Soviet and Warsaw pact opinion of individual NATO countries and inter-NATO grumblings

[Intrepid_Hants]

I recently came across two documents that discussed early 80's thoughts on NATO made by senior Warsaw officers. The results were a bit alarming and somewhat surprising.  These documents are entitled "Warsaw Pact Perceptions of NATO Strengths and Weaknesses" (1981)  and COMBAT POTENTIALS of the Armament and Combat Equipment of the Ground Forces and Aviation of the USSR and of the Armies of the Probable Enemy, and Table of the Combat Potentials of Large Units

Some key points:

They appear to hold most of NATO in contempt in terms of tactics, training and doctrine. Only holding the Germans in high regard.  Some highlights include.

1) They seem to think that the West Germans are capable of raising 155(?!) divisions! 

2) Militarily, the strategic (Nuclear) forces of the United States, The United Kingdom and France generally are highly regarded. (NATO commands little respect in WP military circles; the only serious threat. is perceived to be posed by the strategic forces--missiles, bombers, missile-carrying nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers--of the United States (and, to a lesser extent of the United Kingdom and France).

3) The French army is seen as poorly organized, trained and equipped, and the tactical air defence forces are described as "very poor." 

4)The British Army of the Rhine is viewed as a particular joke- -inadequately trained and equipped, and an embarrassment for NATO.

How much of this can be put down to the Warsaw Pact projection of thought? Or is this more a reflection of dire spending and other problems of NATO during the early 80s and that the capability gap be closed as the 1980s went on?

 

On a slightly different note, someone stated on youtube that the other Nations of NATO warned the UK not to go forward or to continue using Chieftain as its main MBT. Does anyone have a confirmation of that?

[urbanoid]

NATO is clearly superior in communications, command and control. NATO's weakness is communications, command and control. Makes sense.

[Stuart Galbraith]

25 minutes ago, Intrepid_Hants said:

I recently came across two documents that discussed early 80's thoughts on NATO made by senior Warsaw officers. The results were a bit alarming and somewhat surprising.  These documents are entitled "Warsaw Pact Perceptions of NATO Strengths and Weaknesses" (1981)  and COMBAT POTENTIALS of the Armament and Combat Equipment of the Ground Forces and Aviation of the USSR and of the Armies of the Probable Enemy, and Table of the Combat Potentials of Large Units

Some key points:

They appear to hold most of NATO in contempt in terms of tactics, training and doctrine. Only holding the Germans in high regard.  Some highlights include.

1) They seem to think that the West Germans are capable of raising 155(?!) divisions! 

2) Militarily, the strategic (Nuclear) forces of the United States, The United Kingdom and France generally are highly regarded. (NATO commands little respect in WP military circles; the only serious threat. is perceived to be posed by the strategic forces--missiles, bombers, missile-carrying nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers--of the United States (and, to a lesser extent of the United Kingdom and France).

3) The French army is seen as poorly organized, trained and equipped, and the tactical air defence forces are described as "very poor." 

4)The British Army of the Rhine is viewed as a particular joke- -inadequately trained and equipped, and an embarrassment for NATO.

How much of this can be put down to the Warsaw Pact projection of thought? Or is this more a reflection of dire spending and other problems of NATO during the early 80s and that the capability gap be closed as the 1980s went on?

 

On a slightly different note, someone stated on youtube that the other Nations of NATO warned the UK not to go forward or to continue using Chieftain as its main MBT. Does anyone have a confirmation of that?

Ive never heard that. And we would have told them what to do anyway, ie 'Get a 120mm gun!'

The real problem was less the tank, than the lack of track miles they were getting. It was a combination of modified engine, and driving the tracks off them with extra fuel in the 1980's that banished the worst of the problems. over serviced is also another claim held against it. Basically I think it was a good tank, with reservations, so they had no place to get shirty about it, particularly as it won CAT at least once.

Ive not read all you posted (Thanks for doing that, Im always ready to read new stuff) but..

1 Well they did a lot more in 1939-45, so the I guess the mindset is, they were still up for it.

2 Thats interesting, but not wholly surprising. hey were wrong if they disrespected NATO, the command and control system for its nuclear forces seems to have been pretty good, albeit subject to spoofing.

3 Yeah, they are off base. The French were always good postwar. Their airforce in particular.

4 Yeah, there is a pattern forming here....

Lets put it this way, a tanknetter about 2 decades ago gave me some documents and the claim that the Soviets tried to move towards a conventional only doctrine, and found that they couldnt make it work. it cost too much money. So they eventually went back to the use of tactical nuclear weapons, as pretty much every exercise warplan they had before 1986 featured prodigious amounts of them.

The point is, if NATO was as bad as they said, why did they seem to have every training exercise nuking every damn town between Bremen and Brussels? Doesnt say much about how effective the Red Army was.

 

[Perun]

As said before, many times, Soviets planed to use nukes only in retaliation. At least that was planed in all of their exercises that I could finde. I dont see any logical reason to repeat again and again that Soviets wanted to conqoure nuclear wasteland

[Stuart Galbraith]

As I explained patiently last time, retaliation is a pretty wide street if you believe you are about to be attacked. The Israeli offensive in the 6 day war was a 'retaliation' also.

[Perun]

No, it was not

[Rick]

"...WP forces plan to be on the Rhine River within 6-8 days, in Paris within 15 days, and to have  overrun the Iberian Peninsula within 30 days." 

Hhhmmm, probable? 

Edited April 19, 2023 by Rick

[R011]

2 hours ago, Rick said:

"...WP forces plan to be on the Rhine River within 6-8 days, in Paris within 15 days, and to have  overrun the Iberian Peninsula within 30 days." 

Hhhmmm, probable? 

Just like the three day special military operation.  Mind you, I'm not sure Nato would be much more ready.

[Mykola Saichuk]

These are contingent calculations in a command-staff exercise, during which hundreds of nuclear strikes pave the way for the troops. But this same exercise assumes that soviet troops will be able to regain combat effectiveness in 10-20 hours after NATO nuclear strikes. 
In all seriousness, the chief marshal of the armored forces P.Rotmistrov named the term of the offensive operation as 60-90 days in 1967 (taking into account the use of nuclear weapons, and without it there was no perspective of victory).

[Stuart Galbraith]

12 hours ago, Perun said:

No, it was not

Whatever you say Perun.

3 hours ago, R011 said:

Just like the three day special military operation.  Mind you, I'm not sure Nato would be much more ready.

It has giving me a vivid new understanding of quite why the Soviet military was so paranoid. They knew damn well if they got caught on the backfoot, quite how quickly their military machine probably would fold. Which is why they had so many readiness units to plug the gap I guess.

I dont believe they would have waited to get hit first. They did that in 1941, and look how well that turned out for them, 20 million dead. Far better to fight on NATO territory and let them suffer all the fallout and blast damage. All their publications talk of going on the offensive as quickly as possible,I dont believe that necessarily means NATO had to fire first.

The problem is that NATO believed the Soviets could go with a minimum of 2 days preparation, but they didnt think that was remotely likely, because it would mean only the forces inside GSFG would go. The problem is, that thinking was probably wrong. I chanced upon a document relating that the Soviets in 1983 signed a document requiring all pact forces to come under their control in a crisis, which mean they could give them a no notice mobilisation and they would come. None of them would fight very well, there would be relatively few follow on forces with a limited mobilisation. But as Tom Clancy put it for the Soviets, 'None of our officers are skiing in the fucking alps!'

So the Soviets could go very quickly, if they wanted to. Brixmis reported they could go from their barracks to jumping off positions without a single squeak of radio traffic. When they told GCHQ that, they didnt believe they could do it. Mixed in with a quick and limited nuclear strike, the Soviets would be in Bonn, before NATO even figured out what was going on. Probably. Maybe. Hopefully. That is what 7 Days to the River Rhine proposed, though after looking at Ukraine, I think we have a new perspective on how it would have gone, particularly with their reluctance to stop and debus their infantry. They demonstrated that time and again, even in Afghanistan.

[Stuart Galbraith]

2 hours ago, Mykola Saichuk said:

These are contingent calculations in a command-staff exercise, during which hundreds of nuclear strikes pave the way for the troops. But this same exercise assumes that soviet troops will be able to regain combat effectiveness in 10-20 hours after NATO nuclear strikes. 
In all seriousness, the chief marshal of the armored forces P.Rotmistrov named the term of the offensive operation as 60-90 days in 1967 (taking into account the use of nuclear weapons, and without it there was no perspective of victory).

Which is very telling how realistic they believed a 'NATO offensive' actually was.

Ive seen the maps of the fallout plumes from the envisaged fallout from NATO attacks (and from their own). Ive even wargamed it on nuclear war simulator to see for myself.  Poland would have been largely coated with it. So there is a large degree of unreality in these plans. NATO strikes, but doesnt seemingly destroy anything, Poland is coated with fallout, yet is still able to provide 3 armies for offensive action. There is no effect upon follow on forces in second and third echelons, let allone supply trucks and trains. Its almost the same degree of reality that believed Kyiv would fall in 3 days. Similarly the Soviet Army  also seemingly strove to accomodate political wishes of its masters. It didnt mean they were realistic.

[Perun]

Those were scenarios for wargames and not real studies. There is no need to choke this topic with non argumented prejudices

[Stuart Galbraith]

No, ive read the real studies on the fallout that would fall on Poland. Hence even the Soviets seemed to realise their claim that they could go directly on the offensive after taking a nuclear strike was ridiculous. Which suggests strongly to me, that they never intended it to happen.

Ok, Im wrong. Tell me, why im wrong. And as for choking the topic, all you have presently added to it is 'You are wrong' with no evidence supporting your position.

 

 

Edited April 19, 2023 by Stuart Galbraith

[urbanoid]

4 minutes ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

No, ive read the real studies on the fallout that would fall on Poland. Hence even the Soviets seemed to realise their claim that they could go directly on the offensive after taking a nuclear strike was ridiculous. Which suggests strongly to me, that they never intended it to happen.

Ok, Im wrong. Tell me, why im wrong. And as for choking the topic, all you have presently added to it is 'You are wrong' with no evidence supporting your position.

 

 

The Soviets have always said that their intentions are peaceful - how's that for a source, filthy westerner?

Edited April 19, 2023 by urbanoid

[Mykola Saichuk]

The Soviet military command initially relied on tactical nuclear weapons as a universal tool to quickly break through the defense of NATO troops. Therefore there was little conventional ammunition in storage in East Germany. See table. In 1969 the consumption of shells in the first artillery strike was 20,000 tons that the Soviets to reach the first line of defense 30 km from the border. It's only 30 km! At that time there were only 200,000 tons in storage. That would have run out before the Soviets even reached the Rhine. Therefore the use of nuclear weapons was becoming inevitable.

In the late 1970s the Soviet command adopted the concept of a long period of conventional warfare. Changes in operational plans caused an increase in the amount of conventional ammunition in depots in East Germany. Their maximum quantity in 1989-1990 was 677,000 tons.

[Stuart Galbraith]

Ive read that was certainly the intention by the 1980's. OTOH, I was in contact with a Russian who had a friend who was a T64 commander in East Germany in the 1980's, who sent me his emails discussing what he had seen in the Soviet Army. He said he saw a big exercise board with the command post exercise, showing wave upon wave of tactical nuclear strikes, which is pretty odd that they seemed to be using them in the major exercises if they had gone with conventional only. Ive also read that they never really gave up on tactical nuclear strikes till after Chernobyl, when they belatedly saw how vulnerable they were to a reciprocal strike.

If they could have ensured NATO would not mobilise and if they had air superiority, ive no doubt they would have done it conventionally. But as things stood, particularly with the vulnerablity to Pershing 2 and the perception it would inevitably be used, I dont really see a conventional only war option was viable. Maybe with just Chemical weapons, but I have to doubt even that. Its the old thought experiment, how much do you trust your enemy to not do the thing you most fear?

And if they had done it conventionally, there is a very good chance they would have had fuel for a month, and a month only. There was book I read on Chuck Horner, the General commanding airforces in Desert Storm. He related they had a plan to use F117's to hit the fuel pump terminals that led back to the USSR. They calculated that if they hit those, the Soviets would have about a month of fuel in Central Europe.  . Whether NATO could have held out for a month is another matter of course, but ive no doubt at least parts of it would have done.

Edited April 19, 2023 by Stuart Galbraith

[bd1]

2 hours ago, Perun said:

Those were scenarios for wargames and not real studies. There is no need to choke this topic with non argumented prejudices

perun, please look at prevailing winds in Europe

[Ssnake]

1 hour ago, Mykola Saichuk said:

In 1969 the consumption of shells in the first artillery strike was 20,000 tons that the Soviets to reach the first line of defense 30 km from the border. It's only 30 km! At that time there were only 200,000 tons in storage.

Eh, good enough for 300km, and you need less as you get closer to the Rhine, so...

[RETAC21]

On 4/18/2023 at 4:53 PM, Intrepid_Hants said:

I recently came across two documents that discussed early 80's thoughts on NATO made by senior Warsaw officers. The results were a bit alarming and somewhat surprising.  These documents are entitled "Warsaw Pact Perceptions of NATO Strengths and Weaknesses" (1981)  and COMBAT POTENTIALS of the Armament and Combat Equipment of the Ground Forces and Aviation of the USSR and of the Armies of the Probable Enemy, and Table of the Combat Potentials of Large Units

Some key points:

They appear to hold most of NATO in contempt in terms of tactics, training and doctrine. Only holding the Germans in high regard.  Some highlights include.

1) They seem to think that the West Germans are capable of raising 155(?!) divisions! 

2) Militarily, the strategic (Nuclear) forces of the United States, The United Kingdom and France generally are highly regarded. (NATO commands little respect in WP military circles; the only serious threat. is perceived to be posed by the strategic forces--missiles, bombers, missile-carrying nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers--of the United States (and, to a lesser extent of the United Kingdom and France).

3) The French army is seen as poorly organized, trained and equipped, and the tactical air defence forces are described as "very poor." 

4)The British Army of the Rhine is viewed as a particular joke- -inadequately trained and equipped, and an embarrassment for NATO.

How much of this can be put down to the Warsaw Pact projection of thought? Or is this more a reflection of dire spending and other problems of NATO during the early 80s and that the capability gap be closed as the 1980s went on?

 

On a slightly different note, someone stated on youtube that the other Nations of NATO warned the UK not to go forward or to continue using Chieftain as its main MBT. Does anyone have a confirmation of that?

Both of these documents came from Ryszard Kukliński, and were part of those used during his training at Voroshilov academy in 1973, so the potentials reflect the Soviet opinion of NATO in the early 70s, and it that light, it's not that far off.

Around this time Greece and Turkey were at each other's throat over Cyprus and Italy seem on the verge of becoming the first Eurocommunist country (remember that The Third World War novel had the Soviet occupying Italy without a fight)

On the equipment front, the main fighter for the Soviets was the MiG-23 and for the US, the F-4 Phantom, NATO had the F-104G galore and the WP allies the MiG-21. M48s, Leopard-1s and M60s compared poorly to T-64s of the Soviets, but the WP was uniformly equipped with T-54/55s, while NATO had an advantage is Self-propelled artillery, but only because the other side didn't have any, not for lack of tubes.

[Mykola Saichuk]

37 minutes ago, Ssnake said:

Eh, good enough for 300km, and you need less as you get closer to the Rhine, so...

No, look at the "chewing through" of the Ukrainian defense today.

Soviet troops in Germany would have repeated it. They had 7 allowances of ammunition; 2 of which were directly in the troops, 4 in army and front-line depots.
The life of these warehouses would have been short. For example, there were only seven front-line depots in East Germany.

And there is enough ammunition in a soviet motorized rifle (tank) regiment to break the defense of one infantry battalion (10-20% is the mandatory residue). And after that, the regiment cannot advance.
 

[Perun]

1 hour ago, bd1 said:

perun, please look at prevailing winds in Europe

As I can see from maps wind paterns are highly favorite for NATO. Those maps are just few of many. I found them in few minutes and I doubt that winds changed their paterns so I doubt that Soviets didnt know about them. If someone have real documents please sent link for them or name them. Although stories like "I met some guy who knew some guy who..." is interesting I prefere real documents

[Stuart Galbraith]

You can have the email if I can find it, I doubt Vasily Fofanov would mind.

So we established the USSR was uniquely vulnerable to nuclear attack. Its own exercises pretended it would take extremely  limited casualties, and it would be able to go immediately  onto an offensive with minimal preparations. It prepared in all its exercises almost exclusively  for a high tempo offensive. It had absolutely no prepared defences ( Even Nato did that).

Join the dots, it's not exactly rocket science. Well it IS rocket science I guess. Well you know what I mean..

[Perun]

Well, I wasnt impresed by dot connecting becouse it is motivated by prejudices. Point me to some real documents

[Stuart Galbraith]

 

Ok, here is a little light reading. You will probably be interested in the comment that the only decision that can be arrived at in war is by taking to the offensive at the earliest opportunity. Note 'earliest opportunity'. They almost certainly dont seem to mean waiting to be hit by NATO atomic weapons. Indeed, i think there was a section in it on the offensive with nuclear weapons.

https://books.google.co.uk/books/about/The_Offensive.html?id=Ztx5OgAACAAJ&redir_esc=y

Then do a search for 'Soviet Defensive structures'. Dont you think it a little strange, that the ONLY place in the Eastern Bloc where they invested seriously in defensive structures was Albania? Which wasnt even in the Warsaw pact.

There is a very good book by Timothy Phillips called 'The Curtain and the Wall'. He describes in the far north, on the border with Norway, there was a metal fence covering the border. And that was it. He was told 'Yeah, there wasnt much else there, even in cold war days'. No miles of landmines, not antitank defenses. There wasnt even much in the way of barracks up there. Locals at one point were even allowed to walk across and use the shops.

https://www.amazon.co.uk/Curtain-Wall-Modern-Journey-Europes/dp/1783785764/ref=sr_1_2?crid=37C9Z84YLT8PT&keywords=journey+along+the+iron+curtain&qid=1681974867&sprefix=journey+along+the+iron+curtain%2Caps%2C107&sr=8-2

So ask yourself this question, how realistic is the narrative they were 'scared' of being invaded, when the border, only a few hundred miles from their most sensitive bases at Murmansk and Polyarny, and nothing, other than a few border troops and a few isolated motor rifle troops, to stop the NATO incursion? And if they were purely intending to fight a defensive action, why didnt they prepare for one, either in the North or in East Germany?

Also, dont you think it strange the massive investment in Airborne Divisions, by my calculation 6 by the 1980's, 7 or 8 at their height, and not even including the Airborne Brigades, or the Airmobile Brigades. Did you know they had one of the latter in East Germany? The 35th Guards Air Assault Brigade in Cottbus. Thats not including 3rd Guards Spetsnaz Brigade at Furstenberg. Dont you think there is something just a LITTLE strange about maintaining such forces so far forward, when they would, just like Western Special Forces, for the most part would be kept further back? Ok, so stay behind. You still have to explain why they kept an entire Air Assault Brigade for purely defensive purposes, when all they practiced was seizing Bridges behind enemy lines. And the reason is clear. Because the entire operational tempo of the Soviet Army was for the offensive, for the liberation of the downtrodden masses, just as Trotsky has originally intended. It was in their DNA, and remained so till the end.

And if you doubt that claim on my part, try reading Odoms 'Collapse of the Soviet Military', which will firmly establish, if you have any kind of open mind at all, their mindset was offensive, not defensive. And when Gorbachev tried to make them adopt a defensive mindset, my God didnt they complain about it.

https://www.amazon.co.uk/Collapse-Soviet-Military-William-Odom/dp/0300082711/ref=sr_1_4?adgrpid=1184174921953419&hvadid=74011135081125&hvbmt=be&hvdev=c&hvlocphy=41210&hvnetw=s&hvqmt=e&hvtargid=kwd-74011069553059%3Aloc-188&hydadcr=11703_2290928&keywords=the+collapse+of+the+soviet+military&qid=1681975595&sr=8-4

Odom it will be remembered was, IIRC, military attache in Moscow, but most interestingly was a member of USMLM, so saw the Soviet Army a lot closer up than you and I have. His opinion is well worth listening to.

You are entitled to your opinion, and you are perfectly entitled to doubt everything I say, but you are not entitled to call me prejudiced. Not when ive spent the past 30 years indulging in this near obession in my own time. If I found anything that suggested post 1960 before 1986 the Soviets had a purely defensive strategy, I would have found it by now. Im still looking. So if you have any sources of your own that indicate Im wrong, I strongly suggest you post it up and stop coming up with smart one liners because you find what im saying objectionable.

Edited April 20, 2023 by Stuart Galbraith

[Perun]

Thank you for light read. As much as I know, every military has the possibility for offensive operations. If we go by your criteria, then NATO is the most aggressive defensive pact because the USA, the main NATO player, has invaded a dozen countries in the last 74 years.

As for Albania, they were in WP but Enver Hoxa decided to leave because the Soviets started destalinization and that was dangerous for Hoxa regime. 

I recommend another light read, MILITARY PLANNING FOR EUROPEAN THEATRE CONFLICT DURING THE COLD WAR AN ORAL HISTORY ROUNDTABLE. 

https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/ZB-79.pdf

There is an interesting view of nuclear weapons use by WP generals and that view is totally contrary to yours.