naval warfare 3rd WW, battle for the Mediterranean (Cold war period)

[Jaroslav]

Black sea fleet helicopter units

ВМФ
78 окплвп Донузлав 48 Ка-25 2 Ка-27Е
555 оплвп Очаков 16 Ка-27 24 Ка-25 12 Ми-14 4 Ка-29
872 оплвп Кача 24 Ми-14 5 Ми-8 14 Ка-25
б/н ивп Кача 12 Ми-14 12 Ка-27

 

 

Border guard

ПВ
24 оаэ Одесса (Школьный) 8 Ми-8 4 Ка-27

Edited September 28 by Jaroslav

[Jaroslav]

On 7/7/2025 at 2:01 PM, Jaroslav said:

For attack phase (island Crete) WP forces are:

•23rd independent Landing-Assault Brigade

•40th independent Landing-Assault Brigade

•58th independent Landing-Assault Brigade

•9th independent Special Forces Brigade GRU

•17th independent Special Forces Brigade GRU (Black sea fleet)

•64th Army Corps

- 4th Guards Motorised Rifle Division

- 36th Motorised Rifle Division

- 46th Motorised Rifle Division.

 

•6th Guards Military-Transport Aviation Division, Il-76

•7th Military-Transport Aviation Division, Il-76

(for air transport of airborne troops).

 

Naval Aviation Black Sea Fleet

•119th Maritime Fighter Aviation Division:

-86th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment, 31 MiG-29, 3 MiG-29UB

-161st Fighter Aviation Regiment MiG-23M

-684th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment MiG-23M

-841st Guards Maritime Fighter Aviation Regiment MiG-23M

•43rd Fighter-Bomber Aviation Regiment Su-17

•2nd Guards Maritime Missile Aviation Division

•30th independent Maritime Reconnaissance Aviation Regiment

•318th independent Anti-Submarine Aviation Regiment

•78th independent Shipborne Anti-Submarine Helicopter Regiment

•872nd independent Shipborne Anti-Submarine Helicopter Regiment

•917th independent Transport Aviation Regiment

For attack phase on asian side of Turkish straits WP forces are:

•810th Naval Infantry Brigade

•89th Naval infantry battalion (Bulgaria)

•307th Coastal Defense Battalion (Romania)

•98th Guards Airborne Division

•161st Airborne Regiment (Romania)

•3rd Army Parchute Reconnaissance Battalion (Bulgaria)

•10th independent Special Forces Brigade GRU

•17th independent Special Forces Brigade GRU (Black sea fleet)

•32nd Army Corps

- 126th Motorised Rifle Division

- 157th Motorised Rifle Division

•9th Mechanised Division (Romania)

•16th Motorised Rifle Division (Bulgaria)

 

•6th Guards Military-Transport Aviation Division, Il-76

•7th Military-Transport Aviation Division, Il-76

•16th Transport Air Regiment, 4 An-2, 5 An-24, 5 An-26, 1 An-30, 1 L.410 (Bulgarian AF)

•Baza 90 Aviatie de Transport, 6 An-24, 14 An-26, 3 An-30 (Romanian AF)

(for air transport of airborne troops).

 

Naval Aviation Black Sea Fleet

•119th Maritime Fighter Aviation Division:

-86th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment, 31 MiG-29, 3 MiG-29UB

-161st Fighter Aviation Regiment MiG-23M

-684th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment MiG-23M

•43rd Fighter-Bomber Aviation Regiment Su-17

•2nd Guards Maritime Missile Aviation Division

•30th independent Maritime Reconnaissance Aviation Regiment

•318th independent Anti-Submarine Aviation Regiment

•78th independent Shipborne Anti-Submarine Helicopter Regiment

•872nd independent Shipborne Anti-Submarine Helicopter Regiment

•917th independent Transport Aviation Regiment

•OPLEV-VMF (Otdelna Protivolodachna Eskadrila na VMF - Independent ASW Squadron of the Navy) (Bulgaria)

•59th Helicopter Squadron (Romania)

 

5th Air Army

24th Air Army VGK ON

Edited October 29 by Jaroslav

[Jaroslav]

[Jaroslav]

[Jaroslav]

[Jaroslav]

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[Jaroslav]

[Jaroslav]

https://maps.lib.utexas.edu/maps/onc/txu-pclmaps-oclc-8322829_f_3.jpg

ONC F-3 Albania; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Croatia; Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; Greece; Hungary; Moldova; Romania; Slovakia; Turkey; Ukraine; Yugoslavia [Not for navigational use] U.S. Defense Mapping Agency Aerospace Center, compiled 1973, revised 2000 (20.3MB)

Edited October 6 by Jaroslav

[Jaroslav]

https://maps.lib.utexas.edu/maps/onc/txu-pclmaps-oclc-8322829_g_3.jpg

ONC G-3 Albania; Cyprus; Greece; Italy; Libya; Turkey [Not for navigational use] U.S. Defense Mapping Agency Aerospace Center, compiled 1973, revised 1981 (14.1MB)

[Jaroslav]

https://maps.lib.utexas.edu/maps/imw/txu-oclc-6654394-nj-35-34-2nd-ed.jpg

NJ 35, Parts of NJ 34, NI 34, NI 35 The Aegean [Greece, Turkey] Series 1301, Edition 2-GSGS, 5-AMS (2.5 MB)

[Jaroslav]

https://maps.lib.utexas.edu/maps/imw/txu-oclc-6654394-nk-34-35-6th-ed.jpg

NK 34 and NK 35 Sofiya, Series 1301, Edition 6-GSGS (14.3 MB)

[Jaroslav]

[Jaroslav]

https://maps.lib.utexas.edu/maps/ams/europe_500k/txu-pclmaps-oclc-6470410-crete-ne-34-23-3.jpg

Crete

[Jaroslav]

On this exercise Romanian peoples army planed to made landing on asian side of Turkey. Does anyone know with which devices/ships was this planned? I noticed that Romanian navy didnt have amphibious ships. Soviets would use their ships for their own army. Only one left was Bulgarians with their amphibious ships. Am I correct?

[Jaroslav]

For NATO naval attack on Warsaw pact naval forces (mainly Soviet Black sea fleet) scenario (phase III) and amphibious landing on island Crete scenario (phase IV), involved navies would be:

 

1. Portuguese navy

FRIGATES: 6 Joao Coutinho.
AMPHIBIOUS: Craft only, 3 LCU, 3 LCM
SUPPORT AND MISCELLANEOUS: 5: 1 AOR, 1 AK, 1 AGHS, 1 tug.

2,800 marines

2,300 Paratroopers

 

2. Spanish navy

SUBMARINES: 4 Galerna (Fr Agosta)

CARRIERS: (CW): 1 Principe de Asturias
FRIGATES: 3 Santa Maria (US Perry) 

All landing vessels

8,500 marines

(?) paratroopers

 

3. French navy

4 SSN-Rubis class (S-601/602/603/604).

2 carriers-Clemencau class (R-98/99).

1 CG-Colbert class (C-611).

7 DD-4 Type F70 class (D-640/641/642/643), 2 Suffren class (D-602/603), 1 Type T53 (D-633).

5 MCMV-3 Eridan class (M-647/648/649), 2 Vulcain class (M613/622).

All landing vessels

13500 paratroopers

8000 marines

7400 infantry

 

 

4. Italian navy

SUBMARINES: 6: 2 Pelosi (imp Sauro), 4 Sauro
CARRIER: 1:  1 G. Garibaldi
CRUISERS: 3: 1 Vittorio Veneto CGH, 2 Andrea Doria CGH
DESTROYERS: 4: 2 Audace DDGH, 2 Impavido DDG

All landing vessels

600 special forces

800 marines

~2000 (?) paratroopers

~4000 (?) infantry

 

 

5. US navy

CW: 3

Cruisers: 6

Destroyers: 5

Frigates: 8

-USS Belknap CG-26 (US 6th fleet flagship)

-USS Forrestal (CV-59)

USS Yorktown (CG-48)

USS Hayler (DD-997)

USS SIMPSON (FFG-56)

USS MCCLOY (FF-1038)

USS USS W. S. Sims (FF-1059)

USS Donald B. Beary (FF 1085)

USS Pharris (FF-1094)

USS Holland (AS-32)

-USS Saratoga CV-60

USS Biddle CG-34

USS Philippine Sea CG-58

USS Spruance DD-963

USS Sampson DDG-10

USS Elmer Montgomery FF-1082

USS Thomas C. Hart FF-1092.

-USS America CV-66

USS Dale CG-19

USS Mobile Bay CG-53

USS Lawrence DDG-4

USS Comte de Grasse DDG-974

USS Joseph Hewes FFG-1078

-LPH-7 USS Guadalcanal

LPD-4 USS Austin

LSD-41 Whidbey Island

LST-1179 USS Newport

LST-1192 USS Spartanburg County

~1100 marines

~800 paratroopers

 

 

Total:

Submarines-18 (4 SSN, 14 SS)

CW-7

Cruisers-11

Destroyers-16

Frigates-17

To be continued...

Edited October 21 by Jaroslav

[Jaroslav]

[Jaroslav]

What It Was Like Dogfighting In The F-14 Against America’s Secret MiG Squadron

In a recently posted new video, a former F-14 Tomcat Radar Intercept Officer, or RIO, describes exactly what happened when he was chosen to take part in the ultra-secretive Constant Peg program and given the unique chance to fly against actual enemy aircraft not far from a desolate airbase near Tonopah, Nevada.

...

In the fall of 1985, Ward was assigned to Fighter Squadron 32 (VF-32), the “Swordsmen,” and, after coming off his first deployment aboard the Forrestal class aircraft carrier USS Independence, was now engaged in workups for his second deployment, a process that took him to Fallon, Nevada — a hotbed of naval fighter activity, then, and now.

“One day we were informed that we were going to participate in an exercise called Constant Peg, something I had never heard of before we got to Fallon,” he recalls.

...

Ward explains how the instructors serving with the 4477th were the cream of the crop, their posting requiring around 3,000 flight hours in tactical jets as well as graduation from the Air Force Fighter Weapons School at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada, or from the Navy’s Topgun program. 

...

First up was the Flogger and Ward’s initial impression was that the jet was much smaller than he’d anticipated. Until now, the most he’d seen of a MiG-23 was in grainy intelligence photos.

After joining up with the air-to-air variant of the MiG-23, the first point on the flight plan was a speed demo. With Tomcat and MiG-23 side-by-side, the command came over the radio: “On my mark, go to full afterburner.” In the F-14A, the TF30 engines had to be carefully advanced through the stages up to full military power. Not so in the MiG. “Bottom line is, the MiG-23 just walked away from us … First lesson learnt, don’t try to outrun a MiG-23,” Ward says.

Next up were maneuvers with the Tomcat alternating between defensive and offensive starting positions. With the MiG-23 on the offensive, a max-g turn by the F-14 was enough to force the MiG to overshoot immediately. Subsequently, with the F-14 on the offensive, the Navy jet was able to keep pace with the turning MiG, maintain the advantage, and get in close enough for a potential gun kill.

The third Flogger event was a neutral setup, starting with the jets three miles apart and at 350 knots. This time, the MiG-23 pilot dived very low and very fast, and the F-14 crew lost sight of it over the desert. The Soviet jet then reappeared on their wing line and took a simulated shot — it was “a real eye-opener” for Ward and his pilot.

The YF-110 — an F-7 in this case — was next and, conversely, this looked bigger than Ward was expecting.

In the speed demo, the F-14 could keep pace with the Chinese Fishbed clone. In the defensive setup, however, the F-7 was able to hang in the turn with the Tomcat, demonstrating a similar turn rate, but a smaller radius over the first 90 degrees of the turn. Beyond that, the F-7 pilot was “spat out,” unable to keep tabs on the Tomcat and overshooting. With the F-14 on the offensive, Ward and “Truck” could stay glued to the Fishbed throughout the turn.

The neutral setup provided another surprise for the VF-32 crew. With the F-7’s limited turning ability in mind, they didn’t expect the bandit to enter a one-circle fight. But then, the F-7 went vertical “in a way that was very surprising.” The adversary pilot deployed flaps in a “magic move” and was suddenly looming behind the F-14 in an offensive position. Another lesson learned.

...

https://www.twz.com/40907/what-it-was-like-dogfighting-in-the-f-14-against-americas-secret-mig-squadron

 

If I am correct those were MiG-21 f-13 and MiG-23MS

[Jaroslav]

In his recent book MiG-23 Flogger "Soviet swing wing fighter/strike aircraft" Yefim Gordon makes and interesting comparassion of several western fighters.

In it he compares the IAI Kfir, F-4E, F-15A and F-16A with the export MiG-23MLD based on a Soviet manual, he states that the F-15 was overwhelmingly superior to the MiG-23MLD, the F-16A only slightly superior, the F-4E was slightly inferior to the MiG-23MLD and the IAI Kfir definitively inferior to the MiG-23MLD.

he says that the best Radar of all those fighters was the F-15`s AN/APG-63, much later followed by the MiG-23MLD`s Sapheer-23ML these later followed by the F-16`s AN/APG-66.

In agility and performance he states, the MiG-23 was more agile due to 8.5 G max warload enjoyed by the MiG-23 versus the lower 7.3Gs max warload of the F-4E.

The MiG-23 enjoyed some turn superiority over the F-16A above the 5000 meters, it enjoyed superiority in acceleration versus the F-15A and F-4E.

The IAI Kfir was inferior according to this document at all speed below 4000 meters..

With respect the AA-7 Apex it claims it has shorter launch range giving the MiG-23 some degree of advantage in within visual range combat.

In conclusion in his book he gives a clearer and wider understanding of the true capabilities of the MiG-23

https://www.key.aero/forum/modern-military-aviation/50844-mig-23-versus-western-fighters-do-you-agree-with-yefim-gordon

[Jaroslav]

ALTHOUGH ANY article about the MiG-23 must now be viewed from an historical perspective, retrospective analysis of the aircraft's capabilities nevertheless still has some relevance to the present day, even though the Flogger was retired from service in Russia, the CIS republics and Eastern Europe between 1997 and 2002. However, in those Third World countries which are considered to be hostile to the West, and still operating the type, it is considered capable of performing very effectively in the air-to-air role - perhaps with even better mission-capable rates than the early-series MiG-29s operated by those nations. As many as 30 interceptor Floggers were thought to have been maintained in combat-ready status by the Iraqi Air Force prior to Operation IRAOI FREEDOM and 60 more are in service with the Syrian Air Force (including more than 40 highly-modified MiG-23MLD Flogger-K). The Cuban Air Force has just under three dozen MiG-23MF F/ogger-6/MiG-23MLA Flogger-G on strength, while more than 40 Flogger-Gs continue to soldier on with the North Korean Air Force. Some of the countries on the 'rogue' list (i.e. North Korea, Syria) have skilled and determined Flogger pilots. To underestimate them and their aircraft would be foolish and, in the case of war, potentially dangerous.

Further Flogger Upgrades

In June 1982, the Syrian Air Force's rather orthodox Soviet-style air superiority/air defence doctrine, training and tactics proved ineffective against the Israeli Defence Force/Air Force (IDF/AF). Syrian losses between June 6 and June 11 - of fighters, fighter-bombers and helicopters - numbered around 85 (the actual figure was somewhere between 82 and 92, according to some sources), while Syria claimed to have shot down some 27 IDF/AF fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, which is obviously untrue. On the other hand, Israeli denials that it lost any aircraft in air combat during the 1982 Lebanon war may be considered, to some extent, dubious. According to an authoritative article, Early MiG-23s in Operational Service, by Tom Cooper, who has researched the local conflicts of the 1960s-1980s (see Air Enthusiast, Vol 100, July-August 2002, p56-67), the Syrian fighter Floggers played only a secondary role in the conflict. Confirmed Syrian losses during the clashes over the Bekaa Valley between June 9 and 11 were four MiG-23MS Flogger-Es (the original Flogger interceptor variant for export to Middle East customers) and six MiG-23MF Flogger-Bs, their pilots claiming at least five enemy aircraft shot down. Most, if not all, of these kills cannot be confirmed by independent sources and thus must be regarded as less than reliable reports.

M1G-23MLD Pros and Cons

The Soviet Air Force's most significant post-Bekaa Valley undertaking was the accelerated upgrade to MiG-23MLD Flogger-K standard of the then huge VVS-FA MiG-23ML/MLA Flogger-G fleet (this variant was also known as Izdyelie 2318 in the internal designation system of the MiG Design Bureau). In the early 1980s, the MiG-23 formed the backbone of VVS (Voenno-Vozdushniye Sili - the Soviet Air Force) Frontal Aviation (FA) air defence/air superiority assets. No fewer than 1,100 MiG-23M/ML/MLAs were then in service with the Soviet front-line combat units and more than 600 of them were used to equip at least 15 fighter regiments based in Central Europe. These regiments were considered to be the spearhead of Soviet air superiority assets in the Cold War era's most sensitive theatre of operations. The Flogger-K upgrade package is known to have been completed prior to the Lebanon war and a total of 560 VVS MiG-23ML/MLAs were upgraded to the improved standard. Additionally, a total of 66 modified interceptors (in which only the avionics were upgraded) were said by Russian sources to have been newly-built between mid/late 1982 and December 1984.

Known as the MiG-23MLD (Export) (Izdelie 23-19 or the alternative designation Izdelie 23-22), these were exported only to Syria and Bulgaria totalling 50 and 16 examples respectively. Interestingly, the NATO reporting name Flogger-G was retained as these aircraft were hardly distinguishable from the basic MiG-23ML/MLA. Unlike its export counterparts, the VVS-FA MiG-23MLD had a much-improved manoeuvring performance, thanks to a host of airframe and flight control system upgrades. Westerners might find it interesting to read a 32page Soviet Air Force supplementary air combat manual called Aide-Memoire for the MiG-23 Pilot on Air Combat vs F-15A, F-I6A, F-4E and Kfir C.2,published not long after the Bekaa Valley clashes. At that time both Soviet pilots and those from its client states were still trained mainly in the orthodox - some might say 'inflexible' - air intercept tactics originating from the 1960s, which were mastered to perfection during the MiG-21 era, from the early 1960s to the 1970s. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the Soviet Union and its client air arms flew the MiG-23M/ML/MLD in the same way as the MiG-21 as a high-speed point interceptor closely guided and supported by the GCI. It took the Russians 12 years to exploit the Flogger-G/K as a true air superiority fighter. The Aide-Memoire for the MiG-23 Pilot on Air Combat vs F-15A, F-I6A, F-4E and Kfir C.2 refers to the MiG-23MLD(Export) version, powered by the R35-300 turbojet, rated at 28,700lb (127kN) in full afterburner, without the aerodynamics and flight control system improvements of the VVS-FA MIG-23MLDS. According to the manual, the aircraft's main parameters, defining its manoeuvring performance, turn out to be slightly better than the McDonnell Douglas F-4E Phantom II and definitely better than the IAI KfirC.2. However, the MiG-23MLD's air combat performance, as quoted in the manual, is cited as definitely inferior to the McDonnell Douglas F-15A and General Dynamics F-16A. There are only a few areas within the MiG-23MLD's envelope where it could boast performance equal to, or slightly better than, the third-generation US fighters.

The manual's authors claim that in comparison with the F-4E (though whether they mean the slatted or non-slatted sub-version of the Phantom is not clear), the MiG-23MLD has superior sustained turn performance throughout the entire envelope, excluding the range between 377 and 540kts (700 and 1,000km/h) below 21,000ft (6,400m). It also has the edge over the Phantom II in zoom climb performance at all altitudes and speeds, excluding the true airspeed range between 485 and 647kts (900 and 1,200km/h) above 18,000ft (6,000m). Compared with the F-15A, the MiG-23MLD's only notable advantage is in zoom climb performance at speeds above 620kts (1,150km/h). However, the manual asserts that compared with the F-16A, the Soviet swing-wing fighter produces a somewhat better sustained turn performance above 15,000ft (5,000m), at speeds close to the maximum, as well as better zoom climb performance at true airspeeds exceeding 590kts (1,100km/h). However, as comparative tests have shown, using the Syrian MiG-23MLD(Export) which defected to Israel in October 1989, the swing-wing fighter demonstrated, somewhat surprisingly, that it had better acceleration than the escorting F-16s. This would seem to indicate that in 'real world' conditions the MiG-23MLD would have a slight edge over the early F-16s in acceleration and energy manoeuvrability at true airspeeds above 485kts (900km/h). The IAI Kfir C.2, as assessed in the manual, is said to be inferior to the MiG-23MLD in sustained turn performance at airspeeds above 540kts (1,000km/h), and in zoom climb performance at true airspeeds below 540kts (1,000km/h). However, at altitudes below 12,000ft (4,000m) the MiG-23MLD has the edge in energy manoeuvrability throughout the entire speed range.

Sensor and Self-Protection Considerations

According to the manual, the MiG-23MLD's N008E Sapfir-23MLAE-2 pulse radar has a performance superior to the Phantom's APQ-120, an approximately equal performance to the F-16A's AN/APG-66, and a distinctly inferior performance to the F-15A's AN/APG-63. The authors claim that airborne radar maximum detection range alone cannot grant any decisive tactical advantage in the non-sterile environment of 'real world' air combat. It is a well-known fact that fighter radar target detection and discrimination performance are, in general terms, somewhat limited by the relatively low resolution offered by a radar beam with an average width of between 2.5 and 3.5 degrees in azimuth and elevation. In addition, the generally low reliability of the electronic identification (EID) facilities of the early/mid 1980s is another factor which would prevent enemy fighters from making full use of their superior Beyond Visual Range (BVR) capability. However, the manual notes that the F-16A and F15A radars have a wide range of valuable close air combat modes with automatic target acquisition at close ranges (up to 6-10nm [1018km]), with missile seeker heads slaved to the radar's line-of-sight for increased accuracy and reduced missile lock-on times.

Both the F-15A and F-16A pulse-Doppler (PD) radars are known to have problems with lock-on stability against targets flying below them which appear on the port or starboard beam, when in 'snap-down' mode. This particular shortcoming may be used to good effect by MiG-23 pilots to escape from attacks, since evading the AIM-7F Sparrow SARH (Semi-Active Radar Homing) missile launched by the F-15 could be easily achieved by carrying out high-g manoeuvring abeam the intercepting aircraft.

As a general rule, in operations over mountainous terrain, the performance of the early Sapfir-23 in the look-down/shoot down mode is noticeably degraded. However, the MLD's Sapfir-23MLAE-2 radar has a new and highly useful pulse-Doppler mode (Non-Coherent) with improved ultra-lowlevel target detection (useful for operations over rough terrain) reguiring a minimum target altitude of 160ft (50m). Whichever intercept profile is employed, the MiG-23MLD's lookdown/shoot-down operations require heavy GCI support, and any attacks against fighter-size targets in such conditions should be mounted in tail-on aspect, where the radar's maximum detection range is said to be up to 13nm (25km) and tracking range up to 9nm (16km). The Spafir23MLAE-2, featuring new look-down, passive jamming countermeasures and close air combat modes, demonstrated a moderate reliability in actual operational conditions, with Mean-Time-Between-Failures (MBTF) of the order of 60 hours. The MiG-23MLD's sensor suite also incorporates the under-nose TP-26-Sh Infra-Reel Search-and-Track (IRST) sensor, which can be useful for emission-free tail-on intercepts, particularly as a back-up sensor should the radar be rendered inoperative by heavy jamming or technical failure.

The IRST, however, has a somewhat limited search performance due to its restricted field of scanning - only 60° in azimuth and 15° in elevation. The average low-level detection range against receding fighter-size targets (in tail-on aspect) with afterburner on, is said to be more than 6nm (11km), though at high level detecting range it increases to 13nm (25km).

The MiG-23MLD is equipped with the SPO-15LE Beryoza Radar Warning Receiver (RWR). This is an analogue device, developed in the early to mid1970s, capable of providing 360° coverage in azimuth and 30° in elevation. It has the capability to provide precise angular warning of radiating targets attacking in the forward hemisphere, although accuracy is much lower in the rear sector. The SPO-15LE is claimed to be sensitive enough to warn the pilot of the presence of an adversary's radar and the probable type and mode of its operation. On the other hand, the manual states that the RWRs used on Western fighters usually have 360° coverage in azimuth and 60°-80° in elevation. As a rule, the Western systems are sensitive and 'smart' enough to give timely warning of the MiG-23MLD's radar emissions as their detection range is considerably better than that of the radar - capable, for instance, of detecting an approaching MiG-23MLD with its radar emitting in search mode at distances of over 60nm (110km).

Unlike its main rivals, the MiG-23MLD lacks an integrated or pod-mounted ECM (electronic counter measures) system for self-protection -a great disadvantage in combat against the F-15A, F16A, F-4E and the Kfir C.2, which all boast state-of-the-art ECM gear. The only self-protection gear on the MiG-23MLD is the PKiBP-23 (KDS-23M) chaff/flare dispenser comprising two six-round downward-firing units built-in to the centreline pylon. The VVS-FA Flogger-Ks' self-protection is enhanced by two BVP-50-60 50-round chaff/flare dispensers mounted in long slim housings on top of the centre fuselage. Syrian MiG-23MLDs received additional chaff/flare dispensers, (probably installed in the mid/late 1980s) installed on the rear fuselage.

One of the major advantages of the MiG-23 in combat with the F-15A and F-4E is its compact appearance and relatively small size, along with the fact that the wings are set at a 72° swept angle for high-speed flight. Combined with suitable camouflage, this would make low-level visual detection and tracking very difficult, particularly from above and in head-on encounters.

https://www.xairforces.net/analyses/mig-23.html

[Jaroslav]

High Command of the Southwestern Direction (GKVYuZH)

Главное Командование Войск Юго-Западного Направления (ГКВЮЗН)

Military Unit: 83392

Commanders:

• General of the Army Ivan Aleksandrovich Gerasimov, 5.9.84 - 5.1.89
• Colonel-General Vladimir Vasilevich Osipov, 5.1.89 - 30.6.92

Activated 5.9.84 in Kishinev, Moldavian SSR.

Organisation 1984:

• 2nd independent Communications Brigade (Kishinev, Moldavian SSR)
• 57th independent Communications Brigade (Dubossary, Moldavian SSR)
• 193rd independent Mixed Aviation Squadron (Kishinev, Moldavian SSR)
• 24th Air Army VGK ON (Vinnitsa, Vinnitsa Oblast)
• Southern Group of Forces (Budapest, Hungary)
• Kiev Military District (Kiev, Kiev Oblast)
• Odessa Military District (Odessa, Odessa Oblast)
• Black Sea Fleet (Sevastopol, Crimean Oblast)

In 9.86 the 23rd independent Landing-Assault Brigade joined the High-Command.

Organisation 1990:

• 23rd independent Landing-Assault Brigade (Kremenchug, Poltava Oblast)
• 2nd independent Communications Brigade (Kishinev, Moldavian SSR)
• 57th independent Communications Brigade (Dubossary, Moldavian SSR)
• 193rd independent Mixed Aviation Squadron (Kishinev, Moldavian SSR)
• 24th Air Army VGK ON (Vinnitsa, Vinnitsa Oblast)
• Southern Group of Forces (Budapest, Hungary)
• Kiev Military District (Kiev, Kiev Oblast)
• Odessa Military District (Odessa, Odessa Oblast)
• Black Sea Fleet (Sevastopol, Crimean Oblast)

Disbanded 30.6.92.

Headquarters:

• Kishinev, Moldavian SSR, 9.84 - 6.92 [possibly 47 00 14N, 28 49 57E]

Subordination:

• General Staff Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, 9.84 - 6.92

http://ww2.dk/new/army/gkv/gkvyuzh.htm

[Jaroslav]

NIE 11-6-67, 1 Jun 67, Soviet Strategy and Intentions in the Mediterranean Basin

https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/84/3271/7327184/content/arcmedia/dc-metro/rg-263/6942952/Box-17-NIE-11-6-67/263-a1-29-Box-17-NIE-11-6-67.pdf

[Jaroslav]

NI IIM 76-035, 2 Aug 76, Prospects for Soviet Naval Access to Mediterranean Shore Facilities

https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/24/3273/7327324/content/arcmedia/dc-metro/rg-263/6942952/Box-24-NIO-IIM-76-035/263-a1-29-Box-24-NIO-IIM-76-035.pdf

[Jaroslav]

NIE 11-6-70, 5 Mar 70, Soviet Policies in the Middle East and Mediterranean Area

https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/92/3269/7326992/content/arcmedia/dc-metro/rg-263/6942952/Box-5-NIE-11-6-70/263-a1-29-Box-5-NIE-11-6-70.pdf

[Jaroslav]

Memo to Holders of NIE 11-6-67, Soviet Strategy and Intentions in the Mediterranean Basin and SNIE 11-9-68, Soviet Interests and Activities in Arab States

https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/88/3271/7327188/content/arcmedia/dc-metro/rg-263/6942952/Box-17-NIE-11-6-67MEMO/263-a1-29-Box-17-NIE-11-6-67MEMO.pdf