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Posted

There are numerous books and documentaries on why Operation Market Garden failed.

Most often cited as Number 1 reason for the failure is the single highway British XXX Corps was forced to advance on due to The Netherlands road grid.

Is there somewhere else on the Allied front line in September 1944 that those same Allied Airborne units could have been deployed to help try and punch a hole through German lines to the Rhine and hopefully gain a bridgehead into Germany?

 

 

Posted

Not that im aware. There were several plans to use those airborne units to help the advance, right since the breakout from Normandy, but the allied armies were moving too fast for them to ever get into play. I think Arnhem was the first chance the Germans had to go firm, and the allies had a chance to plan an airborne operation. I suppose operation varsity is another example. But the battlefield had to change for that one to be viable. I dont believe the opportunity even existed in 1944, at least not till Veritable happened. Im speaking beyond my knowledge here, but no, Ive not read there were any alternatives in September 44, it was Arnhem or wait till another opportunity opened up.

As for reasons, the latest causes, which have caused 2 books to be written are,

1 There was a spy, probably 2 spies, telling the Nazi's all about it. One of them was a French resistance member who had been blackmailed by the Germans into compromising allied plans, and went on doing it after the advance into Holland. I forget his name. One other example offered up, and Ive no idea how plausible this is, is Anthony Blunt. The narrative goes that the Soviets encouraged him to make contact with Nazi's and feed them operation on Market Garden. The reason? If the allies got stalled on the West bank of the Rhine,  the Soviets had first shot at taking Berlin. Ive not read the book, but the author made a passionate case on a podcast, and there is just enough evidence to suggest that yes, it might have been possible.

2 The Americans were late taking Nijmegen Bridge, which threw the rest of the timetable in the crapper. Which again, ive not read it, but has become increasingly popular among the pro 30 corp crowd. Well, at least they moved on from blaming the Poles I guess..

 

Posted

Montgomery was criticised for that. But to me, it seems his thinking was probably to throw everything to getting across the Rhine, before the Germans formed an inpenetrable defence line. I still dont think his thinking was wrong, even if we can see in retrospect it was flawed, because the Germans were recovering faster than he thought.

Posted
3 hours ago, Markus Becker said:

The better move would have been to clear the approaches to Antwerp to fix the supply situation. 

No idea if or how the paras could have helped with that. 

In hind site, since Market Garden failed, it would have been better to concentrate on clearing the approaches to Antwerp.

The Airborne units could have been used as standard infantry to help clear Scheldt River. This would probably be a poor use of a specialized asset. Better to save them for an operation more suited to them.

Posted

I think Antwerp was two far forward to convincingly use as a port. Lets not forget, the Luftwaffe did turn up a few times during the arnhem airlift, and that was well escorted. The Luftwaffe wasnt truly broken till Bodenplate, so even if we had cleared the harbour, it would have been taking daily attacks in an attempt to disrupt it. Certainly we wouldnt have been able to bring in anything like the supplies for a quick drive into Germany.

Besides, there is no guarantee we could have got it intact. We never got any of the Channel ports in good order.

Posted
2 hours ago, 17thfabn said:

Better to save them for an operation more suited to them.

Problem is, some flag rank officer or another in the command structure of the airborne forces developed a use them or lose them mentality, and there were too many operations cancelled because the land forces arrived too early to the airborne forces objective, I think.

Posted

I wonder if the 82nd and 101st Airborne were not already on the continent due to a cancelled Market Garden. And the Battle of the Bulge occurs. Would they plus possibly available British, Canadian & Polish Airborne units be used to plug holes in the line? 

With the weather being bad it would take some time to commit these units if they were still in England.

On the other hand it is unlikely that high command would have left these units idle for another three months.

Posted

I can't blame Monty. As an army commander he proposed an idea for what he thought was the best use if the limited allied resources.

Ike should have rejected it. Because if logistical problems limit you to an offensive in just one sector, you should fix your logistics and then resume the offensive everywhere.

Another problem with M-G. If it had worked, the British would have been an hour's drive away from the heart of the Ruhrgebiet but would they have had the supplies to actually go there? In the face of Germany throwing everything at them. Helped by the relative inactivity elsewhere on the front.

Posted
4 hours ago, Markus Becker said:

I can't blame Monty. As an army commander he proposed an idea for what he thought was the best use if the limited allied resources.

Another problem with M-G. If it had worked, the British would have been an hour's drive away from the heart of the Ruhrgebiet but would they have had the supplies to actually go there? In the face of Germany throwing everything at them. Helped by the relative inactivity elsewhere on the front.

Who had the power to scratch the op? From what I remember they were getting intelligence that there were two under strength German Panzer divisions in the area.

Obviously Eisenhower had the power to cancel it. Would Montgomery being closer to the planning and intelligence reports have had the authority to stop the operation?

Good point on if there had been a break through into Germany. If the operation had succeed in gaining a foot hold in Germany, the Germans would have scrapped together every formation they could to try and seal the breech. 

Posted
18 hours ago, Markus Becker said:

The better move would have been to clear the approaches to Antwerp to fix the supply situation.

The problem with that is it required the ability to walk on water. Seriously, Walcheren could not be captured until the Breskens pocket was eliminated. And then, to complete the operation required amphibious assets that were still either in the Med after DRAGOON or were recovering from NEPTUNE and DRAGOON in Britain. They simply were not available when MARKET-GARDEN was contemplated.

Quote

No idea if or how the paras could have helped with that.

Doubtful. Walcheren made the risks of jumping into the Cotentin look trivial. Jumping without an amphibious followup was suicidal.

Possibly a better use would have been to lay the airborne carpet between Antwerp and Bergen-op-Zoom, cutting the neck of the Walcheren peninsula.

Posted
6 hours ago, 17thfabn said:

Who had the power to scratch the op? From what I remember they were getting intelligence that there were two under strength German Panzer divisions in the area.

Obviously Eisenhower had the power to cancel it. Would Montgomery being closer to the planning and intelligence reports have had the authority to stop the operation?

Good point on if there had been a break through into Germany. If the operation had succeed in gaining a foot hold in Germany, the Germans would have scrapped together every formation they could to try and seal the breech. 

Eisenhower could have, but he was generally a hands of commander and likely would not have. In any case the intelligence was not firm...and it wasn't German Panzer divisions that defeated MARKET-GARDEN. That defeat was decided by the action - and inaction - of Eisenhower, Montgomery, and Bradley during the third week of August 1944.

 

Posted
On 10/10/2024 at 9:12 AM, Stuart Galbraith said:

Not that im aware. There were several plans to use those airborne units to help the advance, right since the breakout from Normandy, but the allied armies were moving too fast for them to ever get into play. I think Arnhem was the first chance the Germans had to go firm, and the allies had a chance to plan an airborne operation. I suppose operation varsity is another example. But the battlefield had to change for that one to be viable. I dont believe the opportunity even existed in 1944, at least not till Veritable happened. Im speaking beyond my knowledge here, but no, Ive not read there were any alternatives in September 44, it was Arnhem or wait till another opportunity opened up.

As for reasons, the latest causes, which have caused 2 books to be written are,

1 There was a spy, probably 2 spies, telling the Nazi's all about it. One of them was a French resistance member who had been blackmailed by the Germans into compromising allied plans, and went on doing it after the advance into Holland. I forget his name. One other example offered up, and Ive no idea how plausible this is, is Anthony Blunt. The narrative goes that the Soviets encouraged him to make contact with Nazi's and feed them operation on Market Garden. The reason? If the allies got stalled on the West bank of the Rhine,  the Soviets had first shot at taking Berlin. Ive not read the book, but the author made a passionate case on a podcast, and there is just enough evidence to suggest that yes, it might have been possible.

2 The Americans were late taking Nijmegen Bridge, which threw the rest of the timetable in the crapper. Which again, ive not read it, but has become increasingly popular among the pro 30 corp crowd. Well, at least they moved on from blaming the Poles I guess..

 

Blunt couldn't be, he was in MI5 and what he betrayed to the Soviets was mostly Ultra intelligence, so he wouldn't know of Market Garden. The other guy was Dutch: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christiaan_Lindemans and sounds more plausible.

Posted (edited)
2 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

Blunt couldn't be, he was in MI5 and what he betrayed to the Soviets was mostly Ultra intelligence, so he wouldn't know of Market Garden. The other guy was Dutch: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christiaan_Lindemans and sounds more plausible.

Ive not read it, so I cant comment on the authors sources. But bear in mind Blunt WAS one of the Cambridge set, and they clearly were happy to converse with each other about everything they learned. Also, in those days, there was something of a revolving door between 5 and 6. I remember when Paul Volkov was betrayed by Kim Philby, Sir Roger Hollis, later director of MI5, was one of those placed in the frame for it, and later was himself held to be a Soviet spy. Logically working for the Security service, he should have had no access to what you would be an intelligence service job. But somehow he did.

The most convincing case I heard on the podcast is that Agent Josephine, the agent that passed on details to the Nazi's is still unknown. Unless we accept there was a Nazi spy at the heart of whitehall passing on secrets (and how curious it was he didnt pass on DDay), then we have to assume it was some kind of operation on behalf of the Soviets. And there are 5 obvious candidates of whom that was. And how curious it was the Security service shut down any attempts by the Americans to reopen the investigation, something they also did later with the Cambridge set.

Curiously Blunt tried to quite working for the Soviets right after Arnhem. Which is a very curious coincidence. Its certainly not a slam dunk, but it does have a convincing internal logic to it.

Edited by Stuart Galbraith
Posted
7 hours ago, RichTO90 said:

The problem with that is it required the ability to walk on water. Seriously, Walcheren could not be captured until the Breskens pocket was eliminated. And then, to complete the operation required amphibious assets that were still either in the Med after DRAGOON or were recovering from NEPTUNE and DRAGOON in Britain. They simply were not available when MARKET-GARDEN was contemplated.

....snip....

Possibly a better use would have been to lay the airborne carpet between Antwerp and Bergen-op-Zoom, cutting the neck of the Walcheren peninsula.

How big would the amphibious part have been compared to Neptune? That involved the landing of two entire corps, reinforcements and resupply.

Help like that!

 

I'm beginning to see a method in M-G: You think you have a clear path to the Rhine now, so you try to rush towards and over. Dig in, take care of logistics and exploit the foothold at a later date. Ok, at that time the Germans will have reinforced a lot but you are at least on the other side of the Rhine, instead of having to fight your way through the Netherlands and than force a crossing.

Posted

I think that was the thinking. And besides, even if the British didnt exploit the crossing, the Germans have to deploy their resources against the units that crossed, which means much fewer if the Americans try to cross the Rhine elsewhere. A crossing of the Rhine simply couldnt be ignored by the Germans.

Posted
3 hours ago, Markus Becker said:

How big would the amphibious part have been compared to Neptune? That involved the landing of two entire corps, reinforcements and resupply.

Help like that!

INFATUATE I and II each were a reinforced brigade or so in strength, so the two were equivalent to about 1/4 of the NEPTUNE assault force, but without the extensive follow-on. The critical element was the Support Squadron, the inshore firepower for the assault troops. Much had been sent to the Med after NEPTUNE and it took a while to work up a new squadron for INFATUATE. The other problem was the LCA - those flotillas assigned to various LSI had been dispersed with the ships, again, some to the Med and some to the Indian Ocean and SW Pacific for proposed operations there. IIRC, a separate LCA squadron had to be stood up specifically for the assault on Flushing (INFATUATE I).

  • 3 weeks later...
Posted (edited)
On 10/10/2024 at 6:37 PM, 17thfabn said:

Good point on if there had been a break through into Germany. If the operation had succeed in gaining a foot hold in Germany, the Germans would have scrapped together every formation they could to try and seal the breech. 

Would that not have been just another re-hash of the events leading up to Cobra? The Germans pushed 2 out of 3 units into the area around Caen to keep a breakout from happening there (Bluecoat etc) Cobra just ended up using Caen as the pivot with the US units swinging around after they made a hole. So likewise, that means that with a greater British success in the Dutch/German border area other areas would be weaker and Patton would find less resistance. 

Edited by rmgill
  • 2 weeks later...
Posted

Or it might have worked as intended this time. Even if not it would have acted as a magnet for the Germans at the expense of other areas. Win - smaller win! 

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