Tim the Tank Nut Posted January 13 Posted January 13 I watched the video on preparing the US for WW2 which has a considerable focus on General McNair. I also watched both parts of the interwar US tank development videos which obviously have a lot of overlap. Since I was doing basement repair anyway it wasn't a case of just sitting there. I will confess that it changed my view of McNair somewhat. It may be that I have judged him harshly and/or unfairly. It is true that he may have gotten blame he didn't deserve because he wasn't around to defend himself. The other point that was only tangentially discussed in the video bears further examination. That point is the size of the task at hand. I don't feel like that gets enough recognition. The United States did not have a reputation of a huge standing military. We tend to build it, use it, and then discard it. The mighty force from WW1 was gone and many of the players with it. Manic mentions the age of National Guard and Regular Army officers and they are too old. This was a natural occurrence because the opportunity for promotion was very limited. Of course now we practice up or out which is even worse so it isn't like we can't make changes. McNair and company had a task that other militaries didn't really face which was very nearly make it from scratch. Granted, it had been done before but this time it happened during considerable technical change. Raising an army in 1862 didn't have quite as many challenges as 1917 or 1940. Comparing the size of growth with the time frame makes it all the more amazing. Not just with McNair but also considering the circumstances most of the US Army planners were pretty remarkable. We did have the Chief of Cavalry (Kerr, I think) and of course the unique Fredenhall (not in a planning position). A minor quibble with the video, it's impossible to overstate the effect that Major Patton had on US tank thinking in WW1. He WAS the armor school. Yes, he drifted back to the Cavbalry for the easy and familiar life. He wrote the articles that his peers expected him to write but his methods and thinking on armor employment were sound. Chaffee took more risks and deserves more fame than he gets but Patton built the foundation. It wasn't his fault that the Army and the US Government elected not to maintain it. Manic's notion of scale is very interesting to me as well. It's something that isn't well considered when accounting for US military thinking. On the other hand I do wonder at the officers that thought "we just fought all over Europe, we'll never do that again". All in all I am very glad I watched the videos. I seldom have that much time but a happy series of events fell out just right. NO, you can't convince me to change my mind on Bradley
Tim the Tank Nut Posted January 13 Author Posted January 13 To expand a little bit on the time part of things: What the United States did regarding planning and production would've been possible for any nation. Witness the Soviet Miracle of re-location. The thing is that the US had the additional compression of shipping. Time really meant everything and there wasn't enough of it. Even if the tanks were built already just getting them from the factory to the depot to the unit (training) and then betting the unit overseas was a serious drain on time and that's before the tank was even built.
RichTO90 Posted January 13 Posted January 13 2 hours ago, Tim the Tank Nut said: I watched the video on preparing the US for WW2 which has a considerable focus on General McNair. I also watched both parts of the interwar US tank development videos which obviously have a lot of overlap. Since I was doing basement repair anyway it wasn't a case of just sitting there. I will confess that it changed my view of McNair somewhat. It may be that I have judged him harshly and/or unfairly. It is true that he may have gotten blame he didn't deserve because he wasn't around to defend himself. The other point that was only tangentially discussed in the video bears further examination. McNair was subjected to a lot of calumny that he was never able to reply to. Quote That point is the size of the task at hand. I don't feel like that gets enough recognition. The United States did not have a reputation of a huge standing military. We tend to build it, use it, and then discard it. The mighty force from WW1 was gone and many of the players with it. Manic mentions the age of National Guard and Regular Army officers and they are too old. This was a natural occurrence because the opportunity for promotion was very limited. Of course now we practice up or out which is even worse so it isn't like we can't make changes. The force from WW1 was large, but I would hesitate to call it mighty. Much of it was never fully trained, equipped, and deployed, before it was disbanded. And that was part of the problem interwar. The end of the war saw essentially all of the wartime National Army units disbanded, which meant that the National Guard units had to be reformed. For example, the 26th Division returned to Boston 4 April 1919 and was demobilized on 3 May 1919. It was then reconstituted under the National Defense Act of 1920 and reorganized and Federally recognized 21 March 1923. Effectively there was nearly a four-year hiatus in the organization. The NDA 1920 also reset the Strength of the RA at 296,000, including 17,000 officers, but it never came close. The low point was 30 June 1933, when there were just 13,287 officers and 119.913 enlisted, including the Air Corps, Expansion began in 1936, but it was solely to enlisted strength. The National Guard strength was set at 435,000, but never exceeded 200,000 until 1940. Yes, its officer corps was generally overage but it was the same in the RA and the Reserves. The Organized Reserves were worse, because political machinations in writing NDA 1920 set the OR officer strength as 100% of OR unit officer strength, while enlisted OR strength was set at 33%. The result was that ORC strength peaked at 133,485 on 30 June 1933 but on the same strength ERC strength was just 5,028. It meant that the OR's sole function interwar was to provide officers to periodically fill up RA units for maneuvers that were usually TEWT. Quote McNair and company had a task that other militaries didn't really face which was very nearly make it from scratch. Granted, it had been done before but this time it happened during considerable technical change. Raising an army in 1862 didn't have quite as many challenges as 1917 or 1940. Comparing the size of growth with the time frame makes it all the more amazing. Not just with McNair but also considering the circumstances most of the US Army planners were pretty remarkable. We did have the Chief of Cavalry (Kerr, I think) and of course the unique Fredenhall (not in a planning position). Fredendall never had a major staff role in World War II planning. His last staff duty was as Executive Officer to the Chief of Infantry, which he left in March 1936. Quote A minor quibble with the video, it's impossible to overstate the effect that Major Patton had on US tank thinking in WW1. He WAS the armor school. Yes, he drifted back to the Cavbalry for the easy and familiar life. He wrote the articles that his peers expected him to write but his methods and thinking on armor employment were sound. Chaffee took more risks and deserves more fame than he gets but Patton built the foundation. It wasn't his fault that the Army and the US Government elected not to maintain it. Yes, it is absolutely possible to overstate Patton's effect. Yes, commanded a Tank Brigade in training and in two major engagements in the Great War. However, the armor school he learned from was the French. In terms of training during the war, Eisenhower had as much if not more experience, while postwar both were influential...until they both got out to preserve their careers. Patton returned to the Cavalry in October 1920 and did not return to the Armored Force until July 1940. He and Eisenhower stopped writing articles on armor and army modernization after Eisenhower was called on the carpet for it in November 1920. Chaffee created and helmed the Mechanized Cavalry Brigade, Magruder did the same with the Provisional Infantry Tank Brigade, which were the organizational and doctrinal progenitors of the Armored Force. Vorhees and Andrews both had greater influence on the development of the Armored Force than Patton as well. Heck, you could say that Sereno Brett was much more important than Patton for that matter. Patton had zero role in that and was only an observer/umpire at the Louisiana Maneuvers of May 1940. Quote Manic's notion of scale is very interesting to me as well. It's something that isn't well considered when accounting for US military thinking. On the other hand I do wonder at the officers that thought "we just fought all over Europe, we'll never do that again". All in all I am very glad I watched the videos. I seldom have that much time but a happy series of events fell out just right. NO, you can't convince me to change my mind on Bradley I'm not sure what "scale" he would have been talking about? Anyway, it was most of the United States that considered "we'll never do that again" all the way up to Pearl Harbor. OTOH, I have no interest in trying to change anyone's mind on Bradley, so long as they are aware of his many faults.
Tim the Tank Nut Posted January 13 Author Posted January 13 He had a cool overlay of the Western Front on top of the US/Mexico area of action against the Villistas. His point was that the Western European theatre was small by comparison. The US officers were thinking in terms of larger distances because of their experience in the continental USA. In those days there were no Google maps. Part of my interpretation is that many of the officers discarded their WW1 experience. Patton, of course was the exception as he carefully noted the terrain and referenced it numerous times during WW2 (where the ducks were). Regarding Patton's effect in WW2 it is my opinion that the great majority of the Langres school flowed from Patton's mind. It is much harder to create an organization from scratch than it is to do anything else. Rockenbach and Patton were just the perfect odd couple team. Patton did go to the French school but he made the American one. It's not his fault that the institutional knowledge was poorly maintained. Eisenhower's best lesson was the mission to cross the United States by powered vehicle. It seems absurd on its face but it was a brilliant accomplishment for the time. I think that too played into Manic's theory about US officers having a different concept of scale than their European counterparts. One thing I am uncertain of is that the US Congress was so parsimonious between wars and that meant no new equipment in any real quantity. Did the US cheapness actually provide a benefit as there was precious little unlearn and no obsolete equipment or did it mean that the institutional knowledge was inadequately preserved?
RichTO90 Posted January 13 Posted January 13 54 minutes ago, Tim the Tank Nut said: He had a cool overlay of the Western Front on top of the US/Mexico area of action against the Villistas. His point was that the Western European theatre was small by comparison. The US officers were thinking in terms of larger distances because of their experience in the continental USA. In those days there were no Google maps. Part of my interpretation is that many of the officers discarded their WW1 experience. Patton, of course was the exception as he carefully noted the terrain and referenced it numerous times during WW2 (where the ducks were). Okay, I see what you meant. There were no Google maps, but there were also few paved highways and even fewer bridges capable of taking military traffic other than in urban areas. My interpretation is that too many officers were slaves to their WW1 experience. The best example of that is the planning for NEPTUNE after the assault and build-up phases. Quote Regarding Patton's effect in WW2 it is my opinion that the great majority of the Langres school flowed from Patton's mind. It is much harder to create an organization from scratch than it is to do anything else. Rockenbach and Patton were just the perfect odd couple team. Patton did go to the French school but he made the American one. The problem is that Patton was a line officer in the horse Cavalry after October 1920 until July 1940 and had few staff assignments associated with armor or mechanization. He had zero experience with or input to the doctrinal and organizational arguments and decision making regarding mechanization. Zero. Zilch. Nada. Quote It's not his fault that the institutional knowledge was poorly maintained. Eisenhower's best lesson was the mission to cross the United States by powered vehicle. It seems absurd on its face but it was a brilliant accomplishment for the time. I think that too played into Manic's theory about US officers having a different concept of scale than their European counterparts. Institutional knowledge was maintained. The NDA 1920 simply eliminated the Tank Corps as a recognized Corps in the Army and moved its assets and institutional knowledge to the Infantry, because the Cavalry, did not want it...at least until 1934 when they started creating their own institutional knowledge. The most important thing stemming from the Transcontinental Motor Corps was the Interstate. Quote One thing I am uncertain of is that the US Congress was so parsimonious between wars and that meant no new equipment in any real quantity. Did the US cheapness actually provide a benefit as there was precious little unlearn and no obsolete equipment or did it mean that the institutional knowledge was inadequately preserved? Neither. The cheapness, which included keeping the RA and NG at less than half strength in manpower and equipment was simply the way the U.S. Government funded the military up until the modern-day aberration engendered by politicos wearing the flag on their lapels and funded by the military-industrial complex that Eisenhower warned against. Of course, during the interwar years, the post Great War revulsion against the military except as defense of CONUS was exacerbated by a certain event in October 1929 that was not fully recovered from until around 1940. For most of the Great Depression, unemployment in the U.S. remained between 15 and 20 percent. Spending significant Federal funds on the military and expansion of military personnel strength were non-starters until June 1940 and even then it was a political dogfight.
Rick Posted January 14 Posted January 14 14 hours ago, RichTO90 said: McNair was subjected to a lot of calumny that he was never able to reply to. The force from WW1 was large, but I would hesitate to call it mighty. Much of it was never fully trained, equipped, and deployed, before it was disbanded. And that was part of the problem interwar. The end of the war saw essentially all of the wartime National Army units disbanded, which meant that the National Guard units had to be reformed. For example, the 26th Division returned to Boston 4 April 1919 and was demobilized on 3 May 1919. It was then reconstituted under the National Defense Act of 1920 and reorganized and Federally recognized 21 March 1923. Effectively there was nearly a four-year hiatus in the organization. The NDA 1920 also reset the Strength of the RA at 296,000, including 17,000 officers, but it never came close. The low point was 30 June 1933, when there were just 13,287 officers and 119.913 enlisted, including the Air Corps, Expansion began in 1936, but it was solely to enlisted strength. The National Guard strength was set at 435,000, but never exceeded 200,000 until 1940. Yes, its officer corps was generally overage but it was the same in the RA and the Reserves. The Organized Reserves were worse, because political machinations in writing NDA 1920 set the OR officer strength as 100% of OR unit officer strength, while enlisted OR strength was set at 33%. The result was that ORC strength peaked at 133,485 on 30 June 1933 but on the same strength ERC strength was just 5,028. It meant that the OR's sole function interwar was to provide officers to periodically fill up RA units for maneuvers that were usually TEWT. Fredendall never had a major staff role in World War II planning. His last staff duty was as Executive Officer to the Chief of Infantry, which he left in March 1936. Yes, it is absolutely possible to overstate Patton's effect. Yes, commanded a Tank Brigade in training and in two major engagements in the Great War. However, the armor school he learned from was the French. In terms of training during the war, Eisenhower had as much if not more experience, while postwar both were influential...until they both got out to preserve their careers. Patton returned to the Cavalry in October 1920 and did not return to the Armored Force until July 1940. He and Eisenhower stopped writing articles on armor and army modernization after Eisenhower was called on the carpet for it in November 1920. Chaffee created and helmed the Mechanized Cavalry Brigade, Magruder did the same with the Provisional Infantry Tank Brigade, which were the organizational and doctrinal progenitors of the Armored Force. Vorhees and Andrews both had greater influence on the development of the Armored Force than Patton as well. Heck, you could say that Sereno Brett was much more important than Patton for that matter. Patton had zero role in that and was only an observer/umpire at the Louisiana Maneuvers of May 1940. I'm not sure what "scale" he would have been talking about? Anyway, it was most of the United States that considered "we'll never do that again" all the way up to Pearl Harbor. OTOH, I have no interest in trying to change anyone's mind on Bradley, so long as they are aware of his many faults. As someone who doesn't know, what were Bradley's "many faults?" Thank you.
Tim the Tank Nut Posted January 14 Author Posted January 14 we just recently had a Bradley thread. If you search for it I think it covers it very well.
RichTO90 Posted January 14 Posted January 14 7 hours ago, Rick said: As someone who doesn't know, what were Bradley's "many faults?" Thank you. Aside from being a habitual liar? Aside from being a chronic self-promoter? Aside from believing himself infallible on the same order as Monty? Aside from denigrating fellow officers who could not respond to his attacks? In working on my next book on my Dad's experience with the 90th Infantry Division in Normandy, I ran into too much confirmation of what I had long suspected about Bradley. He was an odious little shit. I have a new respect for George Patton given how he was able to swallow his pride and serve under Bradley in a command he should have himself held. What is worse is the best evidence is Bradley's indecisiveness directly impacted the length of the war in Europe due to his failure to command in Normandy. If Montgomery and Patton had commanded the two army groups, most of 7. Armee, 5. Panzerarmee, and Panzergruppe Eberbach would have been destroyed west of the Seine by the end of August. Instead of 55,000 German prisoners 14-31 August it would have been about 300,000 German prisoners 14-31 August. Much of the reason he is now so venerated is simply because he lived so long. He controlled the narrative like no one else, simply because he lived until 1981 as the "last surviving five-star". There is a very good reason Martin Blumenson had to wait until 1993 to publish The Battle of the Generals.
Tim the Tank Nut Posted January 14 Author Posted January 14 I just realized an error on my part that needs clarification: I wrote "regarding Patton's effect in WW2..." What I meant to say was effect in WW1. Patton really was the genesis for the US Armored Force. It was primarily Patton that went to the French and British experts and correlated the results and then tailored them for American ingenuity and know how. This seed planted at Langres is the beginning of all of it. Patton and Eisenhower would both have stayed the course in mechanized warfare if they could have. The truth is that Army thinking wasn't with them at the time. They were simply too far ahead of it for their own good. Later, when Patton was a cavalry officer again he wrote on behalf of the cavalry things that he could scarcely believe himself as his WW1 experience clearly showed he knew better but I think he "wrote what would sell". The time frame between WW1 and WW2 was both forever and not long at all. The advances in mechanization and communications really came closer to 2 than 1. The enormous gains in technology between 1936 and 1940 with respect to reliability of engines and radios was a huge change. Radio communication represented a force multiplier that when it worked could be decisive. The fact that some older commanders took these advances and ran with them is proof that sometimes an old dog can learn new tricks. I do believe it is time for me to look for more information on Chaffee. I don't own any books that cover him well, it's always in passing. Any recommendations are always welcome. Dropping in on the idea that "Institutional knowledge was maintained" by the infantry for a moment. Well, I suppose it was but it certainly seems to have lost the free wheeling and fast moving operational mentality of the Tank Corps of WW1. The Cavalry mentality was better suited to tank operations and I think it's fair to say that the Cavalry if not under Kerr would've gotten further, faster with the Armor Concept. Nick mentions in his video that the force was called "Armored" so that it wouldn't fall directly infantry or cavalry. When the famous patch was created I thought that they already referring to the force as Armored...
RichTO90 Posted January 14 Posted January 14 (edited) 3 hours ago, Tim the Tank Nut said: I just realized an error on my part that needs clarification: I wrote "regarding Patton's effect in WW2..." What I meant to say was effect in WW1. Patton really was the genesis for the US Armored Force. It was primarily Patton that went to the French and British experts and correlated the results and then tailored them for American ingenuity and know how. This seed planted at Langres is the beginning of all of it. Patton and Eisenhower would both have stayed the course in mechanized warfare if they could have. The truth is that Army thinking wasn't with them at the time. They were simply too far ahead of it for their own good. Later, when Patton was a cavalry officer again he wrote on behalf of the cavalry things that he could scarcely believe himself as his WW1 experience clearly showed he knew better but I think he "wrote what would sell". Patton stopped writing about mechanized warfare after Eisenhower was called on the carpet by Farnsworth in November 1920. By that time Patton had already left the Tank Corps in March 1920. The actual reorganization and dissolution of the Tank Corps took effect in January 1921, a year before Eisenhower left Fort Meade for a post in the Canal Zone under his mentor Fox Conner. Both Patton and Rockenbach were Cavalry, but as conceived in World War I the tank was an infantry support vehicle, which is how it was employed in both battles Patton commanded the AEF Tank Brigade in. That is what the French taught at Langres. Patton wrote one postwar article, "Tanks in Future Wars", in the Infantry Journal (May 1920) and then "Comments on Cavalry Tanks" in the Cavalry Journal (July 1921). After that it was an innocuous article "The Effect of Weapons on War" (Infantry Journal November 1930) and "Motorization and Mechanization in the Cavalry" (Cavalry Journal July 1930), both of which carefully hewed to the party line. "Comments of Cavalry Tanks" was in fact his rebuttal of an article by Major, Infantry (Tanks) Bradford Chynoweth in which Patton defended the HORSE cavalry. Vigorously. I think it was his way of saying "look at what a good boy I am now". 😀 The genesis for the Armored Force were Eskridge, Voorhis, and Chaffee, not Patton or Eisenhower. They did all the equipment, organizational, and doctrinal testing for a mechanized (armored) force between 1928 and 1939. Patton had no role in that. Zero. Zilch. Nada. Quote The time frame between WW1 and WW2 was both forever and not long at all. The advances in mechanization and communications really came closer to 2 than 1. The enormous gains in technology between 1936 and 1940 with respect to reliability of engines and radios was a huge change. Radio communication represented a force multiplier that when it worked could be decisive. The fact that some older commanders took these advances and ran with them is proof that sometimes an old dog can learn new tricks. To put it in persepctive, The end of the Great War 11 November 1918 to the start of World War II on 1 September 1939 was 20 years, 9 months, 21 days, As of today, 911 was 23 years, 4 months, 3 days. Quote I do believe it is time for me to look for more information on Chaffee. I don't own any books that cover him well, it's always in passing. Any recommendations are always welcome. Dropping in on the idea that "Institutional knowledge was maintained" by the infantry for a moment. Well, I suppose it was but it certainly seems to have lost the free wheeling and fast moving operational mentality of the Tank Corps of WW1. The Cavalry mentality was better suited to tank operations and I think it's fair to say that the Cavalry if not under Kerr would've gotten further, faster with the Armor Concept. Nick mentions in his video that the force was called "Armored" so that it wouldn't fall directly infantry or cavalry. When the famous patch was created I thought that they already referring to the force as Armored... I tried to give the gist of him. His vision of the Armored Force was Armored Cavalry, but he was smart enough to incorporate the vision of the Infantry as well. Thus, the first two divisions he cleverly mixed up. The 1st was commanded by Bruce Magruder, and Infantryman, but most of its armored element was the old 7th Mechanized Cavalry Brigade with the addition of the 69th Infantry (Medium Tanks). The 2d was commanded by Charles Scott, a Cavalryman, but most of its armored element was the Provisional Infantry Tank Brigade. Even better, Magruder had commanded the Provisional Tank Brigade in the Louisiana Maneuvers and Scott had been Chaffee's Chief of Staff in the 7th Mechanized Cavalry Brigade. I am honestly confused by why you think the Tank Corps of World War I was "free wheeling and fast moving"? The whole reason Marshall broke the deadlock by authorizing the organization of the Armored Force under Chaffee was precisely because the Cavalry and Infantry could not agree on its future organization and doctrine. Cavalry wanted it to be a Cavalry force with a Cavalry mission, Infantry wanted it to be an Infantry supporting force, with an Infantry mission. If Marshall had not directed the fusion of the two Branches it is unlikely that either vision would have worked as well. The Armored Force was created as a Provisional unit for service test on 10 July 1940. The patch followed a few months later on 22 November 1940, incorporating elements of the WWI Tank Corps insignia, which was designed by Patton - the triangle and colors - with the 7th Cavalry Brigade stylized tracks, lightning, and cannon superimposed on it. BTW, the last Chief of Cavalry before the Marshall reorganization of March 1942 eliminated the "traditional" Line Branch Chiefs (which had only really been traditional since the NDA 1920 took effect in 1921) was John K. Herr, not Kerr. He was something of a fossil in attitude, but not a complete idiot. The Infantry Chief, George Lynch, was actually very forward thinking and was partly responsible for the 75mm-armed medium tank. The Chief of Artillery, Robert Danford, was probably the worst, refusing to countenance SP artillery, the loss of horse-drawn artillery, and eliminating the prerogatives of the Battery Commander (he was not a promoter of the development of rapid massing of fires as developed at Sill or of the AOP. Edited January 14 by RichTO90
Tim the Tank Nut Posted January 14 Author Posted January 14 The debut action of the WW1 Tank Corps outran the infantry support and kept going. They bounced all over happily shooting Germans. I'd call their performance very fast moving and free wheeling. As an organization the Tank Corps was light (not loaded up with senior officers beholden to the old ways as there were no old ways). The WW1 Tankers were creating doctrine in combat and got away with it. I think they were pretty good. I do recognize that the French and the British also did similar performance but I have a hard time looking at the St Chammond or the Whippet and seeing the future. The FT17 (French) set the mold for all tanks to come. ref Fox Connor, I had forgotten about him. Carlo D'Este write of him as a military genius. That's another officer that probably needs my further study. On a happier note I expect to be reading on your book by this weekend. I've nearly finished my "beside the bed" stack and having been saving this one for cold winter nights. They are here!
RichTO90 Posted January 14 Posted January 14 48 minutes ago, Tim the Tank Nut said: The debut action of the WW1 Tank Corps outran the infantry support and kept going. They bounced all over happily shooting Germans. I'd call their performance very fast moving and free wheeling. As an organization the Tank Corps was light (not loaded up with senior officers beholden to the old ways as there were no old ways). The WW1 Tankers were creating doctrine in combat and got away with it. I think they were pretty good. I do recognize that the French and the British also did similar performance but I have a hard time looking at the St Chammond or the Whippet and seeing the future. The FT17 (French) set the mold for all tanks to come. Arguably, outrunning the infantry they were supposed to support was a mistake, but that is not the debut action, which was 12 September. That was a mudfest rather than a battle. It was at Cheppy when Patton was wounded that the Tank Corps came of age and that was in tank-infantry cooperation rather than in breakthrough or pursuit. Quote ref Fox Connor, I had forgotten about him. Carlo D'Este write of him as a military genius. That's another officer that probably needs my further study. On a happier note I expect to be reading on your book by this weekend. I've nearly finished my "beside the bed" stack and having been saving this one for cold winter nights. They are here! Good! I hope you enjoy it.
Tim the Tank Nut Posted January 15 Author Posted January 15 are you kidding? This is THE BOOK I have been waiting for. As a practical matter it's going to be my go to for reference. I really don't remember things like I used to and things that I know I knew I just don't know any more, so this is a refresher and an education at the same time. I wasn't about to start in before Christmas as I had family obligations but January and February, I've got down time most evenings. I'm looking forward to it very much. Also, in your reply to Rick about Bradley: Try not to beat around the bush so much. You've got to start telling people what you really think!😁
RichTO90 Posted January 15 Posted January 15 5 hours ago, Tim the Tank Nut said: are you kidding? This is THE BOOK I have been waiting for. As a practical matter it's going to be my go to for reference. I really don't remember things like I used to and things that I know I knew I just don't know any more, so this is a refresher and an education at the same time. I wasn't about to start in before Christmas as I had family obligations but January and February, I've got down time most evenings. I'm looking forward to it very much. Also, in your reply to Rick about Bradley: Try not to beat around the bush so much. You've got to start telling people what you really think!😁 Thank you. Sadly, when a question comes up I have to refer to the book as well. Luckily I have the Word and PDF version so can search it. Might as well apologize for the lack of index now. That was a publisher decision. Luckily I have a pretty complete TOC. Bradley was a shit, pure and simple, Everyone knew it. Everyone said it. Quietly, behind his back, especially postwar.
Stuart Galbraith Posted January 16 Posted January 16 On 1/14/2025 at 5:24 PM, RichTO90 said: Aside from being a habitual liar? Aside from being a chronic self-promoter? Aside from believing himself infallible on the same order as Monty? Aside from denigrating fellow officers who could not respond to his attacks? In working on my next book on my Dad's experience with the 90th Infantry Division in Normandy, I ran into too much confirmation of what I had long suspected about Bradley. He was an odious little shit. I have a new respect for George Patton given how he was able to swallow his pride and serve under Bradley in a command he should have himself held. What is worse is the best evidence is Bradley's indecisiveness directly impacted the length of the war in Europe due to his failure to command in Normandy. If Montgomery and Patton had commanded the two army groups, most of 7. Armee, 5. Panzerarmee, and Panzergruppe Eberbach would have been destroyed west of the Seine by the end of August. Instead of 55,000 German prisoners 14-31 August it would have been about 300,000 German prisoners 14-31 August. Much of the reason he is now so venerated is simply because he lived so long. He controlled the narrative like no one else, simply because he lived until 1981 as the "last surviving five-star". There is a very good reason Martin Blumenson had to wait until 1993 to publish The Battle of the Generals. If you are writing that in your next book, put me down for a preorder.
RichTO90 Posted January 16 Posted January 16 3 hours ago, Stuart Galbraith said: If you are writing that in your next book, put me down for a preorder. The problem is that Montgomery as GFC dropped the ball badly too after the landing. Ironically, it was because he was trying too hard to be nice to the Americans. Eisenhower by his hands off command style did not help either.
RETAC21 Posted January 16 Posted January 16 40 minutes ago, RichTO90 said: The problem is that Montgomery as GFC dropped the ball badly too after the landing. Ironically, it was because he was trying too hard to be nice to the Americans. Eisenhower by his hands off command style did not help either.
Tim the Tank Nut Posted January 16 Author Posted January 16 it's worth mentioning that Rich is right about Montgomery's tact in Normandy. Montgomery was a great General (flawed person) who was the right General for the British Army. That didn't really make him the right General for the US Army. The culture clash at the top was never really resolved and for whatever reason Montgomery was too often walking on his toes around Bradley and the First Army. I assume that he felt Bradley had Eisenhower's ear from their associations in North Africa. A lot of popular history has focused on Montgomery's eccentricities rather than his military successes. When that isn't topic it's always Market Garden. Given a comparison Montgomery rates well against contemporary US Generals for overall effectiveness. If you take into account the resources and cultural differences between the US and Great Britain then he comes off even better. US Generals could take comfort in the fact that there were always more men, tanks, and ammunition coming. Montgomery could not see it the same way. None of that is to excuse the idea that Caen was going to fall on D+1 or D+2. That was just wishful thinking.
RETAC21 Posted January 18 Posted January 18 On 1/16/2025 at 9:54 PM, Tim the Tank Nut said: it's worth mentioning that Rich is right about Montgomery's tact in Normandy. Montgomery was a great General (flawed person) who was the right General for the British Army. That didn't really make him the right General for the US Army. The culture clash at the top was never really resolved and for whatever reason Montgomery was too often walking on his toes around Bradley and the First Army. I assume that he felt Bradley had Eisenhower's ear from their associations in North Africa. A lot of popular history has focused on Montgomery's eccentricities rather than his military successes. When that isn't topic it's always Market Garden. Given a comparison Montgomery rates well against contemporary US Generals for overall effectiveness. If you take into account the resources and cultural differences between the US and Great Britain then he comes off even better. US Generals could take comfort in the fact that there were always more men, tanks, and ammunition coming. Montgomery could not see it the same way. None of that is to excuse the idea that Caen was going to fall on D+1 or D+2. That was just wishful thinking. Don't take me wrong, I completely agree. Monty is at the same underrated by more modern historians and overrated by his contemporaries, but a point that I think is missed is that he obnoxiousness hid the real difficulties of managing a multi-national force that the Commonwealth forces were and coordinating with Americans whose egos and internal fights were unknown to him.
Stuart Galbraith Posted January 18 Posted January 18 On 1/16/2025 at 5:57 PM, RichTO90 said: 😇 On 1/16/2025 at 5:22 PM, RETAC21 said: Im guessing he wasnt feeling well at the time.
Stuart Galbraith Posted January 18 Posted January 18 1 minute ago, RETAC21 said: Don't take me wrong, I completely agree. Monty is at the same underrated by more modern historians and overrated by his contemporaries, but a point that I think is missed is that he obnoxiousness hid the real difficulties of managing a multi-national force that the Commonwealth forces were and coordinating with Americans whose egos and internal fights were unknown to him. I gather even Churchill had difficulties getting on with him, which says something. I always felt he probably had Aspbergers or something like that. It was distinctly surprised when I heard 21st Army group was moving as fast as 21st Army group across NW Europe as Patton was doing with 3rd Army group. Even allowing for the relatively few units, that strongly suggests he was capable of lighting a fire under people when he felt the need.
LeeWalls Posted January 18 Posted January 18 On 1/13/2025 at 9:10 AM, Tim the Tank Nut said: NO, you can't convince me to change my mind on Bradley Was Bradley a "coward"? I have read his actions during the Battle of the Bulge described as "craven cowardice" but i don't recall what the basis for the accusation was.
Tim the Tank Nut Posted January 18 Author Posted January 18 not so far as I know. I believe you are thinking of Fredenhall. An officer from the UK asked Harmon "Surely you have better men than that?" and we did. Harmon recommended Fredenhall be relieved. This all happened in North Africa.
LeeWalls Posted January 26 Posted January 26 On 1/18/2025 at 8:13 AM, Tim the Tank Nut said: not so far as I know. I believe you are thinking of Fredenhall. An officer from the UK asked Harmon "Surely you have better men than that?" and we did. Harmon recommended Fredenhall be relieved. This all happened in North Africa. But -- but I read it on the internet. Surely it must be true!
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