Tim the Tank Nut Posted November 5, 2024 Posted November 5, 2024 coming from the Bradley thread I thought we'd have a go at the ubiquitous Courtney Hodges and his biggest blunder. Firstly, do we even blame Hodges or can we pin this one one Bradley? There's no shortage of blame to go around as Collins can't use the excuse of "I'm a clown and didn't know any better" whereas the other two could plausibly use that as an excuse. Even moderate reconnaissance should have indicated the strength of the position (in the off chance that nobody knew that big muddy forest equals casualties) but First Army just kept going. Hodges should've pushed back against Bradley on this one. Even if they "couldn't go around" which the US Army in WW2 was uniquely suited to there were plenty of advances on other fronts. First Army could've easily sat still and stayed out of that particular meatgrinder but they were headline hungry and wanted that advance no matter the cost. It's not like they were sucking in German reserves from other fronts. The conditions were such that the Germans didn't need a massive effort to wear the US forces down. Everyone likes to bash the British for poorly executed set piece attacks but if you MUST attack into a dark, wet forest then maybe set piece is the way to go? If nothing else, Eisenhower should've queried if the battle made sense. It's like for a moment everyone forgot how to read a map...
Stuart Galbraith Posted November 5, 2024 Posted November 5, 2024 There was a lot of this thinking around in Italy too. Oh no, we can't possibly outflank Monte Casino, we must do a frontal assault, then they do it not once but twice after proving it couldn't be done, totalling a Polish Division. If anyone is interested, we have ways podcast is discussing Huertgen in context with the execution of Eddie Slovak.
seahawk Posted November 5, 2024 Posted November 5, 2024 They were outflanking when they went into Hürtgenwald. The defensive line along the Rur seems (and was) much stronger, what they did not know was that the Eifel was needed in preparation for the coming Battle of the Bulge, for which German forces were massing in the area.
Tim the Tank Nut Posted November 6, 2024 Author Posted November 6, 2024 at least a person can argue that Italy is narrow and there are limits to how far you can go around. That's just not the case in central Europe proper. It was a bad attack into a bad area that was badly planned and badly executed. Sometimes I think it shows that American Generals could've fit in at the Somme in WW1.
RichTO90 Posted November 6, 2024 Posted November 6, 2024 On 11/5/2024 at 11:59 AM, seahawk said: They were outflanking when they went into Hürtgenwald. The defensive line along the Rur seems (and was) much stronger, what they did not know was that the Eifel was needed in preparation for the coming Battle of the Bulge, for which German forces were massing in the area. No, they were not. They were attacking through impossible terrain in order to seize an objective that would allow them to cross the Roer in safety. Why not instead extend the Ninth Army line south, while continuing pressure on the front from Jülich to Düren, which they did anyway without capturing the dams. Then the V Corps and VII Corps of First Army could mass on the Losheim Gap - one directed at Münstereifel and the other on Mayen. The dams would be outflanked, the assembly area for a German counterattack from the Eifel would be eliminated, and all would be hunky dory.
Tim the Tank Nut Posted November 8, 2024 Author Posted November 8, 2024 some reports say that armor committed at the earliest stages of the battle would have helped but that the US command didn't feel armor could be effective in such conditions. Of course, later, when the infantry was bogged down they sent in the tanks anyway. I'd be leery of sending tanks into the woods too but I'd also be leery of attacking such a strong defensive work when other options were available. The Huertgen seems denser in many areas than the Ardennes but that may be a trick of modern photography.
seahawk Posted November 8, 2024 Posted November 8, 2024 On 11/6/2024 at 10:55 PM, RichTO90 said: No, they were not. They were attacking through impossible terrain in order to seize an objective that would allow them to cross the Roer in safety. Why not instead extend the Ninth Army line south, while continuing pressure on the front from Jülich to Düren, which they did anyway without capturing the dams. Then the V Corps and VII Corps of First Army could mass on the Losheim Gap - one directed at Münstereifel and the other on Mayen. The dams would be outflanked, the assembly area for a German counterattack from the Eifel would be eliminated, and all would be hunky dory. But attacking through impossible terrain is what the Germans did in their attack against France. The only difference was that the French had very little troops in the terrain, while the Germans did, but honestly only because they needed the Eifel as a staging area for the Battle of Bulge. Otherwise small units would have protected the dams and that would have been it.
RichTO90 Posted November 8, 2024 Posted November 8, 2024 3 hours ago, Tim the Tank Nut said: some reports say that armor committed at the earliest stages of the battle would have helped but that the US command didn't feel armor could be effective in such conditions. Of course, later, when the infantry was bogged down they sent in the tanks anyway. What reports are those? Armor was committed at the earliest stages of the battle. The 9th Armored Division (-) was in VIII Corps reserve and was committed in the first few days. CCB/ 9th Armd Div was in V Corps reserve, prepared to exploit once the 2d Infantry Division pushed through Schleiden. It was diverted south to bolster the 106th Inf Div at St. Vith. Similarly, 10th Armored Division was drawn from Third Army and committed on the southern end of the VIII Corps line. Quote I'd be leery of sending tanks into the woods too but I'd also be leery of attacking such a strong defensive work when other options were available. The Huertgen seems denser in many areas than the Ardennes but that may be a trick of modern photography. Tanks were rarely sent into the woods unless there was a good road or trail to be used. The V Corps was leery about sending tanks down unimproved forest trails after the experience with the 28th Inf Div at Schmidt, but that was not the situation. The anticpation was that once the 2d Inf Div attack succeeded in reaching Schleiden, the options were to drive northeast across the Cologne plan or southeast across more broken terrain to Coblenz. In essence, it eliminated the threat of the dams because it crossed the Roer at its headwaters above them rather than downstream below them. It also completely outflanked the Aachen-Stadtkyl switchline of the Westwall and the Westwall defenses running south to Trier.
RichTO90 Posted November 8, 2024 Posted November 8, 2024 3 hours ago, seahawk said: But attacking through impossible terrain is what the Germans did in their attack against France. The only difference was that the French had very little troops in the terrain, while the Germans did, but honestly only because they needed the Eifel as a staging area for the Battle of Bulge. Otherwise small units would have protected the dams and that would have been it. Sorry, but no, not the same terrain at all. The attacks by the V Corps with the 9th and 28th Infantry Division in succession, attempted a direct assault on the terrain controlling the approaches to the dams. They were followed by the 5th Armored Division attack, which finally secured Bergstein and Kleinau by attacking along the single road corridor in the forest that began at Vossenack. I suspect that part of the reason for the succession of single division attacks there was because only a single division could be supported on that road. Oh, and it was still below the dams. An assault crossing of the Roer at Bergstein was as unfeasible as any further downstream, so somehow enough combat power needed to be expended to drive south for the dams...or to wait for the drive by the other wind of the V Corps from the south. However, further south as the Germans had demonstrated in 1940, there were actually a number of east to west roads available to support to operations. Not the best, and with bottlenecks that had to be overcome, but they were there. What made the 2d Infantry Division attack such a threat was that it outflanked the major bottleneck to west to east movement, which was the Westwall. Once the Schleiden-Monschau road was open, then the Butgenback-Stadtkyl roadwas threatened, and then the St. Vith-Bitburg road. Yes, the terrain was still bad, but it was not nearly as impossible as further north. Why Bradley, Hodges, and Gerow continued to hammer on the defenses in the north, then tried to do a two-prong approach from north and south is beyond me. Doing the north alone hit the worst terrain with the least force. Doing both dissipated strength. Concentrating on the more vulnerable south probably would have gotten better results, especially if started early enough. Even better, since it directly threatened German assembly areas for WACHT AM RHEIN the necessary German reaction may have better telegraphed what the Germans planned.
seahawk Posted November 8, 2024 Posted November 8, 2024 I disagree, the basic idea was okay. The fact that the US pressed on after the 9th Inf. Div had taken a beating, was the crucial mistake. Because by then it was obvious that the area was not lighlty defended and that the road and trails network did not support combined arms operations, especially at the time of the year.
RichTO90 Posted November 8, 2024 Posted November 8, 2024 22 minutes ago, seahawk said: I disagree, the basic idea was okay. The fact that the US pressed on after the 9th Inf. Div had taken a beating, was the crucial mistake. Because by then it was obvious that the area was not lighlty defended and that the road and trails network did not support combined arms operations, especially at the time of the year. I disagree, if the US pressed on after the initial attacks, 9th and 28th Infantry Division, failed, and the 5th Armored Division attack only finally succeeded, only to demonstrate the Vossenack-Bergstein corridor was a dead end and its attack did nothing to secure the dams, how is that basic idea okay? It was a cul-de-sac that wrecked two divisions and effectively immobilized a third at a crucial time. Meanwhile. the 4th Infantry Division was also nearly ruined in trying to drive east to Schevenhuette. All directed into impossible terrain seriatim, all wrecked or stymied, with no clear tactical objective other than to push forward. For the better part of two months. The 2d Infantry Division produced measurable gains in days that did have a tactical and operational impact. What if instead of a single division with another division and a combat command in support doing it in December it was a four-division V Corps doing it in late October or early November?
seahawk Posted November 8, 2024 Posted November 8, 2024 If they would have walked through the forest with next to no resistance and captured Schmidt and Vossenack easily, it would have been a success. The first attempt of the 9th however showed that the defence was strong and determined, so the plan was no longer valid.
RichTO90 Posted November 8, 2024 Posted November 8, 2024 1 hour ago, seahawk said: If they would have walked through the forest with next to no resistance and captured Schmidt and Vossenack easily, it would have been a success. The first attempt of the 9th however showed that the defence was strong and determined, so the plan was no longer valid. Well, yes, exactly. What then happened though appears to be the military version of the sunk cost fallacy. "We've already started this way, so we may as well through more at it until it gives." Bradley. Hodges, and Gerow made no effort to actually evaluate the terrain, the objectives, the enemy strength, and their own strength and craft a plan that took advantage of American strength and German weakness. What they came up with wasn't it.
Rick Posted November 8, 2024 Posted November 8, 2024 7 minutes ago, RichTO90 said: Well, yes, exactly. What then happened though appears to be the military version of the sunk cost fallacy. "We've already started this way, so we may as well through more at it until it gives." Bradley. Hodges, and Gerow made no effort to actually evaluate the terrain, the objectives, the enemy strength, and their own strength and craft a plan that took advantage of American strength and German weakness. What they came up with wasn't it. "...craft a plan that took advantage of American strength and German weakness. What they came up with wasn't it." Just a curiosity question, what would those strengths and weaknesses be? Thank you.
Tim the Tank Nut Posted November 8, 2024 Author Posted November 8, 2024 Limitless mobility and firepower against a foe that doesn't have the fuel to reposition or the ammunition to fire continuously. The US didn't have to attack in any particular spot. The US Army had the luxury of being able to drive anywhere there was some sort of road and not have to walk.
RichTO90 Posted November 9, 2024 Posted November 9, 2024 5 hours ago, Tim the Tank Nut said: Limitless mobility and firepower against a foe that doesn't have the fuel to reposition or the ammunition to fire continuously. The US didn't have to attack in any particular spot. The US Army had the luxury of being able to drive anywhere there was some sort of road and not have to walk. Yes, more or less. The US Army had the ability to rapidly mass maneuver units and firepower to a much greater extent than the Germans. The Germans compensated with terrain, fortifications, and small unit tactical excellence that was much more variable at this point in American units. And, for the American units, that variable was compensated for by tactical modifications and mobile protected firepower.
seahawk Posted November 9, 2024 Posted November 9, 2024 11 hours ago, RichTO90 said: Well, yes, exactly. What then happened though appears to be the military version of the sunk cost fallacy. "We've already started this way, so we may as well through more at it until it gives." Bradley. Hodges, and Gerow made no effort to actually evaluate the terrain, the objectives, the enemy strength, and their own strength and craft a plan that took advantage of American strength and German weakness. What they came up with wasn't it. That is what I mean. The basic idea to try to go through the Hürtgen forest and maybe surprise the Germans, was imho valid. Re-enforcing the attack after it became clear that the Germans were prepared, determined and there were plenty of Germans around was a huge mistake of the command.
Rick Posted November 9, 2024 Posted November 9, 2024 4 hours ago, RichTO90 said: Yes, more or less. The US Army had the ability to rapidly mass maneuver units and firepower to a much greater extent than the Germans. The Germans compensated with terrain, fortifications, and small unit tactical excellence that was much more variable at this point in American units. And, for the American units, that variable was compensated for by tactical modifications and mobile protected firepower. Thank you both. So it appears that this U.S. excellence was enabled by U.S. logistical abilities.
RichTO90 Posted November 9, 2024 Posted November 9, 2024 7 hours ago, Rick said: Thank you both. So it appears that this U.S. excellence was enabled by U.S. logistical abilities. It was enabled by the full motorization and excellent communications of the US Army. It was limited by US logistical abilities, which in October 1944 were in a mess not fully corrected until December, when they were thrown into partial disarray again by the German counteroffensives. They then functioned well until late in the pursuit phase of the closing stages of the war.
Tim the Tank Nut Posted November 9, 2024 Author Posted November 9, 2024 I am the last person on earth to defend JCH Lee and don't intend to now but one of the reasons that US logistics were a mess in October of 1944 is that supplies had a lot further to go. The advances of August and September were sudden and long and it made supplies harder to get to the front. General history cheers the Red Ball Express but the fact is that if was an inefficient expedient at the time. The US rear echelon supply types got first dibs on everything good and that is wretched but in the Axis armies that problem didn't exist because there were never any supplies for the rear echelon to take in the first place. When I speak of the limitless firepower and mobility of the US Army I am comparing to its peer group.
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