Possible US / China War

[Strannik]

To free poor "China's Peaceful Rise" from various imaginative military game play scenarios. 

[Josh]

  

On 9/8/2023 at 7:33 PM, glenn239 said:

Josh is way too optimistic about the USAF's options I think.  Venezuela is a large jungle nation, and jungles are not easy to see down into for what's underneath the canopy.  One patch of jungle looks exactly like that other patch with the hypersonic missile launcher under it.  DF-21 mobile batteries operating in Venezuela or Cuba should be able to use their DF-ZF hypersonic glide missiles to target US warships and naval infastructure all the way to Boston and beyond. 

I also doubt much can be expected from the few dozen sorties a day that can be spared by a USAF urgently engaged on about 5 other fronts all over the world.  (If there is one thing Biden has accomplished, it's to make the number of fronts in the next US war as ubiquitous as possible).   USAF operations against Venezuela would have to be from bases in third world countries teaming with people that hate the USA, so opportunities for drone and missile attacks on aircraft at the bases.  Why not just have the USAF blow up their own F-35's and save the trouble?

 

I thought about that, but copy-pasting all the quotes over is a pain, so....

I'll answer this one here, since someone else responded to it as well.
 

Politically, basing or arming Venezuela with weapons that would reach the US would be seen as a dramatic escalation. The blowback would be huge. A Cuba style "quarantine" would be on the table. Basing US troops in Taiwan or arming Taiwan with US hypersonics would be discussed. Other equally heavy handed moves would be considered. Now, that probably would not be quite fair: the US will almost certainly base hypersonics in Guam at some point, possibly Japan, and US Army medium range weapons based in Japan probably can reach the Chinese mainland. The US Navy can hit some coastal Chinese cities with cruise missiles almost from its piers in Yokosuka. But as you and I both know, the US isn't particularly reasonable about foreign powers laying roots in what it views as its hemisphere. Look at the flap that arose just from a listening base being set up in Cuba, when the US maintains several ballistic missile radars that stare into China. Congress and the US public would demand immediate and drastic action, with the Soviet basing of nuclear weapons in Cuba being the first comparison made. Is fair? Not really. Would the US drop the diplomatic hammer on China if it based IRBMs in the western hemisphere? Absolutely.

All of this assumes that Maduro would even want that kind of heat put on his country. In addition to the possibility of blockade by another name, one could definitely expect the entire military of Venezuela to be a target in the event of any PRC-US war. Maduro may not want that kind of threat to his relatively cozy existence given that he would have no control over Chinese foreign policy.

 

From a technical standpoint, there probably wouldn't be much that could stop such launchers from firing in a first strike, but they probably wouldn't have a very long life after that. Venezuela is within easy refueled tactical aircraft range of the continental US. There wouldn't be "few dozen sorties"; there are a few dozen active and reserve air bases the US could use to scour the region with tactical aircraft and UAVs. Nothing would have to be based in South America. Hell, most of Cuba would be inside rocket artillery range. It isn't the situation in the Pacific where lack of infrastructure and huge distances make employing US airpower difficult. Even if China imported a first class integrated air defense system, it would find itself under constant attack and no hope of resupply.

I don't consider it a good option for China. Any move in that direction changes the calculus from "should we defend Taiwan from China?" to "we definitely need to defend the US from China" and all questions about "strategic ambiguity" immediately fall away. Public opinion on countering China would be solidified indefinitely.

Edited September 11, 2023 by Josh

[sunday]

Free the poor!

[glenn239]

7 hours ago, Josh said:

  Politically, basing or arming Venezuela with weapons that would reach the US would be seen as a dramatic escalation. The blowback would be huge. A Cuba style "quarantine" would be on the table. Basing US troops in Taiwan or arming Taiwan with US hypersonics would be discussed.

I don't think any of that will be a deterrence.  The United States has a choice on Taiwan to make.  What will happen after that depends entirely on what that choice is going to be.  If, as you suggest, the choice is for all-out defense of Taiwan, then I suspect that things will spiral in terms of many moves on many fronts simultaneously.  

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From a technical standpoint, there probably wouldn't be much that could stop such launchers from firing in a first strike, but they probably wouldn't have a very long life after that. 

Essentially yes, targets all along the US eastern seaboard would be in range of DF-21 batteries using hypersonic glide warheads.  That's why I'm not particularly convinced of your viewpoint that in this conflict you imagine that things will stay in the Western Pacific.  I see no reason for the Chinese to play the US game on US terms.

 

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Even if China imported a first class integrated air defense system, it would find itself under constant attack and no hope of resupply.

Not sure on that.   We're talking South America here.  The trade patterns are huge in scale, and in the upcoming decades US influence is going to be challenged by Chinese influence across the whole continent.  Further, the Chinese do not need an integrated air defense network.  They simply have to hide their hypersonic missile launchers well enough that the USAF can't find it.  I have no idea why you'd suppose that the USAF will succeed.  The task would be extraordinarily difficult.

Edited September 12, 2023 by glenn239

[Josh]

32 minutes ago, glenn239 said:

I don't think any of that will be a deterrence.  The United States has a choice on Taiwan to make.  What will happen after that depends entirely on what that choice is going to be.  If, as you suggest, the choice is for all-out defense of Taiwan, then I suspect that things will spiral in terms of many moves on many fronts simultaneously.  
 

Basing weapons in the Wester hemisphere ends any conversations regarding the defense of Taiwan. The context changes from defending Taiwan to confronting China overnight; decision made.

 

32 minutes ago, glenn239 said:

Essentially yes, targets all along the US eastern seaboard would be in range of DF-21 batteries using hypersonic glide warheads.  That's why I'm not particularly convinced of your viewpoint that in this conflict you imagine that things will stay in the Western Pacific.  I see no reason for the Chinese to play the US game on US terms.

DF-21 isn’t known to use such. DF-17 is only known operational hypersonic system. They have similar ranges and would be limited to shooting at Florida if launched from Venezuela. Cuba obviously increases the area of the US in range. DF-26s would do what you describe from Venezuela, though again no hypersonic warhead is known to be operational.

 

It worth noting the US can already strike throughout the entire breath and depth of China and such an attack would spark a sustained US strategic bombing campaign against Chinese infrastructure. The US can hit China with a lot more cruise missiles than China even has ballistic missiles, assuming all of them were moved to the western hemisphere. Soon B-21s with 30,000 lbs of cheap JDAMs and SDBs will push that advantage overwhelmingly in the US favor.
 

32 minutes ago, glenn239 said:

 

Not sure on that.   We're talking South America here.  The trade patterns are huge in scale, and in the upcoming decades US influence is going to be challenged by Chinese influence across the whole continent.  Further, the Chinese do not need an integrated air defense network.  They simply have to hide their hypersonic missile launchers well enough that the USAF can't find it.  I have no idea why you'd suppose that the USAF will succeed.  The task would be extraordinarily difficult.

If the USAF can easily operate persistent MALE and HALE UAVs over either country it is hard to imagine launchers being able to operate freely like the Scuds in Iraq. Sensors have gained far more range and resolution and kill chains are several orders of magnitude faster than they were three decades ago. These launch vehicles are not cross country capable in that environment. Certainly a launch makes it quite clear where the vehicle is in IR and radar.

 

The other thing to consider is that SM-3s have a boost phase intercept capability if the are very close to the launch site. Some kind of anti ship complex would also have to be part of the effort, less an Aegis ship off the coast simply engage the outbound missiles as they struggle to ascend. I think the entire effort of basing weapons in the region is more complex than you imagine and would require a top to bottom anti axis package to defend. At a minimum it requires a host country to take on enormous risk just to even start such a project.

Edited September 12, 2023 by Josh

[glenn239]

22 hours ago, Josh said:

Basing weapons in the Wester hemisphere ends any conversations regarding the defense of Taiwan. The context changes from defending Taiwan to confronting China overnight; decision made.

You're assuming any Chinese are left in Beijing that believe there is a conversation on Taiwan to be had.  

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It worth noting the US can already strike throughout the entire breath and depth of China and such an attack would spark a sustained US strategic bombing campaign against Chinese infrastructure. The US can hit China with a lot more cruise missiles than China even has ballistic missiles, assuming all of them were moved to the western hemisphere. Soon B-21s with 30,000 lbs of cheap JDAMs and SDBs will push that advantage overwhelmingly in the US favor.

Dunno about any of that.  My sense is that at this moment the US currently has the advantage but that in 10 years the Chinese will have the stronger armed forces, and that any expansion by the Chinese into friendly countries in the Americas will just make things even worse.  The B-21 certainly sounds impressive with its LF stealth characteristics, but I doubt a few dozen of these do much to tip the balance and frankly it does not seem that much of an improvement over the F-35.

Quote

The other thing to consider is that SM-3s have a boost phase intercept capability if the are very close to the launch site. Some kind of anti ship complex would also have to be part of the effort, less an Aegis ship off the coast simply engage the outbound missiles as they struggle to ascend. I think the entire effort of basing weapons in the region is more complex than you imagine and would require a top to bottom anti axis package to defend. At a minimum it requires a host country to take on enormous risk just to even start such a project.

Sounds like a low cost investment that results in a high cost US response.  This is the type of thing the Chinese might be shopping for, with the theory that if the Chinese are victorious in Taiwan and the US wins in the Americas, then the US has lost overall. 

 

 

 

[Strannik]

CSIS study https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2023-01/230119_Jones_Empty_Bins.pdf?VersionId=mW3OOngwul8V2nR2EHKBYxkpiOzMiS88 that has some interesting tables/claims including:

- In nearly two dozen iterations of a CSIS war game that examined a U.S.-China war in the Taiwan Strait, the United States typically expended more than 5,000 long range missiles in three weeks of conflict: 4,000 JASSMs, 450 LRASMs, 400 Harpoons, and 400 Tomahawks (same is true of ship-based munitions, such as the SM-6)

-  In every iteration of the war game, the United States expended its inventory of LRASMs within the first week of the conflict.

-  it takes nearly two years to produce LRASMs

- The FY 2023 budget proposes buying only 88 LRASMs

[Josh]

35 minutes ago, glenn239 said:

You're assuming any Chinese are left in Beijing that believe there is a conversation on Taiwan to be had.

My assumption was that some people in the US would be on the fence rather than instigating a global war with China. I assume the US not getting involved would be preferable for the PRC. If we (and the PRC) assume that the US will commit to the hilt no matter what, I agree it is a moot point.

 

35 minutes ago, glenn239 said:

Dunno about any of that.  My sense is that at this moment the US currently has the advantage but that in 10 years the Chinese will have the stronger armed forces, and that any expansion by the Chinese into friendly countries in the Americas will just make things even worse.  The B-21 certainly sounds impressive with its LF stealth characteristics, but I doubt a few dozen of these do much to tip the balance and frankly it does not seem that much of an improvement over the F-35.

The main advantage of B-21 is that it doesn’t need local bases to make the trip. IMO, it likely has B-52 level endurance based on how it sacrifices payload but isn’t drastically smaller than B-2 (plus there’s a lot of weight and fuel saving tech in the last three decades). Austin is on record as saying it doesn’t need basing or logistical support in theater, which I read as being able to tank over HI or AK and do an unescorted trip to the PRC to drop wing kit JDAM or SDB 100-150km from 15,000m. If that is true, they could embark on a strategic bombing campaign against coastal targets from the CONUS with tankers only from US states without even entering Chinese airspace, and they would do it with tens of thousands of SBDs and hundreds of thousands of JDAM kits in inventory now.

 

I suspect that is a sea change difference from F-35s.

 

35 minutes ago, glenn239 said:

Sounds like a low cost investment that results in a high cost US response.  This is the type of thing the Chinese might be shopping for, with the theory that if the Chinese are victorious in Taiwan and the US wins in the Americas, then the US has lost overall. 

 

China has to recreate its anti access ability on its own coast in a new country, in a vastly more adverse environment where the basing situation is reversed - few Chinese bases against vast U.S. basing. And this happens with the potential political cost of the U.S. simply permanently basing its forces in Taiwan (if allowed) or just donating copious amounts of missiles Ukraine style, with little concern of nuclear war since it has dominance.

 

Maybe if China is a nuclear peer next decade, this move makes sense. Right now I would personally welcome it; opinions about China would be solidified instantly and priorities and defense spending would change. It would definitely be consistent with their Wolf Warrior diplomacy that has seen huge changes is US influence in Australia, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, and the Philippines.

Edited September 13, 2023 by Josh

[Josh]

3 minutes ago, Strannik said:

CSIS study https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2023-01/230119_Jones_Empty_Bins.pdf?VersionId=mW3OOngwul8V2nR2EHKBYxkpiOzMiS88 that has some interesting tables/claims including:

- In nearly two dozen iterations of a CSIS war game that examined a U.S.-China war in the Taiwan Strait, the United States typically expended more than 5,000 long range missiles in three weeks of conflict: 4,000 JASSMs, 450 LRASMs, 400 Harpoons, and 400 Tomahawks (same is true of ship-based munitions, such as the SM-6)

-  In every iteration of the war game, the United States expended its inventory of LRASMs within the first week of the conflict.

-  it takes nearly two years to produce LRASMs

- The FY 2023 budget proposes buying only 88 LRASMs

The same study indicated China would expend all of its ballistic missiles in the same amount of time.

Guess which builds faster? Also while LRASM production is anemic, JASSM production is 500+ for the last several years and capacity is being expanded to a thousand.

Edited September 13, 2023 by Josh

[Strannik]

On 9/11/2023 at 12:30 PM, Josh said:

Politically, basing or arming Venezuela with weapons that would reach the US would be seen as a dramatic escalation. The blowback would be huge. A Cuba style "quarantine" would be on the table.

Yes and likely would be done only after what China considers as huge escalation re: Taiwan.  Also Venezuela would want lots of economic benefits for this obviously. 

I wonder if this will be raised during the current Maduro visit.  But perhaps this frog will be boiled:

- mil cooperation.

- ISR and naval base 

- copious AD assets

- Airbase

 - and only then strike assets (possibly after US puts "advisors" + some red line assets into Taiwan)

On 9/11/2023 at 12:30 PM, Josh said:

 Basing US troops in Taiwan and other threats... 

That's not going to move a needle when things reach that point. 

 

[Strannik]

On 9/11/2023 at 12:42 PM, sunday said:

Free the poor!

Go in peace my son 🤲

[Josh]

I also would point you towards my thread in general naval and air regarding the USNs strategy. They intend to flood PLAN units with sea skimming MALD-N decoys in the hundreds, and back those with small numbers of actual LRASM or MST.

 

The USAF can simply use real AGM-158s as decoys. They look identical even sitting next to each other. A B-1 strike could easily substitute most of its LRASM for AGM-158B and the net effect is the same number of inbounds that have to be shot down until point defense ranges.

 

Edit: once we get to the next lot of AGM-158D, those missiles can absolutely guide to a naval target.

Edited September 13, 2023 by Josh

[Strannik]

23 hours ago, Josh said:

Ihe USAF can easily operate persistent MALE and HALE UAVs over either country it is hard to imagine launchers being able to operate freely like the Scuds in Iraq.

VZ has some AD so no free4all ISR.  Not much but Chinese can add.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_equipment_of_the_Venezuelan_Army

Edited September 13, 2023 by Strannik

[Josh]

Just now, Strannik said:

VZ has some AD so no free4all ISR.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_equipment_of_the_Venezuelan_Army

Nothing that would last a hard day’s work if the US decided it was harboring weapons that threatened its political, industrial, and military centers.

[Strannik]

Just now, Josh said:

Nothing that would last a hard day’s work if the US decided it was harboring weapons that threatened its political, industrial, and military centers.

It would be likely seriously beefed up at that point, so no, not a day or even a week. 

[Strannik]

Also UUVs from VZ can easily threaten USN in Norfolk.

[Strannik]

21 minutes ago, Josh said:

The same study indicated China would expend all of its ballistic missiles in the same amount of time.

Guess which builds faster? Also while LRASM production is anemic, JASSM production is 500+ for the last several years and capacity is being expanded to a thousand.

Too bad we don't know Chinese build capacity.  But something tells me it's quite significant.

[Strannik]

The point of Chinese strike force close to US shores would be to deter US strike on China's mainland (and limit conflict to sea/air and perhaps non main actors bases if they are involved) not to attack first.

If they manage to establish the sufficient assets to achieve this then the Taiwan equitation looks hopeless.

Edited September 13, 2023 by Strannik

[Josh]

3 hours ago, Strannik said:

The point of Chinese strike force close to US shores would be to deter US strike on China's mainland (and limit conflict to sea/air and perhaps non main actors bases if they are involved) not to attack first.

If they manage to establish the sufficient assets to achieve this then the Taiwan equitation looks hopeless.

The point is that Chinese strategic forces in this hemisphere would immediately be interpreted as a fight. See Cuba. It is not something that would make the US back down; it is a reason to push up against China where it lives. I welcome that move.

Edited September 13, 2023 by Josh

[seahawk]

4 hours ago, Strannik said:

The point of Chinese strike force close to US shores would be to deter US strike on China's mainland (and limit conflict to sea/air and perhaps non main actors bases if they are involved) not to attack first.

If they manage to establish the sufficient assets to achieve this then the Taiwan equitation looks hopeless.

The Taiwanese question is hopeless.

[sunday]

5 hours ago, Strannik said:

Go in peace my son 🤲

Nope, I am your father.

[BansheeOne]

 

[futon]

[futon]

Even though there is hypocrisy in parr of how the Taiwan Strait situation has gotten this bad, a lot of the US recognizes and openly states that. It still takes the PRC from thenselves to keep this old claim into and through today. So if/when it gets to the point that the US is expending lots of its long range missiles and is losing equipment and service lives all the while a friendly Taiwan is getting pummeled and invaded, I don't think Japan can stand by. Depending on who the PM is, a response may be immediate or may be days in delay. Kishida's response to the Ukraine while diplommatic was immediate, throwing away past efforts by Abe to work with Putin on the northern territory. So that adds what Japan's got on top of the US. In the coming years there will be a lot of new long range missiles, around 1,000 or more, depending on the year. Japan's looking to get 400 tomohawks and some JASSM-ERs from the US. New 1000km range anti-ship missiles are in development for ground, surface and underwater vessel, and air lunch variants. Hyper sonic glider also in development. Ground forces are being organized to be more mobile in deploynent, all for reinforcing the southern islands. I do not rule out landing a force on Taiwan itself if things come to it. There have several means to do from the east side of the island. Secure points of supply from the sea on the island or help defend a section of Taipei. It would be a tragic day that Japanese service members once again shoot and kill Chinese ones and vis versa. Something that punks would say its tradition or in their blood to do so as if it was unchangeable. A Taiwan crisis would not be from the makings from such an old assumed tradition. Once the defense of Taiwan is done, then that's it. It's done. The PRC should be compelled then to give it up. They are the biggest in Asia by far already and need not Taiwan to become a massive central and even a welcomed leading hub of all of Asia. 

[Strannik]

6 hours ago, Josh said:

The point is that Chinese strategic forces in this hemisphere would immediately be interpreted as a fight. See Cuba. It is not something that would make the US back down; it is a reason to push up against China where it lives. I welcome that move.

As I said before: first the base with area denial assets, drones, UUVs and only then IRBMs when the situation warrants it and the time is right from Chinese perspective.

I am actually amazed at the timing of how this thread started and Maduro's visit...

And if you mention Cuba you should know the results of this crisis - it's security guaranteed and missiles from Turkey withdrawn.