W.W.2 No Germans to North Africa...

[Sardaukar]

One of my favourite "what-ifs" is that Italians discover oil in Libya and Germans discover means to pump it. That'd be total opposite to topic of this discussion. That would be loads of Germans in Libya then. 😎

"The discovery of oil. With the discovery of significant oil reserves in 1959, Libya changed abruptly from being dependent on international aid and the rent from U.S. and British air bases to being an oil-rich monarchy."

[RichTO90]

6 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

I completely agree, but they would still need to be dislodged from Tripoli, delaying the wrapping up of the NA campaign, or the Italians could eventually grow more adventurous and indeed venture into the desert after additional reinforcement. 

I'm just not sure what additional reinforcement they could commit at the time? Ariete and Trento were about it as I recall, given that the rest of the Italian army was either being beaten up in Greece and barely hanging onto Albania or was being annihilated in Italian East Africa. It took quite a while for them to scrape together the reinforcements and reorganize to the AS42 organization, so the major reinforcement was the partial motorization of Bologna and Sabratha late in 1942, but they were not ready for field operations until the spring 1942 offensive. Basically, without the Germans the Italians do not have much to replace the losses they already suffered.

They can establish lines blocking the coast roads, but the British were already adept at outflanking those, so I don't see where and how the Italians can keep from being dislodged. It really comes down to how the British manage their logistics and what happens in the rest of the Med. If the Germans do not bailout the Italians in NA, why do they bail them out in Greece? Does MERKUR take place? If Hitler completely disregards a Med strategy, then the British have free rein to do as they wish, pretty much at the pace they wish.

[RichTO90]

6 hours ago, Sardaukar said:

One of my favourite "what-ifs" is that Italians discover oil in Libya and Germans discover means to pump it. That'd be total opposite to topic of this discussion. That would be loads of Germans in Libya then. 😎

"The discovery of oil. With the discovery of significant oil reserves in 1959, Libya changed abruptly from being dependent on international aid and the rent from U.S. and British air bases to being an oil-rich monarchy."

It would have to have been prewar. Exploration began in 1954, but the first proven fields were in 1959 and the first exports in 1961. So the Italians would have to start serious exploration in 1934 to have any realistic output by 1941...except the inducement for exploration in Libya was the discovery of oil in Algeria, so the French also need to start exploration there around 1932.

[RETAC21]

52 minutes ago, RichTO90 said:

I'm just not sure what additional reinforcement they could commit at the time? Ariete and Trento were about it as I recall, given that the rest of the Italian army was either being beaten up in Greece and barely hanging onto Albania or was being annihilated in Italian East Africa. It took quite a while for them to scrape together the reinforcements and reorganize to the AS42 organization, so the major reinforcement was the partial motorization of Bologna and Sabratha late in 1942, but they were not ready for field operations until the spring 1942 offensive. Basically, without the Germans the Italians do not have much to replace the losses they already suffered.

They can establish lines blocking the coast roads, but the British were already adept at outflanking those, so I don't see where and how the Italians can keep from being dislodged. It really comes down to how the British manage their logistics and what happens in the rest of the Med. If the Germans do not bailout the Italians in NA, why do they bail them out in Greece? Does MERKUR take place? If Hitler completely disregards a Med strategy, then the British have free rein to do as they wish, pretty much at the pace they wish.

" At the end of February the Italian army in Libya was 105,000 strong (total 113,000 plus 16,000 Libyans), 24,000 of whom fought mostly with the newly arrived 132a Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’ and Divisione di Fanteria ‘Brescia’, both
only partly combat effective. Both would take part in Rommel’s drive to Cyrenaica that led to the encirclement of Tobruk and to reaching the Libyan–Egyptian border, also taking part in the first, unsuccessful attempts to seize the Australian-held fortress along with the 102a Divisione Fanteria Motorizzata ‘Trento’, newly arrived in mid-April. Because of the stalemate, other Italian units were brought forward and, in June, the deployment was as follows: the ‘Savona’ west of El Agheila, X Corpo and ‘Bologna’ division at Barce, the ‘Pavia’ at Derna, the ‘Ariete’, ‘Brescia’, ‘Pavia’ and ‘Trento’ divisions encircling Tobruk. By the end of June 1941 another 47,000 men had been sent to Libya along with 1,500 machine guns, 90 mortars, 375 anti-tank guns, 493 other guns, 5,000 lorries and 387 AFVs. By mid-June total Italian strength in Libya was 136,500; armament included 7,000 light and heavy machine guns, 780 mortars, 280 tanks (100 of which were medium), two armoured cars, 1,848 guns (including 436 anti-tank and 556 anti-aircraft guns) and 8,600 lorries, 3,330 of which were not in working order. However, only 61,500 men (45 per cent) were at the front; another 19,000 were garrisoned in Tripoli and the Sahara (14 per cent), and 20,000 others (14.5 per cent) were with the territorial army, the navy and air force. "

From "Italian solider in North Africa 1941-43" from the Oprey Warrior series.

The front stabilized were it did because the terrain to the South was unsuitable for flanking (salt marshes IIRC)

[Markus Becker]

3 hours ago, RichTO90 said:

I'm just not sure what additional reinforcement they could commit at the time? Ariete and Trento were about it as I recall, given that the rest of the Italian army was either being beaten up in Greece and barely hanging onto Albania or was being annihilated in Italian East Africa. It took quite a while for them to scrape together the reinforcements and reorganize to the AS42 organization, so the major reinforcement was the partial motorization of Bologna and Sabratha late in 1942, but they were not ready for field operations until the spring 1942 offensive. Basically, without the Germans the Italians do not have much to replace the losses they already suffered.

They can establish lines blocking the coast roads, but the British were already adept at outflanking those, so I don't see where and how the Italians can keep from being dislodged. It really comes down to how the British manage their logistics and what happens in the rest of the Med. If the Germans do not bailout the Italians in NA, why do they bail them out in Greece? Does MERKUR take place? If Hitler completely disregards a Med strategy, then the British have free rein to do as they wish, pretty much at the pace they wish.

 

And you need to get into Tripoli in the first place. The closer the British get, the more difficult that will become. 

IRL the British remained 650km away for just under two months but with a minimum force. Certainly ground and presumably air to as Greece was reinforced. 

By the end of March Rommel pushed them back and fast. That for example meant no more ferrying fighters to Malta from Bengazi. 

 

PS: After the Italian invasion, RAF units got stationed in mainland Greece and ground forces on some islands. Adolf saw this as just the beginning of a wider incursion on the Balkans and decided to get involved to protect the oil supply from Romaina. 

Edited February 3, 2024 by Markus Becker

[Markus Becker]

2 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

The front stabilized were it did because the terrain to the South was unsuitable for flanking (salt marshes IIRC)

And because the British government issued a halt order in the second week of February. The Cyrenaica was just to be defended and with as little forces as possible. 

[Markus Becker]

10 hours ago, Sardaukar said:

One of my favourite "what-ifs" is that Italians discover oil in Libya and Germans discover means to pump it. That'd be total opposite to topic of this discussion. That would be loads of Germans in Libya then. 😎

"The discovery of oil. With the discovery of significant oil reserves in 1959, Libya changed abruptly from being dependent on international aid and the rent from U.S. and British air bases to being an oil-rich monarchy."

No idea what Mussolini would have done if he had oil wells in Libya. 

But wouldn't it be the British or Americans pumping it? They had far more experience in that regard. 

I will say one thing though. I can't see London stopping Compass now just to support Greece. Not with so much oil at stake! 

[Markus Becker]

Anyone having a book about the wider Greco Italian war, the British intervention and the German invasion at hand? Like Beevor's Battle of Crete? 

I'm curious about the quantity to quality of the British equipment. The units had previously fought in Operation Compass and that had indeed worn out the armoured vehicles in particular. 

Did they patch them up on the way to Greece or did they get issued new ones that had arrived in Egypt after Compass began? 

Correction: Only the 6th AUS and 1st UK tank regiment did but not the 2nd NZ and a Polish infantry brigade. They went fresh from Egypt to Greece and could have gone to Libya. 

Edited February 3, 2024 by Markus Becker

[RichTO90]

4 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

" At the end of February the Italian army in Libya was 105,000 strong (total 113,000 plus 16,000 Libyans), 24,000 of whom fought mostly with the newly arrived 132a Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’ and Divisione di Fanteria ‘Brescia’, both
only partly combat effective. Both would take part in Rommel’s drive to Cyrenaica that led to the encirclement of Tobruk and to reaching the Libyan–Egyptian border, also taking part in the first, unsuccessful attempts to seize the Australian-held fortress along with the 102a Divisione Fanteria Motorizzata ‘Trento’, newly arrived in mid-April. 

Well, yes, it was the Italian 5th Army, minus the XXIII Corps and the 1st and 2nd Blackshort Divisions, which were attached to the 10th Army and destroyed with it, plus Ariete and Trento, which arrived in March as the only viable strategic reserve the Italians had. I'm not sure I said anything different?

However, the more accurate statement would be that only Ariete and Trento were partly combat effective.

Of the 5th Army divisions, Brescia lost its artillery and other elements in the disaster at Ajdabiya in February, which had been replaced by the III Group (mot), 1st Fast Artillery Regiment "Eugenio di Savoia". Pavia also had its artillery regiment and other elements destroyed and replaced by the III Group (mot), 3d Fast Artillery Regiment "Principe Amedeo Duca d'Aosta". Bologna also had its original artillery regiment and other elements destroyed and replaced with a newly organized one. Sabratha and Sirte were  nearly destroyed at Beda Fomm.

That left Savona as the only other intact division in 5th Army.

Quote

The front stabilized were it did because the terrain to the South was unsuitable for flanking (salt marshes IIRC)

The front stabilized temporarily because of terrain, but also because the British forces were at the end of a long pursuit and needed a logistical pause to reset. It is unlikely it would have stood up to a further British attack, once 4th Indian Division was back from Ethiopia, the I Tank regiments had a chance to do recovery and maintenance, 9th Australian Division was in place, and especially if 7th Armored and 6th and 7th Australian Division were not diverted to Greece and Crete.

The real question is whether or not the Germans totally eschew a Mediterranean strategy or just refuse to send forces to aid the Italians in North Africa? So if not there, why in Greece? If the Germans do not attack Greece and take Crete then there is unlikely to be much inducement for an attack on Vichy Syria and Lebanon from Palestine, which leaves the British 1st Cavalry and 6th Infantry Division as well as the 2nd New Zealand and 1st FF Division, free for other operations too.

Edited February 3, 2024 by RichTO90

[RichTO90]

1 hour ago, Markus Becker said:

Anyone having a book about the wider Greco Italian war, the British intervention and the German invasion at hand? Like Beevor's Battle of Crete? 

I'm curious about the quantity to quality of the British equipment. The units had previously fought in Operation Compass and that had indeed worn out the armoured vehicles in particular. 

Did they patch them up on the way to Greece or did they get issued new ones that had arrived in Egypt after Compass began? 

Correction: Only the 6th AUS and 1st UK tank regiment did but not the 2nd NZ and a Polish infantry brigade. They went fresh from Egypt to Greece and could have gone to Libya. 

The British tank unit in Greece was 1st Armoured Brigade of the 2d Armoured Division, although just two regiments, 3rd RTR (6 A10CS and 46 A10) and 4th Queen's Own Hussars (36? Light Tank Mk VI). Another 10 Light Tanks Mk VI of C Squadron, 3d Hussars were in Crete and lost there as were nine Matilda I Tanks MK II of 7th RTR.

[Perun]

Italian Medium Tanks in North Africa – 1940 to 1942

Background

The list below is based on a post by User nmao on the Axis History Forum at this link.

I am sure (as is he) that it is not fully correct, but it gives a good overview of Italian medium tank deliveries to North Africa nevertheless, and by posting it I am hoping somebody maybe able to help me. The original list seemed to be from the Official History, but with a bit of research it is possible to discover a number of errors in it. Those errors I have identified by checking the unit histories on the Italian Association of Tankers I have corrected, but I am sure they are not all.

Health Warning

Please note the table below is provided ‘as is’, and not a definitive accounting exercise. For example, a delivery of 24 M13/40 tanks in November 1941 is missing on the AHF list (I have added it here), and some battalions, such as 9/132 seem to be far too strong, while 7 and 8/132 also seem overly strong.

What is known is that Ariete as a whole fielded 138 M13/40 on 17 November 1941, but I am missing the RECAM here which also operated medium tanks. So still many open questions.

Italian Medium Tank M13/40 Column in Libya, Date unknown (from Wikipedia)

Regimental associations In terms of regiments, a quick overview is provided below. By mid 1941 4 Regiment had become the training centre in Italy, and any new crews would be affiliated to it before being posted to their destination unit in North Africa. COMPASS

4 Regiment Babini Armoured Brigade

32 Regiment Babini Armoured Brigade

All medium tanks delivered were lost. By early February 1941, 209 light tanks remained operational in North Africa. Prior to CRUSADER many light tanks had been allocated as support to the infantry divisions, while Ariete also held a substantial number. All light tanks were lost in CRUSADER and were not replaced.

CRUSADER

132 Regiment Ariete (Mediums)

32 Regiment Ariete (Carri d’Assalto light tanks)

Gazala

132 Regiment Ariete (Mediums)

133 Regiment (Mediums – initially used to rebuild 132 and give Trieste a tank battalion)

El Alamein

132 Regiment Ariete (Mediums)

133 Regiment Littorio (Mediums) This regiment was used for loss replacement of Ariete in late Dec 1941/January 1942.

Tunisia

135 Regiment Centauro (Mediums) This regiment is not included and I have no numbers for it.

You can download the PDF file here for better readability. Italian Tank Arrivals

https://rommelsriposte.com/2013/08/11/italian-medium-tanks-in-north-africa-1940-to-1942/

[RETAC21]

11 hours ago, RichTO90 said:

Well, yes, it was the Italian 5th Army, minus the XXIII Corps and the 1st and 2nd Blackshort Divisions, which were attached to the 10th Army and destroyed with it, plus Ariete and Trento, which arrived in March as the only viable strategic reserve the Italians had. I'm not sure I said anything different?

However, the more accurate statement would be that only Ariete and Trento were partly combat effective.

Of the 5th Army divisions, Brescia lost its artillery and other elements in the disaster at Ajdabiya in February, which had been replaced by the III Group (mot), 1st Fast Artillery Regiment "Eugenio di Savoia". Pavia also had its artillery regiment and other elements destroyed and replaced by the III Group (mot), 3d Fast Artillery Regiment "Principe Amedeo Duca d'Aosta". Bologna also had its original artillery regiment and other elements destroyed and replaced with a newly organized one. Sabratha and Sirte were  nearly destroyed at Beda Fomm.

That left Savona as the only other intact division in 5th Army.

The front stabilized temporarily because of terrain, but also because the British forces were at the end of a long pursuit and needed a logistical pause to reset. It is unlikely it would have stood up to a further British attack, once 4th Indian Division was back from Ethiopia, the I Tank regiments had a chance to do recovery and maintenance, 9th Australian Division was in place, and especially if 7th Armored and 6th and 7th Australian Division were not diverted to Greece and Crete.

The real question is whether or not the Germans totally eschew a Mediterranean strategy or just refuse to send forces to aid the Italians in North Africa? So if not there, why in Greece? If the Germans do not attack Greece and take Crete then there is unlikely to be much inducement for an attack on Vichy Syria and Lebanon from Palestine, which leaves the British 1st Cavalry and 6th Infantry Division as well as the 2nd New Zealand and 1st FF Division, free for other operations too.

Maybe we are arguing the same point.

Thing is, Tripoli was defended, and it will take some time to take it at the end of a very long logistical line with limited forces so the campaign will last in 1942 IMO. I don't think the Italians, on their own, can build a force to push back the British to Egypt - mainly because their command wouldn't believe them capable, but at the same time, they weren't going to fold when they had a secure logistic base in Tripoli.

The question of the Balkans is also quite pertinent, either Hitler goes all out against the Soviet Union and risks an open flank in the Balkans (with British troops landing on 31st March in Greece and the Yugoslavia coup on 27th March) or he does something about it.

Doing nothing and letting the Italians be defeated at best meant that Mussolini gets ousted and Italy surrenders or declares an Armistice, which neutralizes the Med and frees British forces for the West (mainly air and naval, with consequent impacts on the Battle of the Atlantic) as well as opening a more convenient route to Lend Lease to Russia through Turkey and the Black Sea. Not a good idea, overall.

 

[seahawk]

In the end the Axis would have to agree that Libya and North Africa can not be won and can not be held in the long run. So resources spent would be limited. The Balkans however are much more critical, as this opens another front against Germany and a direct threat towards Italy. I think this is something the Axis can not afford.

But this also leaves the question if Scilly would be the chosen target for a first Allied invasion or if Crete - with a planed advance into Greece - would not be a more logical choice.

[Perun]

If Italy lose Lybia that would make huge pressure on Mussolini so he might have try to invade Yugoslavia to ease pressure. But I doubt that Italian army could do much against Yugoslavia

[RETAC21]

2 hours ago, seahawk said:

In the end the Axis would have to agree that Libya and North Africa can not be won and can not be held in the long run. So resources spent would be limited. The Balkans however are much more critical, as this opens another front against Germany and a direct threat towards Italy. I think this is something the Axis can not afford.

But this also leaves the question if Scilly would be the chosen target for a first Allied invasion or if Crete - with a planed advance into Greece - would not be a more logical choice.

What Perun sez, that requires Mussolini to not be Mussolini, remember he's they guy that inspired Hitler in the 20s, for him war was an end into itself, and he jumped in the war gladly.

Losing the "empire" would be a huge thing and probably lead to his removal, which is what drove Hitler to send the Afrika Korps to Africa in the first instance, not to invade Egypt, but to keep the Italians in the war.

[RichTO90]

9 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

Maybe we are arguing the same point.

Thing is, Tripoli was defended, and it will take some time to take it at the end of a very long logistical line with limited forces so the campaign will last in 1942 IMO. I don't think the Italians, on their own, can build a force to push back the British to Egypt - mainly because their command wouldn't believe them capable, but at the same time, they weren't going to fold when they had a secure logistic base in Tripoli.

The question of the Balkans is also quite pertinent, either Hitler goes all out against the Soviet Union and risks an open flank in the Balkans (with British troops landing on 31st March in Greece and the Yugoslavia coup on 27th March) or he does something about it.

Doing nothing and letting the Italians be defeated at best meant that Mussolini gets ousted and Italy surrenders or declares an Armistice, which neutralizes the Med and frees British forces for the West (mainly air and naval, with consequent impacts on the Battle of the Atlantic) as well as opening a more convenient route to Lend Lease to Russia through Turkey and the Black Sea. Not a good idea, overall.

 

I think so and agree with your points. What I really intended to highlight is the lack of reality in the premise. If Hitler chooses not to support his ally Italy in North Africa, then why should he chose to support his ally Italy in Greece? If Hitler chooses to crush Yugoslavia by the commitment of massive Wehrmacht forces, why would he not follow the next logical step and assist Italy against Greece.

The notion can only work if there is some deus ex machina in place that prevents the Germans from operating in North Africa. The pause at Ajdabiya will occur no matter what and it likely will not matter if Sperrverband Rommel arrives in Tripoli, since events in the Balkans will divert British attention through mid 1941. At that point, from their forward outpost at Ajdabiya and with the historic reinforcements, I think it unlikely the Italians alone would be able to prevent a further British advance and the eventual fall of Tripoli. The Italians simply do not have enough mobile forces to contest the British and the strength of their infantry forces was compromised by COMPASS - nothing they could put in the field in late 1941 would stop another COMPASS-style attack and I suspect the end point would be the fall of Tripoli by the end of 1941.

[seahawk]

Although politically next to impossible, strategically the Axis could come to the conclusion that Libya is indeed indefensible in case of an Allied attack. Greece on the other hand would always be a dangerously weak flank for the German operation into Russia.

[Rick]

2 hours ago, seahawk said:

Although politically next to impossible, strategically the Axis could come to the conclusion that Libya is indeed indefensible in case of an Allied attack. Greece on the other hand would always be a dangerously weak flank for the German operation into Russia.

How so? Would not Romania and Bulgaria be in the way?

Another spin off scenario is Germany not only not in North Africa, but stays out of the Balkans also. All in for Russia or die trying. Which, imo, would occur anyway, maybe take the Red Army a little longer?

[Stuart Galbraith]

But the Germans were obsessed by the Balkans. It will be remembered that when Operation Mincemeat took place, the plan they gave to the Germans envisaged a landing in Greece, one they were all too receptive to.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Mincemeat

'Adolf Hitler was concerned about a Balkan invasion, as the area had been the source of raw materials for the German war industry, including copper, bauxite, chrome and oil. The Allies knew of Hitler's fears,^[22] and they launched Operation Barclay, a deception operation to play upon his concerns and to mislead the Germans into thinking the Balkans were the objective, diverting resources from Sicily.^[17][23] The deception reinforced German strategic thinking about the likely British target.^[24] To suggest the eastern Mediterranean was the target, the Allies set up a headquarters in Cairo, Egypt, for a fictional formation, the Twelfth Army, consisting of twelve divisions. Military manoeuvres were conducted in Syria, with numbers inflated by dummy tanks and armoured vehicles to deceive observers. Greek interpreters were recruited and the Allies stockpiled Greek maps and currency. False communications about troop movements were generated from the Twelfth Army headquarters, while the Allied command post in Tunis – which was to be the headquarters of the Sicily invasion – reduced radio traffic by using landlines wherever possible.^[25][26]'

^{Looked at another way, the Allies taking Greece means they are  within striking range of Romania, either via airpower or even a ground invasion. And at that point, the war is over for the Germans.}

Edited February 5, 2024 by Stuart Galbraith

[seahawk]

34 minutes ago, Rick said:

How so? Would not Romania and Bulgaria be in the way?

Another spin off scenario is Germany not only not in North Africa, but stays out of the Balkans also. All in for Russia or die trying. Which, imo, would occur anyway, maybe take the Red Army a little longer?

Romania alone is very valuable due to the oil.

[Markus Becker]

33 minutes ago, seahawk said:

Romania alone is very valuable due to the oil.

And Germany was also getting much copper and bauxite from the region. 

[RichTO90]

Indeed, I think Hitler considered the Balkans too important to ignore it. However, Even if the British suffer the reverses in Greece and Crete, by the end of July 1940, 82 new Cruiser and 84 Infantry tanks, along with the first 40 Light Tanks M3, have landed safely in Egypt. Allow a month to get them to British-held Benghazi and the Italian position at Ajadabiya has a short time to exist. From there, it is likely a repeat of COMPASS, so by the end of 1941, the British have secured North Africa.

That secures Malta's position as well, at least seven months early. I could see that leading to an attempt to carry out C3/HERKULES, which would likely be a disaster and could lead to an early, all-British invasion of Sicily by fall 1942, instead of TORCH, or even an attempt to retake Crete, which would be much more interesting.

[RETAC21]

1 hour ago, RichTO90 said:

Indeed, I think Hitler considered the Balkans too important to ignore it. However, Even if the British suffer the reverses in Greece and Crete, by the end of July 1940, 82 new Cruiser and 84 Infantry tanks, along with the first 40 Light Tanks M3, have landed safely in Egypt. Allow a month to get them to British-held Benghazi and the Italian position at Ajadabiya has a short time to exist. From there, it is likely a repeat of COMPASS, so by the end of 1941, the British have secured North Africa.

That secures Malta's position as well, at least seven months early. I could see that leading to an attempt to carry out C3/HERKULES, which would likely be a disaster and could lead to an early, all-British invasion of Sicily by fall 1942, instead of TORCH, or even an attempt to retake Crete, which would be much more interesting.

If North Africa is lost, Malta is rather irrelevant, Crete on the other hand will still attract the Führer for the same reasons it did historically.

[Markus Becker]

1 hour ago, RETAC21 said:

If North Africa is lost, Malta is rather irrelevant, Crete on the other hand will still attract the Führer for the same reasons it did historically.

There is still the Tunisia - Sicily narrows convoys would have to get through. A strong RAF/RN presence on Malta would help with that a lot. 

[RichTO90]

2 hours ago, Markus Becker said:

There is still the Tunisia - Sicily narrows convoys would have to get through. A strong RAF/RN presence on Malta would help with that a lot. 

And it supports operations directed at Sicily as well.