W.W.2 No Germans to North Africa...

[RichTO90]

Some details.

AA Guns

A total of 8,403 US antiaircraft guns (2,110 20mm, 424 37mm, 5,595 40mm, 270 90mm, and 4 120mm) were actually shipped, with 7,833 arriving. In addition, 516 Navy 3” and 146 5” dual-purpose guns were shipped. The UK shipped another 288 antiaircraft and dual-purpose guns (162 20mm, 4 40mm, 22 12-pdr, 4 3.7”, 36 4”, and 56 130mm guns.  Soviet wartime production (including the first half of 1941) 1941-1945 was 36,438. Thus, Lend-Lease, excluding the dual-purpose guns, totaled 8,121, about 18.2% of the total.  But when looking at types we find something even more interesting.  The Soviets produced just 4,860 M1940 25mm AA guns (1941-1945), Lend-Lease shipments of 20mm guns totaled 2,272 (31.9% of the total). The Soviets produced 19,116 M1939 37mm AA guns (1941-1945), Lend-Lease shipments totaled 6,023 37mm and 40mm guns (24% of the total).

More interesting, these figures reflect the actual request made by the Soviet Union in the four Lend-Lease protocols with the US. In the first (1 Oct 41- 30 Jun 42) the Soviets requested 300 37mm AA guns or larger per month (2,700). In the second (30 Jun 42-30 Jun 43) a total of 360 12.7mm and 20mm guns (30 per month) and 3,000 37mm and 40mm guns (250 per month) were requested, along with 204 90mm guns. Thus we can see that a total of 5,700 37 and 40mm guns were requested and that 6,019 were shipped. There is little reason to suppose that the shipments were not completed under the terms of the protocol, so we may presume that about 4,200 were shipped in 1941 and 1942, about 69.8% of the total. In other words these shipments were completed to Soviet requirements – understandable considering the general dominance of the Luftwaffe, and given that just 3,896 Soviet M1939 37mm guns were completed in 1942 and that only a total of 6,802 had been completed in total. In other words, the US shipments may have accounted for between about 39 and 42 percent of the total receipts of that type.

Motor Vehicles

Total Soviet production of trucks in the second half of 1941 was 62,000, and then dropped precipitously to 35,000 in 1942, 49,200 in 1943, 60,600 in 1944, and 74,700 in 1945, for a wartime grand total of 281,500.
So Soviet production of trucks in the second half of 1941 was 62,000, while Lend-Lease shipments from the US alone were 8,300 (11.8% of the total). Granted that only 1,506 arrived prior to 1 January 1942, but Soviet production in 1942 was only 35,000, while Lend-Lease from the US alone was 79,000 (69.3% of the total). Soviet production in 1943 was 49,200, while Lend-Lease from the US alone was 144,400 (74.6% of the total). Soviet production for 1944 and 1945 combined was 135,300, while Lend-Lease from the US alone through August 1945 was 188,700 (58.2% of the total). By 1 May 1945 32.8% of the Soviet Army truck park consisted of Lend-Lease vehicles.

Thus, from June 1941 through December 1942, Soviet domestic production was 97,000, while US Lend-Lease was 87,300 (47.4% of the total). I have a difficult time not seeing that as significant, especially given how critical a time that was for the Soviets.

Metals
In terms of raw steel, Soviet production in 1941 totaled 17.893-million tons, but then catastrophically dipped to 44.1% of that in 1942, a total of 8.070-million tons. In 1943 production increased slightly to 8.475-million tons, and then steadily recovered thereafter to 10.887-million in 1944, and 12-252-million in 1945.

US Lend-Lease data is less complete by year, but by 31 October 1943 a total of 1.198-million tons had been shipped, and 1.35-million tons by 1 January 1944. That is just 8.2% of the total domestic production through 1943, but obviously when production was at such low ebb any additions would have been beneficial. Nonetheless, the total of 2.017-million tons supplied through Lend-Lease was not critical compared to the 39.684-million tons produced domestically.

In terms of finished steel and iron products production was also hard hit. In 1941 the Soviet Union produced 874,000 tons of rails, 780,000 tons of tubular steel, 185,000 tons of structural steel, 649,000 tons of steel wire, and 10.880-million tons of other steel and iron products. This decreased drastically in 1942, with only 112,000 tons of rails, 281,000 tons of tubular steel, 48,000 tons of structural steel, 210,000 tons of wire, and 5,045-million tons of other steel and iron products produced. Production then increased slightly in 1943 and then continued to recover through the end of the war.

US Lend-Lease data is again incomplete, but in terms of rails, some 92,000 tons were shipped by 1 March 1943, 100,000 tons by 30 June 1943, and 656,000 tons to 31 March 1945. This may be compared to the total of 227,000 tons produced domestically in 1942 and 1943 and 664,000 tons total 1942-1945. At least in this area of metals production it appears that Lend-Lease may have played a critical role in covering the losses of production after the German invasion.

In terms of non-ferrous metals, the Soviet Union produced 2.888-million tons in 1941, but was able to increase production in 1942 to 3.932-million tons. However, that increase was solely in tin, with copper production decreasing 36.2%, aluminum by 23.5%, lead by 23%, zinc by 46%, and nickel by 18.2%. In 1943 production decreased to 3.166-million tons. But copper production increased 10.2%, aluminum increased 19.2%, and nickel increased 44.4%. The others all decreased.

By 1 January 1944 US Lend-Lease shipments of non-ferrous metals totaled just 384,000 tons, just 5.4% of Soviet production. However, most of the shipments were apparently concentrated in copper and aluminum, probably alleviating some of the shortfalls in that production. But again, it appears that other than as a temporary bridge to make up shortfalls Lend-Lease was not critical in these areas.

POL
Soviet domestic production of POL (diesel, petrol, motor fuel, and fuel oil) totaled 17.388-million tons 1942-1943, compared to US Lend-Lease POL shipments of 740,000 tons (4.3%). It is obvious that except for deliveries of hi-octane fuels and additives (which cannot be accurately assessed), Lend-Lease was a “drop in the bucket” compared to Soviet production.

With regards to aviation gasoline however, US and Commonwealth shipments may have been critical. Overall, the Allies shipped 2.586-million tons of avgas to the Soviet Union between 1941 and 1945. From 1942-1945 Soviet receipts totaled 4.27-million tons – including the Allied shipments! It is difficult not to presume that this may have had as great an impact on Soviet air operations as anything else.

Ammunition
This is quite possibly one of the most critical areas and also the area in which Soviet production capability (next to production of basic foodstuffs) was worse hit by the German invasion. Prewar, the Soviet Union had spent enormous energy in expanding the chemical industry to support a major expansion in ammunition production. Unfortunately, much of this expansion was overrun in the first three months of the war, with the loss of annual production capability for 94,000 tons of propellant, 36,000 tons of TNT and 193,000 tons of nitric acid, 100-million artillery rounds, 32-million mortar shells, and 24-million aerial bombs.

Lend-Lease supplied a total of 214,607 tons of finished explosives (mostly TNT), compared to domestic Soviet production of about 600,000 tons. In terms of raw materials, the US supplied 103,293 tons of toluene, compared to Soviet production of about 116,000 tons. In addition, the US shipped nearly 300,000 tons of propellants, equal to about three years worth of the production capacity lost when the Donbas chemical industry was overrun in 1941.

This was probably critical, since the entire Soviet pre-war ammunition production (in terms of artillery ammunition) stockpiled from 1936 through June 1941, some 88-million rounds, was expended by the end of 1941. The loss of the Donbas chemical industry and of many ammunition plants meant that production delivered June-December 1941 was just 50 to 60 percent of the mobilization plan. As a stopgap production of aerial bombs, at 16-million in 1941, was reduced in 1942 to 6-million to allow diversion of the explosive filler and its constituent chemicals to other uses. As late as 1945 the production of bombs remained at under 6-million annually. But propellant production in the first quarter of 1943 was still at 91 percent of prewar capacity, while projectile production was at 113 percent, and gun production was at 281.6 percent. It is difficult to see how even this restricted production level could have been maintained without the Lend-Lease receipts. In fact ammunition production in terms of finished rounds peaked at just a 58% increase over the second quarter of 1941 – in the first quarter of 1945!

 

[RichTO90]

On 2/23/2024 at 3:26 PM, RichTO90 said:

 Defended, in prepared positions, by the 2nd KOMR...oh, except for the one-third of the poor sods who get to land at the eastern end of the line on the other side of the Blue Grotto, who land on the positions of the 2nd Devons. After that, the Germans get to form up and capture the suspected airfield in their zone so the La Spezia Division could be airlifted in...except that there was no airfield there. They were also to seize the area around the Zurrieq Valley, where the first amphibious landings by the San Marco marines would be made, at 0100, eleven and a half hours after the airborne assault began. In the meantime, two more air landings would occur, at 1615 (the rest of Brigade Ramcke) and 1900 (the first tranche of Folgore).

The more I look into this, the more piss-poor the German-Italian planning appears, especially this fantasy by Student. It is actually worse than I initially thought.

Part of what confused me about Student's plan was the expected capture of an RAF airfield, supposedly on the coast on the left of the German glider landing line, which they would use to airlift reinforcements. The thing was, there was no airfield there then, so I couldn't figure out what they thought they would capture. It turns out they were looking at RAF Qrendi (AKA Krendi), which construction had started in 1940 but halted when only partly complete because of the heavy bombing of April 1942 diverting construction resources to repair. However, the British also decided to use Krendi in the meantime as a decoy and would periodically turn on the landing lights to make it look as if it was completed...apparently it worked.

Anyway, neither runway was complete or leveled, but it was occupied by Coy D, 3rd KOMR, with probably 125-150 O&OR. Then, about 1 1/4 KM to the southeast at Hagar Qim were Bn HQ, HQ Coy, and Coy B of the 3rd KOMR, with the Battalion 3" mortars. Then 1 1/4 to the northeast of Hagar Qim at the village of Qrendi was Coy C, 3rd KOMR. The last company of the battalion, A, was about 1 KM north of Qrendi village manning AAMG and LAA guns along the southwestern side of the Luqa Airfield. Altogether, the battalion probably manned about 40 AAMG (Bren, single Lewis, and twin Lewis).

That is what the left two-thirds of Student's DS 230 line abreast was flying onto. The right two-thirds was supposed to land at the area northeast of the Blue Grotto (AKA the Wied Iż-Żurrieq) and southwest of the village of Zurrieq. The problem was, this is what the gliders were going to land on.

And, yes, that was also what the gliders further west would be landing on. Anyway, the area of Zurrieq was defended by Coy B, 1st Hampshires, with Coy C at Safi, Coy D at Mqabba, with Bn HQ, HQ Coy, and Coy A further back at Gudja. And, along the coast and defending the airfield at Hal Far and the southern approach to Luqa, was the entire 4th HAA Regt RA with 16 3.7" guns, in three four-gun and two two-gun positions at Il-Hagra, Zurrieq, Birżebbuġa, Hal Ghaxaq, and Luqa, the first two of which could bear on any vessels approaching the Blue Grotto.

Another two-gun 3.7" position was at Siġġiewi, just to the north of the 3rd KOMR positions. And then a line stretching east from Rabat to the east coast at Zabbar of 16 more 3.7" and three 3" guns. All could bear on the approaching Stukas and gliders.

Looks pretty suicidal.