-21 May 1970, Tenth NSIA/ Navy ASW Conference, Washington, D.C., COMASWFORPAC, 1969-1972, box 8, Aurand Office Files, OA, NHHC.

(41.) Vice Adm. E. P. Aurand, Commander, Antisubmarine Warfare Forces Pacific [hereafter COMASWFORPAC], to Dr. Joel S. Lawson, Jr., Director of Navy Laboratories, declassified, 17 April 1972, Personal Correspondence, 1970-1972, box 6, Aurand Papers, OA, NHHC. Management of Project UPTIDE actually began in October 1968, and Phase I commenced in December 1968, but the first exercise did not begin until January 1969; COMASWFORPAC Command History, 1968, pp. 5-6, box 839, Post-1946 Command File, OA, NHHC.

(42.) Sims to CNO; R. F. Cross Associates, Sea-Based Airborne Antisubmarine Warfare, 1940-1977, p. 150.

(43.) Sims to CNO.

(44.) Aurand to Lawson.

(45.) Sims to CNO; R. F. Cross Associates, Sea-Based Airborne Antisubmarine Warfare, 1940-1977, p. 150; Commander, Antisubmarine Warfare Group 3 [hereafter COMASWGRU 3], Command History, 1969, encl. 4, declassified, p. 2, Post-1946 Command File, OA, NHHC.

(46.) Sims to CNO; R. F. Cross Associates, Sea-Based Airborne Antisubmarine Warfare, 1940-1977, pp. 150-51.

(47.) Sims to CNO; Aurand, "Speech to Destroyer Conference."

(48.) Sims to CNO; Aurand, "Speech to Destroyer Conference."

(49.) Aurand to Lawson; Rear Adm. C. J. Seiberlich, COMASWGRU 3, to Vice Adm. E. P. Aurand, COMASWFORPAC, declassified, 28 December 1971, COMASWFORPAC Personal File, 1971, box 5, Aurand Papers, OA, NHHC.

(50.) R. F. Cross Associates, Sea-Based Airborne Antisubmarine Warfare, 1940-1977, p. 151.

(51.) Brown to Burke, "Haystack Concept of Striking Forces," p. 7.

(52.) COMSIXTHFLT, "Change 9 to Op Order 50-56," declassified, p. K-VI-3, Sixth Fleet Command File, 1957, Post-1946 Command File, OA, NHHC.

(53.) "Haystack Concept," in Brown to Burke, "Haystack Concept of Striking Forces," pp. 13, 16; Denton, interview.

(54.) Denton, interview.

(55.) "Haystack Concept," in Brown to Burke, "Haystack Concept of Striking Forces," p. 16.

(56.) Rear Adm. N. C. Gillette, Jr., COMASWGRU 3, to Vice Adm. E. P. Aurand, COMASWFORPAC, 12 January 1970, Personal File, 1970, COMASWFORPAC, 1969-72, box 5, Aurand Papers, OA, NHHC; Commander Third Fleet [hereafter COMTHIRDFLT], "UPTIDE Report 6: UPTIDE Exercise 3A [Transit Phase]," 4 September 1973, p. V-2.

(57.) OEG, Sixth Fleet Concept and Analysis of Haystack Operations, pp. 14, 16, 19, 23.

(58.) COMTHIRDFLT, "UPTIDE Report 6," pp. V-l, V-2.

(59.) OEG, Sixth Fleet Concept and Analysis of Haystack Operations, p. 4.

(60.) "Haystack Concept," in Brown to Burke, "Haystack Concept of Striking Forces," p. 15.

(61.) Ibid., p. 16.

(62.) COMSIXTHFLT, Op Order 50-56, app. I, p. E-I-10; "Haystack Concept," in Brown to Burke, "Haystack Concept of Striking Forces," p. 16.

(63.) Seiberlich to Aurand.

(64.) COMTHIRDFLT, "UPTIDE Report 6," p. II-3.

(65.) Smyth and Visco, "Interview of Dr. Ralph Beatty, Jr.," pp. 71-72. The challenge is not limited to naval forces. It is possible to envision a future security environment dominated by reconnaissance strike complexes that places a premium on detecting, tracking, and targeting stealthy forces and communicating in a degraded information environment. See Michael G. Vickers and Robert C. Martinage, The Revolution in War (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2004).

(66.) COMSIXTHFLT, "Change 9 to Op Order 50-56," pp. K-VI-1 to K-VI-4.

(67.) OEG, Sixth Fleet Concept and Analysis of Haystack Operations, pp. 23, 35.

(68.) COMTHIRDFLT, "UPTIDE Report 6," p. VI-2.

(69.) Smyth and Visco, "Interview of Dr. Ralph Beatty, Jr.," p. 71.

(70.) Rear Adm. G. P. Steele to Vice Adrn. E. P. Aurand, COMASWFORPAC, declassified, 30 January 1972, Personal Correspondence, 1970-1972, box 6, Aurand Papers, OA, NHHC.

https://www.thefreelibrary.com/Hiding+in+plain+sight%3a+the+U.S.+Navy+and+dispersed+operations+under...-a0255037247

[sunday]

I would like to ask for the use of quotes.

Quote

 

 

[RETAC21]

11 hours ago, Jaroslav said:

What was Infanteria marina capabilities for large operations in oposite side of Mediterranean. Scenario include Spanish, French and Italian naval infantry amphibious landing on Crete alongside with paratroopers. USMC would contribute only with 6th fleet asociated unit

That would be well within its capabilities, the first NATO maneuvers they participated in were in 1992, but they worked regularly with the USMC and would have fit right in.

[Jaroslav]

5 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

That would be well within its capabilities, the first NATO maneuvers they participated in were in 1992, but they worked regularly with the USMC and would have fit right in.

Thanks mate

[Jaroslav]

Does anyone have OOB and TOE for 24th and 26th MEU for 1989.?

I have 22nd MEU from NATO OOB 1989. but i dont have for those two abovementioned

[Jaroslav]

NIE 11-10-79, Oct 79,

Soviet Military Capabilities to Project Power and Influence in Distant Areas

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/ac/NIE_11-10-79%2C_Oct_79%2C_Soviet_Military_Capabilities_to_Project_Power_and_Influence_in_Distant_Areas.pdf

[Jaroslav]

Spanish forces:

Light Airportable Infantry Brigade (BRILAT):
a. RIAT 29 “Isabel La Católica”
1.- I/29 Zamora Light Infantry Battalion
2.- II/29 Zaragoza Light Infantry Battalion
b. RIAT 3 “Príncipe”
1.- III/3 Toledo Light Infantry Battalion
2.- IV/3 San Quintin Light Infantry Battalion
c. Anti-tank Company
d. Airportable Artillery Group
e. Airportable Engineer Battalion
f. Airportable Logistic Group

Parachute Brigade (BRIPAC): Created from Legión units and maintaining close links, its battalions are designated “banderas”. Was designated as part of the General Reserve.
a. I Roger de Flor Parachute Battalion (Bandera Paracaidísta): 3 rifle cos (9 rifle squads, 3 MMG, 6 C-90 ATGL, 2 81mm mortars each), 1 support co (4 Land Rover w/Milan, 4 Land Rover w/106mm RR, 4 
LR-towed 20mm Oerlikon AA guns, 4 truck-towed 120mm mortars, Recon pltn)
b. II Roger de Lauria Parachute Battalion: same as above
c. III Órtiz de Zarate Parachute Battalion: same as above
d. Parachute Anti-tank Company: 12 Land Rover w/Milan
e. Parachute Artillery Group: 12 105mm M56 howitzers
f. Parachute Engineer Battalion: Two companies, light equipment
g. Parachute Radar Platoon: 3 Rasura radars

 

Tercio de Armada – (Marine Brigade)
A.HQ & HQ Co, Service Platoon, Police Platoon
B. Landing Group (Agrupacion de Desembarco – AD)
1. Batallon de Desmbarco 1
a. HQ & Service Co.
b. Recon Platoon: 3 Recon squads: 6 Land Rovers; 6 Recon teams, Radar squad, FO squad
c. Anti-tank. Platoon: 6 106mm RR 
d. Weapons Co: 8 81mm mortars on Land Rover, 6 12.7mm MGs on Land Rover
e. 3 x Infantry Cos, each: 2 60mm Mortars, 3 Dragon ATGM, 9 Infantry squads
2. Batallon de Desmbarco 2
a. HQ & Service Co.
b. Recon Platoon: 3 Recon squads: 6 Land Rovers; 6 Recon teams, Radar squad, FO squad
c. Anti-tank. Platoon: 6 106mm RR 
d. Weapons Co: 8 81mm mortars on Land Rover, 6 12.7mm MGs on Land Rover
e. 3 x Infantry Cos, each: 2 60mm Mortars, 3 Dragon ATGM, 9 Infantry squads
3. Special Operations Unit (UOE)
a. 3 Special Operations Platoons: 3 squads each.
4. Combat Support Group (AAC)
a. HQ & Service Co.
b. Landing Artillery Group (GAD)
1. HQ & Service Battery
2. SP Battery: 6 M-109A2 SP Guns, 6 M992 FAASV
3. 2 Howitzer Batteries: 6 105mm M56 howitzers each
4. Light SAM Btty: 20mm Oerlikon AA Guns
c. Amphibious Mechanized Group (GMA)
1. Amphibious Tractor Co: 16 LVTP-7
2. Tank Co. 16 M48A3E; 17 Scorpion light tanks
3. Anti-tank Co. 12 TOW on Land Rover
4. 3 Transport Cos: 12 BLR each
Note 1: Hummers were on order to replace the amphibious versions of Land Rover 88 and 109s. 
Note 2: UOE may have been a battalion strength unit with 3 para-commando companies plus a combat diver company.
Note 3: Marines may have had 8 M52A1 105mm SP

Naval Air
A. 3ª Escuadrilla – Rota: 12 AB-212ASW (including 4 fitted with Gufo ECM/ESM system)
B. 5ª Escuadrilla – Rota: 9 SH-3D Sea King, 3 SH-3AEW 
C. 6a Escuadrilla: 11 Hughes 500ASW
C. 8ª Escuadrilla -- Rota: 7 AV-8S Matador/2 TAV-8S (AV-8As)
D. 9ª Escuadrilla -- Rota: 12 EAV-8B
E. 10ª Escuadrilla – Rota: 6 SH-60B

 

Naval air wouldnt be all used.

Any advices would be appriciated.

All data is from Johnson / Callahan NATO OOB 1989. V8.6