Would Germany have done better with Panzer IV primary force

[RichTO90]

1 hour ago, Sardaukar said:

Well, with Luftwaffe Field Divisions and Waffen SS, Germany's use of manpower was rarely optimal. 

In the U.S, in 1943, just 35.4% of the working population were in war-related jobs, the military or war-related industry. In Britain, 45.3% was. In Germany, 37.8% was. Overall during the war the U.S., from a population of about 136 million, mobilized 16 million, 11.8%. Germany, from a population of about 80 million, mobilized 11 million, about 13.75%.

The Luftwaffe Feld Divisionen probably did not utilize its manpower excess optimally, but was it optimal of the U.S. to field 99% of its black population as service troops?

[RichTO90]

4 hours ago, Rick said:

Rich, would you elaborate on the bolden part.

The U.S. badly underutilized its manpower advantage. In terms of war-related work, it was the least mobilized of the major powers. In terms of its mobilized manpower, it largely wasted the reservoir of black manpower by limiting the service they could perform. For most of the war, the U.S.  draft was the easiest to get deferments from...there is an entire Army Medical Corps history on the medical deferments allowed and how it changed over time. Essentially, until mid 1943, almost any medical condition was cause for deferment no matter how minor. Perhaps most astonishing, when the crunch was felt in 1943, the U.S. War Manpower Commission on 1 February 1943 released a list of "nondeferable" occupations and urged draft boards reclassify such persons as 1-A. The draft boards categorically refused and since the Commission had no authority under law to force compliance, the list was rescinded in December 1943, never having an effect.

You see, the 6,500 draft boards reported to the Selective Service Commission and not the War Manpower Commission. But even the Selective Service Commission had difficulty getting people into service. By the end of the war, 12 million were in uniform but 16 million had been called up (of whom about 2 million were volunteers) and fewer than half a million had died, were prisoners of war, or were discharged with disabilities. So where did the other 3.5 million go? They were deferred. And in February 1945 the Army committed the last division it could field.

[Sardaukar]

24 minutes ago, RichTO90 said:

In the U.S, in 1943, just 35.4% of the working population were in war-related jobs, the military or war-related industry. In Britain, 45.3% was. In Germany, 37.8% was. Overall during the war the U.S., from a population of about 136 million, mobilized 16 million, 11.8%. Germany, from a population of about 80 million, mobilized 11 million, about 13.75%.

The Luftwaffe Feld Divisionen probably did not utilize its manpower excess optimally, but was it optimal of the U.S. to field 99% of its black population as service troops?

US use of manpower is another "can of worms". Especially since troops deemed more "intelligent" were assigned to jobs like MP, leaving e.g. infantry severely lacking good NCOs. 

[RichTO90]

1 minute ago, Sardaukar said:

US use of manpower is another "can of worms". Especially since troops deemed more "intelligent" were assigned to jobs like MP, leaving e.g. infantry severely lacking good NCOs. 

Don't even get me started. That was one of the problems and it truly was a can of worms.

Another was that replacement manpower expectations were based off of World War I experience and a WAG to account for "modern" weapons. Losses in armored personnel were expected to be too high and those of infantry too low.

Another was that the cadre system for forming new units was poorly thought out, as was the mobilization schedule. When linked to the early decision to do basic training by the mobilizing division and to prioritize manpower to mobilization rather than to replacement training and the early commitment of forces to major combat, the result was near chaos.

Another was the decision to release trained personnel for advanced schooling in the ASTP and related programs, which gave the men pretty much just enough time to forget their initial training and get comfy with the idea they were elite manpower destined to be rocket scientists or occifers only then to get dumped into the infantry when the shit hit the fan.

Then there were minor hiccups such as no doctrine for tank-infantry-artillery combined arms training except in the armored division. There was quite literally no manual or training plan written for tank battalions supporting infantry divisions until after almost all the tank battalions and infantry divisions had deployed, so it was always makee learnee in combat...with the expected outcome.

Or how about the decision that units in training would make do with a 50 percent allowance of basic equipment. By early 1943, divisions were experiencing postponements of up to six weeks in various training phases due to lack of equipment, ammunition, and the limited number of weapons, which meant the “groups working single weapons were so large that individuals were receiving scant instruction.”

Even the proficiency tests used during training that determined when a unit was ready to deploy were mostly simple checklists rather than actual assessments of the ability of the unit to perform tasks. I get a bit into the weeds on this subject when I look at the experience of the 90th Infantry Division in my neck book Spearheading the Breakout. It is eye opening to say the least.

General William E. DePuy, Retired, who was the first Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) from 30 June 1973 until his retirement on 1 July 1977,  described the reality of the wartime Mobilization Training Program in 1979 as, "…a time-oriented process. A unit spent so many hours or days on each subject…The goal or object was to complete the training—get it done! Never mind whether or not the troops learned anything. The process completely obscured the product. If a soldier missed first aid training he must make it up so that 100 percent of the unit went through the prescribed [MTP]…The learning function was obscured and secondary to the scheduling function. Few took training seriously. "

 

[Sardaukar]

I think better system would have been that division's infantry replacements would have been allocated per state in US.

Thus, troops would have had some familiarity with each other. Of course it's hindsight from 80+ yrs back.

While "90 day wonders" were universally derided, it was lack of good NCOs that severely hindered US Army in WW II. 

Yes, there were lot of outstanding ones, but they had to learn "on the job". 

 

[RichTO90]

17 minutes ago, Sardaukar said:

I think better system would have been that division's infantry replacements would have been allocated per state in US.

Thus, troops would have had some familiarity with each other. Of course it's hindsight from 80+ yrs back.

While "90 day wonders" were universally derided, it was lack of good NCOs that severely hindered US Army in WW II. 

Yes, there were lot of outstanding ones, but they had to learn "on the job".

Given the disparity of populations in different states that was probably unworkable and also why many ANG divisions were multi-state. Fundamentally the size of the U.S. meant that a Wehrkreis system would not have worked and there was no institutional system prewar or wartime that was similar to the Ersatzheer. The U.S. Army Replacement and Schools Command was an administrative entity at best and had zero authority on organizational or training issues. Thise were almost entirely top-down driven, which was very different from the German system.

There were actually no "90 day wonders" in the U.S. Army in World War II. 😁 My Dad's experience was pretty typical. A young officer commissioned in the Coast Artillery had a minimum of 129 days service as enlisted OCS candidates, and many like Dad had ROTC experience in college, but few had gone through cadet military training like Dad. He was a graduate of Viriginia Polytechnic Institute (VPI, now known as Virginia Tech) and then as now, VPI was one of a small number of senior military colleges in the U.S., besides West Point. So he had just under four years of cadet military training as well (his class was graduated six months early under a wartime accelerated program).

Yes, as Colonel Joseph H. Rustemeyer, the first commander of the 358th Infantry put it years later, "I had good NCOs, but with the Army’s need for officers, many of my best NCOs left for OCS. To fill vacant NCO positions it was necessary to develop NCOs from men of the lower ranks. As they developed, then they too would go to OCS. So, you see, it took a long time to shake down the regiment."

 

[Tim the Tank Nut]

"the learning function was obscured and secondary to the scheduling" is an astonishing statement.  The brevity and accuracy of putting it that way highlights how unprepared the interwar Army was for WW2.  I'll still say that the expansion produced the best results likely to be possible but on the job training is expensive in men and materiel.

The experience of the Tank School in WW1 would show a better way.  More thorough training generated better results.

[Sardaukar]

I was thinking about dividing with population. Of course bit of difference between New Hampshire and TX/CA etc.

That sort of "Wehrkreis". 

Edited April 15, 2023 by Sardaukar

[DogDodger]

18 hours ago, RichTO90 said:

Yes, Britain outproduced Germany in tank chassis production. In 1939 Germany built 787 and Britain 969. In 1940 it was 1,729 to 1,399. Oh, wait. In 1941 it was 3,816 German tanks to 4,841 British tanks and only 769 of the British tanks were Covenantor and only 706 were Churchill 2-pdr, both of which were essentially non-operational. Oh, wait. In 1942 it was 5,847 German tanks to 8,611 British tanks and only 925 were new built Covenantor and only 566 were rebuilt Covenantor and only 760 were the near useless Churchill 2 pdr but at least 529 were Churchill rebuilt to workable standards and 138 were conversions from 2 pdr to 6 pdr so at least a few had some actual utility. Oh, wait. In 1943 it was 11,949 German tanks to 7,476 British. Oh, seriously now wait a minute. British tank manufacture was contracting? In 1944 it was 19,091 German tanks to 4,854 British. Seriously now, wait a minute, British tank manufacture was contracting again?

Well to throw a bone to British tank manufacturers and their contracting numbers from 1943 on, beginning in that year their efforts began to be redirected towards locomotive assembly with the large number of Lend-Lease tanks anticipated, as assembling the locomotives in the UK would save much valuable shipping space and handling effort. On 29 March 1943 LTG Somervell himself mooted the possibility of the UK making railroad equipment instead of the Cromwell to Director-General of the British Supply Mission General Sir Walter Venning due to US fears of Sherman overproduction. Knight shares correspondence between British officials where the fear of becoming completely dependent on US tanks is discussed, which led to the Cromwell's continued production. Continued pressure did result in concessions, though: according to Coombs, there were 27 British firms working in tank production in 1943, and by 1945 this number had dwindled to 11. E.g., London, Midland, and Scottish's Crewe location switched to locomotive assembly after their Covenanter contract expired in August 1942 (even before Somervell's request), while their Horwich location started on locomotives in November 1943 after its Centaur contract was complete; ditto Beyer Peacock's last Churchill was delivered in March 1943, and they were able to switch to locomotive production that same month; after completing their Matilda contracts, Vulcan changed to locomotives in June 1943 and North British Locomotive the following month.

But on the other hand again, the main production reductions were taken from the Centaur, so it's probably just as well.

[Sardaukar]

Brits did have quite a few truck models...and found out that many had defective pistons.... (Re: Max Hastings book..Armageddon)

[RichTO90]

1 hour ago, Sardaukar said:

Brits did have quite a few truck models...and found out that many had defective pistons.... (Re: Max Hastings book..Armageddon)

That appears to be something of a myth based upon a misreading of the 21 Army Group administrative history. A friend a few years ago did a deep dive into the transport companies and failed to find mention of the supposed defect causing problems. Part of it was that it was a defect in a specific truck model, which was not in widespread use and the numbers involved - c. 1,400 - was actually a drop in the bucket.

[Stuart Galbraith]

4 hours ago, DogDodger said:

Well to throw a bone to British tank manufacturers and their contracting numbers from 1943 on, beginning in that year their efforts began to be redirected towards locomotive assembly with the large number of Lend-Lease tanks anticipated, as assembling the locomotives in the UK would save much valuable shipping space and handling effort. On 29 March 1943 LTG Somervell himself mooted the possibility of the UK making railroad equipment instead of the Cromwell to Director-General of the British Supply Mission General Sir Walter Venning due to US fears of Sherman overproduction. Knight shares correspondence between British officials where the fear of becoming completely dependent on US tanks is discussed, which led to the Cromwell's continued production. Continued pressure did result in concessions, though: according to Coombs, there were 27 British firms working in tank production in 1943, and by 1945 this number had dwindled to 11. E.g., London, Midland, and Scottish's Crewe location switched to locomotive assembly after their Covenanter contract expired in August 1942 (even before Somervell's request), while their Horwich location started on locomotives in November 1943 after its Centaur contract was complete; ditto Beyer Peacock's last Churchill was delivered in March 1943, and they were able to switch to locomotive production that same month; after completing their Matilda contracts, Vulcan changed to locomotives in June 1943 and North British Locomotive the following month.

But on the other hand again, the main production reductions were taken from the Centaur, so it's probably just as well.

I can certainly point to at least one company , GCWC, that was building Churchill tanks until 1945, but was also building a vast amount of the country's rolling stock. You are right, there was something of a choice to be made here.

London Midland and Scottish it will be remembered, were building what was in the early war, the British Army's standard freight locomotive, the 8F. Which gave good service as far afield as Persia, shipping freight into the Soviet Union via their railways. And they couldnt build enough, so not only did they have the other railway companies in the UK crank them out, they even simplified it as the WD Austerity. Between both those types, they cranked out 1000 steam locomotives for the war effort. Getting on for 2000, if you include the ones built for internal use in the UK.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LMS_Stanier_Class_8F

 

 

[Sardaukar]

8 hours ago, RichTO90 said:

That appears to be something of a myth based upon a misreading of the 21 Army Group administrative history. A friend a few years ago did a deep dive into the transport companies and failed to find mention of the supposed defect causing problems. Part of it was that it was a defect in a specific truck model, which was not in widespread use and the numbers involved - c. 1,400 - was actually a drop in the bucket.

I think I stand corrected and so does Hastings.

Edited April 16, 2023 by Sardaukar

[Rick]

Back to the national manpower management; how did Italy and Japan manage theirs?

[RETAC21]

7 hours ago, Rick said:

Back to the national manpower management; how did Italy and Japan manage theirs?

Italy, where the Army HQ closed at 3 for the day...

[Argus]

Speaking of Tungsten, given they opened a Wolfram mine on King Island, so someone was very worried about global supply. 

[Rick]

On 4/15/2023 at 12:22 PM, RichTO90 said:

Don't even get me started. That was one of the problems and it truly was a can of worms.

Another was that replacement manpower expectations were based off of World War I experience and a WAG to account for "modern" weapons. Losses in armored personnel were expected to be too high and those of infantry too low.

Another was that the cadre system for forming new units was poorly thought out, as was the mobilization schedule. When linked to the early decision to do basic training by the mobilizing division and to prioritize manpower to mobilization rather than to replacement training and the early commitment of forces to major combat, the result was near chaos.

Another was the decision to release trained personnel for advanced schooling in the ASTP and related programs, which gave the men pretty much just enough time to forget their initial training and get comfy with the idea they were elite manpower destined to be rocket scientists or occifers only then to get dumped into the infantry when the shit hit the fan.

Then there were minor hiccups such as no doctrine for tank-infantry-artillery combined arms training except in the armored division. There was quite literally no manual or training plan written for tank battalions supporting infantry divisions until after almost all the tank battalions and infantry divisions had deployed, so it was always makee learnee in combat...with the expected outcome.

Or how about the decision that units in training would make do with a 50 percent allowance of basic equipment. By early 1943, divisions were experiencing postponements of up to six weeks in various training phases due to lack of equipment, ammunition, and the limited number of weapons, which meant the “groups working single weapons were so large that individuals were receiving scant instruction.”

Even the proficiency tests used during training that determined when a unit was ready to deploy were mostly simple checklists rather than actual assessments of the ability of the unit to perform tasks. I get a bit into the weeds on this subject when I look at the experience of the 90th Infantry Division in my neck book Spearheading the Breakout. It is eye opening to say the least.

General William E. DePuy, Retired, who was the first Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) from 30 June 1973 until his retirement on 1 July 1977,  described the reality of the wartime Mobilization Training Program in 1979 as, "…a time-oriented process. A unit spent so many hours or days on each subject…The goal or object was to complete the training—get it done! Never mind whether or not the troops learned anything. The process completely obscured the product. If a soldier missed first aid training he must make it up so that 100 percent of the unit went through the prescribed [MTP]…The learning function was obscured and secondary to the scheduling function. Few took training seriously. "

 

In reference to the bolden part, was this due to Lend-Lease?

On another note, I understand you have a book or two published or close to being so? 

Edited April 17, 2023 by Rick

[RichTO90]

7 hours ago, Rick said:

In reference to the bolden part, was this due to Lend-Lease?

Partly, but also because personnel expansion occurred faster than manufacturing and delivery of new equipment. It was also thought more efficient to ship as much equipment as possible in bulk for issue overseas. The only major operation equipped directly from the Z/I shore-to-shore was the Western Task Force in TORCH.

Quote

On another note, I understand you have a book or two published or close to being so? 

Yes, Stackpole is publishing For Purpose of Service Test but they want to title it American Thunder. At this point it is 672 pages of text and c. 420 photos after editing and excising material on the organization of the Tank Destroyer Command, which may end up as a separate title. Hard to say when publication will occur but probably closer to Christmas or next spring. At the moment I am writing about the 90th Infantry Division's - and my Dad's - experience in Normandy titled Spearheading the Breakout. I expect to finish it sometime this fall.

[Sardaukar]

Wow, I don't think anyone has written about 90th ID before, at least anything comprehensive. 

And what has been written is in footnotes of general Normandy books. 

 

Edited April 17, 2023 by Sardaukar

[RichTO90]

Update from Stackpole: publication date for American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II is listed as 12/16/2023 with expected availability in Stackpole's warehouse on 11/16/2023.

[RichTO90]

5 hours ago, Sardaukar said:

Wow, I don't think anyone has written about 90th ID before, at least anything comprehensive. 

And what has been written is in footnotes of general Normandy books.

And what has been written is generally somewhere between nonsense and RUMINT. 😁

[PCallahan]

2 hours ago, RichTO90 said:

And what has been written is generally somewhere between nonsense and RUMINT. 😁

Looking forward to this one also, as my grandfather served in that division.

[RichTO90]

2 hours ago, PCallahan said:

Looking forward to this one also, as my grandfather served in that division.

Very seriously, I would love to hear more. PM me please. I am up to the early July fighting on Mont Castre so am only halfway through with the initial draft.

[nitflegal]

On 4/17/2023 at 6:42 PM, RichTO90 said:

Update from Stackpole: publication date for American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II is listed as 12/16/2023 with expected availability in Stackpole's warehouse on 11/16/2023.

Whelp, I know one thing on my Christmas list.  Do you know i it will be print only or will there be a Kindle version?  I tend to get both since I like real books but Kindle has the advantage of being able to read a bit whenever I'm stuck in a line or having lunch at work or what have you.

[RichTO90]

5 hours ago, nitflegal said:

Whelp, I know one thing on my Christmas list.  Do you know i it will be print only or will there be a Kindle version?  I tend to get both since I like real books but Kindle has the advantage of being able to read a bit whenever I'm stuck in a line or having lunch at work or what have you.

I only know of a print version at this time but eBook editions are commonplace now.