Leak-a-geddon

[Ivanhoe]

https://www.theepochtimes.com/what-we-know-about-jack-teixeira-accused-of-involvement-in-classified-documents-leak_5194429.html

So they've got their guy; A1C Jack Teixeira, 21, of the Massachusetts Air National Guard; 102nd Intelligence Wing at Otis Air National Guard Base.

https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/23777132-teixeira-charging-document

https://www.boston.com/news/national-news/2023/04/13/who-is-jack-teixeira-documents-leak-suspect/#:~:text=Teixeira was recently promoted to,a cyber transport systems journeyman.

Armchair analysts are all over the map with this one. It's amusing to see the contrast between the "it's all intentional misinfo" camp and the "we'll never recover from the foreign policy backblast" camp. 

There is a camp that asserts that Teixeira is a patsy for some malevolent foreign or domestic intel service, but it's hard to see that making sense at this point. 

Two classic, nay eternal, principles were clearly violated; Principle of Least Priviledge, and Need to Know. Let's just say that I'm not surprised that an intel unit is involved. 

 

[Stuart Galbraith]

As I said on the other thread, they have learned nothing from Chelsea Manning. Nothing.

Oh, Its real, and and the story the more I read it of his motivation is banal enough to be completely convincing. Maybe if they have a psycological evaluation before handing someone the keys to nuclear weapons, maybe they should consider the same with military techies.

[BansheeOne]

The whole thing, not least the low grade of much of the intelligence in the Ukraine documents, points to two connected problems with US practice: overclassifying information, then oversharing it for the classification level. Basically, copying and pasting from open sources, slapping "top secret" on it, then putting it on an intranet where any junior enlisted twenty-something with personality issues can access anything without "need to know" because nobody wants another 9/11 due to information not shared.

Of course the possibility remains it's an intentional leak or a sting operation with bad intelligence, and Airman Minecraft was set up. But in the documents not directly relating to Ukraine in particular is quite a bit of actual sensitive information, not least US spying on allied governments (though that's not really a surprise either), so that's less likely the more comes out.

[Stuart Galbraith]

The Taiwanese stuff looks awkward, deeply awkward. And I dont think (I hope so anyway) the US would have leaked all that stuff about the RAF RC135 just for a disinformation operation.

TBH, I think that conspiracy theory would give too much credit to US intelligence. Its kind of like what Coca Cola said after the new Coca Cola recipe fiasco, 'we arent that dumb, and we arent that clever'.

 

Edited April 17 by Stuart Galbraith

[Ivanhoe]

4 hours ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

As I said on the other thread, they have learned nothing from Chelsea Manning. Nothing.

Don't forget Snowdon. GF when he got his clearance was apparently a stripper, which would preclude TS/SCI. Stripper GF now with him in Moscow. 

 

4 hours ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

Oh, Its real, and and the story the more I read it of his motivation is banal enough to be completely convincing. Maybe if they have a psycological evaluation before handing someone the keys to nuclear weapons, maybe they should consider the same with military techies.

I've read an assertion that the military is essentially foregoing real background checks in order to fill slots. Especially in the last few years, I can believe it. 

[Ivanhoe]

3 hours ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

The Taiwanese stuff looks awkward, deeply awkward. And I dont think (I hope so anyway) the US would have leaked all that stuff about the RAF RC135 just for a disinformation operation.

AIUI, baking some truth into a package of lies is SOP. 

 

3 hours ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

TBH, I think that conspiracy theory would give too much credit to US intelligence. Its kind of like what Coca Cola said after the new Coca Cola recipe fiasco, 'we arent that dumb, and we arent that clever'.

Keep in mind that America's intel community is a bunch of folks who play chess two moves ahead and think they can beat the average Russian high schooler. 

[Stuart Galbraith]

15 minutes ago, Ivanhoe said:

Don't forget Snowdon. GF when he got his clearance was apparently a stripper, which would preclude TS/SCI. Stripper GF now with him in Moscow. 

 

I've read an assertion that the military is essentially foregoing real background checks in order to fill slots. Especially in the last few years, I can believe it. 

It would explain a lot, wouldn't it?

[Ivanhoe]

4 hours ago, BansheeOne said:

The whole thing, not least the low grade of much of the intelligence in the Ukraine documents, points to two connected problems with US practice: overclassifying information, then oversharing it for the classification level. Basically, copying and pasting from open sources, slapping "top secret" on it, then putting it on an intranet where any junior enlisted twenty-something with personality issues can access anything without "need to know" because nobody wants another 9/11 due to information not shared.

At high levels it is all about intel sharing, but at lower levels the issue is the inflexibility of the bureaucracy and conflict between "getting things done" and compliance with security policy. 

There are ways to control and log access, but would require "above baseline" policy settings and filesystem permissions. The folks who understand how to do it aren't senior enough to make it happen. 

[DKTanker]

21 hours ago, Ivanhoe said:

There is a camp that asserts that Teixeira is a patsy for some malevolent foreign or domestic intel service, but it's hard to see that making sense at this point. 

I'm of the camp that believes all leaks, no matter the classification, are righteous and beyond the scope of prosecution if they further the Deep State's agenda.  Everyone else is playing with fire no matter how innocuous the classified material.

[Tim Sielbeck]

 

[Ivanhoe]

2 hours ago, DKTanker said:

I'm of the camp that believes all leaks, no matter the classification, are righteous and beyond the scope of prosecution if they further the Deep State's agenda.  Everyone else is playing with fire no matter how innocuous the classified material.

True. Since the Deep State is 200% behind Ukraine, and the leak would seem to harm Ukraine, any shadow actor would seem to be Russian or Chinese. 

 

[urbanoid]

If it contains disinformation about Ukrainian forces, it doesn't necessarily 'harm Ukraine', it actually has the potential to help.

[Murph]

Where was his sergeant? Where was his supervisor?  Where was the Flight commander? Where was the Squadron commander?  Why have they not been relieved and court martialled for dereliction of duty?  Why was no one watching this kid?  I smell a rat, and a scapegoat.  

[DKTanker]

Just now, Murph said:

Where was his sergeant? Where was his supervisor?  Where was the Flight commander? Where was the Squadron commander?  Why have they not been relieved and court martialled for dereliction of duty?  Why was no one watching this kid?  I smell a rat, and a scapegoat.  

Indeed.  He evidently had the clearance, nobody is arguing that.  What nobody is talking about is how he came to be having the need to know so as to access that information.  The more days that pass, and further we are from hearing how his possession came to be, not to mention no further arrests, I tend to agree with your assessment. 

[Stuart Galbraith]

14 hours ago, Murph said:

Where was his sergeant? Where was his supervisor?  Where was the Flight commander? Where was the Squadron commander?  Why have they not been relieved and court martialled for dereliction of duty?  Why was no one watching this kid?  I smell a rat, and a scapegoat.  

By that logic, all of Rand helped Daniel Ellsburg leak the Pentagon papers, which doesnt really stand up. Never blame on conspiracy which you can easily blame on institutional incompetence.

[R011]

9 hours ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

By that logic, all of Rand helped Daniel Ellsburg leak the Pentagon papers, which doesnt really stand up. Never blame on conspiracy which you can easily blame on institutional incompetence.

Most workplaces have internal information on an intranet.  Usually, it's nothing sensitive, but nothing stops me from copying it and re-posting it here - except no one, including me would care. My supervisors would only know if someone brought it to their attention.  This seems to be the same situation, except the information was classified and instead of a corporate internal PR department, this was done by a USAF higher HQ.

[DKTanker]

4 hours ago, R011 said:

This seems to be the same situation, except the information was classified and instead of a corporate internal PR department, this was done by a USAF higher HQ.

Having a clearance to read classified information doesn't give one license to read it, one must also have a need to know.  So no, such information isn't open to just anybody on the office intranet.  I'm also led to believe that whenever classified document, secret and above, are accessed electronically a time date stamp is generated with the name of the authorized person accessing the data.  So, how was Airman Teixeira able to go undetected for so long?  Who gave him the authorization?  Was it actually hard copies, printed pages, that he photographed and uploaded onto his own personal computer?  If so, why was he in possession?  So many questions, absolutely no answers are forth coming.  The media for their part are choosing to remain ignorant, are happy to remain ignorant, both about how Teixeira came into possession and about the contents of the information.

[R011]

My understanding is that everybody with a security clearance in those intelligence units was deemed to have a need to know and so Teixeira had every right to access those documents.  What he didn't have and is being charged with is releasing those documents.  It would seem then that the issue is one of policy - who gets security clearanes and who should have access.

[lucklucky]

On 4/18/2023 at 4:00 AM, Ivanhoe said:

True. Since the Deep State is 200% behind Ukraine, and the leak would seem to harm Ukraine, any shadow actor would seem to be Russian or Chinese. 

 

Maybe not so much as to wanting the whole Ukraine back. This might be a message to Ukraine side to start thinking about negotiating. If indeed as an engineered "leak". 

[DKTanker]

25 minutes ago, R011 said:

My understanding is that everybody with a security clearance in those intelligence units was deemed to have a need to know and so Teixeira had every right to access those documents.  What he didn't have and is being charged with is releasing those documents.  It would seem then that the issue is one of policy - who gets security clearanes and who should have access.

Teixeira is an IT tech, not an intelligence data analyst (and even they are compartmentalized).  If an A1C, a private, is allowed to have unfettered access to wide ranging top secret information, because he had a need to know, DoD has some serious explaining to do.  In other words, what was his real role in the Air National Guard that he had a need to know about such sensitive and wide ranging information?

[Murph]

8 minutes ago, DKTanker said:

Teixeira is an IT tech, not an intelligence data analyst (and even they are compartmentalized).  If an A1C, a private, is allowed to have unfettered access to wide ranging top secret information, because he had a need to know, DoD has some serious explaining to do.  In other words, what was his real role in the Air National Guard that he had a need to know about such sensitive and wide ranging information?

Completely on point here.  Where were his supervisors?

[Ivanhoe]

5 hours ago, R011 said:

It would seem then that the issue is one of policy - who gets security clearanes and who should have access.

To be clear, it is a question of policy compliance, which stems from organizational culture. 

This scenario appears to be another episode of "IO versus IA" (Information Operations versus Information Assurance). As always, both will end up losers. 

[Stuart Galbraith]

10 hours ago, R011 said:

My understanding is that everybody with a security clearance in those intelligence units was deemed to have a need to know and so Teixeira had every right to access those documents.  What he didn't have and is being charged with is releasing those documents.  It would seem then that the issue is one of policy - who gets security clearanes and who should have access.

But is it really beyond anyone in the military to issue code passes, and send documents zipped up, so they can only be accessed by the appropriate code?

Its certainly awkward. Not nearly as awkward as having the intelligence all aired in the open so every spotty teenager can download it.

[Ivanhoe]

https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/defense-national-security/air-force-unit-with-alleged-leaker-loses-intelligence-mission

 

Quote

With the investigation commencing, the 102nd Intelligence Wing has ceased performing its assigned intelligence mission, a spokeswoman told the Washington Examiner, adding that the mission has been temporarily reassigned to other organizations within the Air Force.

 

This is now a career-ending event for the Os and senior NCOs. 

Quote

Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr., the Air Force chief of staff, also testified in front of the committee and told lawmakers that there are procedures in place to protect classified information, but “in this case, this process fell apart.” He also said Teixeira had access to classified intelligence but “didn’t necessarily have need-to-know for some of the information.”

 

[Ivanhoe]

https://www.cnn.com/2023/05/19/politics/jack-teixeira-leak-intelligence-unit-warnings/index.html

 

 

Quote

 

Newly released memos revealing that Air Force leadership repeatedly warned Airman 1st Class Jack Teixeira about inappropriately accessing classified intelligence have left former and current defense personnel baffled at how he retained his security clearance and was able to continue sharing classified information for months.

“This is negligence on the part of the chain of command,” said Jason Kikta, a former Marine Corps Officer and former member of US Cyber Command. “They had a clear pattern of behavior,” adding he “should have been cut off at the second incident.”

Three Air Force memos documenting Teixeira’s misconduct were released publicly on Wednesday as part of the prosecution’s argument in favor keeping him detained pending trial.