naval warfare 3rd WW, battle for the Mediterranean (Cold war period)

[Jaroslav]

US Navy tactics in attack on Libya 15.04.1986.

 

https://historyrussia.org/sobytiya/15-aprelya-1986-goda-aviatsiya-ssha-nachala-bombardirovku-livijskikh-gorodov.html

Edited December 12, 2025 by Jaroslav

[Jaroslav]

[Jaroslav]

30th independent Sevastopolskiy Red Banner Maritime Reconnaissance Aviation Regiment

30-й отдельный морской разведывательный Севастопольский Краснознаменный авиационный полк

 

В 1989-90 гг. в составе полка имелось 14 Ту-22р, 6 Ту-22у, 4 Ту-22пп.

In 1989-90, the regiment had 14 Tu-22R, 6 Tu-22U, 4 Tu-22P.

http://ava.org.ru/rap/30m.htm

http://ww2.dk/new/navy/30omrap.htm

Edited December 14, 2025 by Jaroslav

[Jaroslav]

2nd Guards Sevastopolskaya Maritime Missile Aviation Division imeni N.A. Tokarev

2-я гвардейская морская ракетоносная Севастопольская авиационная дивизия имени Н.А. Токарева

Organisation 1990:

• 5th Guards Maritime Missile Aviation Regiment (Veseloye, Crimean Oblast) with Tu-22M3 and Tu-16.

• Aircraft:

• Tu-16T/K-10, 4.56-1994 (from 1987 elint versions only)
• Tu-22M3, 1985-1994

• Inventory: 11.90: 22 Tu-22M3 and 16 Tu-16SPS/E [CFE treaty data exchange]

• 124th Maritime Missile Aviation Regiment (Gvardeskoye, Crimean Oblast) with Tu-16.

• Aircraft:

• Tu-16, 6.56-1993
• Tu-16KS, 1957-1990

• Inventory: 11.90: 19 Tu-16 [CFE treaty data exchange]

• 943rd Maritime Missile Aviation Regiment (Oktyabrskoye, Crimean Oblast) with Tu-22M2 and Tu-16.

• Aircraft:

• Tu-16, 5.57-1992
• Tu-22M2, 9.74-1996

• Inventory: 11.90: 21 Tu-22M, 6 Tu-22R and 6 Tu-16 [CFE treaty data exchange]

 

 

Bases:

• Gvardeskoye, Crimean Oblast, 1971 - 1994 [45 07 00N, 33 58 43E]

Subordination:

• Black Sea Fleet, 1939 - 1960 and 1971 - 1994.

http://ww2.dk/new/navy/2gvmrad.htm

[Jaroslav]

318th independent Konstantskiy Red Banner Anti-Submarine Aviation Regiment

318-й отдельный противолодочный Констанцский Краснознаменный авиационный полк

19 Be-12PL and 2 Be-12PS

(15.10.1995.)

https://ava.org.ru/rap/18em.htm

 

[Jaroslav]

ВМФ

78. окплвп Донузлав: 48 Ка-25, 2 Ка-27Е.

555. оплвп Очаков: 16 Ка-27, 24 Ка-25, 12 Ми-14, 4 Ка-29.

872. оплвп Кача: 24 Ми-14, 5 Ми-8, 14 Ка-25.

б/н ивп Кача: 12 Ми-14, 12 Ка-27.

 

https://forums.airforce.ru/matchast/6639-vertolyoty-u-silovikov-sssr-1990-god-struktura-i-chislennost/

Edited December 14, 2025 by Jaroslav

[Jaroslav]

ПОДВОДНАЯ ЛОДКА ПР. 651

Торпедные аппараты:
6 х 533 мм носовых торпедных аппаратов (Боезапас - 18 торпед);
4 х 400 мм кормовых торпедных аппарата (Боезапас - 4 торпеды);

Ракетное вооружение:
4 управляемых крылатых ракеты П-5 (П-6 или П-500) 
(Время подготовки к первому запуску  - 4.5 мин, последующий пуск - через 10 сек., при скорости хода - до 4 уз. )

 

PR. 651 SUBMARINE

Torpedo Tubes:
6 x 533 mm bow torpedo tubes (18 torpedoes);
4 x 400 mm stern torpedo tubes (4 torpedoes);

Missile Armament:
4 P-5 (P-6 or P-500) guided cruise missiles
(First launch preparation time: 4.5 minutes, subsequent launch after 10 seconds, at a speed of up to 4 knots)

https://book.uraic.ru/elib/pl/lodki/651.htm

 

Тактико-технические данные проекта:

водоизмещение в надводном положении - 3174 т.

в подводном положении - 3750 т.

скорость в надводном положении - 16 узлов

в подводном положении - 14,5 (18 с САБ) узлов

глубина погружения рабочая - 240 м.

дальность плавания в надводном положении - 30000 (8,0) миль

в подводном положении - 350 (2,8) (810 (2,7) с САБ) миль

длина - 85,9 м.

ширина - 9,7 м.

осадка - 6,9м.

автономность - 90 суток.

экипаж - 78 человек.

вооружение ракетное: КР «П-6» - 4 шт.

торпедное: НТА - 6 шт. (6 торпед)

КТА - 4 шт. (12 торпед)

 

 

Project performance data:

Surface displacement - 3,174 tons

Submerged displacement - 3,750 tons

Surface speed - 16 knots

Submerged speed - 14.5 knots (18 knots with submarine)

Operating depth - 240 m

Range surfaced - 30,000 (8.0) miles

Submerged - 350 (2.8) miles (810 (2.7) miles with submarine)

Length - 85.9 m

Width - 9.7 m

Draft - 6.9 m

Endurance - 90 days

Crew - 78

Missile armament: 4 P-6 cruise missiles

Torpedo armament: 6 bow launchers (6 torpedoes)

KTA - 4 pcs. (12 torpedoes)

https://web.archive.org/web/20111209110405/http://www.k-77.com/k77/spec/index.php?w=ru

[Jaroslav]

On 12/14/2025 at 9:23 AM, Jaroslav said:

2nd Guards Sevastopolskaya Maritime Missile Aviation Division imeni N.A. Tokarev

2-я гвардейская морская ракетоносная Севастопольская авиационная дивизия имени Н.А. Токарева

Organisation 1990:

• 5th Guards Maritime Missile Aviation Regiment (Veseloye, Crimean Oblast) with Tu-22M3 and Tu-16.

• Aircraft:

• Tu-16T/K-10, 4.56-1994 (from 1987 elint versions only)
• Tu-22M3, 1985-1994

• Inventory: 11.90: 22 Tu-22M3 and 16 Tu-16SPS/E [CFE treaty data exchange]

• 124th Maritime Missile Aviation Regiment (Gvardeskoye, Crimean Oblast) with Tu-16.

• Aircraft:

• Tu-16, 6.56-1993
• Tu-16KS, 1957-1990

• Inventory: 11.90: 19 Tu-16 [CFE treaty data exchange]

• 943rd Maritime Missile Aviation Regiment (Oktyabrskoye, Crimean Oblast) with Tu-22M2 and Tu-16.

• Aircraft:

• Tu-16, 5.57-1992
• Tu-22M2, 9.74-1996

• Inventory: 11.90: 21 Tu-22M, 6 Tu-22R and 6 Tu-16 [CFE treaty data exchange]

 

 

Bases:

• Gvardeskoye, Crimean Oblast, 1971 - 1994 [45 07 00N, 33 58 43E]

Subordination:

• Black Sea Fleet, 1939 - 1960 and 1971 - 1994.

http://ww2.dk/new/navy/2gvmrad.htm

В 1974 г. 124-й ОМРАМ вошел в состав вновь сформированной 2-й гв. МРАД Авиации ЧФ.

В начале 1980-х гг. в составе полка были 1-я и 2-я эскадрильи, вооруженные самолетами Ту-16к-10—26, и 3-я эскадрилья, вооруженная самолетами Ту-16зщ и Ту-16спс.

В 1980-е гг. эскадрилья самолетов Ту-16к-10—26 из состава полка несла боевую службу в Средиземном море, выполняя вылеты с аэродромов Сирии.

В 1990 г. 124-й МРАП, вооруженный самолетами Ту-16к-10, на аэродроме Гвардейское был расформирован.

 

In 1974, the 124th OMRAM became part of the newly formed 2nd Guards MRAD of the Black Sea Fleet Aviation.

In the early 1980s, the regiment consisted of the 1st and 2nd Squadrons, equipped with Tu-16K-10-26 aircraft, and the 3rd Squadron, equipped with Tu-16ZSh and Tu-16SpS aircraft.

In the 1980s, the regiment's squadron of Tu-16K-10-26 aircraft served in the Mediterranean, flying from airfields in Syria.

In 1990, the 124th MRAP, equipped with Tu-16K-10 aircraft, was disbanded at Gvardeyskoye Airfield.

https://litmir.club/br/?b=236110&p=8

[Jaroslav]

[Jaroslav]

 

Tales From The A-6 Intruder Cockpit: AGM-84 Harpoon vs Libyan Patrol Craft

 

 

An underside view of an A-6A Intruder aircraft armed with four AGM-84 Harpoon missiles. (USN)

Operation Prairie Fire: The First Use of Harpoon Missiles In Combat by U.S. Navy A-6 Intruders

Operation Prairie Fire, launched in March 1986, was a response by the U.S. Navy to hostile actions from Libyan forces that had fired surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) at American aircraft that had crossed into Libya’s claimed “Line of Death” in the Mediterranean.

The operation marked a significant moment in naval warfare, as it involved the first combat use of the AGM-84 Harpoon missile by U.S. Navy A-6 Intruders.

These carrier-based aircraft were instrumental in attacking Libyan naval targets, including the fast attack craft Waheed. The A-6 Intruders, armed with Harpoon missiles and Rockeye cluster bombs, successfully engaged and severely damaged the Libyan vessel, showcasing the effectiveness of advanced anti-ship weaponry in modern naval combat.

The attack is described in detail in “Harpoon Missile vs Surface Ships” by author Lon Nordeen, who delivers a detailed account of the development, deployment, and combat use of the Harpoon anti-ship missile system.

Focusing on its use by the U.S. Navy, Nordeen explores how the missile shaped naval strategies during the 1980s. Originally developed to counter Soviet naval threats, the Harpoon was adopted by numerous countries, including Iran, which became one of the first to use it in combat.

Notably, the Iranian Navy deployed the missile during the Iran-Iraq War, and the same ship that first fired the missile in 1980 was later involved in a skirmish with the US Navy in 1988.

An AGM-84 Harpoon skims the waves on its way to the target. (USN)

The book highlights how the Harpoon missile, along with other anti-ship weapons, revolutionized naval combat by increasing the range, lethality, and precision of strikes. Nordeen explains how these weapons forced navies to adapt, developing new detection, tracking, and defense systems to counter missile threats. The book underscores the difficulties of spotting incoming sea-skimming missiles and how navies worked to overcome these challenges with tactics and advanced sensor technologies.

Jim Laurier created many excellent ship, aircraft, and weapons profiles, plus maps, tactical drawings, and artwork depicting combat situations for the book, including this one that was chosen for the cover. It depicts VA-95 A-6E “Lizard 500” firing an AGM-84C at Sahand after being targeted by AAA and MANPADS during a high-speed pass down the port side of the frigate on April 18, 1988. Seconds earlier, the pilot of the aircraft, Cdr “Bud” Langston, had told his mission controller onboard a nearby E-2C that, “He shot at me. I’m now 12 miles out and I have just launched a Harpoon missile. I’m waiting for it to hit.” (via Osprey)

One of the most interesting parts of the book, is the one in which US Navy pilots and crew members recount their experiences during Operation Prairie Fire, which took place on Mar. 24, 1986 and marked the first use of the Harpoon. The operation was initiated after Libyan forces fired surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) at US Navy aircraft that had crossed Libya’s “Line of Death” in the Mediterranean. The text details the engagements between US aircraft, including F-14 Tomcats and A-6 Intruders, and Libyan naval and air forces. Notably, it describes how VA-34’s A-6 Intruders from USS America successfully attacked the Libyan fast attack craft Waheed using AGM-84 Harpoon missiles and Rockeye cluster bombs.

ATM-84 Harpoon training missile on an A-4 Skyhawk (USN)

First combat use of the Harpoon

On March 24, 1986, the SAG comprising Ticonderoga, Scott and Caron (DD-970) crossed the “Line of Death” as part of Operation Attain Document III. F-14s covering the vessels were targeted by Libyan SA-2 and SA-5 SAMs over the next 24 hours, resulting in the instigation of Operation Prairie Fire by Sixth Fleet’s Task Force Zulu.

NFO Lt Dave Parsons was strapped into the back seat of one of the Tomcats that was targeted:

I was assigned to VF-102 “Diamondbacks”, flying F-14As off America. We had conducted a no notice deployment in February 1986 to join Saratoga and Coral Sea off Libya to challenge Gaddafi’s “Line of Death”. With three carriers on station, we knew there would likely be a confrontation. We were issued sidearms for first time in my career.

At 1352 hrs on March 24, we were underway on the wing of Lt Roy “Flash” Gordon, who flew with the skipper, Cdr Mike “Sparky” Lyle, as his RIO. Once on station [replacing a pair of VF-33 F-14s also from America that had intercepted two LAAF MiG-25s, which had then broken off the engagement just prior to the Tomcat crews being given permission to open fire], we flew a race-track pattern. “Flash” and “Sparky” were flying south, we north, when “Sparky’s” AWG-9 radar picked up a contact about 60 miles away. “Flash” turned in, thinking this would be another MiG-25 coming directly at him. “Sparky” locked onto the contact and “Flash” followed the target symbol in his head-up display, seeing the target accelerate through Mach 1, Mach 2 and Mach 3. He then spotted a vertical contrail. Moments later, we received a coded message via data link that the Libyans had fired an SA-5 at us. That’s when we realized the radar contact must be a SAM. We retired northwards vis a split-s maneuver while other assets confirmed our diagnosis.

Two SA-5s had in fact been fired by the battery at Sirte following a direct order by Gaddafi himself. The SAMs missed. Once it had been ascertained that the Libyans had indeed committed a hostile act, the US Navy now had the opportunity to strike back. Vice Admiral Kelso duly sent a flash precedence message to all warships in Task Force Zulu at 1538 hrs, informing them that contingency operation Prairie Fire had now commenced. This authorized warships and carrier-based aircraft to “engage Libyan units closing on the force in international waters and airspace”.

More clashes between LAAF MiG-25s and US Navy Tomcats and Hornets ensued, but these ended without any aircraft from either side being shot down. At 1830 hrs, two A-7Es armed with AGM-88s commenced an abortive attack on the Sirte SAM battery, but this was abandoned when they were targeted by two SA-5s and an SA-2.

Ninety minutes later, the Otomat ASM-armed fast attack craft Waheed of the Libyan Navy was detected by both an E-2C and Ticonderoga heading northwest at 24 knots from the naval base near Misratah directly towards the SAG. A SUCAP section of two A-6Es was immediately vectored towards Waheed by the Hawkeye, the Intruders from VA-34 being armed with AGM-84s and Mk 20 Rockeye II CBUs.

Flying the second A-6E was Lt Mike Dowty: My B/N, Lt Cdr Larry Schofield, and I made an evening launch [in “Blaster 507”] from America. We carried one AGM-84 Harpoon and two Rockeye cluster bombs. Lt Cdr Don Watkins launched before us, and our squadron CO, Cdr “Breeze” Coleman, flew an A-6 in tanker configuration. We were tasked with performing an ASUW [anti-surface warfare] patrol, during which we would check out any surface contacts assigned. If there were none previously identified, we would search assigned sectors, flying at around 3,000–5,000ft and 200 knots. Our radar would typically pick up contacts at around 30–50 miles, depending on a number of variables. We would report our contacts to “center” either directly or via a controlling E-2C. They would usually ask us to get a closer look with FLIR [forward-looking infrared], so we’d move to within a couple miles at lower altitude and higher speed. If the contact was of interest, we were asked to “bird-dog” [maintain contact].

The pilot and navigator/bombardier of an A-6E Intruder aircraft aboard the aircraft carrier USS AMERICA (CV 66) conduct preflight checks in the cockpit prior to a mission. They are participating in flight operations off the coast of Libya. (USN)

As noted by Dowty, Lt Cdr Watkins and B/N Lt Rick Serex were flying just ahead of him and Schofield.

According to Watkins:

About half-an-hour into the flight [in “Blaster 505”], I was vectored towards a surface contact by our early warning, command and control E-2C aircraft and tasked with identifying it. Using our FLIR, we were able to identify the surface vessel as a La Combattante fast attack class patrol boat [Waheed], and reported its position, heading and speed back to the E-2C.

Our instructions were to “bird-dog” with the ship – something we had a lot of practice doing during years of Cold War operations against the Soviets. After approximately 20 minutes (at around 2015 hrs local time), we received coded orders to attack the ship. As we verified the order to attack was legitimate, I was slightly to the southwest of the vessel, and we could see commercial shipping just to the north of the patrol craft. While the early versions of the Harpoon could limit the size of its search area to some degree, we weren’t altogether comfortable that its radar wouldn’t lock onto a larger commercial vessel in the vicinity, vice the smaller patrol craft. Because of this constraint to the weapon, our CO [Cdr Richard G. Coleman] told us that if we did happen to engage any surface ships, we could only shoot Harpoons from north to south. Therefore, I began to maneuver around to the north, which would enable us to fire with a clear shot to the south.

Although “Blaster 505” had been the first to identify the contact, it was actually “Blaster 507” that was better positioned to attack.

Dowty recalled:

We checked in with the E-2Cs and they told us “we have a couple of contacts – we want you to go ‘bird-dog’ one coming out of Tripoli”. The controllers then said, “‘Blaster 505’, go check this one out (it was the closer one) and ‘Blaster 507’, go east”. We headed east and joined up with two A-7s, and when we got a bit more than halfway to our target, Don Watkins came up and identified the boat by type – we had a code word that night for a La Combattante-class patrol boat and another for the larger Nanuchka-class corvette. He identified it, and we then heard “alpha sierra passes stable”. According to the code words written on my knee board, this said “ATTACK!”

I now knew I had to turn around and speed west, so I asked the E-2C controller, “Anything out there?”, to which he answered, “Negative”. So, I told Larry, “Get on that radar and check”. He did not see anything but one blip. We were at about 3,000ft, headed west-southwest, and it was dark, but there was moonlight. We shot the Harpoon at a range of about 22 miles. I looked out and saw the missile fall away from the jet. I watched it drop into the darkness and then the motor fired up and it sped out in front of us, but it did not seem to be traveling all that much faster than we were.

We were turning away from the target when the Harpoon hit. Don Watkins and others saw the impact, but we did not.

Watkins did indeed see “Blaster 507’s” missile strike its target.

As we circled back to the north, “Blaster 507” attacked from a more northeast to southwest approach, and were able to execute the first clear shot. Their Harpoon clearly struck the La Combattante’s superstructure, before exploding a fraction of a second later, and they continued their attack, dropping their Rockeye.

Dowty described the follow-up attack with Mk 20 Rockeye CBUs as follows:

The only other radio comms I heard was from Don Watkins. He was loitering around the target, but he was not getting a good BIT [built-in test] check from his Harpoon. So, after our Harpoon hit, we set up for a follow up-attack with Rockeye cluster bombs. However, we screwed up the first pass due to FLIR and computer issues, so we had to circle around for another go, from a north-to-south angle.

The FLIR was stuck, so I said we would circle around to put the target in the moonlight. I told Larry, “We are going to step up the altitude to 500ft so we can get a good radar lock, and you will have time to sweeten the angles for a successful bombing attack”. Larry replied, “Skipper said never go back and reattack the same target again!” I said, “They are not shooting at us, so we are going back!” So, we bombed the ship with Rockeye. As we pulled away, Don Watkins called “Bulldog away”, which meant he was firing his Harpoon at the target.

Watkins recalled “Blaster 505’s” AGM-84 attack:

As “Blaster 507” cleared the target, we were then in position to fire. Our Harpoon struck the Libyan craft, which was left totally dead in the water. As we continued towards the vessel, we could see that only the bow of the ship remained afloat, with the bulk of it engulfed in heavy flames. Seeing the ship on the verge of sinking, and believing there may be other threats to the fleet, we decided to retain our Rockeye in case they might be needed against any other Libyan naval vessels in the area. When our fuel began to run low we returned to the ship.

Painting depicting the moment of Impact (USN released)

The next morning the Spanish tanker SS Castillo de Ricote rescued 16 Libyan survivors from Waheed. According to VA-34’s mission write-up, “Intruder crews learned from the attack that it is fairly easy to severely damage and stop a ship, especially one with exposed missiles topside. However, the ship’s structural compartmentalization can make it much more difficult to sink”.

 

https://theaviationist.com/2024/09/21/a-6-agm-84/

[Jaroslav]

Soviet Naval Spetsnaz Forces

https://www.jstor.org/stable/44636878?seq=1

[Jaroslav]

Naval Spetsnaz 

Background

The modern concept of Naval Spetsnaz Brigades were formed by the Soviet Union in the 1950s. Although there were outside influences, the Soviets invested heavily in home-grown technology and doctrine which caused a significant divergence from the Western model. In the Soviet model Naval Spetsnaz Brigades were tasked with reconnaissance (both across the beach and of underwater defenses, landing zones etc), preparation of pre-emptive strikes (e.g. placing nuclear mines in enemy and neutral ports and waterways) and preparation of coastal raids, particularly on the remote radar and SOSUS outposts. The extent to which they conducted cross-border operations during the Cold War is open to discussion although the widespread view is that they did. The belief is that because of the covert nature of their operations and lower likelihood of compromise Naval Spetsnaz got more cross-border time than their army colleagues. This logic still holds true today.

Since the collapse of the USSR in 1991 the Naval Spetsnaz Brigades went through the same period of neglect as other units and, more recently, have taken on more Western influences again. However, the flavor of Naval Spetsnaz is still very Russian.

In Soviet doctrine the primary way for Spetsnaz divers to get into the water was by parachute, sometimes even jumping with their DPVs strapped to their bodies. Air mobility still has some relevance but for Hybrid Warfare we should expect a more subtle approach: submarine. The Russians have never adopted Dry Deck Shelters (DDS) (remember, only the SEALs and SBS have those!) or even lock-out chambers in patrol submarines (SSKs) so any Spetsnaz infiltrating NATO shores will have to exit the boat Soviet style: through the torpedo tubes. This is a comparatively dangerous and uncomfortable way to exit or enter a submarine and generally requires the sub to bottom-out in shallow water. Divers, DPVs and any gear need to be hauled out of the claustrophobic confines. Another common method is from boats or quasi-civilian surface ships which may also act as mother-ships for SDV operations. 
Spetsnaz diver practices exiting a submarine via the forward torpedo tubes. Not for the faint hearted! Photo credit Pavlo1

In more modern times they have added maritime counter-terrorism to the list although it is unclear to the author the extent to which this is organized as separate units. In general Russia was slower to respond to international terrorism than the West and mostly adopted the Western tactical methods and equipment when it did so. Maritime Counter-Terrorism is less widely covered than other CT topics but suffice it to say that most diver propulsion devices (DPVs) and some Swimmer Delivery Vehicles (SDVs) are marketed for this purpose. And it is most likely from this ‘paramilitary’ channel that Russia has obtained relatively up to date Western underwater craft. It would therefore not be surprising if a Spetsnaz operator turned up riding a DPV normally associated with NATO forces. However, this article covers the Russian origin kit which anyway is the more likely.
 

In Hybrid Warfare Naval Special Forces can adapt to several tasks:
a) Location, identification, tapping and disruption of underwater communications cables
b) Observation of ‘enemy’ naval exercises
c) Coastal raids which can be passed off as carried out by aligned irregular military units notionally outside Russia’s control
d) Kidnapping of high-value targets within reach of coast
e) Low-level sabotage and ‘show of force’ missions intended to frustrate, distract and intimidate enemies
f) Making up for limited conventional naval assets during sudden flare-ups in conflict
g) Training and equipping waterborne saboteurs of aligned irregular/rebel units

These are just a few, the reader is invited to think up more. The only point is that Special Forces, particularly maritime ones, are particularly suited to low-level conflicts where a degree of deniability is required.

Probably the main underwater vehicle, this is the up to date model of a long line of Soviet diver scooters. These craft can carry one or two divers in a partially exposed position for relatively short journeys underwater. DPVs in general have many limitations compared to SDVs, but they are also cheaper and of course much smaller, creating niche where they are useful. They are particularly relevant for over-the-beach missions where they can be treated as disposable thus simplifying the mission profile considerably, something which few Navies would do with a larger SDV. The Spetsnaz operated these more extensively than most of their NATO adversaries although in modern times advancements in technology and budget constraints has narrowed the gap in this respect.

PDSS counter-divers

In addition to the Naval Spetsnaz Brigades discussed here, there are several additional Russian special waterborne forces to be aware of. The first is PDSS who are counter-saboteur frogmen. Armed with underwater guns and sometimes using propulsion devices, these fit the popular image of Spetsnaz. Their role is however defensive and confined to friendly ports where they protect vessels from enemy frogmen.

http://www.hisutton.com/Naval Spetsnaz in Hybrid Warfare.html

[Jaroslav]

 

Naval Infantry, Russian

A Brief History

The history of the Russian Naval Infantry predates its much larger cousin, the United States Marine Corps, by around seventy years, when Tzar Peter the Great transferred two regiments of ordinary infantry to the Navy, thus creating the Naval Infantry (Morskaya pekhota). However the arm of service has not had the same recognition or development as others have. The Naval Infantry fought well during the Great Northern War (1700 - 1721) and the Seven Years War (1756 - 1763), as well as during campaigns against the Turks in the Mediterranean, the Crimea and Russo-Japanese Wars.

The large number of Naval Infantry formations maintained during these wars cannot be ascribed to any recognition of their usefulness. On the contrary, most of the units raised consisted of supernumerary ships’ crews from immobilised or destroyed Russian warships. [note 1]

The naval Infantry performed a number of important landings in both World Wars including raids against the Turks around the Black Sea and the capture of Sakhalin Island and the Japanese-held ports in North Korea. However, they were disbanded in 1947 and remained so until 1961. There were several reasons for this. Firstly, the countries that had maintained a strong amphibious capability (the USA and UK) have been active in seaborne empire building (militarily and economically) and trade, and so for many years after the Russian Revolution, the Kremlin regarded marines as a symbol of imperialism. Secondly, the appearance of a Soviet ‘blue-water’ fleet is a fairly recent phenomenon. There have however, been many historical examples of the Russians using armed parties of sailors ashore. The 1st Separate Naval Infantry Brigade earned a fearsome reputation during the siege of Leningrad in World War Two. However, several factors came together at the start of the 1960’s which heralded the Naval Infantry’s resurrection. Firstly, there was a growing unease about the all-out nuclear strategy introduced by Krushchev in the 1950’s (which mirrored the unease in the USA over massive retaliation at the same time). Secondly, the study of US and British operations during World War Two, showed the utility of amphibious forces in conventional operations (as did the landings of the US Marines in Lebanon in 1958, and the Royal Marines at Suez in 1956). Thirdly, the Cuban Missile Crisis underlined the need for a more balanced Soviet Navy and fourthly, Admiral Gorshkov (who had been involved in amphibious operations during the war) took command of the Soviet Fleet and was determined to build it into a true ‘blue-water’ navy.

It was only with Gorshkov’s appointment that the old Soviet stigma of seeing marine forces as a manifestation of imperialism was finally overcome. His importance in this resurrection cannot be overemphasised. [note 2]

To this was added a number of articles in the Soviet military press, such as the ones by Captain N P Vivuenko and Admiral Yu A Panteleev.

The revival of the Naval Infantry entailed the building of a modern amphibious fleet. Starting in the late 1950’s, the Soviets had started to build sixteen MP-2 and twenty-five MP-4 class landing ships. While the MP-2s could only carry infantry, the MP-4s could carry up to eight APCs and were eventually converted from transporters to fully fledged landing ships. In the 1960’s ten cargo ships of the ‘Bira’ class were converted as well, creating the MP-6 class and were followed by the eighteen ships of the MP-8 class, which were heavily armed and could carry 12 APCs or 400 tons of material. Finally, the forty-six ships of the MP-10 class, which were capable of carrying three tanks, concluded the first generation of post-war Soviet landing ships. After a short pause in the build up, the first ships of the ‘Polnocny’ class were laid down. These were to become the standard Soviet landing ship, and were built in three versions. The last (Polnocny III), could carry eight APCs or 500 tons of stores, and could give substantial support to its Naval Infantry with its two sets of fourteen rocket launchers. Soon after this came the first exercises on the Black Sea with Bulgarian and Rumanian troops. These were probably small in scale and only involved around a company of Naval Infantry in each.

From there on, the build up of the Naval Infantry continued at a steady pace. From 1965 to 1969 it grew from just over 3000 personnel to around 8000. The growing importance of the arm was demonstrated with its part in Soviet naval exercises. There were a number of these conducted on the Baltic and Black Seas with other members of the Warsaw Pact, including Exercises ‘Sever’ and ‘Oder-Neisse’, as well as a regimental landing conducted in 1974 with East German and Polish Marines. Along with these high profile manouvres, the second generation of landing ships came into service. Among these were the Alligator class, which could carry up to thirty APCs or 1700 tons of stores. Finally, during the 1970’s, the largest Soviet landing ship began construction, the ‘Ropucha’, which had the capacity to take nineteen APCs or 1000 tons of material. The Naval Infantry was divided between the four fleets (Northern, Baltic, Black Sea and Pacific) with a single regiment going to three of the fleets and two going to the Pacific. As the Naval Infantry expanded through the 1970’s and 1980’s, the regiments were expanded into brigades (an indication of their elite status as brigades were not a common formation in the Soviet Armed Forces) and the Pacific units were formed into a division. Each formation was tailored to its geographical situation, but it can be assumed that the regiments were composed of three infantry battalions (of around 350 personnel) mounted in BTR-60PB armoured personnel carriers, a battalion of T-54 or T-55 medium tanks, a light tank battalion of PT-76 tanks, plus a number of combat support and combat service support assets including BM-21 multiple rocket launchers, ZSU-23-4 ‘Shilka’ self-propelled anti-aircraft artillery systems, SA-9 ‘Gaskin’ surface-to-air missile systems, and AT-3 ‘Sagger’ anti-tank missile systems. A Naval Infantry brigade has two tank battalions and five infantry battalions, making it nearly double the size of the regiment. Naval Infantry are of a higher calibre than normal motor rifle troops, and are given more rigerous training and special courses to familiarise them with ship types, naval terminology and signals, parachuting and navigation as well as being taught to use all the weapons at the company’s disposal. The general character of the Naval Infantry is elitist, as are most other marine forces, and they wear the distictive blue and white stripped shirts, that are also worn by the paratroops. The ranks in the Naval Infantry are military, but non-rated personnel are called Seamen. The highest rank is that of Major General, and officers are graduates of the higher military schools.

Given the fact that the Naval Infantry of the modern period has been fairly small, its use would remain limited to the tactical and operational levels, as raiding parties or the spearhead of a larger amphibious force, where the beachhead would be seized by the Naval Infantry, and the second echelon would comprise of units of the Ground Forces. While the US Marine Corps uses specially designed armoured amphibious vehicles (amtracs) the Naval Infantry uses normal Army equipment (in the Soviet era this was the BTR-60) as the tactics would be different. The Naval Infantry would be unlikely to assault a heavily defended coastline, while the US Marines are trained and equipped for such a mission. The Naval Infantry have however been ahead of the Marine Corps in the adoption of hovercraft for beach landing operations. Four types have come into service : ‘Gus’, ‘Lebed’, ‘Uterok’ and ‘Aist’ and their capacity is quite impressive. The ‘Gus’ class can carry nine tons of stores at 57.5 knots, while the ‘Aist’ class can carry either four PT-76 tanks, two T-72 tanks or 220 troops at a maximum speed of 70 knots. Finally a new class of assault landing ship came into service at the end of the 1970’s - the ‘Ivan Rogov’ class which had habitable berths for a whole battalion of Naval Infantry and so allowed them to be projected much further from Soviet shores than was previously possible, and so permitting long voyages to more distant destinations. This point has been illustrated by Soviet landing exercises in Syria. [note 3] The Naval Infantry had come of age as a power projection force.

The 1980’s saw a gradual overhaul of the Naval Infantry force structure as well as modernisation of its equipment and a change in doctrine under Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal N V Ogarkov. He planned to use amphibious landings along with ‘deep’ strikes (such as airborne and airmobile assault) in a theatre offensive to attack an enemy’s nuclear weapons, missile and air force concentrations, command and control assets and logistics infrastructure. The categories of desant were updated into six new types : Operational - Strategic, Operational, Operational - Tactical, Tactical, Special Purpose and Demonstration. No sizes were given, but were assumed to be army / corps, division, brigade / regiment / battalion / company and company / platoon / squad respectively. Similarly, no depth was indicated for each type of operation but would be expected to vary between fifty and 1000 kilometres depending on the situation. The term ‘Sea Landing Operation’ (morskaya desantnaya operatsiia) is used to describe landings at the operational - strategic, operational and operational - tactical levels. It can be conducted as part of a strategic theatre offensive, a counter-offensive operation, an independent strategic operation or to support a front or fleet, and is controlled by a TVD headquarters (teatr voyennykh deystviy) - the equivalent of a ‘theatre of operations’. Along with the increase in Soviet surface fleet numbers and the upgrading of the naval infrastructure, the Naval Infantry’s numbers were expanded from just over 12,000 to around 20,000. They also received a boost to their organic firepower with the addition of the M1974 122mm self-propelled gun, the replacement of the BTR with the new BMD airborne infantry fighting vehicle, MT-LB multi-purpose combat vehicle, the replacement of the T-54 and T-55 medium tanks with the T-72 main battle tank, and the addition of SA-8 ‘Gecko’ SAMs. Naval Infantry airborne assault units were also created to enhance the shock effect of an amphibious landing, and prevent the Naval Infantry from having to call upon the VDV (Vosdushno desantnaya voyska - air assault force) for help and becoming part of the planning process which would complicate command and control. This consideration has a particular implication for the Pacific Naval Command. It tacitly implies an endorsement of the Command’s relative autonomy in the conduct of military operations over the far-flung territories of the Soviet Maritime Far East and beyond - into the expanses of the Pacific. [note 4] In the late 1980’s the Naval Infantry of both the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact were given a lower profile, and its exercises were to have a low key approach in line with Gorbachev’s new thinking and his decision to follow a more defensive doctrine.

After the Cold War

With the end of the Cold War, dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 - 91, the Naval Infantry once again found itself to be ‘Russian’. The new scenarios that were created by these events seemed very different from those of the Cold War - namely internal security and counter-insurgency missions both in Russia and in the Near Abroad (the regions that are in the immediate vicinity of the Russian Federation). The emphasis is now on elite mobile formations, particularly those of the VDV, air assault brigades, the Spetsnaz and the Naval Infantry. The Naval Infantry is controlled through a joint command with the Coastal Missile and Artillery Troops and has a strength of around 27,000 personnel. The Naval Infantry is however at around half of its listed strength and has a large number of conscripts, which can do little to help the combat strength of the units.

The listed formations include one division, three independent brigades, one independent regiment and a number of smaller detachments. The 55th (formerly 5th) Division is based in the Far East and is composed of two infantry regiments, one air assault regiment, one tank regiment, one artillery battalion and other combat support elements. Only the air assault regiment is fully manned, with the two infantry regiments significantly understrength. The 63rd Guards Independent Brigade is based with the Northern Fleet at Pechenga - Petsamo and the 175th Independent Brigade at Serebrinanski. The 63rd has two infantry battalions, one air assault battalion, a tank battalion and an artillery battalion. The 175th is mainly at cadre strength. On the Baltic resides the 336th Guards Independent Brigade (formerly the 36th) at Kaliningrad, and is composed of four infantry battalions, two tank battalions plus combat support and combat service support elements. On the Black Sea, the continuing problems between Russia and Ukraine has meant that the 810th Independent Brigade (formerly 79th) has been split between the two countries with the Ukrainians forming the 1st Naval Infantry Brigade, and the remnants becoming the cadre of a new independent regiment for the Russians. Detachments include small units based on the Azov Sea, Caspian Sea and Amur River. There is also a detachment at the Moscow Navy HQ based around two companies of Naval Infantry.

Many Naval Infantry battalions have BTR-70 armoured personnel carriers (APC) but are slowly converting to BMD-2 airborne infantry fighting vehicle. The tank battalions have either T-55AM medium tanks or T-72 main battle tanks (which are steadily replacing the older tank). The OT-55 flamethrower and PT-76 light tanks have almost completely been replaced. The Northern Fleet’s brigades have a larger tank battalion based around four companies of main battle tanks (MBT) and another two companies of PT-76 light tanks that are being phased out or replaced to some extent by the 2S9 ‘Anona’ self-propelled gun. The artillery battalions contain 122mm 2S1 ‘Gvozdika’ self-propelled guns (SPGs), augmented by 2S9 ‘Anona’ SPGs in some cases. The Pacific Fleet’s 55th Division also has 152mm 2S3 SPGs and some 122mm M-74 towed guns. The MRL battalion has 18 BM-21 trucks with 122mm barrels, while the anti-tank battalion consists of 18 BRDM-2 vehicles, which mount AT-3 ‘Sagger’ or AT-5 ‘Spandrel’ anti-tank missiles. In the anti-aircraft role, the air defence battalion fields a mix of ZSU-23-4 ‘Shilka’ and 2S6 ‘Tunguska’ self-propelled anti-aircraft (AA) systems and SA-9 ‘Gaskin’ surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems. Interestingly, both the PTS-M and MT-LB tracked vehicles are in common use (the former with the engineers) and the MT-LB sometimes replaces the BTR-70 as its wide tracks give it better mobility over soft terrain, and is used as a weapons carrier for the 120mm mortar and SA-13 ‘Gopher’ SAM.

As in the Soviet era, the Naval Infantry could be used as a show of force, such as the landings in Syria, Vietnam, Cuba and Aden demonstrated. The Naval Infantry now operates in the ‘Near Abroad’, for example, in the civil war in Georgia, the Naval Infantry was landed to gain control of important communications sites. The Naval Infantry was also used in the Chechen conflict when four battalions were airlifted (from the Baltic and Pacific) to Chechnya. While the training and the motivation of the Naval Infantry are among the best in Russia, their use in counter-insurgency operations has meant problems, as exemplified by the refusal of 300 men to go to Chechnya. They have also seen action in the South China Sea where they engaged pirates attacking Russian merchantmen. They have also been used as an internal security force, with action in the Crimea and the Baltic Republics. The Naval infantry were even used to force the local electricity company in the Kola Peninsula to turn the electricity back on to the naval base which had failed to pay its bill, due to fears over the safety of nuclear reactors.

Unfortunately the very assets that make the Naval Infantry what it is, are in poor condition and much of it is becoming elderly, due to a lack of spare parts and proper maintenance (which isn’t helped by the fact that the shipyard that built the ‘Ropucha’ and ‘Polnocny’ classes is in Poland). While evaluating overall combat capability is therefore difficult, short-range capability is probably still good as the naval infantry can still use the twenty-six ships of the ‘Polnocny’ class (as they can land directly on the beach area) and the various classes of hovercraft (‘Gus’, ‘Lebed’, ‘Aist’, ‘Uterok’, ‘Tsaplya’ and ‘Serena’). Problems persist however in keeping these air-cushion vehicles in service, as they are expensive to maintain.

Finally, while the special forces available to the Russian Army have declined in numbers, the navy has maintained its special forces almost untouched. Each fleet has a special forces brigade (Morskaya brigada osobogo naznacheniya) attached to it. They are located at Murmansk (Northern), Baltiysk (Baltic), Sevastopol (Black Sea) and Vladivostock / Sovetskaya Gavan (Pacific). The Naval Spetsnaz brigade has a headquarters company, a battalion of special craft (including midget submarines), two or three commando battalions and supporting units. The Northern and Black Sea Fleets have smaller brigades, while the Baltic and Pacific Fleets have larger ones. At most, a battalion of Spetsnaz will have around 200 personnel and a brigade will have around 8 - 900 personnel. Most of the Spetsnaz are selected two year conscripts or short-term volunteers with three years of service.(de Lionis, p. 302)

In recent times, the parachute battalion or independent battalion for sabotage and reconnaissance has been moved from brigade control to fleet headquarters control. Most are around 120 personnel, while the Pacific Fleet’s is larger. This was due to the need to resort to specialised long-range reconnaissance units for intelligence gathering leaving harbour sabotage to the Naval Spetsnaz and beach operations to either Naval Spetsnaz or the MP.(de Lionis, p. 302) There is close co-operation between the Naval Spetsnaz and Naval Infantry and tasks such as beach raiding and reconnaissance, underwater demolition and amphibious assault can be given to either.

In conclusion, the long history and proven performance of the Naval Infantry should ensure its future among the cash starved Russian Armed Forces. The only problems are the lack of funds for the maintenance of the amphibious fleet and adequate operational training. Also, there is a lack of training in counter-terrorist operations (unlike Western special forces) but given the changing world in which we live, the hijack of a Turkish ferry by Chechen rebels and the increasing problems with organised crime, this situation could change.

 

Bibliography

1. de Cuhna, Derek, "Soviet Naval Infantry and Amphibious Lift in the Pacific", Armed Forces, October 1988, pp.446-450
2. de Lionis, Andres "How Elite is Russia’s Naval Infantry ?", Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 1996, pp. 298-302.
3. Pritchard, Charles G "Warsaw Pact Amphibious Forces under Gorbachev", International Defence Review, 4 / 1989, pp401 - 404
4. Rasmussen, Peter H "Naval Infantry", Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual, No.4, 1980, pp228 - 238, Academic International Press, Florida
5. Rasmussen, Peter H, "Naval Infantry", Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual, No.5, 1981, pp153 - 157, Academic International Press, Florida
6. Rasmussen, Peter H, "Naval Infantry", Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual, No.8, 1985, pp185 - 189, Academic International Press, Florida
7. Rasmussen, Peter H, "Soviet Naval Infantry and Spetsnaz Naval Brigades", Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual, No.10, 1987, pp141 - 145, Academic International Press, Florida
8. Urban, Mark L "The Red Banner Baltic Fleet Guards Naval Infantry Regiment", Armed Forces, June 1984, pp224 - 227
9. Zaloga Steven J & Loop, James, Soviet Bloc Elite Forces, Osprey Publishing Ltd, 1985, Elite No.5, 0-85045-631-2, 64 pages

[BACK] 1 Rasmussen, Peter H "Naval Infantry", Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual, No.4, 1980, p.228
[BACK] 2 Urban, Mark L "The Red Banner Baltic Fleet Guards Naval Infantry Regiment", Armed Forces, June 1984, p.225
[BACK] 3 Zaloga Steven J & Loop, James, Soviet Bloc Elite Forces, Osprey Publishing Ltd, 1985, Elite No.5, p.25
[BACK] 4 de Cuhna, Derek, "Soviet Naval Infantry and Amphibious Lift in the Pacific", Armed Forces, October 1988, p.448

 

https://www.historyofwar.org/articles/weapons_russiannavallong.html

Edited December 22, 2025 by Jaroslav

[Jaroslav]

Emerson Electric AGM-123 Skipper II

In the early 1980s, the Naval Weapons Center (NWC) in China Lake created the AGM-123A Skipper II laser-guided standoff missile using off-the-shelf components. The GBU-16/B Paveway II LGB (Laser-Guided Bomb), consisting of a 450 kg (1000 lb) MK 83 bomb, an MXU-667/B airfoil group, and an MAU-169/B guidance section, was combined with a MK 78 rocket motor (taken from obsolete AGM-45B Shrike missiles) in a WPU-5/B propulsion section. The first test launches of experimental prototypes were conducted at China Lake in 1980. Because of the "bang-bang" mode of the MAU-169/B autopilot (the control surfaces were either deflected fully or not at all), the missile's flight path resembled that of a stone skipping across a pond, leading to the Skipper name. However, it took some time until the concept of this somewhat crude, but very cheap guided weapon (especially when compared to the then new Paveway III guided bombs) caught on in official circles. Finally, in March 1985 a contract for full-scale production of 2500 AGM-123As was awarded to Emerson Electric. The Skipper II (there was no "Skipper I", the "II" was derived from the Paveway II guidance) achieved Initial Operational Capability with the U.S. Navy in late 1985. The ATM-123A was an inert training variant of the AGM-123A.

The AGM-123A was primarily employed by the A-6E Intruder in the anti-shipping role. It was a simple and effective weapon, which could lock on a laser-designated target before or after launch. The powered glide-bomb could theoretically reach a range of 55 km (30 nm), but in practice this was usually limited to about 25 km (13.5 nm) by the range of the laser designator (which was normally carried by the launching aircraft).

The designation AGM-123B was allocated to a variant described as "forward fit version of the AGM-123A". The AGM-123B is described by source [4] as having a WCU-10A/B control section and MXU-737A/B airfoil group, and the manufacturer is quoted as Texas Instruments. I have no information how many (if any) Skipper IIs were actually built as AGM-123B. The Skipper II is no longer in service with the U.S. Navy, having been phased out in the mid-1990s.

Specifications

Note: Data given by several sources show slight variations. Figures given below may therefore be inaccurate!

Data for AGM-123A:

Length	4.27 m (14 ft)
Wingspan	1.60 m (5 ft 3 in)
Diameter	35.6 cm (14 in)
Weight	580 kg (1280 lb)
Speed	1100 km/h (680 mph)
Range	25 km (13.5 nm)
Propulsion	Aerojet MK 78 dual-thrust solid-fueled rocket
Warhead	450 kg (1000 lb) MK 83 bomb

Main Sources

[1] Norman Polmar: "The Naval Institute Guide to the Ship and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet", 15th ed., Naval Institute Press, 1993
[2] Christopher Chant: "World Encyclopaedia of Modern Air Weapons", Patrick Stephens Ltd., 1988
[3] Bernard Blake (ed.): "Jane's Weapon Systems 1987-88", Jane's, 1988
[4] Department of Defense Missile Nomenclature Records
[5] E-mail from David T. Hunter on early Skipper development

http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-123.html

 

[Jaroslav]

[Jaroslav]

Skipper was made from TI Paveway bombs, but they tried like hell to kill it because it competed with their troubled LLLGB program.

I was the lead EE on the pilot production program. NAC in Indianapolis built 360 of them, plus all the production test equipment, to validate China Lake's modifications to the Paveway. Those pre-production weapons were used to sink the Sahand.

We contracted with Emerson Electric to build 2500 more, and they were a royal PITA for the entire three years that it took. The original management team massively underbid the effort and they spent the entire time trying to get terminated.

TI eventually got on board. We worked with them to improve the fleet test equipment and then re-design to build the mods into the weapons on the production line. They built another 2500 or so before the program was killed to ensure the requirements for JSOW - a weapon an order of magnitude more expensive and hardly used.

In the latter half of my career I worked with four pilots who had employed Skipper in the first gulf war, and they just loved the thing. "Just makes tanks go away!"

 

[Jaroslav]

AGM-123 Skipper II


Anti-ship missile consisting of a fragmentation-explosive (GP) bomb Mk.83 equipped with a laser guidance set of the Paveway II series and a rocket engine (from AGM-45) propulsion part WPU-5/B. The guidance section of the weapon is type WCU-10/B, the tail part bears the designation MXU-737/B. The range is not great, it places the projectile in the category of "short range", but it already meets the philosophy of stand-off. It allows you to attack from a distance as far away from the enemy air defense as possible. In service since 1985.
Made 2500 pieces. It is a naval weapon, carried by naval aircraft A-6E Intruder, A-7 Corsair II, F/A-18 Hornet.


AGM-123 was removed from the US Navy in 1997.


Dimensions AGM-123


length: 4.3 m
diameter: 50 cm
span: 1.61 m
total weight: 582 kg
warhead weight: 454 kg
control system: laser, passive
engine: rocket, on TPH
speed: 925-1100 km/h
range: 10 km (up to 25 km)

https://www.armedconflicts.com/USA-AGM-123-Skipper-II-t28642

 

First combat deployment


The AGM-123 underwent a baptism of fire on April 18, 1988, during Operation Praying Mantis, which was the US Navy's military response to Iran's Gulf mines, which resulted in damage to the USS Samuel B. Roberts missile frigate.


In retaliation, US ships attacked the Sassan and Sirri oil rigs. A US Navy raid forced an Iranian response. First in the form of fast motorboats, which were, however, "flushed" by cluster bombs CBU-59/B dropped by two aircraft A-6E z výstbroje letky VA-95, which operated from the deck of an aircraft carrier USS Enterprise. The Iranian attack vessel Joshan later joined the action. While the ship Joshan was sunk, the Iranian frigate Sahand approached the American ships around 4 pm, despite warnings from the frigate USS Jack Williams. The response to the American warning came at 16.21 - Sahand began unsuccessfully shelling American ships from its 76 mm guns. The Iranian frigate was immediately taken care of by a couple Intruders from VA-95, which provided air cover for American ships. Between 16.34 and 16.43, the Iranian vessel was hit by two anti-ship missiles AGM-84D Harpoon, followed by a quartet of AGM- 123 Skipper II. Another Harpoon was immediately added by the destroyer USS Joseph Strauss. Corsairy II z letky VA-22 then against Sahandu fired two missiles AGM-62 Walleye II ERDL. To make matters worse, US aircraft dropped 18 more cluster bombs on the already devastated Iranian ship Mk.20 Rockeye, 18 fragmentation -trhavých pum Mk.83 a 3 GBU-12/B Paveway II. Sahand finally sank on the night of April 18-19.


During Operation Praying Mantis, one bomb was in the early evening of April 18 GBU-12/B from an airplane A-6E hit the frigate Sabaland, which the Iranians later managed to tow and repair.


Resources

1) Cooper, T. & amp; Bishop, F .: Iran-Iraq War in the Air, Atglen, 2000
2) Greeley, B .: US Sinks Iranian Frigate in Persian Gulf Action, AW & ST, April 25, 1988
3) USS Enterprise (CVN-65), 1988 Command History Encl (1)
4) en.wikipedia.org

https://www.armedconflicts.com/USA-AGM-123-Skipper-II-t28642

[Jaroslav]

A map showing the location of the Black Sea and some of the large or prominent ports around it. The Sea of Azov and Sea of Marmara are also labelled.

[Jaroslav]

On 6/7/2024 at 12:19 PM, Perun said:

Bulgarian navy 1989.

 

Command structure in 1989
Directly subordinate to Naval Staff
Electronic Warfare Section (Отделение РЕБ)
Independent Electronic Warfare Battalion type "NS" (Отделен батальон тип "НС") (one company type N for jamming of enemy communications and one company type S for jamming of enemy targeting systems)
8th Submarine Division, Varna Naval Base, with 4x Romeo-class submarines (Afterwards two were decommissioned without replacement in 1990, one in 1992, and the last one in 2011.)
81 Pobeda (Победа, "Victory", delivered in 1972, former Soviet S-57), 82 Victoria (Виктория, delivered in 1972, former Soviet S-212), 83 Nadezhda (Надежда, "Hope", delivered in 1983, former Soviet S-36), 84 Slava (Слава, "Glory", delivered in 1985, former Soviet S-38) (traditional female names)
2nd Coastal Missile Brigade, south of Varna, with 4K51 Rubezh anti-ship missiles
10th Missile & Torpedo Boat Brigade, in Sozopol (mixed composition of the divisions, the torpedo boats had the dual role to attack enemy vessels with their torpedoes and to provide target acquisition for the missile boats)
122 (Commander's cutter, 10-ton Soviet project 371)
10th Missile & Torpedo Boat Division
Project 205 missile boats: 101 Svetkavitsa (Светкавица, "Lightning", delivered in 1982, former Soviet R-496, improved project 205U); 102 Uragan (Ураган, "Hurricane", delivered in 1977, former Soviet R-169, improved project 205U); 103 Burya (Буря, "Storm", delivered in 1971, former Soviet R-176?, basic project 205)
Project 206 torpedo boats: 104 Orel (Орел, "Eagle"), 105 Yastreb (Ястреб, "Hawk"), 106 Albatros (Албатрос)
11th Missile & Torpedo Boat Division
Project 205 missile boats: 111 Tayfun (Тайфун, "Typhoon", delivered in 1982, former Soviet R-496, improved project 205U); 112 Gram (Гръм, "Thunder", delivered in 1977, former Soviet R-169, improved project 205U); 113 Smerch (Смерч, "Whirlwind", delivered in 1971, former Soviet R-176?, basic project 205)
Project 206 torpedo boats : 114 Bars (Барс, "snow leopard"), 115 Yaguar (Ягуар, "Jaguar"), 116 Pantera (Пантера, "Panther")
Coastal Base Sozopol (Брегова база Созопол, the brigade's logistic formation)
274 (fireboat project 364 of Soviet build)
25th Signals Regiment, in Varna
63rd Anti-submarine Helicopter Squadron, at Chayka Independent Naval Helicopter Base in Varna (in the Chayka suburb), flying 8x Mi-14PL anti-submarine helicopters (nr. 801, and nr. 810 of the original ten were lost), 1 x Mi-14BT (nr. 811; nr. 812 had been retired in 1986 and the minesweeping equipment removed from 811. Afterwards nr. 811 was used for transport tasks) and 1 x Ka-25C (Hormone-B, nr. 821, used for OTH targeting of the shore-based AShM systems).
65th Maritime Special Reconnaissance Detachment (65-ти Морски Специален Разузннавателен Отряд (65ти МСРО)), in Varna (Tihina) (Navy frogmen)
130mm Coastal Artillery Training Battery, in Varna (in wartime the navy would mobilize the 1st (Varna) and 2nd (Burgas) Coastal Artillery Regiments with 5 batteries each)
People's Higher Naval School "Nikola Vaptsarov", in Varna
44th Surveillance and Signals Battalion - Danube River, in Ruse (44-ти батальон за наблюдение и свръзки - река Дунав) (Radar and SIGINT)[18]
Rear (Тил) (logistic services)
Varna Naval Base
Varna Naval Base, in Varna
2 commander's cutters of Project 371
1st Anti-Submarine Ships Division
Riga-class frigates: 11 Drazki (Дръзки, "daring, bold", delivered in 1957, former Soviet Black Sea Fleet SKR-67), 12 Smeli (Смели, "Brave", delivered in 1958, former Black Sea Fleet SKR-53, replaced on Sept 4 1989 by the Koni-class frigate 11 "Brave", this caused renumbering of the Riga-class ships, but they were retired only a year later), 13 Bodri (Бодри, "Cheerful", delivered in 1985, former Soviet Baltic Fleet SKR "Kobchik")
Poti-class small ASW ships: 14 Hrabri (Храбри, "Brave", delivered in 1975, former Soviet MPK-106), 15 Bezstrashni (Безстрашни, "Fearless", delivered in 1975, former Soviet MPK-125)
3rd Minesweepers Division
31 Iskar (Искър, after the river), 32 Tsibar (Цибър), 33 Dobrotich (Добротич, after the medieval ruler), 34 Kapitan-Leytenant Kiril Minkov (Капитан-лейтенант Кирил Минков), 35 Kapitan-Leytenant Evstati Vinarov (Капитан-лейтенант Евстати Винаров), 36 Kapitan I Rang Dimitar Paskalev (Капитан I-ви ранг Димитър Паскалев) (minehunters project 257D/DME, Soviet second hand, NATO reporting name Vanya)
5th Minesweepers Division (Coastal Base Balchik)
51 - 56 (minehunters of project 1259.2 project "Malachite", NATO reporting name Olya, built in Michurin), 2 auxiliary cutters of project 501 (former auxiliary minesweeping boats) and a commander's cutter of project 371
18th Independent Division of Special Purpose Ships (former 18th Harbour Area Security Ships, includes supply, rescue and support ships and small patrol craft)
300 General Vladimir Zaimov (Генерал Владимир Заимов) (Command ship Bulgarian project 589, built in Ruse, also used for SIGINT of the Turkish Navy)
221 Yupiter (Юпитер, "Jupiter") (East German fire-/ tugboat project 700, used as fireboat, salvage tugboat, submarine rescue ship and target tow for the coastal artillery and ships)
401 Admiral Branimir Ormanov (Адмирал Бранимир Орманов) (Polish project 861-МВ hydrographic ship, built in 1977)
206 Kapitan I Rang Dimitar Dobrev (Капитан І ранг Димитър Добрев) (Polish project 1799 (class 130 for the Soviet Navy) degaussing ship, built in 1988, the modern Polish Navy ship ORP Kontradmirał Xawery Czernicki is a development on the same hull type)
311 Anton Ivanov, later Mitsar and Anlain ("Антон Иванов", "Мицар", "Анлайн", Auxiliary transport (replenishment) ship Bulgarian project 102, built in Ruse in 1979, main task was to provide en route replenishment for the Bulgarian ships, committed to the Soviet Navy Operational Mediterranean Squadron)
223 (diving support boat Bulgarian project 245, built in Varna in 1980)
121, 215 and 216 (multirole motor cutters Bulgarian project 160, built in Varna)
1 fireboat type L26, pennant number changed several times (built in Rostock, GDR in 1954-55)
218 and 219 (auxiliary cutters, former minesweeping boats type R376 "Sever")
55th Surveillance and Signals Battalion (55-ти батальон за наблюдение и свръзки) (Radar and SIGINT)
Repair Workshop
Shore based support units
Atia Naval Base
Atia Naval Base, east of Burgas
2 commander's cutters of project 371
4th Small Anti-Submarine Ships Division
Poti-class small ASW ships: 41 Letyashti (Летящи, "flying"; delivered in 1982, former Soviet MPK-77), 42 Bditelni (Бдителни, "Vigilant"; delivered in 1982, former Soviet MPK-148), 43 Naporisti (Напористи, "persistent, assertive"; delivered in 1982, former Soviet MPK-109), 44 Strogi (Строги, "stern, rigorous"; delivered in 1975 to Varna, transferred in 1982 to Burgas, former Soviet MPK-59)
6th Minesweepers Division
61 Briz (Бриз, "breeze"), 62 Shkval (Шквал, "squall"), 63 Priboy (Прибой, "surf"), 64 Shtorm (Щорм, "sea storm") (minehunters project 1265 "Yakhont")
65, 66, 67, 68 (minesweepers project 1258E "Korund", NATO reporting name Yevgenya)
7th Landing Ships Division
701 "Sirius" ("Сириус") and 702 "Antares" ("Антарес") (Polish project 770Е medium tank landing ships, NATO reporting name Polnocny)
703 - 712 (Soviet project 106K small tank landing ship and auxiliary minelayers, practically self-propelled landing barges, built in Ruse and Burgas, NATO reporting name Vydra)
(another 14 project 106K small tank landing ships and auxiliary minelayers mothballed after construction and stored by Bulgarian Sea Fleet (the state-owned merchant marine) as wartime mobilization stock)
96th Independent Division of Special Purpose Ships (former 96th Harbour Area Security Ships, includes supply, rescue and support ships and small patrol craft)
301 Kapitan Kiril Halachev ("Капитан Кирил Халачев") (Command ship Bulgarian project 589, built in Ruse)
302 Atiya (Атия; auxiliary transport (replenishment) ship Bulgarian project 102, built in Ruse in 1987, main task was to provide en route replenishment for the Bulgarian ships, committed to the Soviet Navy Operational Mediterranean Squadron)
323 (diving support boat Bulgarian project 245, built in Varna in 1980)
331 (torpedo salvage boat Bulgarian project 205, built in Varna in 1980)
312 and 313 (multirole motor cutters Bulgarian project 160, built in Varna)
1 fireboat type L26, pennant number changed several times (built in Rostock, GDR in 1954-55)
57 and 58 (auxiliary cutters, former minesweeping boats type R376 "Sever")
66th Surveillance and Signals Battalion (66-ти батальон за наблюдение и свръзки) (Radar and SIGINT)
Coastal Radiolocation Station "Periscope I" (ELINT unit)
Repair Workshop
Shore based support units
Naval Equipment
In 1989 the people's navy's inventory consisted of:

4x Romeo-class submarines (all decommissioned with last in 2011)
3x Riga-class frigates (One decommissioned in 1989, two in 1990)
1x Koni-class frigate (Commissioned in December 1989)
6x Poti-class anti-submarine warfare corvettes
1x Pauk-class corvette (Commissioned in 1989, a second Pauk-class corvette was transferred from the Soviet Union in 1990)
6x Osa-class missile boats
6x Shershen-class torpedo boats
2x Polnocny-class landing ships
6x Vanya-class minesweepers
4x Yevgenya-class minesweepers
4x Sonya-class minesweepers
6x Olya-class minesweepers
34x R376 type "Yaroslavets" axillary cutters in various configurations.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bulgarian_Navy

 

[Jaroslav]

On 6/26/2024 at 8:56 PM, Perun said:

Romanian navy 01.01.1990.

 

- 307th Marine Infantry Battalion

 

- 42nd Maritime Division:

--79th Submarine Hunter Division with five ships 260-264.

--339. division of submarine hunters and it consisted of three ships - with the boarding numbers 31,32,33.

--176. Dragoare Maritime Division included four ships - D.M. 24, DM 25, DM 29, DM 30.

--146. division, had four Basic Dragoons - DB 13, 14, 15, 16 and two minelayers - PM 271 and 274.

--19. division, with six ships.

--545th Coastal Artillery Division with two batteries, totaling 16 130 mm caliber guns stationed in Mamaia Sat and Capul Midia.

--460th Coastal Rocket Battery.

 

- 29th Star Brigade: 

--133rd Missile Carrier Division had six ships - NPR 194-199.

--93. Division with six ships which had boarding numbers between 201 and 206.

--93. ?? Division, also had six such vessels, with boarding numbers between 207 and 212. 

--81. small torpedo boat divisions (Type 25).

--84. small torpedo boat divisions (Type 25).

(81. and 84. stbd, each had 12 such ships in operation).

 

- 27th Fluvial-Maritime Brigade:

--50th Submarine Hunter and Rada Dragoon Division had three sections.

---Section 1 with three Hunters - V.Sn.1 – V.Sn.3. 

---2nd section had four Ships - V.Sn 41- V.Sn44.

---3rd Section completes with several other dragoons, identical to those in the 19th Dragoare de Radă Division. 

--118. Armored Star Divisions, six ships.

--145. Armored Star Divisions, three ships.

 

- 24th River Brigade had five divisions under it. Three with dredger stars - 73, 92,61 - totaling 19 ships and two - 23 and 94 - with armored stars each with six ships. The ships were stationed in most of the big Danube ports, especially in Brăila, Galaţi, Tulcea or Giurgiu.

The sea-river flotilla also had six 97-ton dredger ships, part of the 88th Division, made at Drobeta-Turnu Severin.

 

-------------------------------------------

 

All the large units: the Maritime Division, the Starship Brigade, the Maritime-Fluvio Brigade and the River Brigade each had a Division of auxiliary ships. They had a variable number of ships and, basically, they were composed of: tugs, fuel tanks, repair workshop ships and material transport ships. Maritime ships participated annually in at least one multinational exercise within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty. One anti-submarine and one attack with missiles and torpedoes. The organization for combat on board the ships was of the Soviet type, also due to the fact that the sensors, armament and communication equipment were of Russian production. In the period 1985-1989 F.N.R. they faced an acute shortage of fuel and lubricants. This led to a drastic reduction in the number of training days at sea and on the river, which led to an advanced deterioration of the equipment in the ships that already had advanced technical and moral wear.

 

Translated from Romanian with google translator.

 

https://evz.ro/radiografia-marinei-militare-romane-cum-a-fost-distrusa-flota-in.html

 

[Jaroslav]

On 6/27/2024 at 9:32 AM, Darth Stalin said:

"dragoare" = mine clearing vessels, as I understand

"Vedete Purtătoare de Rachete" - hydrofoil (?) missile boats - possibly Osa-class

There were also Type 025 torpedo boats (license-built Chinese project), some of them also as hydrofoils

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_025_torpedo_boat

Some interesting info:

https://warsearcher.com/shipsearcher/romanian-navy-current-and-retired/romanian-navy-corvettes-and-patrol-vessels/

https://www.the-blueprints.com/blueprints/ships/ships-other/61655/view/nms_smeul_f-202_epitrop_class_torpedo_boat/

Here's a Wiki article in Polish:

https://pl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forțele_Navale_Române

And some other info abiut Romanian Navy and her ships:

https://www.hazegray.org/worldnav/europe/romania.htm

River Flotilla:

https://www.worldnavalships.com/forums/thread.php?threadid=14909

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smârdan-class_river_monitor

Official homepage in Romanian and English:

https://www.navy.ro/despre/organizare/divizion_150/istoric_en.php

https://www.navy.ro/despre/organizare/organizare_en.php

https://www.navy.ro/despre/organizare/organizare.php

 

[Jaroslav]

Commandos (Portugal)

Commando Regiment, which included the:

Commando Battalion 11 (BCmds 11) - included the commando companies (CCmds): 111, 112, 113 and 114. BCmds 11 was formed with 2041st, 2042nd, 4041st and 112th/74 CCmds, after coming back from Angola and Guinea, changing their numbers. CCmds 113 was later deactivated;

Commando Battalion 12 (BCmds 12) - included the CCmds: 121, 122 and 123 (heavy weapons). CCmds 123 was deactivated in 1982; CCmds 131 was created later, also of heavy weapons. In this battalion was also integrated the Commando Company REDES (Raids and Destructions);

Commando Company 131 (heavy weapons) - created in 1982 as the initial company of the future Commando Battalion 13, which was never activated. It was later deactivated;

Headquarters and Support Battalion (BCS/RCmds) - included: Headquarters and Services, Specialities Training, Maintenance and Transport and Resupply companies;

Training Battalion (BInstrução/RCmds) - included Training companies: 1st and 2nd;

 

The Portuguese Commandos are analogous to the 75th Ranger Regiment and Army Special Forces of the US Army.

 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commandos_(Portugal)

[Jaroslav]

Special Actions Detachment (Portuguese: Destacamento de Ações Especiais)

Size: 60.

DAE is a special forces unit of the Portuguese Navy. It is part of the Portuguese Marine Corps. Raised in 1985, the DAE is one of the smallest special forces units within the Portuguese Armed Forces. It is responsible for conducting air-sea rescue, amphibious reconnaissance, amphibious warfare, black operation, bomb disposal, CBRN defense, coastal raiding, counterterrorism, direct action, executive protection, hostage rescue, irregular warfare, ISTAR, long-range penetration, JTAC, manhunt high-value target, maritime sabotage, mountain rescue, naval boarding, operation behind high risk enemy lines, special operations, special reconnaissance, tracking targets, underwater demolition, unconventional warfare, other missions in support of Portuguese and NATO armed forces. DAE's mission and training are similar to their American counterparts DEVGRU and the British SBS. DAE often trains with them alongside other counter-terror units.

Organization

The unit is led by a commander, and is subdivided into a command cell and four combat teams. The command cell contains the unit commander, his deputy (a lieutenant commander) and a small staff of eight. The combat teams are composed of ten men: petty officers and seamen and a commanding petty officer.

The unit can operate, as a whole, organized as a Special Operation Maritime Task Unit (SOMTU). As a SOMTU, it can operate autonomously or, together with the Portuguese Army Special Operations Forces, as part of a joint Special Operation Task Group (SOTG). It can also operate, together with special forces of allied countries, as part of a combined SOTG.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special_Actions_Detachment

[Jaroslav]

Unidad de Operaciones Especiales

The Special Operations Unit (Spanish: Unidad de Operaciones Especiales, UOE) was the elite special operations force of the Spanish Navy and marines from 1967 to 2009. In June 2009, the unit was absorbed into the newly formed Special Naval Warfare Force, which inherited the reputation and which continues the record of the UOE.[1] The UOE was formerly garrisoned in the Tercio de Armada in San Fernando, Cádiz and operated under the direct control of the Admiralty and Special Naval Warfare Command. It was thought to comprise approximately 100 men organized into three Operational Teams (Estoles) as well as command and support personnel. The unit (and today's FGNE) has long been one of Europe's most respected special forces.[2]

The UOE was tasked with Special Operations in maritime, coastal, and inland environments usually up to 50 km from the sea, though this was not a restriction and its teams were known to operate deep inland. The unit's remit covered all aspects of modern Naval Special Warfare, including: Maritime Counter-Terrorism, ship boarding (MIO non-compliant), combat diving and swimming, coastal infiltration, airborne insertion, special reconnaissance, direct action, VIP protection and escort, and combat search and rescue (CSAR).

For these purposes, the UOE employed a wide range of naval and other military platforms, including submarines, frigates, soft- and rigid-hull inflatable boats, land vehicles, as well as helicopters and airplanes for airborne insertions.

History

La Unidad ("The Unit"), as it was informally known in Spain, traces its roots to the Amphibious Climbing Company (Compañía de Escaladores Anfibios), established in 1952 as an all-volunteer unit tasked with coastal assaults and infiltration. In 1967, using the US Navy SEALs and British SBS as its guides,[citation needed] the unit expanded its mandate and range of skills to include combat diving, underwater demolitions, airborne insertions and direct action missions. In 1985 the UOE was re-designated COMANFES (Comando Anfibio Especial), but reverted to its original name in the early 1990s. Today, the unit is one of two operational elements within the Spanish Navy's Naval Special Warfare Force.

The UOE collaborated and trained closely with similar NATO units, such as the United States Navy SEALs, the Italian Navy's COMSUBIN, the French Commando Hubert, and the Portuguese DAE, as well as with special intervention units of the Spanish police forces (UEI and GEO).

The UOE and its parent Naval Special Warfare Force are one of only three units in the Spanish military formally tasked with Special Operations, along with the Army's MOE and the Air Force's EZAPAC.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unidad_de_Operaciones_Especiales

[Jaroslav]

Commandos Marine

The Commandos Marine, nicknamed Bérets Verts (Green Berets), are the special operation forces (SOF) of the French Navy, headquartered in Lorient, Brittany in western France. They operate under the Special Operations Command (COS), FORFUSCO, one of the four main forces of the French Navy or any operational command designated by the French Army staff. They specialize in offshore operations; operations from sea to land and special operations on land. One of the major characteristics of marine commando units is to be perfectly interoperable with all the resources and units of the navy (vessels, aircraft, submarines).[1]

Comprising seven operational units of around 90 men and around 160 in specialized support, their missions include: hostage rescue, evacuation operations, intelligence within enemy lines, (assault on high-value targets), Navy missions (assault at sea, remote support and destruction, reconnaissance, underwater action) as well as certain missions in support of naval airforce: amphibious operations, guidance and fire support, reinforcement teams, embargo control and State actions at sea against illegal fishing, immigration and trafficking.

Commando Hubert

Since the 1950s, the combat swimmer unit of the French Navy have been formed as Commando Hubert, also known as French commando frogmen, the only Commandos Marine unit having combat swimmers. The tip of the spear of the overall Commandos Marine organization, their military capacities are broader than combat swimming operations. They are publicly known to be a Special Mission Unit supporting counter terrorism along with GIGN (see Ouvea cave, MS Pascal Paoli). Jacques-Yves Cousteau was a naval officer in World War II and helped to set up France's commando frogmen. France further developed the role of commando frogmen in the First Indochina War.

The French intelligence service DGSE also has combat-swimmers brought together in the Centre Parachutiste d'Entraînement aux Opérations Maritimes (CPEOM, "maritime operations training parachutist center") at Roscanvel.

While these are the only French combat-diver units, other French units have divers, including:

the military engineer units of the French Army have two types of divers:

the spécialistes d'aide au franchissement (SAF, "specialists for help in clearing"): swimmers trained to recon and clear banks and bridges to permit their use by military vehicles.

the nageurs d'intervention offensive (NIO, swimmers "for offensive actions"): they accomplish missions similar to combat swimmers but in rivers and estuaries, to destroy bridges inside enemy territory for example and belong to an engineer-regiment.

some commando units like the commando group of the 2nd foreign parachutist regiment and the special unit forces of the Army and the Air Force have offensive divers.

the GIGN and RAID counter-terrorist groups have divers trained to assault a hijacked ship in support of Commando Hubert.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commandos_Marine