W.W.2 U.S. Army mobilization and manpower?

[Rick]

During the last few months have finished reading the following

Martin van Creveld's "Fighting Power."

Richard Overy's "Why the Allies Won."

The U.S. Army W.W.2 "Greenbook, Organization of Ground Combat Troops"

Peter Mansoor's "The GI Offensive in Europe."

Most impressed with Mansoor's book, but was wondering, even with hindsight, could have the U.S. Army  mobilized its manpower and divisions appreciatively better than it did? It appears there were a lot of constraints on Army manpower requirements and that the Army did about as well as could be expected.   

[RichTO90]

1 hour ago, Rick said:

During the last few months have finished reading the following

Martin van Creveld's "Fighting Power."

Richard Overy's "Why the Allies Won."

The U.S. Army W.W.2 "Greenbook, Organization of Ground Combat Troops"

Peter Mansoor's "The GI Offensive in Europe."

Most impressed with Mansoor's book, but was wondering, even with hindsight, could have the U.S. Army  mobilized its manpower and divisions appreciatively better than it did? It appears there were a lot of constraints on Army manpower requirements and that the Army did about as well as could be expected.   

Not sure what Creveld, Overy, and Mansoor had to say about U.S. Army manpower utilization? Greenfield et al had quite a bit to say and not much of it good. I highly recommend Kreidberg and Henry, History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army 1775-1945 for a dispassionate and careful examination of the subject. Go through it and then read the Medical Department's History of Physical Standards in World War II.

Effectively, in World War II, the United States began with the odd assumption that it had access to unlimited manpower...and then decided to do everything it possibly could to limit its utilization of that manpower. If you were drafted, deferments were widespread and easy to get. Just about any kind of medical condition no matter how insignificant was good for a discharge.

Then, if you were drafted and not kicked out because you had a bunion on your right little toe, everything possible was done to ensure that you would never be put in harms way. Using assumptions pulled out of its anal orifice, the Army decided that "intelligent" soldiers needed to be coddled and used in technical services...or sent to schools for a couple of years so they were better educated and so could make good "officer materiel". They also made the odd assumption that because the Army was being mechanized that meant that Infantry would no longer suffer the brunt of the casualties, while simultaneously deciding that it was more efficient to have the new units being organized do basic training and that there was no need to provide trained replacements until the majority of the Army completed training.

On top of that, the prewar Regular Army was anemically understrength, the Reserves were 95% superannuated officers, and the National Guard was mostly a refuge from the Depression where a guy could get an occasional meal unbothered by officers who were mostly political appointees.

Now add on a mobilization plan that suffered from the fixed assumption that the Army was only concerned with CONUS and overseas base defense and that the mobilization "plan", such as it was, was never tested, that about 90 percent of prewar maneuvers were notional in all respects, and that the need to generate enough junior officers and noncommissioned officers, provide cadres for new units, and then when operations began to provide replacements, meant that the unit mobilizations took on average about twice as much time as planned - an average of about 22 months per division versus the 12 months planned for - as the personnel churn created chaos.

Don't even get me started on the loony doctrinal assumptions..."Tank Destroyer Commandos"? How about the simple fact that no doctrine for tank support of infantry divisions was developed and trained in CONUS until nearly all the infantry divisions and separate tank battalions had completed training in CONUS and deployed to the theaters of war?

Aside from that though, it was all smooth sailing. 😀

[Rick]

Rich,

Thank you for replying. I would put your knowledge and access to resources above the authors I mentioned. 

Mansoor's book, published in 1999, is about U.S. infantry divisions in Europe. There is nothing in the bibliography naming the sources you stated. He claims that the U.S. public wanted a "quick, decisive action" to end W.W.2  and that the Army was able do this by mobilizing, training, and sustaining infantry divisions.

He states the Army was limited to 89 divisions due to manpower requirements in agriculture, industry, U.S.A.A.A.F., and the Navy. He does not state anything regarding to your second and third paragraphs. He mentions the under strength Regular army and the problems you mentioned regarding the National Guard and Reserves. He does mention the personnel turnover in infantry divisions due to forming cadres for newer divisions and the competition, especially for Category I and II men, for other slots other than infantry. 

He  points out the Individual Replacement System was the only such causality replacement system that would work for the Army due to the limited number of divisions and that its flaws "stemmed from poor administration of the system rather than an inherent flaw in the concept."  He states this was mitigated due varying degrees if the divisional commander set up replacement/learning unit that the new arrivals would stay for at least a few weeks before going into combat. 

Regarding infantry doctrine he states that U.S. infantry divisions had a lot to learn but did so rather quickly and was quick to adapt to new problems. He mentions that U.S. artillery effectiveness was superb and that armor and air coordination left a lot to be desired. 

For someone like an ex-sailor who does not have your passion, Mansoor's book seemed like a good, general read on the subject. 

 

[RichTO90]

3 minutes ago, Rick said:

Rich,

Thank you for replying. I would put your knowledge and access to resources above the authors I mentioned. 

Mansoor's book, published in 1999, is about U.S. infantry divisions in Europe. There is nothing in the bibliography naming the sources you stated. He claims that the U.S. public wanted a "quick, decisive action" to end W.W.2  and that the Army was able do this by mobilizing, training, and sustaining infantry divisions.

Yes, I know both Mansoor's book and the thesis he wrote that it derived from. That he wrote about mobilization and manpower utilization without using those two sources kind of tells it all.

Quote

He states the Army was limited to 89 divisions due to manpower requirements in agriculture, industry, U.S.A.A.A.F., and the Navy. He does not state anything regarding to your second and third paragraphs. He mentions the under strength Regular army and the problems you mentioned regarding the National Guard and Reserves. He does mention the personnel turnover in infantry divisions due to forming cadres for newer divisions and the competition, especially for Category I and II men, for other slots other than infantry.

At the time the "88-division" decision was made, 1 July 1943, the Army Ground Forces combat manpower in tactical units was:

1,060,000 in divisions, which was 40,000 under strength

689,000 in combat support (less AAA), which was 144,000 over strength

412,000 in AAA, which was 118,000 under strength

310,000 in combat service support, which was 38,000 under strength

Total Ground Forces tactical manpower was 2,471,000, which was 51,000 under strength

Total Army Service Forces, i.e., service support, was 735,000, which was 110,000 under strength

Total Army Air Forces was 1,991,000, which was 159,000 under strength

There was an overhead of 1,213,000, which was 26,000 over strength

So the decision, of course, was to reduce AAA and Army Service Forces in order to build up the tactical combat unit strength. A year later? Division strength increased by 37,000, combat support had increased by 24,000, AAA had shrunk by 54,000,  combat service support had increased by 126,000, and service support had increase by 279,000. Overheads had also increased by 182,000. Total Army strength, including the AAF, went from 6,410,000 and a shortfall of 594,000 to 6,916,000 and a shortfall of 16,000.

The main issue with the Mobilization Training Program, aside from the lack of realism, was that it was based upon completing steps and checking boxes, rather than completing training. As an example, to be ready to deploy, all members of a unit had to have completed all of the prescribed training tests, but each individual did not have to display proficiency, rather, the unit had to be able to show that it had completed all of the test programs. What made it worse was that one requirement for deployment was that the unit be at full T/O&E strength...except in the normal course of events, soldiers got sick or hurt, were in hospital, went AWOL and otherwise were always under strength. The solution was not, okay, this unit is scheduled to deploy so we grant a 5% or 10% overstrength to ensure they can deploy...no, the solution was to fill up the unit at the last minute from random troops taken from whatever unit was available that had completed the MTP that were available at the Port of Embarkation. Then THAT unit had to find men to replace those troops and so on.

 

Quote

He  points out the Individual Replacement System was the only such causality replacement system that would work for the Army due to the limited number of divisions and that its flaws "stemmed from poor administration of the system rather than an inherent flaw in the concept."  He states this was mitigated due varying degrees if the divisional commander set up replacement/learning unit that the new arrivals would stay for at least a few weeks before going into combat.

Sure, Individual Replacement was the only one that would work...except that it did not work either. The Replacement system was an afterthought, poorly organized and poorly administered. It never worked the way it was supposed to and none of the fixes ever really fixed the root problems. Worse, the problems it was created to correct, thorough unit training and relief from prolonged combat, were made worse rather than better. Saying that it would have worked if it wasn't so poorly administered is pretty silly.

Quote

Regarding infantry doctrine he states that U.S. infantry divisions had a lot to learn but did so rather quickly and was quick to adapt to new problems. He mentions that U.S. artillery effectiveness was superb and that armor and air coordination left a lot to be desired.

For someone like an ex-sailor who does not have your passion, Mansoor's book seemed like a good, general read on the subject.

American infantry doctrine was Great War doctrine that gave lip service to technological change. It was poorly thought out, poorly trained, and generally poorly executed initially. Quick adaptation? I suppose it depends on what is considered "quick". The real problem was that while "adapting" the divisions were generally eviscerated, the extreme example being the 90th Infantry Division and the 106th Infantry Division, but they all followed a similar pattern, with the 104th being one of the very few exceptions, because its CG, Terry Allen, had led the 1st Infantry Division in North Africa and Sicily so knew what did and did not work.

What truly makes the story sad is just that - it was no real secret that tactical doctrine was bad, the Rangers and Airborne demonstrated that other ways were possible, as did Allen later.

Armor and Infantry coordination was pretty good - in the Armored Division. Otherwise, it was nonexistent. Tank and infantry units were tossed together and expected to make it work, without radios that talked to each other, and with little or no understanding of what the requirements were of each. It was only improvisation in the field that corrected the problem.

Close air support was as bad.

[Rick]

Was the main problem the U.S. Army faced during this time was its rapid growth? 

Edited April 28, 2025 by Rick

[FALightFighter]

@RichTO90, what do you think of Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers, by David Johnson? And Engineers of Victory, by Paul Kennedy?

 

Edited April 28, 2025 by FALightFighter

[Markus Becker]

A long time ago I read a paper, either on the now dead Military History Online or the Army's own historical website.

The utter lack of inter service co-operation with regard to manpower stood out. Army and Navy were competing and within the two were more competitors in the form of the Marines and Army Air Force. The army Army in general and the infantry in particular were the least 'sexy' services/branches. No ships, no planes, the Marines and Airborne were more appealing to the 'though guys' and last but not least you could more or less pick your position by volunteering.

Don't want to be in the PBI? Don't wait for the draft letter, sign up for the the heavy field artillery.  BTW, that's also worth watching.

 

 

[RichTO90]

7 hours ago, Rick said:

Was the main problem the U.S. Army faced during this time was its rapid growth? 

Indeed, plus a lack of realistic peacetime planning and exercises. There was a mobilization plan, but it was essentially scrapped after nine months of desultory and conflicting growth stemming from Roosevelt's declaration of a limited emergency on 8 September 1939.

As of 1 July 1939, the entire United States Army totaled about 174,000 officers and men. As of 1 July 1940 the United States Regular Army consisted of 13,797 officers and an enlisted strength totaling 243,095 (authorized enlisted strength had been expanded from 227,000 to 280,000 on 13 June and to 375,000 on 26 June), including the Army Air Corps (51,185 as of 1 July 1940). So it had grown by about 83,000, 29,000 of which was in the AAC.

The strength of the National Guard officer corps was about 21,074, of which only about 6,800 had attended a Service school (the rest were mostly superannuated or political appointees),  and enlisted strength was 226,837. There were also approximately 33,000 Reserve officers and 104,228 ROTC (Reserve Officers’ Training Camps) and CMTC (Citizens’ Military Training Camps) graduates in the Organized Reserve Corps. Finally, the CCC (Civilian Conservation Corps), established by President Roosevelt as part of the “New Deal,” had provided a taste of military discipline, barracks and field life to approximately 250,000 young men.

So as of 1 July 1940, the entire strength of the Army was about 642,000 including all reserves and National Guard. It more than doubled by 1 July 1941, to 1,638,000. By 31 December 1941 it had only increased to 1,657,000, but by 31 December 1942 it had tripled to 5,400,000, then increased by another 2 million by 31 December 1943. 

The real issue was the tripling during 1942. The problem was that pretty much all units from battalion up were expected to both train to deployable status in 12 months, as well as providing personnel for cadre for creating new units (essentially about 10% of unit strength each time), as well as providing personnel for specialty training and OCS. Now remember, training was based upon checking boxes and 100% of a unit had to have its box checked. Three months of so in and 25% of the boxes are checked and now 10% of the unit disappears as cadre and are replaced by untrained men from the reception centers. Now they have to be brought up to speed. Okay, we're six weeks into doing that, and now 10% of our best enlisted are selected for OCS. They have to be replaced from the reception centers by guys that now need to be brought up to speed on 4 1/2 months of training...and now the Airborne is calling for volunteers and the really good soldiers are now sick and tired of bringing newbies up to snuff so they volunteer and another 10% of the unit needs to be replaced...and so on. That was the normal churn, but because the size of the Army tripled in 1942, units were being expected in some cases to provide two cadre for new units...or more.

Worse, after mid 1942 active operations began in the SWPA and then later in North Africa, so casualties started needing replacing, which overstretched the Replacement Training Centers, since they had been put on the back burner as troops were sent directly to units to have their basic training done to "save time". Worse, the expectation that casualties would fall proportionately between the new mechanized elements - Armor and Tank Destroyers - and that Infantry would suffer fewer proportionately was proven disastrously wrong. The nascent RTC could not crank out enough Infantry replacements, so where do you get them from? Of course, the new units closest to the end of its training cycle.

In the aftermath, from late 1942 to early 1944, 6 infantry divisions nearly at the end of their training had more than 50% their personnel stripped away as replacements. Another 19 lost 20 to 50% of its strength stripped as replacements.

The end result was chaos.

There were also some little nuggets buried into the mobilization that caused widespread problems. For example, initially, the rule was that to deploy, you had to be 18-years old or older, but in the wake of Pearl Harbor there was widespread enlistment of 17-year-olds (with parental permission). If the unit they were a part of was scheduled to deploy and they had not reached age 18, they could not be deployed and had to be replaced. 

Do not even begin to get me into the insanity of the under utilization of "colored" personnel. Blacks were of course widely discriminated against, but so could be Hispanics. Puerto Ricans to a large extent were limited to service in segregated units, mostly service support units such as QM Service (read manual labor) companies. Hispanics of the old southwest were a little more utilized, but even then it was mostly as enlisted. Asian Americans were also underutilized with Japanese Americans of course receiving the greatest discrimination. It pretty much depended on the whiteness of you skin. Neat fact though, one of the very first, if not the first, Black American killed in action was in one of the Tank Battalions in the Philippines. He "passed" and was in the 38th Tank Company, Kentucky NG (Company D, 192d Tank Bn) when he was killed in the Japanese bombing of 8 December.

 

[RichTO90]

6 hours ago, FALightFighter said:

@RichTO90, what do you think of Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers, by David Johnson? And Engineers of Victory, by Paul Kennedy?

Johnson is very good, Kennedy less so and very derivative. Baime's Arsenal of Democracy and Hermann's Freedom's Forge are better, but the best is Hyde's Arsenal of Democracy (you can't copyright a title).

[RichTO90]

5 hours ago, Markus Becker said:

A long time ago I read a paper, either on the now dead Military History Online or the Army's own historical website.

MHO is not dead. It transitioned to a new format for the site. The forum is still somewhat active.

[Markus Becker]

29 minutes ago, RichTO90 said:

MHO is not dead. It transitioned to a new format for the site. The forum is still somewhat active.

Great to hear. You got a link?

[RichTO90]

3 hours ago, Markus Becker said:

Great to hear. You got a link?

Same as it's always been. https://militaryhistoryonline.com/

[FALightFighter]

4 hours ago, RichTO90 said:

Johnson is very good, Kennedy less so and very derivative. Baime's Arsenal of Democracy and Hermann's Freedom's Forge are better, but the best is Hyde's Arsenal of Democracy (you can't copyright a title).

Thanks! Three more things to read.

[futon]

6 hours ago, RichTO90 said:

...

 Neat fact though, one of the very first, if not the first, Black American killed in action was in one of the Tank Battalions in the Philippines. He "passed" and was in the 38th Tank Company, Kentucky NG (Company D, 192d Tank Bn) when he was killed in the Japanese bombing of 8 December.

 

I don't know how common it was throughout but Caldwell's Thunder on Bataan mentioned that National Guards from the same state tended to stick gether during the creation of new units. Guards and regular Army also had friction between them. Those things were in play as the 192 and 194 tank battlions were being formed. So I wonder if the case with the Black American was a case of the Black man from Kentucky viewed as better than anyone (white or not) that's from another state and that maybe the racist factor by other Kentucky Guards was relatively low. Or something like. That's a lot of conjecture from me, but for thinking how he got his pass, something like that seems more likely than some example of systematic tolerance success.

[Rick]

Rich, in your first post you mentioned a "Greenfield et al." Would you tell me who these men were and the title of their book(s) if any?

Thank you. 

[RichTO90]

5 hours ago, Rick said:

Rich, in your first post you mentioned a "Greenfield et al." Would you tell me who these men were and the title of their book(s) if any?

Thank you. 

Kent Roberts Greenfield, Robert Roswell Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, Organization of Ground Combat Troops, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1946). It is actually one of the first volumes published of the U.S. Army in World War II series, the "Green Books". It is invaluable when read in conjunction with Kreidberg and Henry.

[RichTO90]

On 4/28/2025 at 5:18 PM, futon said:

I don't know how common it was throughout but Caldwell's Thunder on Bataan mentioned that National Guards from the same state tended to stick gether during the creation of new units. Guards and regular Army also had friction between them. Those things were in play as the 192 and 194 tank battlions were being formed. So I wonder if the case with the Black American was a case of the Black man from Kentucky viewed as better than anyone (white or not) that's from another state and that maybe the racist factor by other Kentucky Guards was relatively low. Or something like. That's a lot of conjecture from me, but for thinking how he got his pass, something like that seems more likely than some example of systematic tolerance success.

Um, no. The 192d and 194th were both NG, there was no Regular versus NG strife. Meanwhile, Kentucky was a segregated State, the Army - Regular, NG, and Reserve was segregated, so I don't think you understand what happened. He passed. He looked white so passed as white. It wasn't until Jake Devers made a condolence cal to the First Armored Force casualty that official notice was taken.

[futon]

4 hours ago, RichTO90 said:

Um, no. The 192d and 194th were both NG, there was no Regular versus NG strife. Meanwhile, Kentucky was a segregated State, the Army - Regular, NG, and Reserve was segregated, so I don't think you understand what happened. He passed. He looked white so passed as white. It wasn't until Jake Devers made a condolence cal to the First Armored Force casualty that official notice was taken.

You're right, really interesting cases have happened. 

https://usa.inquirer.net/118546/the-first-u-s-soldier-to-die-in-ph-on-dec-8-1941-was-black

[Stuart Galbraith]

On 4/28/2025 at 6:50 PM, RichTO90 said:

Indeed, plus a lack of realistic peacetime planning and exercises. There was a mobilization plan, but it was essentially scrapped after nine months of desultory and conflicting growth stemming from Roosevelt's declaration of a limited emergency on 8 September 1939.

As of 1 July 1939, the entire United States Army totaled about 174,000 officers and men. As of 1 July 1940 the United States Regular Army consisted of 13,797 officers and an enlisted strength totaling 243,095 (authorized enlisted strength had been expanded from 227,000 to 280,000 on 13 June and to 375,000 on 26 June), including the Army Air Corps (51,185 as of 1 July 1940). So it had grown by about 83,000, 29,000 of which was in the AAC.

The strength of the National Guard officer corps was about 21,074, of which only about 6,800 had attended a Service school (the rest were mostly superannuated or political appointees),  and enlisted strength was 226,837. There were also approximately 33,000 Reserve officers and 104,228 ROTC (Reserve Officers’ Training Camps) and CMTC (Citizens’ Military Training Camps) graduates in the Organized Reserve Corps. Finally, the CCC (Civilian Conservation Corps), established by President Roosevelt as part of the “New Deal,” had provided a taste of military discipline, barracks and field life to approximately 250,000 young men.

So as of 1 July 1940, the entire strength of the Army was about 642,000 including all reserves and National Guard. It more than doubled by 1 July 1941, to 1,638,000. By 31 December 1941 it had only increased to 1,657,000, but by 31 December 1942 it had tripled to 5,400,000, then increased by another 2 million by 31 December 1943. 

The real issue was the tripling during 1942. The problem was that pretty much all units from battalion up were expected to both train to deployable status in 12 months, as well as providing personnel for cadre for creating new units (essentially about 10% of unit strength each time), as well as providing personnel for specialty training and OCS. Now remember, training was based upon checking boxes and 100% of a unit had to have its box checked. Three months of so in and 25% of the boxes are checked and now 10% of the unit disappears as cadre and are replaced by untrained men from the reception centers. Now they have to be brought up to speed. Okay, we're six weeks into doing that, and now 10% of our best enlisted are selected for OCS. They have to be replaced from the reception centers by guys that now need to be brought up to speed on 4 1/2 months of training...and now the Airborne is calling for volunteers and the really good soldiers are now sick and tired of bringing newbies up to snuff so they volunteer and another 10% of the unit needs to be replaced...and so on. That was the normal churn, but because the size of the Army tripled in 1942, units were being expected in some cases to provide two cadre for new units...or more.

Worse, after mid 1942 active operations began in the SWPA and then later in North Africa, so casualties started needing replacing, which overstretched the Replacement Training Centers, since they had been put on the back burner as troops were sent directly to units to have their basic training done to "save time". Worse, the expectation that casualties would fall proportionately between the new mechanized elements - Armor and Tank Destroyers - and that Infantry would suffer fewer proportionately was proven disastrously wrong. The nascent RTC could not crank out enough Infantry replacements, so where do you get them from? Of course, the new units closest to the end of its training cycle.

In the aftermath, from late 1942 to early 1944, 6 infantry divisions nearly at the end of their training had more than 50% their personnel stripped away as replacements. Another 19 lost 20 to 50% of its strength stripped as replacements.

The end result was chaos.

There were also some little nuggets buried into the mobilization that caused widespread problems. For example, initially, the rule was that to deploy, you had to be 18-years old or older, but in the wake of Pearl Harbor there was widespread enlistment of 17-year-olds (with parental permission). If the unit they were a part of was scheduled to deploy and they had not reached age 18, they could not be deployed and had to be replaced. 

Do not even begin to get me into the insanity of the under utilization of "colored" personnel. Blacks were of course widely discriminated against, but so could be Hispanics. Puerto Ricans to a large extent were limited to service in segregated units, mostly service support units such as QM Service (read manual labor) companies. Hispanics of the old southwest were a little more utilized, but even then it was mostly as enlisted. Asian Americans were also underutilized with Japanese Americans of course receiving the greatest discrimination. It pretty much depended on the whiteness of you skin. Neat fact though, one of the very first, if not the first, Black American killed in action was in one of the Tank Battalions in the Philippines. He "passed" and was in the 38th Tank Company, Kentucky NG (Company D, 192d Tank Bn) when he was killed in the Japanese bombing of 8 December.

 

As an aside, can you recommend any good books on Black or minority personnel in US Army service? Mainly interesting in European deployment.

I remember there was one segregated tank battalion in Pattons III Army, just curious if there was any more in combat in Europe.

[RichTO90]

9 hours ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

As an aside, can you recommend any good books on Black or minority personnel in US Army service? Mainly interesting in European deployment.

I remember there was one segregated tank battalion in Pattons III Army, just curious if there was any more in combat in Europe.

Employment of Negro Troops is one of the "special studies" in the Green Book series. Although written postwar after the Army was desegregated it suffers badly from various ongoing assumptions carried over from the segregated Army as well as the early experience with black troops in the Korean War. What makes it worse was that it was written and published after the ORO study Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Army, which definitively concluded "racial segregation limits the effectiveness of the army", "integration enhances the effectiveness of the army", and that army-wide integration was feasible. 

The majority of black troops utilized by the Army were by the Army Service Forces and most of that was in the Quartermaster Corps as "Service" (i.e. labor) troops and by the Corps of Engineers as Engineer General Service Regiments and Battalions (also primarily hand-labor troops). Only about 5% of all combat units were "colored".

No all black ground units (there were a few that had an entire complement of black officers and EM) were sent overseas, although eventually a few units came close to that.

Two black Infantry Divisions were organized and were deployed, one to Europe and one to the Pacific. The one sent to Italy was poorly served by being put under the command of an officer who had zero respect or faith in his own division. The results were predictable. The other division in the Pacific was used as laborers. One black Cavalry Division was organized, utilizing most of the prewar black Regular Army Cavalry personnel. It was disbanded in the Mediterranean and all its units converted to QM and Engineer service units. Eleven black Tank Destroyer Battalions were constituted, activated, and organized, but only two went overseas, one SP and one towed, both had distinguished records. The others were all eventually inactivated and disbanded with personnel going to service units. One black FA Group and nine FA battalions served in Europe with distinction, while eight other FA battalions were disbanded and converted to service units. Two of four black Tank Battalions served in the ETOUSA, also with distinction, the others never left the States. And so on.

Puerto Rican manpower was also utilized in segregated units, which is curious because all of the CONUS units drafted Hispanic personnel on an integrated basis. One PR QM Service Battalion HQ and four Service Companies served in Europe, but no PR combat units did. Those stayed as garrisons in PR.

[RETAC21]

2 hours ago, RichTO90 said:

The one sent to Italy was poorly served by being put under the command of an officer who had zero respect or faith in his own division. The results were predictable.

What happened?

[RichTO90]

2 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

What happened?

Ned Almond was promoted beyond his capability. Worse, he was a Virginian who firmly believed every stereotype of the "American Negro" was true. The Division had most of its few black officers transferred out before deployment (two of its FA Battalions, the 599th and 600th were all-black, officers and enlisted, that was "fixed" before deployment). It was committed piecemeal to combat with little thought or planning and the initial commitment of the 370th Infantry was botched, so blame was placed on the inexperienced men rather than the ppplanning. So the immediate decision - backed by Almond - was to break up the division and use it as parts, usually in the shittiest possible way.

Never mind though, Almond managed to survive, mostly by sucking MacArthur's choad, which enabled him to fuck up at even a higher echelon when he was given command of the X Corps in Korea.

Sorry, I may have exceeded my meds...

[RETAC21]

10 hours ago, RichTO90 said:

Ned Almond was promoted beyond his capability. Worse, he was a Virginian who firmly believed every stereotype of the "American Negro" was true. The Division had most of its few black officers transferred out before deployment (two of its FA Battalions, the 599th and 600th were all-black, officers and enlisted, that was "fixed" before deployment). It was committed piecemeal to combat with little thought or planning and the initial commitment of the 370th Infantry was botched, so blame was placed on the inexperienced men rather than the ppplanning. So the immediate decision - backed by Almond - was to break up the division and use it as parts, usually in the shittiest possible way.

Never mind though, Almond managed to survive, mostly by sucking MacArthur's choad, which enabled him to fuck up at even a higher echelon when he was given command of the X Corps in Korea.

Sorry, I may have exceeded my meds...

No, no, this is the kind of stuff that is whitewashed in official histories and then forgotten, I knew the division performed poorly but have never seen any details.

[Stuart Galbraith]

On 5/3/2025 at 6:35 PM, RichTO90 said:

Employment of Negro Troops is one of the "special studies" in the Green Book series. Although written postwar after the Army was desegregated it suffers badly from various ongoing assumptions carried over from the segregated Army as well as the early experience with black troops in the Korean War. What makes it worse was that it was written and published after the ORO study Utilization of Negro Manpower in the Army, which definitively concluded "racial segregation limits the effectiveness of the army", "integration enhances the effectiveness of the army", and that army-wide integration was feasible. 

The majority of black troops utilized by the Army were by the Army Service Forces and most of that was in the Quartermaster Corps as "Service" (i.e. labor) troops and by the Corps of Engineers as Engineer General Service Regiments and Battalions (also primarily hand-labor troops). Only about 5% of all combat units were "colored".

No all black ground units (there were a few that had an entire complement of black officers and EM) were sent overseas, although eventually a few units came close to that.

Two black Infantry Divisions were organized and were deployed, one to Europe and one to the Pacific. The one sent to Italy was poorly served by being put under the command of an officer who had zero respect or faith in his own division. The results were predictable. The other division in the Pacific was used as laborers. One black Cavalry Division was organized, utilizing most of the prewar black Regular Army Cavalry personnel. It was disbanded in the Mediterranean and all its units converted to QM and Engineer service units. Eleven black Tank Destroyer Battalions were constituted, activated, and organized, but only two went overseas, one SP and one towed, both had distinguished records. The others were all eventually inactivated and disbanded with personnel going to service units. One black FA Group and nine FA battalions served in Europe with distinction, while eight other FA battalions were disbanded and converted to service units. Two of four black Tank Battalions served in the ETOUSA, also with distinction, the others never left the States. And so on.

Puerto Rican manpower was also utilized in segregated units, which is curious because all of the CONUS units drafted Hispanic personnel on an integrated basis. One PR QM Service Battalion HQ and four Service Companies served in Europe, but no PR combat units did. Those stayed as garrisons in PR.

Thanks for that Rich. If its the only thing available Ill try and look it up.

[Stuart Galbraith]

On 5/3/2025 at 11:17 PM, RichTO90 said:

Ned Almond was promoted beyond his capability. Worse, he was a Virginian who firmly believed every stereotype of the "American Negro" was true. The Division had most of its few black officers transferred out before deployment (two of its FA Battalions, the 599th and 600th were all-black, officers and enlisted, that was "fixed" before deployment). It was committed piecemeal to combat with little thought or planning and the initial commitment of the 370th Infantry was botched, so blame was placed on the inexperienced men rather than the ppplanning. So the immediate decision - backed by Almond - was to break up the division and use it as parts, usually in the shittiest possible way.

Never mind though, Almond managed to survive, mostly by sucking MacArthur's choad, which enabled him to fuck up at even a higher echelon when he was given command of the X Corps in Korea.

Sorry, I may have exceeded my meds...

All very interesting, thank you.