The Kremlin is burning?

[Stuart Galbraith]

It is of course entirely possible that they lost 2 MTLB's and 2 T72's through casual theft, and wrote them off with a convienient firestorm.

I remember when the British army Donnington went up in smoke in the early 1980's, decades worth of misplaced equipment was written off to balance the books. For years afterwards, generations of storesman told hapless squaddies when they wanted a piece of equipment an impenetrable acronym, 'FOFAD' (Fuck off, fire at Donnington).

[urbanoid]

Great success!

Edited September 28 by urbanoid

[mkenny]

32 minutes ago, urbanoid said:

Great success!

The reality is a little different 

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cx2k0p6w034o

 

[JWB]

That cup of tea

 

[Mike1158]

20 hours ago, urbanoid said:

Great success!

Wow, even the Leprachauns will be quivvering in their booties.

[Roman Alymov]

SERGEY DOVLATOV TO IGOR SMIRNOV
July 6, 1983

"... Sadly, the Russian public in America has joined the most right-wing forces, newspapers are calling for the devil knows what: from the execution of criminals without trial to the revival of the Ku Klux Klan. Regrets are expressed that Hitler did not win the war against the Soviet Union and so on. An old emigrant, a decrepit cretin, asked me if I would like to participate in the occupation of Leningrad? And when I expressed horror about it, he said: "You are the third wave of <emigration>, the children of commissars and shopkeepers..."
At the same time, all these bastards are offended that the Americans do not want to listen to them.
And <...> listen to us if at a conference in Boston <...> he said that a hydrogen bomb should be thrown at Moscow?!
I worked for 15 large-circulation newspapers and have never met such a terrible people as in the Russian free press. There were always two or three scoundrels, but the majority sympathized with you and many tried to help.
The problem, it seems to me, is also that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (for all its abomination) was accepted with some discrimination. If a person drank heavily, publicly tortured his wife or stole music stands from the "red corner*, he was not accepted. Here, everyone who declares their seething hatred of the KGB and the Politburo is taken into the "anti-communist party", thieves, swindlers, scoundrels, <...>, stupids and <...> are taken. And now, from their Brooklyn, they are writing heroic open letters to Andropov and the black forces of evil. All this disgusts me." ( https://t.me/c/2106428722/3000 )

[mandeb48]

Another long battle is over. The negative point for the Russian side is the impossibility of surrounding and trapping entire enemy units. The best way to maximize enemy losses. This whole war is attrition and attrition....

https://rybar.ru/piwigo/upload/2024/10/01/20241001144233-bced7d29.jpg

 

Edited October 1 by mandeb48

[glenn239]

3 hours ago, mandeb48 said:

Another long battle is over. The negative point for the Russian side is the impossibility of surrounding and trapping entire enemy units. The best way to maximize enemy losses. This whole war is attrition and attrition....

https://rybar.ru/piwigo/upload/2024/10/01/20241001144233-bced7d29.jpg

 

Losing Vuhledar is a direct consequence for the Kursk offensive.  A little bit like Vicksburg/Gettysburg.

[Roman Alymov]

Letter from Strelkov (Yandex-translated)

"Dear Alexander Nikolaevich,

This letter is a direct response to yours dated 23.09, but now I receive quite a lot of letters and do not have time to respond to all of them in time. You have to "carve out" time (and place, too) in the evenings. The fact is that the slogan of Russian "correctional" institutions (or, at least, our IK-5) is: the convict must be left as little time as possible for personal needs! And this time should be "torn" into as small pieces as possible, so that it is constantly missed by those who have any interests other than watching Muz-TV (or Ren-TV)* and playing backgammon. On normal weekdays (i.e. 5 days a week) I have no more than an hour and a half between work and the so-called "study" (at vocational school) + about the same amount between the completion of "study" and lights out. At this time, you can only write letters (often interrupted by rounds and other "regime" events). Sometimes I get tired enough at work so that I don't want to write anything "from the word at all." Therefore, do not be surprised at the significant breaks between responses: it is not difficult for you to type a message, but it is not very difficult for me.

Regarding the issue of assessments/analysis of the situation, I still get little information for reliable "tactical" forecasts. "Strategically," however, "everything is bad" — if the "bet on Trump" (in my opinion, initially a failure, but I do not insist on 100% reliability of my opinion) "does not play", then next year (or even the end of this year) will be a very serious test for our state. 
The reasons for this were repeatedly voiced by me even before the arrest (and long before it): 
— the "imitation" style of leadership and public administration led to the fact that "on paper" the Russian Federation looked extremely impressive in all respects (including in terms of military power). In fact, a significant part of our power (sometimes very significant) turned out to be "blown up". And now the needs of the war far exceed the capabilities of our military-industrial complex, and the war has long "eaten" or "is eating up" all stocks of new weapons.
The same applies to trained human resources, which have been spent for 2.5 years (and are still being spent) as if they are endless and inexhaustible. Whereas the main "ready-made" (and relatively painlessly detached from the economy) war has already "eaten up without a trace."
— squalor (to the point of complete absence) strategic planning and the lowest quality of tactical planning have already led us to a complete deadlock (both in strategy and tactics), the loss of initiative to the state of "amoebic reaction to stimuli" — that is, Military and industrial machines react to the problems that have arisen only at the moment when these problems are already becoming critically dangerous.
— Promising forecasting — as there was no talk 2.5 years ago, so there is no question now (which is not surprising, given the "amazing saving of old reliable personnel" at all major VIP positions, except maybe (and then very partially) The Ministry of Defense. The search for a way out of the impasse is either not conducted at all (which is logical, since the level of necessary intelligence and competence significantly exceeds those available to these VIP officials), or we simply are not able to see it (for lack of visible results, at least preliminary ones).
— The time to correct the grossest mistakes (which was kindly provided to us by the enemies in the West and the so-called "Ukraine" due to their own incompetence and degradation) was not even "wasted" — it was simply "missed". And now it's practically gone. The general systemic military-political crisis will soon turn into a military-economic one. Perhaps — on the model of 1917, and the growing fatigue from the senseless and inarticulate (in terms of goals) war on the part of the population will "overlap" with it. And without really strategic (and not tactical — implemented on the principle of "trishkin's caftan", as it is now) changes and measures, we are waiting for extremely unpleasant consequences, the number and quality of which will constantly increase (in the sense of negative consequences for the state and the country as a whole).
That's all I want/can write so far.
Sincerely, I am waiting for letters and reports,
I. V. Girkin
09/28/2024, Kirovo-Chepetsk" ( https://t.me/donbass_skripnik/16738 )

* senceless entertainment TV channels - RA

[JWB]

Liberation Russian style:

 

[Roman Alymov]

Russian society's paradoxical response to war (thehill.com)

"Why do Russians appear so satisfied despite the war in Ukraine?
by Vladislav L. Inozemtsev, opinion contributor - 09/30/24 12:00 PM ET

Two and a half years into their nation’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russians seem to be less affected by the war than they were in 2022.

Neither Ukraine’s incursion into the Kursk region nor the most recent Western sanctions seem to be igniting discontent among “ordinary” citizens or the affluent populations of Russia’s largest cities.  

This comes as a surprise to many Western policymakers and the Russian dissidents who invested some hope in Muscovites and Petersburgers becoming disgruntled with the “war economy,” as such luxuries as Western boutiques, unlimited internet use and even easy weekend trips to European capitals vanish. But although Russia has become significantly cut-off from the West — one can reach Paris or Berlin only via Istanbul or Doha, and a VPN is needed to access “prohibited” websites —  all of this annoys too few people to cause any significant backlash. 

How can one explain such silence in those Russian communities that have been considered the most Westernized in the entire country? I would offer a rather paradoxical answer. Moscow and other Russian metropolises have become much more Westernized in recent years despite Russia appearing to be the West’s most desperate adversary. 

Looking at Moscow, we see not only an enormous concentration of wealth, making the capital a contributor of 20 percent of all taxes to Russia’s federal budget, but a rapid modernization of the city’s infrastructure and development of diverse digital services barely seen anywhere else. 

The Western sanctions imposed in 2022 caused a sharp fall in Russia’s capital exports. Almost all the money that would have previously been channeled into luxury European real estate instead started to flow into Moscow, St. Petersburg and their suburbs. Since 2021, the average dollar price of an apartment in Moscow has risen by a staggering 43 percent, and the city government has invested huge efforts into expanding transportation facilities and stimulating private businesses in the service sector to meet growing demand.

In the last ten years, 78 new stations of the Moscow underground were built — more than in the previous four decades —  and the commuter network was integrated into a broader railway system, now resembling the Paris Métro-RER network. The city now has the largest fleet of locally made all-electric buses in Europe, while river electric trams are bolstering Moscow’s transit infrastructure.

Although Visa and MasterCard suspended their operations in Russia, Russians continue to use Central Bank’s Instantaneous Payments System, which allows the transfer of any amount of money using one’s mobile phone number as an identifier, immediately and without commission. Russia’s capital cities are now ahead of European metropolises in using QR-code payments and facial recognition in financial transactions, and mobile data in Russia remains the cheapest and fastest in Europe. Grocery shops feature the same assortment of goods as before the war, including French wine and Italian confectionary. On the top of that, doorstep delivery of food and goods by autonomous bots is commonplace. 

Of course, the effects of war are still felt in Russia’s most affluent locations. For example, the massive emigration of 2022 and the growing number of people mobilized to military service has led to a labor shortage. But in both Moscow and St. Petersburg, the number sent to war is not too high, as city dwellers cannot be seduced even by record signing bonuses offered to volunteers. Meanwhile, booming demand is driving up local wages.

Moreover, the job offers have been so enticing in recent months that many Russians who left the country at the beginning of the war, are now returning after failing to integrate into European societies. Even Western celebrities like the developmental economist Jeffrey Sachs are starring in glamorous international events like the recent BRICS Urban Future Forum which attracted dozens of mayors of major cities across Asia, Africa and the Middle East. 

Of course, the Russian metropolises were always different from the rest of the country. But these days, one may monitor their developments for understanding why the Russian citizens manage to become more affluent while their country is at war with its closest neighbor.

As I argued 15 years ago in Le Monde, the Russian post-communist society became extremely individualized and focused on, as the late Polish-British sociologist Zygmunt Bauman used to say, personal solutions of systemic contradictions. These people are not so much disturbed but rather pleased by the liberal Russians’ exodus, and they welcome those positive economic changes they witness in their everyday lives.

This economic progress, partially caused by the West’s confrontational policy, has undermined the anti-Putin sentiments in the country much more than any other factor. To date, it outweighs the curtailing of political liberties in the country in recent years — since those liberties are claimed by few, and the economic prosperity is felt by all.

The West’s attempt to undermine Russia economically since 2022 has thus produced an opposite result — at least so far. 

Vladislav Inozemtsev is special adviser to the Middle East Media Research Institute’s Russian Media Studies Project and is director of Moscow-based Center for Post-Industrial Studies."

[Stuart Galbraith]

On 10/2/2024 at 4:59 PM, JWB said:

Liberation Russian style:

 

Am I wrong thinking a 'womans massager' is like one of THOSE massagers, or is my filthy mind interposing again?

Perhaps she didnt have a washing machine.....

 

[Roman Alymov]

30 minutes ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

Am I wrong thinking a 'womans massager' is like one of THOSE massagers, or is my filthy mind interposing again?

Perhaps she didnt have a washing machine.....

Taking into consideration reliability of "Anton Gerashchenko" as source, quite possible the person writing it (no idea who it actually is) is taking insperation from his/her personal inventory....

 

[Roman Alymov]

"IGOR STRELKOV (letter to colleagues).

Dear Alexander Nikolaevich,

Thank you for the excellent selection from 30.09.2024! — It "closed many gaps" in my understanding of the current situation — especially with regard to the "impotent attempts" of our cretins to "achieve a compromise peace" (or at least a "truce"). Having failed to break the enemy militarily and fearing to "increase the degree of confrontation", they completely groundlessly hope for the opportunity to "jump out" of an unfavorable situation into a certain "loophole", which for some reason their former "partners" should provide them. I repeat again: I am deeply convinced that there will be NO truce. New enemy attacks on our positions and facilities will soon follow — even more powerful and dangerous. If they succeed (which they really would not like), then "from the position of the winner" the enemies will again "roll out an ultimatum about surrender." If not achieved, the "stagnation" will continue until a new crisis. And there will be nothing else. — The alternative of "complete defeat or complete victory" has been and remains relevant.

With respect and gratitude,
I. V. Girkin
01.10.2024
Kirovo-Chepetsk, IK-5" ( https://t.me/strelkovii/6909 )

[AETiglathPZ]

Parcels containing military items found on trains to Moscow in Lithuania (msn.com)

Five sets of soiled camouflage trousers were confiscated by the Lithuanian government enroute to Moscow. The loss of such trousers will complicate Russian logistics and change the balance of power in the region. The Ukrainian army will be feasting on crepes in Kursk by New Years day.

[Roman Alymov]

8 hours ago, AETiglathPZ said:

Parcels containing military items found on trains to Moscow in Lithuania (msn.com)

Five sets of soiled camouflage trousers were confiscated by the Lithuanian government enroute to Moscow. The loss of such trousers will complicate Russian logistics and change the balance of power in the region. The Ukrainian army will be feasting on crepes in Kursk by New Years day.

There was also an incident about a week ago, 20 camouflage nets woven by parishioners of a church in Kaliningrad were confiscated during transit. No need to note incidents like that, whatever small they are, are not improving grassroots attitude to "Baltic tigers" in Russia.

[Mike1158]

There is a lot of proporganda from all sides, it's a bit like seiving shit in the hope of finding diamonds.

[JWB]

Roman?

 

[Markus Becker]

 

Auto translation from a German blog:

Russia's Great Transformation to a War Economy

    Russia's 2025 budget sets a historic record with 40 percent for military and security. The capture of the city of Vuhledar shows that Russia is increasingly gearing its economy towards war - but the price for this is high.

    Last week, a political bombshell caused a stir in Moscow. The draft Russian federal budget for 2025 was presented to the State Duma. It marks a new high in military spending since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia plans to spend around 40 percent of its entire budget on defense and security in 2025.

    This share far exceeds spending on education, health and social services, which together receive much less funding. Economic experts described the new budget figures as "shocking" and noted that "the country has finally switched to a war economy."

    On Monday, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin highlighted the key indicators, including an expected 12 percent increase in state revenues and a reduction in the budget deficit to 0.5 percent. Mishustin also promised to adjust pensions, including those for working pensioners. Despite these announcements, one key issue was not directly addressed: the significant increase in military spending. In 2025, this is expected to amount to 6.3 percent of total spending - a total of 13.5 trillion rubles.

    According to earlier reports by Bloomberg news agency, planned military spending for 2025 is set at 13.2 trillion rubles, or 6.2 percent of GDP, up 25 percent from the planned 10.4 trillion rubles in 2024 - and even exceeding initial estimates (Achgut reported ) - a clear indication of Russia's increasing prioritization in the defense sector.

    This dramatic increase is not an isolated case. In 2024, Russia's defense spending exceeded social spending for the first time. Finance Minister Siluanov justified this with the motto "Everything for the front, everything for victory." The record increase from 6.4 trillion to 10.8 trillion rubles marked this turning point. It was assumed at the time that this sharp increase was a one-off effect. But the current budget shows that this assumption was wrong.

    According to business magazine The Bell, military spending will not decrease significantly in the coming years, although the government had originally planned to cut it to 8.5 trillion rubles in 2025 and 7.4 trillion rubles in 2026. Current developments show that the war in Ukraine has become part of the Russian economy at a structural level. Military and social spending now drive both economic growth and the incomes of the population. This development is unlikely to be reversed in the short term.

    The sharp increase in military spending comes at the expense of other sectors. Health care spending remains unchanged at 1.9 trillion rubles, which represents a real cut when adjusted for inflation. Similar trends can be observed in the areas of education and social policy, whose budgets also lag behind defense spending. This shows that the Russian state is channeling resources to an unprecedented extent into military buildup and warfare, while public services for the population are stagnating or even declining.

    In addition to military spending, the new budget also includes significant increases in the maintenance of the president and his administration. Journalists Farida Rustamova and Maxim Tovkailo report that spending on the presidential administration will increase by 25.6 percent to 30.9 billion rubles in 2025. This increase is closely linked to the planned increase in salaries for Kremlin and presidential staff. The salary fund alone is expected to grow from 18 billion rubles to 21 billion rubles.

    These increases are comparable to the increase in military spending and show that very few areas of the budget have received significant increases. Critics point out that this prioritization is highly tailored to the person of President Putin and his centralized power structure.

    The new budget plans have already sparked concern in macroeconomic circles. The Telegram channel MMI , which specializes in analyzing the Russian economy, spoke in a commentary of an "inflationary shock" caused by the government's budget policy. The increased budget deficit, the continued militarization of the economy and the double increase in utility fees (11.9 percent) compared to the original plan lead to a significant risk of inflation.

    The channel's founder and head of the Central Bank's monetary policy department, Kirill Tremazov, said the budget contained "a number of unexpected elements" that could lead to adjustments to economic forecasts. Tremazov warned that key interest rates, which were only raised to 19 percent on September 13, could rise further if further "unforeseen circumstances" arise. This budget development will also play a role at the next meeting of the Central Bank Council in October.

    The Bell reported that before the budget was released, the Russian government sent targeted instructions to the media to influence coverage. These instructions focused on positive aspects of the budget, such as education, health and social services, while military spending was only mentioned in passing in one paragraph. The emphasis was on presenting difficult issues, such as tax increases and rising excise taxes, in a positive light, for example by highlighting "saving citizens' health" through a tax on sugary products.

    In Kommerstant and other major media in Russia, the government's recommendations were clearly implemented: defense spending was given in percentages and absolute numbers, but presented without further analysis or criticism. Other media, such as RBK , even avoided giving specific figures when mentioning military spending, and instead gave long statements about the need to "strengthen the country's defense."

    Despite the tense situation, the Kremlin could benefit from a favorable development. The announcement of the new state budget coincides with the capture of Vuhledar. On Wednesday, the Ukrainian armed forces officially confirmed their withdrawal from the strategically important city in the Donbass. The decision was made after the danger of being encircled by the Russian armed forces had increased significantly.

    Only a year ago, the loss of Vuhledar would have been a devastating blow to the Ukrainian defense. The city was a central point along a defensive line that stretched from Toretsk through towns such as Avdiivka and Marinka to Zaporizhia. This line was essential to slowing the Russian advance in the east and south of Ukraine. The city also had particular strategic importance because it was located on high ground and from there the Ukrainian forces could target the Russian supply routes.

    As a result, Vuhledar has been the scene of fierce fighting since the beginning of the Russian invasion. Russian forces attempted to capture the city as early as November 2022, when they advanced almost to the city limits via the town of Pavlivka. But despite numerous large-scale attacks, the Russians were unable to break through Ukraine's defense lines. Particularly costly battles occurred in the fall of 2022 and the winter of 2023, when Russian elite units, including the 155th and 40th Black Berets Marine Brigades, attempted to capture the city.

    During 2024, the military situation in the Donetsk region changed significantly. Ukraine lost key cities such as Avdiivka, Maryinka and Krasnohorivka, while Russian forces continued to advance and intensify their offensive against the remaining defensive belt. Vuhledar, once an essential part of Ukraine's defense, gradually lost strategic importance. By the end of September 2024, the encirclement of the city was almost complete, when Russian troops attacked simultaneously from two sides - from Vodyanoye in the east and Prechivka in the west.

    When Russian artillery finally shelled the Ukrainian forces' last retreat routes, Ukrainian troops had no choice but to abandon the city to avoid complete encirclement. The retreat was presented by Ukrainian commanders as a necessary tactical decision to save soldiers and equipment. This decision had far-reaching consequences than just the loss of a city.

    The loss of Vuhledar marked the end of a long-standing defensive line in southern and eastern Ukraine that had kept Russian forces at bay for a long time. The abandonment of Vuhledar was therefore not only a strategic setback, but also a symbolic loss for the Ukrainian army.

    Despite this, Russia has paid a high price for Vuhledar. It is estimated that the Russian naval brigades 155 and 40 suffered heavy losses in repeated attempts to take the city. Both elite units are said to have lost more than 2,100 soldiers - a third of their pre-war strength. These losses include both killed, wounded and missing. Particularly serious is the loss of officers and experienced soldiers, whose training and experience are essential for coordination and operational action. This means that the affected units no longer have the same striking power as before the offensive.

    The price of the Russian victory is also reflected in the recruitment strategies: As a result of the high losses, the marine brigades had to be filled with fighters from the "Storm-Z" units, which mostly consist of convicts. This illustrates the dramatic personnel shortage in which the Russian armed forces find themselves and raises questions about the future operational capability of the elite units.

    It seems that the losses of the Black Berets in the battle for Vuhledar are four times higher than the losses suffered by these units in the entire ten years of the Chechen war. The shock at the level of losses is felt not only in military circles, but also among the families of the killed soldiers. Many relatives of fallen and missing soldiers who were deployed in Vuhledar expressed their despair and discontent on social networks at the official handling of the course of the war and the poor communication of the authorities.

    Once again, the lack of modern communications on the Russian side led to disastrous errors. In one particularly tragic case, Russian artillery accidentally attacked its own troops as they attempted to shell Ukrainian positions. Such incidents are a recurring pattern in the fighting for Vuhledar, underscoring the structural deficiencies of the Russian armed forces.

    Overall, the fall of the city has both strategic and symbolic significance for the further course of the war. On the one hand, it marks the collapse of one of Ukraine's last important lines of defense in the Donetsk region. Russian troops now have the potential to expand their offensive to other strategically important targets such as the city of Pokrovsk or the western parts of the Donetsk Oblast.

    On the other hand, the enormous losses suffered by Russia in the battle have shown that any further advance in this area requires a high price. In the face of increasing losses, the Russian war effort faces the challenge of maintaining its military resources and human capacity in the long term.

    In this respect, Vuhledar could also be a turning point - not only for Ukraine, which was forced to abandon one of its most important defensive positions, but also for Russia, which may have to bear the consequences of its costly offensive. How further fighting in the region will develop remains to be seen, but the events surrounding Vuhledar have had a significant impact on the war.

 

    Dr. Christian Osthold is a historian specializing in Russian history. His monograph on the Russian-Chechen conflict has been reviewed by Cambridge University Press. Osthold has appeared in the media frequently since 2015.

[Stuart Galbraith]

On 10/6/2024 at 7:48 PM, AETiglathPZ said:

Parcels containing military items found on trains to Moscow in Lithuania (msn.com)

Five sets of soiled camouflage trousers were confiscated by the Lithuanian government enroute to Moscow. The loss of such trousers will complicate Russian logistics and change the balance of power in the region. The Ukrainian army will be feasting on crepes in Kursk by New Years day.

Part of me want to know how they were soiled, and part of me is perfectly happy with never knowing...

[sunday]

This Dr. Christian Osthold?

https://www.cicero.de/taxonomy/term/9355

Edited October 8 by sunday

[Mike1158]

 

4 hours ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

Part of me want to know how they were soiled, and part of me is perfectly happy with never knowing...

President Putin would like to present your new office, the windows will be ready for fitting on the 20th.  How about you visit on the 10th?

[Stuart Galbraith]

As long as he keeps a big pile of the Russian army's dirty laundry stacked under said windows, im distinctly sanguine about the prospect.

[JWB]

Russia stronk!

 

[Mike1158]

Well, I found a definition of 'Stronk' to mean "Like a Greek Goddess".

 

With respect to whom?

 

Sorry Vlad, you don't make the cut.