General Omar Bradley. man and myth...

[Tim the Tank Nut]

picking up so as not to derail another thread too badly:

 

It is my contention that General Omar Bradley was an average commander at best and benefited much from being in the right place at the right time.  Bradley's most astute move was to deal with war correspondent Ernie Pyle.  Pyle's stories elevated General Bradley's reputation a very large amount.  Pyle described Omar as the GI General and Bradley saw the gold and ran with it.  In reality General Bradley was short with his staff and had no real tolerance for failure.  

Bradley's military record is essentially good enough but I don't see anything that he did that was outstanding.  Most accounts pinpoint Cobra as evidence of Bradley's military genius but I am not as certain.  For one thing Montgomery suggested adjustments to Cobra that improved the Allied disposition.  I've read that in older accounts rather than newer ones so accuracy versus whitewash may be at play.  To me the real enhancement of Cobra was unleashing the mobility warfare that the American army excelled at and the tac air and artillery coverage was largely responsible for that.  Maybe Bradley really did come up with Cobra on his own but it isn't fitting with his infantryman's mindset.

Later in the war Bradley really dropped the ball in the Ardennes, so much so that Eisenhower put US troops under British command causing Bradley much heartache and threats to resign ensued.  First Army functioned poorly compared to 3rd Army and British forces around the Ardennes.  If Bradley was such a military genius then he would have read the same signs that Patton did and been more prepared.  Further, the uninspiring Hodges was a Bradley protegee.  As D'Estes said "the new broom swept nothing".

During the war Bradley oscillated between intense dislike and acceptance of Patton's methods.  Devers, Simpson, and Patton all showed a better grasp of circumstances than Bradley or Hodges.

I'll say the Omar Bradley wasn't a bad commander, just that he wasn't the cream of the crop that he portrayed himself to be.  In fact, I would put General Bernard Montgomery far ahead of Bradley as an Army Commander even if he had an insufferable personality.  None of the German General Staff worried about Bradley like they did Patton...

[RichTO90]

That and more. I posted a thread at AHF on some of my observations regarding Bradley, so I will repost them here.

I have been re-reading for the first time in fifty years A Soldier's Story and my reaction is it was as smarmy and self-serving a piece of work as I recall. That though, is impression from the writing. I have also been reading through many original sources as I work on my book on the 90th Infantry Division in Normandy, and keep finding more interesting discrepancies in Bradley's account of events, so I was wondering if there are more? So, to start:

By 12 July, Eisenhower and Bradley had resolved to replace William McMahon as CG, 8th Infantry Division, and Gene Landrum as CG, 90th Infantry Division. McMahon was replaced by Don Storh and they settled on Teddy Roosevelt to replace Landrum, but Roosevelt suddenly died the night of 12/13 July...and then for some reason Bradley was unable to find a replacement for sixteen days?

Bradley claimed he met with Ray McLain on 25 July to offer him the job of ADC, 90th Infantry Division, which had been vacant since Sam Williams was relieved nine days earlier. Bradley implied it was his decision, but Patton and Middleton had resolved to relieve Landrum on 23 July, after the mess on the Island.

Bradley implied he had no other choices to replace Landrum after Roosevelt died...except McLain came to the ETOUSA from the MTOUSA in May specifically as a potential Division CG replacement. Bradley also failed to mention that before the discussion on Roosevelt came up and before he died, he had already asked Patton for a recommendation to replace Landrum, in this interesting conversation:

"During the discussion Bradley asked Patton who he should select for the 90th. Patton’s laconic reply was “McLain”. At the end of the discussion, Bradley, apparently dissatisfied with Patton’s earlier reply, repeated, “George, you haven’t commented on any of these officers. This division is going to belong to you: you had better speak up.” An impatient Patton responded, “hell, damn it, I told you McLain and that is what I meant.”"

I just noticed yet another discrepancy...the 90th Infantry Division was always assigned to the Third Army - it always "belonged" to it and Patton - it was just attached to the First Army for NEPTUNE, as was all of the VIII Corps. Did Bradley not know what the assignments and attachments of his major units were?

Landrum was finally relieved on 29 July, after Middleton renewed his request to Bradley to have him removed, and McLain took command.

 

[RichTO90]

Bradley attempted to closely follow the NEPTUNE outline plan in both the opening operations to cut off the Cotentin and seize Cherbourg. Then, when the plans started going awry and the Germans failed to fall back to the Seine as expected, he began to slip out of his depth. The Great Storm and ammunition consumption exceeding expectations then limited the operations he felt he could undertake. For the second half of June, all except the VII Corps only undertook limited operations, which gave the Germans ample opportunity to prepare. When the great offensive of 3 July began, it was simply a series of linear corps frontal attacks, without any main effort, in an attempt to push the entire German line back. It took three weeks before COBRA could be executed and it was two weeks from concept to execution.

Before COBRA, he authorized Middleton's idiotic, single-division attempt to cross the Seves, with the only purpose of "gaining a better start line" for the VIII Corps after COBRA, when any sane analysis would say a successful COBRA would force the Germans to withdraw in front of the VIII Corps anyway.

The exploitation post COBRA was hampered by Bradley's fixation on Brest and the Brittany Peninsula, which was such a vital element of the NEPTUNE outline plan. As late as 3 August, he was ordering XV Corps to defend an arc DINANT-RENNES-FOUGERES ST. HILAIRE du H and was intent on getting XX Corps operational to expand the drive west into Brittany. It was not until 2035 on 4 August that XV Corps was directed eastward...even though as early as 2 August, P Wood attempted to begin moving the 4th Armored Division eastward, anticipating orders that did not come for nine days. The failure to react to the new situation promptly, mask Brittany, and turn the 4th and 6th Armored Division eastward, reduced the strength of the envelopment, leading to the schizophrenic indecision by Bradley over the short or long envelopment.

When the envelopment was a fact, Bradley remained undecided whether to do a short envelopment through Argentan-Falaise or a long envelopment to the Seine, which was what Montgomery and Patton were both fixed on. Bradley first refused Patton's request on 8 August to head to Dreux and Chartres since there was not enough strength - no 4th or 6th Armored Division q.v. - so ordered the short envelopment, but failed to adequately coordinate with Montgomery (ex post facto excusing that by various claims that he was worried about fratricide). Then on 14 August, Bradley decided to split XV Corps, sending half of it east with XX Corps, while half was left behind as a wholly inadequate plug of the pocket at Argentan. The result was predictable, neither the short or long envelopment had enough strength to be decisive.

[Stuart Galbraith]

There was a book I read some years ago (Im damned if I can remember the name now) that claimed that the drive into Germany was imperiled by his intent to grab as many German prisoners as possible. 'The General has got bags on the mind' was the narrative. The implication being that for someone with the intent of postwar political careers (as with Mark Clark and Rome) a noteworthy victory was more important than actual battlefield effects. Of course, even if they had taken more territory, the postwar split had already been set and it would have had to have given the territory up. But it did paint the picture of a commander with a distinct lack of imagination, except for that which was immediately in front of him.

[RETAC21]

12 hours ago, RichTO90 said:

Bradley attempted to closely follow the NEPTUNE outline plan in both the opening operations to cut off the Cotentin and seize Cherbourg. Then, when the plans started going awry and the Germans failed to fall back to the Seine as expected, he began to slip out of his depth. The Great Storm and ammunition consumption exceeding expectations then limited the operations he felt he could undertake. For the second half of June, all except the VII Corps only undertook limited operations, which gave the Germans ample opportunity to prepare. When the great offensive of 3 July began, it was simply a series of linear corps frontal attacks, without any main effort, in an attempt to push the entire German line back. It took three weeks before COBRA could be executed and it was two weeks from concept to execution.

Before COBRA, he authorized Middleton's idiotic, single-division attempt to cross the Seves, with the only purpose of "gaining a better start line" for the VIII Corps after COBRA, when any sane analysis would say a successful COBRA would force the Germans to withdraw in front of the VIII Corps anyway.

The exploitation post COBRA was hampered by Bradley's fixation on Brest and the Brittany Peninsula, which was such a vital element of the NEPTUNE outline plan. As late as 3 August, he was ordering XV Corps to defend an arc DINANT-RENNES-FOUGERES ST. HILAIRE du H and was intent on getting XX Corps operational to expand the drive west into Brittany. It was not until 2035 on 4 August that XV Corps was directed eastward...even though as early as 2 August, P Wood attempted to begin moving the 4th Armored Division eastward, anticipating orders that did not come for nine days. The failure to react to the new situation promptly, mask Brittany, and turn the 4th and 6th Armored Division eastward, reduced the strength of the envelopment, leading to the schizophrenic indecision by Bradley over the short or long envelopment.

When the envelopment was a fact, Bradley remained undecided whether to do a short envelopment through Argentan-Falaise or a long envelopment to the Seine, which was what Montgomery and Patton were both fixed on. Bradley first refused Patton's request on 8 August to head to Dreux and Chartres since there was not enough strength - no 4th or 6th Armored Division q.v. - so ordered the short envelopment, but failed to adequately coordinate with Montgomery (ex post facto excusing that by various claims that he was worried about fratricide). Then on 14 August, Bradley decided to split XV Corps, sending half of it east with XX Corps, while half was left behind as a wholly inadequate plug of the pocket at Argentan. The result was predictable, neither the short or long envelopment had enough strength to be decisive.

Sounds like an indecisive type, not timid, but not able to settle on a course of action - so I wonder, was there a situation in which he was decisive and proactive during the war? I am thinking about what was said of Ned Almond: "When it paid to be aggressive, Ned was aggressive. When it paid to be cautious, Ned was aggressive." Bradley seems to be the reverse.

[Tim the Tank Nut]

Additionally when comparing commanders you look at Montgomery's efforts and personality he was a real handful to his superiors and peers but generally treated his troops well.  Bradley may have been more tactful when dealing with other higher ranking Generals but didn't seem to have the same touch with the enlisted men.  Montgomery's command did more with less. Bradley benefited from his relationship with Eisenhower and that's okay.  I think Eisenhower was more comfortable with Bradley than he was with Patton despite a long term friendship with Patton.

When Patton cracked up in Sicily the next person was Bradley.  If Bill Simpson had gotten Bradley's opportunity then he would have done better in that slot.

Ernie Pyle wrote a lot of stuff that endeared him to the common grunt but the common grunt can't always have the big picture in mind.  It's too far away.  Same thing with Bill Mauldin, great copy but Generals (even poor ones) can't afford to think like cartoonists.

 

[RichTO90]

5 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

Sounds like an indecisive type, not timid, but not able to settle on a course of action - so I wonder, was there a situation in which he was decisive and proactive during the war? I am thinking about what was said of Ned Almond: "When it paid to be aggressive, Ned was aggressive. When it paid to be cautious, Ned was aggressive." Bradley seems to be the reverse.

Indecisiveness and timidity I think tend to go hand in hand. I would not call Bradley timid though, at least not by the end of the war.

I actually have a hard time thinking of when he was decisive and proactive in a good way. He had a tendency to butt his head against a stone wall until either his head or the wall gave in. In Normandy, he butted until the Germans collapsed. In the Huertgen he butted until he had temporarily ruined three or four American divisions.

It was his propensity to shade the truth or outright lie to cover his own ass that is really bothersome to me though...and his tendency to blame others for his mistakes.

He blamed everyone except himself for the initial poor performance of the 90th Infantry Division, but it was Bradley who selected the 90th as the UTAH follow on, but then insisted he had no idea of the state of the division, didn't know MacKelvie was a dud, did not know all the training problems they had, did not know they would have a troubled introduction to combat and so on...so what made him select them in the first place? Did he really think people would believe he would not know the problems divisions had when first introduced to combat when he had been commanding divisions in combat for over a year at that point. He knew the issues the 1st Armored and 34th Infantry divisions had in Tunisia, the troubles with the 45th in Sicily and the 36th at Salerno, so he was blowing smoke for sure on that one. 

After the COBRA short bombings he deliberately fudged the records to cover up his lax planning.

After the failure to close the Falaise-Argentan  gap he blamed Montgomery and then made fatuous excuses as to why he ordered the XV Corps twice to hold in place.

He blamed Hodges and his staff for the intelligence failure in the Ardennes, when he and his own staff were privy to the same - and more - information and did not better.

Despite the success achieved by concentrating in COBRA he rarely did so again, then blamed the Air Force or subordinates when his badly dispersed and incoherent attacks fizzled out.

[RichTO90]

Okay, the Falaise-Argentan business.

Sometime on the evening of 12 August, Patton supposedly called Bradley to inform him of what was happening. Patton told Bradley, “we have troops in Argentan” – a slight exaggeration – and that they were on their way to Falaise. Bradley’s response was,

Nothing doing, you’re not to go beyond Argentan. Just stop where you are and build up on that shoulder. Sibret [Brigadier General Edwin M. Sibert, Bradley’s G-2] tells me the German is beginning to pull out. You’d better button up and get ready for him.

Instead of authorizing Patton to complete the encirclement of the Germans under what was Bradley’s original concept of operations, he now wanted Patton to halt in place. Bradley’s reply stunned Patton. On 8 August when Bradley had ordered him north, Patton had protested, arguing that a deeper envelopment directing the Third Army to Chartres and Dreux could trap all the German forces west of the Seine, but Bradley had been adamant in sending the XV Corps to Alençon.

Notably, this, and other similar accounts of this conversation are based solely on Bradley’s version of events in his postwar memoir A Soldier’s Story. Patton oddly enough did not mention the conversation in his diary at the time. There are also significant inconsistencies in Bradley’s account. For example, Bradley said Patton "telephoned" and spoke to him on the evening of 12 August from Third Army Headquarters “near Laval”. However, Third Army Headquarters was not at Laval. Patton mentioned in his diary that he “drove to our new CP at a point about 6 miles NW of Le Mans” on 12 August, so he was nowhere near Laval. It is also odd that Bradley says they spoke by telephone, when in other cases of high-level conferences, the principals met in person or used enciphered cablegrams – nether telephone nor radio communications were considered secure. All the other communications back and forth from Third Army to XV Corps are referenced as messages, rather than telephone communications. Finally, it seems inexplicable that Bradley ordered Patton to halt on the evening of 12 August, but Patton still had Gaffey order Haislip to advance after midnight on 12 August. In fact, the XV Corps did not register receipt of the message ordering the halt until 1415 on 13 August.

Nor are the reasons Bradley later gave for the halt order believable. In A Soldier’s Story, he said,

Although Patton may have spun a line across that narrow neck, I doubted his ability to hold it. Nineteen German divisions were now stampeding to escape the trap. Meanwhile, with four divisions George was already blocking three principal escape routes through Alençon. Sees, and Argentan. Had he stretched that line to include Falaise, he would have extended his roadblock a distance of 40 miles. The enemy could not only have broken through, but he might have trampled Patton’s position in the onrush. I much preferred a solid shoulder at Argentan to the possibility of a broken neck at Falaise.

At the same time I was reluctant to chance a head-on meeting between two converging Armies as we might have done had Patton continued on the Falaise.

Bradley’s postwar excuses were specious at best and dishonest at worst. On 14 August, Bradley authorized Patton to send half of the XV Corps forces at Argentan further east towards the Seine, reducing the strength of the “strong shoulder” by half. He also authorized Patton to send the XX Corps, which Patton had been planning on inserting to protect the vulnerable XV Corps left flank, east towards the Seine on 13 August as well, further reducing the potential strength of his “strong shoulder”. Nor was there any indication of a full German withdrawal from the pocket and there was certainly no evidence that nineteen German divisions were “stampeding” eastwards. Instead, the actual indications were of a deliberate, phased withdrawal from the Mortain salient and a possible attack on the left of the XV Corps to stabilize the German southern flank. The actual ULTRA messages revealing the intention to withdraw the elements of 7. Armee and 5. Panzerarmee threatened with encirclement were not decrypted until 14 August and were not completely disseminated to the Allied high command until the early morning hours of 15 August.

Edited October 26, 2024 by RichTO90

[RETAC21]

1 hour ago, RichTO90 said:

Indecisiveness and timidity I think tend to go hand in hand. I would not call Bradley timid though, at least not by the end of the war.

An indecisive commander would tend to continue doing what was planned or was being executed despite a lack of success (sounds like Bradley), a timid commander would avoid risks and follow the "safe" (ie doctrinal or orders from above) course.

[Tim the Tank Nut]

thank you for the additions, it is much appreciated.

 

I feel like that from Heurtgen to Ardennes it is difficult to decide who bears more responsibility between Hodges and Bradley but the simple fact is that Bradley was in charge and DID have access to information that First Army didn't have (or certainly didn't have as quickly).  The Huertgen battles were American generalship at their worst given the nearly limitless maneuverability of US forces there's almost nothing the US Army couldn't go around.

We spend a lot of time bashing the relief effort of Arnhem.  Some say that if Patton had been in charge rather than Horrocks that the Airborne would've been relieved.  If Bradley had been in charge the Germans would still have been in Arnhem in 1949.

Some years ago I got to go to Falaise (in a tank).  What I saw was pretty good ground for an encirclement.  If Patton's forces could've been overrun it would have been expensive for the Germans to do so and while we couldn't be sure that they didn't have the strength to do it Patton had a pretty good idea that he could hold.  Of course, the trend now is to blame the British and Canadians but that's crap.  Patton's forces had the ability and the right ground to do it but even then they could've swept wider on the fly.  US forces could advance faster than German forces could withdraw.

 

If you want one harsh thing to focus on with Omar Bradley a good place to look is Eisenhower's loss of confidence in the Ardennes.  Putting US forces under Montgomery's command was downplayed at the time but even Eisenhower realized that Bradley and First Army had Germans inside the perimeter and more importantly inside their decision loop.  It's fashionable today to bash the French response to the German movement through the Ardennes but certain parts of our command didn't do any better when it happened again.

US Army had some great General officers, Bradley just wasn't one of them.  Sort of an ETO version of Buckner?

[Stuart Galbraith]

I don't think it was Horrocks that screwed up, I think he has been a scapegoat when Sosabowski didn't pass scrutiny. Patton would have done no better, just as he didn't do better than them in Northern France.

[Tim the Tank Nut]

Patton may not have done better but Bradley in Horrocks' role would've done worse.

Patton's legitimate claim to fame is his performance in and around the Ardennes when Third Army was clearly far ahead of SHAEF and First Army on the preparedness meter.  Bradley's claim to fame is Cobra and the truth is that Cobra wasn't the masterpiece accomplishment of Generalship that is is made out to be.

Montgomery is known for the 8th Army in the desert but the reality is that excepting Caen and Market Garden Montgomery did very well in NE Europe.  I don't think anybody was taking Caen on day one, not even George.  I can't compete in the Arnhem thread but the failures weren't all on General Montgomery.

Just FYI, if you are looking for some kick ass commanders look at Juin and LeClerc.  LeClerc in particular had flair and elan in spades.

[RichTO90]

4 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

An indecisive commander would tend to continue doing what was planned or was being executed despite a lack of success (sounds like Bradley), a timid commander would avoid risks and follow the "safe" (ie doctrinal or orders from above) course.

Bradley was both indecisive and timid. The whole business at Argentan was because on 8 August he refused Patton's bold suggestion to send Third Army with three corps abreast into the Orleans gap, seize crossings on the Seine and secure the east bank of the river to Le Havre, entirely cutting off 7. Armee and 5. Panzerarmee. Patton was looking to annihilate the German armies west of the Seine, but Bradley refused and opted for the "safer" short envelopment to Argentan, then lost his nerve because of the gap between the VII and XV Corps - even though Patton was preparing to insert the XX Corps into it and bring up the XII Corps on the deep right.

It would have allowed the XV Corps to continue the attack on 13 August with four divisions (2d French Armd, 5th Armd, 79th INf, and 90th Inf) on either side of Argentan. Even though remnants of 1. SS, 2. SS, and 2. Panzer were arriving to reinforce the remnants of 9. and 116. Panzer there, I seriously doubt the Germans could have held, especially with the Canadians hammering on Trun in their rear. The end result would have been twenty to twenty-four German divisions annihilated, including most of the Panzer divisions. The resulting vacuum in opposition would mean an even faster pursuit, less resistance would mean less gas consumed, and so on.

Except for Bradley's indecisiveness and timidity. Instead, he halted XV Corps for a day on 13 August at Argentan with orders not to push on towards Falaise and then divided his forces to send half of the XV Corps east, leaving only two divisions to hold the gap that he later claimed so worried him. His excuses simply don't hold up under scrutiny.

[RichTO90]

3 hours ago, Tim the Tank Nut said:

Patton may not have done better but Bradley in Horrocks' role would've done worse.

Patton's legitimate claim to fame is his performance in and around the Ardennes when Third Army was clearly far ahead of SHAEF and First Army on the preparedness meter.  Bradley's claim to fame is Cobra and the truth is that Cobra wasn't the masterpiece accomplishment of Generalship that is is made out to be.

Montgomery is known for the 8th Army in the desert but the reality is that excepting Caen and Market Garden Montgomery did very well in NE Europe.  I don't think anybody was taking Caen on day one, not even George.  I can't compete in the Arnhem thread but the failures weren't all on General Montgomery.

Just FYI, if you are looking for some kick ass commanders look at Juin and LeClerc.  LeClerc in particular had flair and elan in spades.

I tend to agree with Blumenson that the allied high command was the perfect mix for failure, partly because of Eisenhower's hands off, consensus style of command. If the two Army Group commanders had been Montgomery and Patton, as it logically should have been, then it would have been Patton driving on Hodges and Bradley without letup, similar to the way he rode his corps commanders during the breakout. Both Patton and Montgomery were looking at a deep envelopment on 8 August and quite possibly would have accomplished it.

One of the problems with what happened on 13-14 August with XV Corps is that Leclerc was uninterested in attacking through Argentan to Falaise. He had his sights on Paris.

Edited October 26, 2024 by RichTO90

[RichTO90]

4 hours ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

I don't think it was Horrocks that screwed up, I think he has been a scapegoat when Sosabowski didn't pass scrutiny. Patton would have done no better, just as he didn't do better than them in Northern France.

The real screwups were Browning and Urquhart, both of whom were far out of their depth.

[Tim the Tank Nut]

I was thinking that LeClerc was a wide encirclement guy.  I knew he wanted to go on to Paris but I didn't realize he'd let the Germans go to do it.  Did he really have the chance to help close the door on the retreating German forces?  He was under the same constraints Patton was after all...

 

If it had been Motgomery and Patton they would have complemented each other in the advance.  Despite the "rivalry" the two men respected one another.  I am pretty sure that Patton was the only General officer from the US Army to attend Montgomery's desert training course in North Africa.

 

by the way, this has been the most fun I have had on TankNet in a long time.  I hope Roman is reading all this.  Good old Gen. Mil. stuff here.  It's great!!

[RichTO90]

3 hours ago, Tim the Tank Nut said:

I was thinking that LeClerc was a wide encirclement guy.  I knew he wanted to go on to Paris but I didn't realize he'd let the Germans go to do it.  Did he really have the chance to help close the door on the retreating German forces?  He was under the same constraints Patton was after all...

 

If it had been Motgomery and Patton they would have complemented each other in the advance.  Despite the "rivalry" the two men respected one another.  I am pretty sure that Patton was the only General officer from the US Army to attend Montgomery's desert training course in North Africa.

 

by the way, this has been the most fun I have had on TankNet in a long time.  I hope Roman is reading all this.  Good old Gen. Mil. stuff here.  It's great!!

Leclerc's division, 2eme DB, was assigned to the Third Army and XV Corps, part of the reasoning being that both Patton and Haisliip spoke fluent French, even if Patton's grammar was poor. Leclerc wanted to liberate French territory and kill Germans...probably in that order. Liberating Paris was a huge political hard on for Leclerc and DeGaulle.

 

When Patton split the XV Corps on 14 August, he sent the two eastern divisions off to the east...the US 5th Armored and 79th Infantry Division. Because they were on the corps left it was convenient to leave the 2eme DB and 90th US Infantry Division at Argentan...convenient for everyone except Leclerc, who began demanding he be sent east as well.

I suspect it was one of the reasons why Patton was later happy to send XV Corps with the 2eme DB and 79th Infantry Division to join the 6th Army Group.

Yes, this is a lot more fun and interesting than the constant mental masturbation going on in Military Current Events....oooo, oooo, oooo, Ukraine winning, Russians winning, sploooooog! It's about as interesting and as stimulating as any other form of pornography.

[futon]

No books have been written about the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. So its not quite academically possible to have well written literature sources that's been not just read but thoroughly studied. That's because its on going where stakes are to be determined by its eventual result. Downplaying it just because it isn't gentlemen's style enjoyment isn't how to handle it. It just is how it is, ugly or not. China military buildup and activities around Taiwan and SCS must be a bore as well? MSM alone of official talking heads alone certainly won't cut it. Current Mil threads are very peaceful and enjoyable if compared to actually being on the ground and directly engaging in that war I wager, for most of us at least. 

Edited October 27, 2024 by futon

[RichTO90]

40 minutes ago, futon said:

No books have been written about the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. So its not quite academically possible to have well written literature sources that's been not just read but thoroughly studied. That's because its on going where stakes are to be determined by its eventual result. Downplaying it just because it isn't gentlemen's style enjoyment isn't how to handle it. It just is how it is, ugly or not. China military buildup and activities around Taiwan and SCS must be a bore as well? MSM alone of official talking heads alone certainly won't cut it. Current Mil threads are very peaceful and enjoyable if compared to actually being on the ground and directly engaging in that war I wager, for most of us at least. 

Nothing like utterly and completely missing the point.

[Roman Alymov]

1 hour ago, futon said:

No books have been written about the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.

There is a plenty of memoirs published in Russia, covering all 10+ yeas of war from 2014 to recent events. Even fighting in Bakhmut is well covered (and it is relatively recent). Some of them are even available for reading online Читать онлайн «Штурм Бахмута. Позывной «Констебль»», Александр «Писатель» Савицкий – ЛитРес

[futon]

1 hour ago, RichTO90 said:

Nothing like completely and completely missing the point.

Bluffing.

[futon]

27 minutes ago, Roman Alymov said:

There are plenty of memoirs published in Russia, covering all 10+ years of the war from 2014 to recent events. Even the fighting in Bakhmut is well covered (and it is relatively recent). Some of them are even available for reading online  Читать онлайн «Штурм Бахмута. Позиван «Сонец»», Александр «Писатель» Савитский – Литрес

Well, at least since Feb 2022. And books as in comprehensive works that sources from various materials that are also since 2022. Some works about some parts can be expected to be complete but only types that have a specific scope.

[Stuart Galbraith]

9 hours ago, RichTO90 said:

The real screwups were Browning and Urquhart, both of whom were far out of their depth.

I wouldnt entirely rule out Gavin as being partially responsible also. Recent authors are pointing to Nijmegen bridge as the last place where it all finally apart, and that was on his watch after all. But yes, there should be a special place in hell for Browning. His insistence on assaulting with his HQ was a ridiculous waste of gliders that could have been better employed in Arnhem or perhaps even Nijmegen.

As for Urquhart, there was a podcast by Al Murray, a British comedian and an amateur historian I thought was amusing. He related talking to one of the veterans of 6th Airborne Division. He asked him why it was that 6th Airborne were able to fulfill virtually all their taskings and why 1st Airborne Div could not? His words were 'Well, 1st Airborne Innit?'

You can put that down to simple rivalry, or he really had a point. The upper leadership (im not talking of the battalion commanders here) of 1st Airborne Division simply wasnt as good as the  other Allied airborne units, and Urquhart has to be the prime reason for that.

[Stuart Galbraith]

Can we leave the Ukraine stuff for another thread please? Yes, I disagree with Rich about the validity of debating it, but at the same time its got 3 different threads, and we havent discussed world war 2 worth a damn in months. We really dont need to do it here.

[futon]

3 minutes ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

Can we leave the Ukraine stuff for another thread please? Yes, I disagree with Rich about the validity of debating it, but at the same time its got 3 different threads, and we havent discussed world war 2 worth a damn in months. We really dont need to do it here.

Ah, more of those Rich vs Glenn ones.