40 years ago this day KAL007 Shootdown

[Stuart Galbraith]

 

[Mykola Saichuk]

Marshal Ogarkov, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, tells Soviet television that KAL007 is to blame for everything, and that the air defense troops acted correctly.

 

Edited June 30, 2024 by Mykola Saichuk

[Stuart Galbraith]

Thanks, thats the best quality photo ive seen of that yet.

Its incredible to think that Seymour Hersh's book 'The Target is Destroyed', which was written in 1986, remains the only decent book on the subject that doesnt launch into conspiracy theory.

[BansheeOne]

I just recently found that someone had linked the notes of a 19 September 1983 meeting between then-deputy KGB head Vladimir Kryuchkov and Erich Mielke in East Berlin from the Stasi files archive to the German KAL 007 Wiki entry I rewrote from the previous conspiracy-minded track in 2010. The shootdown was the main topic covered (it was also the chief reason the meeting was postponed by nine days). Kryuchkov maintained the official line that they didn't know it was a civilian aircraft, that navigation and cabin lights were switched off, that it was tried to make contact and tracers were fired, that KAL 007 tried to evade the fighters, and that it was likely all a deliberate provocation. It's quite possible he believed it, too, because that's what he knew.

Of course Mielke, ever the hardass, crititized that the Soviets hadn't gone on the offensive against Western claims earlier. Kryuchov agreed but noted that as a member of the East German Politburo himself, the dear comrade knew that such question first needed to be deliberated within party leadership, so it went 10:0 for the West. Mielke corrected "No, 10:1, because you shot down their plane after all." He was just an all-around charming guy.

[Stuart Galbraith]

Yes, I think I may have found an English translation of this meeting on NS Archive or somewhere linked by them. I agree, its really very interesting.

Ive found it particularly difficult to determine what exactly anyone at the top end knew, or what they affected to know.I think I read in Taylor Downings '1983' that after Ustinov told Andropov what happened, Andropov told him to deal with it because he was going to the Crimea. He probably had the right idea.

Im not even sure how much the air defence team that night knew. That there have been claims half the radar grid was down after being demolished by a storm, which doesnt seem to introduce confidence in their plotting. In fact one of the more alarming conspiracy books (which was written by McArthur Job, you can find it on internet Archive) used the PVO plotting uncritically and seemed to believe that the aircaft had gone over Kamchatka at low altitude, and had jinked several times to throw off detection aircraft, somehow without the passengers knowing. That the PVO plotting might have been pants (as Hersh probably rightly pointed out) didnt seem to have occurred to them.

I particularly enjoyed the episode of Kleo where Mielke gets murdered by a Stasi Stripper assassin, he was as you say a right little charmer. Even Wolf didnt like him, and Wolf wasnt exactly embracing high moral ethics.

 

[BansheeOne]

Oh yeah, now that I look for it, the Wilson Center did a translation which is available from their site and various others.

Quote

N o t e

About the Talks of Comrade Minister [Erich Mielke] with the Deputy Chairman of the KGB, Comrade V. A. Kryuchkov, on 19 September 1983 in Berlin

 

[Additional] Participants:

 

From the KGB:

Comrade Lieutenant General Shumilov

Comrade Captain Ryabinnikov (Interpreter)

 

From the MfS:

Comrade Major General Grossmann

Comrade Major General Damm

Comrade Lieutenant Colonel Salevsky (Interpreter)

 

Comrade Mielke:

Welcome.

It’s a great pleasure. I understand how the difficult situation makes it hard for you [Kryuchkov] to leave the Soviet Union temporarily. We are happy that it worked out nonetheless.

I have to convey greetings from Comrade [Markus] Wolf [the Deputy Minister for State Security]. He will return from Hungary on 1 October 1983 and come [for a further bilateral MfS-KGB meeting] to Tabarz [in the Thuringian Forest in the GDR where Kryuchkov will stay for vacation]. Then we can already talk there about some issues and return to Berlin during the course of Sunday, 2 October 1983. We will have time on 3 and 4 October to discuss some more issues and requests for mutual cooperation, possibly to be forwarded later to Comrade [CPSU General Secretary] Y. V. Andropov. [Your] return to Moscow is scheduled for 5 October.

I have some requests to hear from you Moscow’s perspectives concerning assessments of the following issues:

- What is the perspective on [Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) disarmament] talks in Geneva? (West German newspaper “Die Welt” says there is no more optimism left, just hope!)

- What does this mean in terms of concrete assignments to the MfS, how should we proceed? (Maybe you could also outline problems for us to forward Comrade E. Honecker.)

- Regarding the entire complex of heightened tensions after the plane incident (South Korea) and ensuing boycott measures: What are the assessments?  What does this mean for the future? Which counter-measures are planned?[1]

- [CSCE follow-up conference in] Madrid

[...]

 

Comrade Kryuchkov:

I am tasked to convey cordial greetings from Y. V. Andropov and his best wishes. He again thanks you for the joint work done for state security.

He rates meetings and talks with you very highly, in particular your cordial and focused development of cooperation with the USSR.

It is his special pleasure to greet you again cordially. Now he is on vacation in the South. For politicians like him, there is no actual vacation. Once in a while he has visitors.

For a half day he is reading information, including ours [KGB] and what we received from you. Also I convey cordial greetings from [KGB Chairman] V. M. Chebrikov and his deputies. They all know you very well. Almost all of them have worked with you in the past, and all of them have very fond memories.

Now to the concrete questions you have raised.

These are questions discussed at the highest level. I myself am not placed so highly.

Hence I will do my best to respond to these questions based on my state of knowledge and responsibilities.

Obviously I will not be able to answer them in full. Yet since we are all part of the process to determine policy and concrete measures, issues of detail included, I can explain at least some aspects and inform you accordingly.

 

On the Plane Incident

Some issues have been already explained at the [9 September 1983] press conference. Now one can outline how the story happened and unfolded in its entirety.

During the first days we were reluctant to provide information. From the beginning, however, there were no reasons to keep the incident secret. We wanted to wait to see what the West had to say. Reagan’s initial reaction was very important to us. The full timeline about what happened to the plane was meanwhile published in our press. Yet we have not yet published everything we have.

We did not know that the downed plane was a civilian airliner. Our pilots were not aware of that. We were convinced that it was a military aircraft. When the regional ground command issued its orders, it did not know it was a civilian airliner. We are not going to make this public, but this was just how it was. We were convinced that this was a special aircraft on a specific reconnaissance mission.

Our radar detected the plane prior to its violation of our airspace, about 600 to 800 kilometers before Kamchatka. The dot on the radar approached Kamchatka, i.e. the area where we have military bases. Some of them are nuclear bases.

Our services were to a certain extent shocked that the plane headed directly towards Kamchatka. Such a brazen incident had never happened before. Thousands of planes fly through the air corridors there. Previous violations were just about between 1 and 5 kilometers. Yet until 1 September 1983, there had been no single incident involving a direct flight over Kamchatka.

The plane was detected by ground radar and by our military aircraft. We decided to do nothing against the plane. We were in doubt what kind of plane it was, and whether it really was an aircraft flying over Kamchatka for intelligence monitoring.

The plane left Soviet airspace over the Sea of Okhotsk. A large part of this ocean consists of open, international waters. There our radar lost the plane. Sometime later the plane showed up in Sakhalin airspace. In Sakhalin they already knew that an airplane had violated airspace over Kamchatka.

We again undertook measures to identify this plane. 4 aircraft went up (2 SU-15, 2 MIG-23). They tried to establish connection; various signals were given. No response. More than 120 [warning] shots were fired.

There were still a few kilometers left for the plane before its departure from our airspace. Our pilots said this is not a passenger plane. It was especially relevant that this plane flew around our anti-aircraft defenses. One SU-15 was especially close, just about 2 kilometers away. The speed of the [KAL] Boeing was 800 kilometers [per hour]; the SU-15 had [a speed of] 2,400 kilometers [per hour], the MIG-23 [had a speed of] 2,000 kilometers [per hour].

For reasons of speed they could not get closer to each other. At the plane, windows were not illuminated and position lights not turned on. We fired special tracer bullets parallel to the plane’s course of direction. Some of them were shot right in front of its nose. The plane’s pilots must have noticed this. The plane maneuvered and changed its altitude to evade our aircraft. Then, on the instructions of ground control, two missiles were fired. The shootdown occurred over the territory of Sakhalin.

After the firing of the missiles the plane still flew for 11 minutes. It lost altitude, went down to 5,000 meters, and then it fell into the sea 9 to 11 nautical miles from the coast. In the morning we noticed an oil spot on the ocean. Parts from the plane were found near Moneron Island (near Nevelsk). Ocean currents carried other parts to the Japanese coast at Hokkaido. The spot of the crash has been located quite exactly. Now Soviets, Americans, and Japanese are searching there for the wreck. Everybody is attempting to find the flight recorder. Until my departure it had not been found.

The plane had deviated from the air corridor towards Sakhalin by about 600 kilometers, altogether by an average of between 200 and 500 kilometers. There were four American and four Japanese air control points along the regular corridor. None of them had issued a signal.

We were completely convinced that this plane was on a reconnaissance mission. If we would have known that this was a passenger plane, we would not have shot it down. Yet everything pointed in another direction. We have recordings of exchanges between ground control and our aircraft.

So far not everything has been published. Why should we make everything available right away? We have posed and forwarded 11 questions to the Americans and Japanese. They have not responded to any of them.

We have still more details about this [KAL] flight. Reagan declared that mankind will unfortunately never know who entered the wrong programming [at the KAL plane]. You could say, this way he conceded this mistake; since mankind wants to know who did that, and why.

Just among us: We have received very interesting information from an American source. He informs how, and by whom, this airliner was prepared for its flight. In the coming days we will provide this information to the Americans without making all of it public. In this way this American will be “sacrificed” as a source. We have to wait for a couple of more days.

Obviously there are still a couple of other facts. There are people who have consciously sent this plane to its demise. Sooner or later everything will come out.

Reactions in individual countries were very different; in some there were very tough, in others, rather irrelevant. The saying goes that such events do not “live” for more than 2 weeks. The Americans will exploit this further when the parts of the plane and the dead are recovered. Some dead bodies have already been found at the Northern shore of Hokkaido. All this will be exploited propagandistically. In the Western press you always find the question raised over and over whether this is beneficial to Reagan.

We [KGB] want to contribute with our active measures towards the revelation of all causes and links of this plane incident. We hope that our friends from the MfS will support us in this regard.

For the first time, [on 9 September 1983] a large press conference was held with the First Deputy Foreign Minister and the Chief of the General Staff [Marshal Nikolai Orgarkov]. Everything had been thoroughly prepared.

In a few days an article will follow by Air Force Marshal [Pyotr S.] Kirsanov, featuring new facts that this [KAL] flight was not a normal one. It will be proven that simultaneously to this flight a US satellite crossed the flight route three times. The Americans knew that we were preparing missiles for launch on this territory at that time. The launch had to be postponed. Also telling is the following episode: On the downed plane there was a well-known US Senator [sic] who initially did not want to board this flight.[2]  He decided to book only at the last minute.

Still some “white spots” remain. After the incident, US Senator [Henry “Scoop”] Jackson [D-WA] delivered a very strong anti-Soviet speech demanding further tough sanctions against the Soviet Union. When he left the podium, he fell and dropped dead. He was an extremely strong anti-Soviet (a pathological case).

We express our deep regrets for the victims but do not accept responsibility. Our Foreign Minister, Comrade Gromyko, did not travel to the U.N. General Assembly in New York. He stayed home since the US did not give guarantees for the safety of his plane.

We will also not participate in the IPU [International Parliamentary Union] Meeting in Seoul (but not because Kim Il Sung has asked us to do so).

It was also because of the plane incident that I was not able to come earlier [to the GDR].

 

Comrade Mielke:

I have the following questions.

I said from the beginning one has to be more on the offensive, based on the fact that this was an organized provocation. You have to declare that the Americans use other nations to cover their own provocations. They apply this method frequently.

You have to say immediately that this is a provocation in order to go on the offensive. You should have done that right away. This is my only critical remark. I did not have any other alternative thoughts.

This argumentation was lacking right from the onset. There are plenty of examples how they operate here at our place. They exploit other nations, and simultaneously use the opportunity to drag others in whom they actually want to get rid of. I said so immediately when this happened. The issue is now evident. In [our central newspaper] Neues Deutschland we published the full transcript of your press conference. We also broadcasted it on television.

You should have gone on the offensive somewhat faster. Sure, you should listen to what the enemy has to say. Yet everything else you could have added later. You have to work out additional arguments that this was a targeted provocation together with South Korea. It is not so much about the issue of the shootdown. Yet that you could not identify the airliner as a passenger plane – I do not think this is good.

This event had exceptional elements of surprise. I said so also to Comrade E. Honecker. What could have come out of this? We have to be extraordinarily vigilant. Nobody can say in advance what is going to happen; whether this plane incident could lead to a provocation transforming into a war. I note the problem of surprise over and over again. This surprise can lead to a war.

It is quite uncomfortable to say that one did not recognize it. It can happen. Everyone is human. Yet there lies a great risk also for other issues.

Everything you say is correct, but the Western press says you were not able to identify the type of plane since your aircraft were flying below. They also say the flight recorder has already been found. If you do not have it, you have to search for it further. They [in the West] sense the danger coming from the flight recorder. We are in complete agreement with you and will continue our measures.

A captain from [the West German airline] Lufthansa has written a wonderful article with sound arguments:

1. This is how they [the US] operate

2. Why did they not guide the plane on a correct course if the US and Japan were aware of this?

Arguments are on the table. You just have to use them for the fight against Reagan. It is interesting that Reagan can get into trouble when a part of the bourgeoisie disagrees. If [CNN Chairman Ted] Turner is saying he will not “swear on a bible” that the [KAL] flight was not a spy mission, he therefore argues against Reagan. They provide the arguments themselves. This is why some countries will not join the boycott. We have to continue our work.

I have no further questions. Only if there are new arguments coming up; but then so we can respond quickly. This is important to the entire world, to your good friends, to those who waver, but also to the enemies who are smart and realists. More timely information would have been better: This just privately since you asked.

There are also comrades who say: Did you really have to shoot down the civilian airliner?! Were they not in a position to recognize this?

This is why the argument that you were not able to identify the type of plane is so dangerous.

 

Comrade Kryuchkov:

They were not able to recognize it.

 

Comrade Mielke:

Of course, those two plane types look similar. Honest specialists from the West are saying this, too. They also say: Why were there so many RC planes flying at that time in this area?

 

Comrade Kryuchkov:

The entire incident occurred at 7:00 hours [A.M.] local time. In Moscow it was midnight. Already at the evening of 1 September all issues were discussed, and a first brief news report issued on [state TV newscast] “Vremya.” The same day we established a large commission and send them to the East. On 3 September they provided a comprehensive report.

 

Comrade Mielke:

We already exchanged our opinions on 2 September. Please understand why I was so arrogant and told V. T. Shumilov: Tell Moscow this was a specially prepared South Korean plane for spying; the most important thing is missing in your public statement!

 

Comrade Kryuchkov:

I can only say: If we had released our second statement 24 hours earlier, the slander would not be this harsh. We did not see through everything right after the incident.

 

Comrade Mielke:

Tomorrow the Central Committee secretaries in charge will meet in Moscow. There we will submit our proposal accordingly.

The adversary immediately coordinated its measures aimed at you and us.

That is why it was necessary to strike immediately and not just release 5 lines. This may suffice at the parochial level, but not for the global public.

 

Comrade Kryuchkov:

It is alright what you say. I completely agree with you. But there is one problem: As a Politburo member you know that such issues first have to be discussed by party leaders. So – 10:0 for them.

 

Comrade Mielke:

No, 10:1 - since you shot down the plane.

I just want to say: There must not be any moments of being surprised. You have to go on the offensive. This is important for future incidents.

 

Comrade Kryuchkov:

In his talks with you, Comrade Y. V. Andropov always agreed with you on issues of how to focus on operative impacts of events.

[...]

 

[Stuart Galbraith]

That was the one, thanks for linking it. 👍

[Stuart Galbraith]

Quite an interesting Document from the Belenko debriefing, showing details on the availability of PVO units in the Kuriles and Khabarovsk Divisions.

https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0324/1553700.pdf

There are a number of other documents relating to his defection, mainly involving the Mig25, which can be found here.

https://forum.dcs.world/topic/326779-mig-25-foxbat-in-dcs/page/3/

[Stuart Galbraith]

40 years ago today, Stanislav Petrov went with his gut instinct, which is probably why we are still here.

https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.kcentv.com/amp/article/news/history/day-history-sept-26-stanislav-petrov-avoids-nuclear-war/500-d416dac5-5a9a-43d9-85b2-bce314a32f8e