Would Germany have done better with Panzer IV primary force

[Domobran7]

So I have been thinking, but would Germany have done better to have focused on Panzer IV instead of developing several variants of Panther and Tiger each, plus however many different tank destroyers?

As I see it,it has positives and negatives:

* Panzer IV is lighter, giving it better strategic mobility (crossing bridges etc.) - Tiger also had to have its outermost row of wheels removed and narrower tracks installed for transport, which meant losing few hours every time they had to be loaded to or unloaded from the train

* less powerful gun means it must engage from shorter range

* weaker armor also means it is more vulnerable

* lower fuel requirements mean less expense

* Panzer IV is far easier to maintain and more reliable than the Tiger

* first Panthers produced were IIRC basically useless due to various technical issues

* not using overlapping wheels may have made Panzer IV better able to deal with mud etc. (not sure about this one) and would have certainly simplified maintenance

* size of the tank and turret ring in particular limited how powerful of a gun could be installed - but on the flip side, Germans also had a ton of tank destroyers, including StuG III - perhaps the best tank destroyer of the war. So I am not certain how much that really mattered.

* I am not certain whether producing Panzer IV instead of Panther and Tiger would have resulted in larger tank force - but on the flip side, Tiger was a gas guzzler, and much of German tank fleet could not be used due to a lack of fuel late in the war anyway. On the flip flip side, Panther and Tiger both began development when it looked very likely that Hitler could have obtained Russian oil.

[Sardaukar]

Plus with diesel engine.

Not that they could not have made those, since they used them in submarines and smaller vessels...

This might have done:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VK_30.01-30.02_(D)

[seahawk]

Yes, if they would have believed to be defeated in early 1945. Otherwise, the development path for the Pz IV was practically done by middle of 1942.

[Ssnake]

As far as I remember it, Panther in particular had a much, much streamlined production compared to Pz IV, and the various Tiger variants were also in part a result of reducing the time and cost of production. As noted elsewhere, if building 12 Tigers cost as much as 18 Pz IVs but the combat value of a dozen Tigers was that of 20..24 PzIVs, and a fuel consumption equal to or less than said 18 PzIVs, building Tigers was the right decision even if it barely slowed down the inevitable.

Nazi Europe was simply outproduced by America, Britain, and the Soviet Union, even with the Pacific war dragging further on US resources. That there were Italian, French, Czech, and mutiple incompatible German production lines in parallel use certainly didn't help. But up to '42 it didn't look like Germany needed a much streamlined production. In mid-late '42 Speer tried to turn the ship around, and the results became visible from the second half of '43 on.

 

With the benefit of hindsight, the efforts probably should have started right after the victory over France. But then it would have looked like pointless actionism, and at the time Wehrmacht and Hitler grossly underestimated the Soviets' capacity for tank production and raising new troops. '41 looked like everything was going according to plan. By the time that you could no longer deny the problems, it was too late.

 

But even if the proposed Pz IV-only production would have been much more useful than I think it would, it's still a bit like rearranging deck chairs on a sinking Titanic. The Soviet Union could have been conquered despite the inefficiencies if only the Nazis hadn't behaved like Nazis, and made it a war of liberation rather than brutal conquest. The potential for broad public support was there, initially. But of course, had the Nazis not been Nazis, there wouldn't have been Barbarossa in its historic form. Without Barbarossa, there probably wouldn't have been US Lend-lease, etc.

[Stuart Galbraith]

Germany was actually demilitarizing after the Battle of France. In fact the Me109F was put on the back burner till about December I think, because they didnt think they would need it. So you are right, there is no prospect of them gearing up for a long war, because they had already believed they had won, and went right on believing it till late 1942. By then it was arguably already too late.

I was interested to read that Goering read of a giant US military plant building bombers, so decided to build his own plant of rival size to get a similar output. He got the plant, but nothing like the output, because they simply didnt gear up to producing military equipment like America and Britain and its allies did. When even Canada can outbuild you in heavy bombers through most of the war, you know you have an issue.

 

[RichTO90]

The real problem is the one that faced them when the decision was made to continue Panzer IV production along with the Panther.

By mid 1942, when the Panther design was settled, Krupp, Vomag, and Nibelungen were the only final assembly plants dedicated to the Panzer IV. Krupp was only capable of an average of about 50 per month and a practical maximum of 120 per month. Vomag was slightly better, eventually, but at the time had just started production and was completing about 13 per month. Nibelungen, although planned to produce as many as 300 per month was building an average of 7.

That left the rest of the industry, MAN, MIAG, Henschel, Wegmann, Alkett, DB, and MNH all producing Panzer III. Alkett was necessary for StuG production, so the others would have had to retool, loosing a calculated six to twelve months of production in the process. That is why Panzer IV production was continued along with the conversion to Panther production, so why would they convert Panzer III production to another obsolescing chassis instead?

[RichTO90]

3 hours ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

Germany was actually demilitarizing after the Battle of France. In fact the Me109F was put on the back burner till about December I think, because they didnt think they would need it. So you are right, there is no prospect of them gearing up for a long war, because they had already believed they had won, and went right on believing it till late 1942. By then it was arguably already too late.

That is actually incorrect. After the Battle of France a large portion of the Heer was not demobilized but was re-balanced because it had over-mobilized. Incomplete divisions were broken up and a large number of divisions were reduced to cadre strength as nearly one million men who had been called up were placed "on leave" to return to industry, which had been nearly crippled by the loss of manpower. They were called up again in early 1941 in the preparation for BARBAROSSA. However, the manpower issue had not gone away but continued to plague German industry to the end of the war. In comparison, the U.S. was still at 15% unemployment in 1940.

Quote

I was interested to read that Goering read of a giant US military plant building bombers, so decided to build his own plant of rival size to get a similar output. He got the plant, but nothing like the output, because they simply didnt gear up to producing military equipment like America and Britain and its allies did. When even Canada can outbuild you in heavy bombers through most of the war, you know you have an issue.

That may be a misreading of how the aviation and other military industrial conglomerates actually operated. No German versions of "giant US" bomber plants were ever built. Instead they had a large number of sub-component plants operating in a region that supported a single final assembly plant, mostly because Germany never had the industrial capital, manpower, or time to construct such a massive centralized plant like Long Beach or Willow Creek.

Germany in fact did "gear up" and managed to mobilize industry to war production at a greater level than did any of the Allies except the USSR and by 1944 before the collapse began they were even beginning to exceed them. The illusion that Germany did not mobilize "like America and Britain" did is principally caused by looking at 1940-1941 in when Britain exceeded German aircraft manufacture in isolation or failing to realize that the American industrial output was never in a fully mobilized wartime mode but simply had so much capacity, calculated at one-half the industrial capacity of the world in 1945.

[urbanoid]

On 4/11/2023 at 8:33 PM, Ssnake said:

As far as I remember it, Panther in particular had a much, much streamlined production compared to Pz IV, and the various Tiger variants were also in part a result of reducing the time and cost of production. As noted elsewhere, if building 12 Tigers cost as much as 18 Pz IVs but the combat value of a dozen Tigers was that of 20..24 PzIVs, and a fuel consumption equal to or less than said 18 PzIVs, building Tigers was the right decision even if it barely slowed down the inevitable.

And less crews were needed that way.

[R011]

If I understand correctly, Panthers were all either built in new factories or repurposed Pz III factories.  They cost only a little more than Pz IV meaning they used about the same manpower and not much more resources.  The upshot would be that you won't have many more tanks if any and they'll be inferior, though they'll have better availability.  You could probably make threee Pz IV for one Tiger I, but not that many were built so total tank numbers won't be much more impressive, though effectiveness would be way down.

Best case scenario for the Germans, the extra tanks make the war end a couple of weeks later.  Wose case, though its very unlikely, is that they extend the war long enough that Hiroshima is just some small city in Japan most people have never heard of.

[Sardaukar]

This might give some ideas about comparable costs:

https://panzerworld.com/product-prices

 

[Stuart Galbraith]

On 4/12/2023 at 6:43 PM, RichTO90 said:

That is actually incorrect. After the Battle of France a large portion of the Heer was not demobilized but was re-balanced because it had over-mobilized. Incomplete divisions were broken up and a large number of divisions were reduced to cadre strength as nearly one million men who had been called up were placed "on leave" to return to industry, which had been nearly crippled by the loss of manpower. They were called up again in early 1941 in the preparation for BARBAROSSA. However, the manpower issue had not gone away but continued to plague German industry to the end of the war. In comparison, the U.S. was still at 15% unemployment in 1940.

Quote

Demilitarisation or demilitarization may mean the reduction of state armed forces; it is the opposite of militarisation in many respects.^[1] For instance, the demilitarisation of Northern Ireland entailed the reduction of British security and military apparatuses.^[2] Demilitarisation in this sense is usually the result of a peace treaty ending a war or a major conflict. The principle is distinguished from demobilisation, which refers to the drastic voluntary reduction in the size of a victorious army.

Ok, so that was a poor choice of words, but I think my intent was pretty clear, and it doesnt even sound like you disagree for the most part.

 

That may be a misreading of how the aviation and other military industrial conglomerates actually operated. No German versions of "giant US" bomber plants were ever built. Instead they had a large number of sub-component plants operating in a region that supported a single final assembly plant, mostly because Germany never had the industrial capital, manpower, or time to construct such a massive centralized plant like Long Beach or Willow Creek.

Quote

Im basing this on some comments made by James Holland on one of the Discovery channel programmes. Ok, so Discovery deserves all the contempt it gets, but Holland is usually reliable. I accept they didnt actually finish it, but it does seem that Goering had heard about Willow run and demanded an attempt be made to replicate it. There are countless examples of big factories the Nazis embarked on building that were abandoned at the last minute as im sure you know.

Germany in fact did "gear up" and managed to mobilize industry to war production at a greater level than did any of the Allies except the USSR and by 1944 before the collapse began they were even beginning to exceed them. The illusion that Germany did not mobilize "like America and Britain" did is principally caused by looking at 1940-1941 in when Britain exceeded German aircraft manufacture in isolation or failing to realize that the American industrial output was never in a fully mobilized wartime mode but simply had so much capacity, calculated at one-half the industrial capacity of the world in 1945.

We have had this discussion before on tanknet. German couldnt even replicate Britain in the amount of agricultural tractors it build from 1939 to 1945, which considering the amount of slave labour they were using on agricultural land, they probably should have done. For most of the war we were even outproducing them in tanks. Just imagine, a country subject to U boat blockade, outproducing Germany in Tanks and Aircraft! Not to mention warships.

Yes, I accept at the 11th hour they really ramped up production through dispersal. But reading any book on the Me109, it was comensurate with production quality falling off a cliff. Aircraft took to the air that never should have done, and promptly fell to bits, because the wooden tails had not been glued correctly. A problem admittedly at least partially due to the quality of glue in Germany which also scuppered the Ta154, but probably no less due to inspection and the dispersed nature of production.

I stand by my point, they did not mobilise indusry like Britain and America, and simply could not. They didnt have the industrial capacity or manpower , nor willingness to embrace women in the workplace to the degree the western allies or soviets did. Lastly they didnt even have the political will to do it, which was surely the most pervasive problem of all.

Edited April 14, 2023 by Stuart Galbraith

[seahawk]

I doubt that Germany had a better access to critical resources than Britain.

[Stuart Galbraith]

Well Britain didnt exactly have unfettered access either. I should look up at the fairly extraordinary means Britain introduced to get ball bearings out of Sweden.

https://www.paxmanhistory.org.uk/blockade.htm#:~:text=This entailed the running from the UK of,effort and only available from the former country.

Just think about it, an Empire running on ball bearings, smuggled past the Germans nose in wooden boats. Incredible.

[urbanoid]

Britain had what was in place (not much) and what was imported at great cost and risk, Germany had most of Europe either occupied or allied.

[Stuart Galbraith]

About the only thing we had in large amounts was Coal, and extracting that turned into a major industrial effort. As you rightly say, we didnt have iron ore, we didnt have copper. Germany had pretty much everything it wanted on its doorstep, and stuff like Tungsten it could go to the Swedes or Portgugese. It was a hell of a lot easier to get than for us. Ok, Oil was a problem, I grant you that. Yet they still have Romania on their doorstep. Our nearest supply was the middle east.

At some point you have to recognise that if Britain was doing better for most of the war building weapons than Germany, then that simply has to be policy. Nobody got serious about cranking out the weapons till the 11th hour, and even then the quality would rival British car manufacturers in the 1970's.

[seahawk]

But that part lacked critical resources and raw materials. Rubber, Oil some metal alloys for example. The UK had problems getting those to the UK, but had the whole world to buy them. Germany could hardly buy much outside the territories it controlled and importing or exporting stuff was even harder due to the British naval blockade.

[Sardaukar]

16 minutes ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

About the only thing we had in large amounts was Coal, and extracting that turned into a major industrial effort. As you rightly say, we didnt have iron ore, we didnt have copper. Germany had pretty much everything it wanted on its doorstep, and stuff like Tungsten it could go to the Swedes or Portgugese. It was a hell of a lot easier to get than for us. Ok, Oil was a problem, I grant you that. Yet they still have Romania on their doorstep. Our nearest supply was the middle east.

At some point you have to recognise that if Britain was doing better for most of the war building weapons than Germany, then that simply has to be policy. Nobody got serious about cranking out the weapons till the 11th hour, and even then the quality would rival British car manufacturers in the 1970's.

Tungsten was a problem for Germany, since back then major producer was Portugal (and being old UK ally, they let UK buy out first) and Spain. Austria had some but it was not really discovered until later. 

[Stuart Galbraith]

Re Tungsten, I seem to vaguely recall something about the UK buying it up at inflated prices (or at least trying to create some way to fix the price) to try and mess with the Reich economy, but that it never really worked out.

[Sardaukar]

28 minutes ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

Re Tungsten, I seem to vaguely recall something about the UK buying it up at inflated prices (or at least trying to create some way to fix the price) to try and mess with the Reich economy, but that it never really worked out.

Actually, it did work out at least to some point, since Germany was having serious tungsten (wolfram) deficiency. That e.g. caused that after middle 1942 (IIRC) Germany mainly stopped using tungsten for armour-piercing rounds and dedicated supply for tools. 

[RichTO90]

20 hours ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

We have had this discussion before on tanknet.

With me? 😁

Quote

German couldnt even replicate Britain in the amount of agricultural tractors it build from 1939 to 1945, which considering the amount of slave labour they were using on agricultural land, they probably should have done. For most of the war we were even outproducing them in tanks. Just imagine, a country subject to U boat blockade, outproducing Germany in Tanks and Aircraft! Not to mention warships.

Why ever would they want to do that? Yes, Britain produced a large number of agricultural tractors during the war, around 50,000 per year. Germany turned most of its tractor production to prime movers and such and probably produced fewer than 50,000 in the entire war. However, why would they want to produce so many? German small-hold farms were generally dirt poor, tiny places unsuited to tractor cultivation in the first place - Deutz did okay prewar but there wasn't much of a market and when the war came...why would the Germans build agricultural tractors it didn't need and could not fuel anyway?

Yes, Britain outproduced Germany in tank chassis production. In 1939 Germany built 787 and Britain 969. In 1940 it was 1,729 to 1,399. Oh, wait. In 1941 it was 3,816 German tanks to 4,841 British tanks and only 769 of the British tanks were Covenantor and only 706 were Churchill 2-pdr, both of which were essentially non-operational. Oh, wait. In 1942 it was 5,847 German tanks to 8,611 British tanks and only 925 were new built Covenantor and only 566 were rebuilt Covenantor and only 760 were the near useless Churchill 2 pdr but at least 529 were Churchill rebuilt to workable standards and 138 were conversions from 2 pdr to 6 pdr so at least a few had some actual utility. Oh, wait. In 1943 it was 11,949 German tanks to 7,476 British. Oh, seriously now wait a minute. British tank manufacture was contracting? In 1944 it was 19,091 German tanks to 4,854 British. Seriously now, wait a minute, British tank manufacture was contracting again?

Quote

Yes, I accept at the 11th hour they really ramped up production through dispersal. But reading any book on the Me109, it was comensurate with production quality falling off a cliff. Aircraft took to the air that never should have done, and promptly fell to bits, because the wooden tails had not been glued correctly. A problem admittedly at least partially due to the quality of glue in Germany which also scuppered the Ta154, but probably no less due to inspection and the dispersed nature of production.

Um, sorry, no, dispersal did not ramp up production, it reduced production by affecting productivity, as did the CBO. Nor were we talking about quality falling off a cliff. Do I need to bring up Covenantor again? Its production, along with many other items was continued because even though it was known to be a dog quality-wise it was kept in production because it was something that could be called a tank.

Quote

I stand by my point, they did not mobilise indusry like Britain and America, and simply could not. They didnt have the industrial capacity or manpower , nor willingness to embrace women in the workplace to the degree the western allies or soviets did. Lastly they didnt even have the political will to do it, which was surely the most pervasive problem of all.

You can stand on the head of a pin if you wish but it doesn't make your point. 😁 For one thing you are mixing up production numbers and quality with mobilization of the nation and productivity. The U.S. had exceedingly high productivity, but did not mobilize as much as the rest of the world. In economic terms, NNP, Britain exceeded Germany in mobilization, slightly in 1940 but fell behind in 1941. Only the USSR exceeded the German economic commitment to the war...through 1942. They were neck and neck thereafter. In 1943, 51.1% of the civilian work force in Germany were women...it was 38.8% in Britain that same year.

Yes, Germany did not have the industrial capacity, capital, or manpower to compare to the coalition it faced...but seriously? No duh. The U.S. had half the manufacturing capacity of the world. It also had sufficient if not infinite manpower and tended to squander what it did have, which only did not cripple the war effort because of the workforce's high productivity.

You need to revisit Harrison, Gropeman, Tooze, and others.

[Stuart Galbraith]

1 hour ago, RichTO90 said:

With me? 😁

Quote

No, with various people through the years, most recent Seahawk as I recall. he couldnt accept that the British Empire didnt just outproduce Germany in Tanks and Aircraft, we were even beating them with agricultural tractors. Because Germany Stronk or something.

Why ever would they want to do that? Yes, Britain produced a large number of agricultural tractors during the war, around 50,000 per year. Germany turned most of its tractor production to prime movers and such and probably produced fewer than 50,000 in the entire war. However, why would they want to produce so many? German small-hold farms were generally dirt poor, tiny places unsuited to tractor cultivation in the first place - Deutz did okay prewar but there wasn't much of a market and when the war came...why would the Germans build agricultural tractors it didn't need and could not fuel anyway?

Quote

Well they were having to used increased amount of people as slave labour on their farms to make them work. I know, my Grandfather was one of them. They usd a lot of the British pows as slave labour. Yes, it certainly cost fuel. But the benefits of increased agricultural output, in a country that was increasingly finding it hard to feed their own people by 1944 was self evident. But they didnt do it, even though it would have freed up people for other roles, just as it did in Britain. They didnt even have anything like the Land Army we did either. So by 1944 they were starting to starve, and we werent. Once again, they didnt mobilize adequately to the task.

Yes, Britain outproduced Germany in tank chassis production. In 1939 Germany built 787 and Britain 969. In 1940 it was 1,729 to 1,399. Oh, wait. In 1941 it was 3,816 German tanks to 4,841 British tanks and only 769 of the British tanks were Covenantor and only 706 were Churchill 2-pdr, both of which were essentially non-operational.

Quote

Overlooking that many of the German tanks, not least Panzer 1 and Panzer II, were hardly any better suited for Combat either, yet they still used them.  And they never really replaced them, they just disappeared to combat attrition and conversion into jagdpanzers. Panzer 35T was actually evaluated by the British Army in the mid 1930's. You would find their discussion of what they thought of it very interesting. But we didnt buy it, and the Germans and Romanians, whom had no option, had to use it.

 

Oh, wait. In 1942 it was 5,847 German tanks to 8,611 British tanks and only 925 were new built Covenantor and only 566 were rebuilt Covenantor and only 760 were the near useless Churchill 2 pdr but at least 529 were Churchill rebuilt to workable standards and 138 were conversions from 2 pdr to 6 pdr so at least a few had some actual utility. Oh, wait. In 1943 it was 11,949 German tanks to 7,476 British. Oh, seriously now wait a minute. British tank manufacture was contracting? In 1944 it was 19,091 German tanks to 4,854 British. Seriously now, wait a minute, British tank manufacture was contracting again?

Quote

And as you very well know, from mid 1941 onwards, we were increasingly getting lend lease Shermans and Stuarts to fill the roles, and that became increasingly important, certainly in North Africa.  I can point to a similar decision being made about Medium bombers. A decision was apparently made early on to not put prioritization into developing and building our own, but to receive off America and put the effort into heavy bombers. It does not follow we couldnt do either of course. It was, in my view at least, a political decision, to put our production into areas that the US could not fill. We certainly developed them, such as the Bristol Buckingham. But with B25's coming off the line, who needed it?

And again, how many of those German tanks and AFVs were any good? Ive heard some pretty telling things from a podcast from a bunch of guys restoring a Jagdpanther,that supposedly superlative tank hunter, that it was effectively undriveable. They thought they had gotten something badly wrong, so they asked a Wartime Jagdpanther commander who said 'Yes, thats right, they were all like that'.

So we are just going to take account of the production numbers, not take account of the assorted problems they had with brittle armour, poorly built engines, inadquate transmissions, sabotage?  All a result of cranking out numbers, without anything like the ability to ensure there was any kind of production standard. And ultimately, far too late by then to make a difference anyway.

Um, sorry, no, dispersal did not ramp up production, it reduced production by affecting productivity, as did the CBO. Nor were we talking about quality falling off a cliff. Do I need to bring up Covenantor again? Its production, along with many other items was continued because even though it was known to be a dog quality-wise it was kept in production because it was something that could be called a tank.

Quote

Yes, you keep bringing up Covenanter. And as you are well aware, it was mass produced becuase there was a desperate need for tanks post 1940, not because anyone claimed it was any good. I seem to recall the M2 and the M3 Medium tanks were particularly uninspired also. I know, my neighbour crewed a Grant in the Gloucestershire Hussars, and they seemingly hated it. So did the Soviets.  M22 Locust? Was it anywhere near as good as a Tetrarch?  Was the M5 really a suitable recce tank into 1944? We all put put fairly unsuitable tanks into service, for a variety of reasons in WW2, so Im not sure why we are the only ones being called on it.

So lets see, Churchill MkIII and before, not very good. Churchill IV, according to one tank crewman I talked to at Bovington, fairly good. VII very good, and armour as good as anything the Germans had. Crusader, not very good. Cromwell, ok. Comet, very good. Centurion, best tank of the late 40's and 1950's. But lets not worry about the possiblity we might be learning anything along the way, lets remain stuck on the miserable Covernanter!

You can stand on the head of a pin if you wish but it doesn't make your point. 😁 For one thing you are mixing up production numbers and quality with mobilization of the nation and productivity. The U.S. had exceedingly high productivity, but did not mobilize as much as the rest of the world. In economic terms, NNP, Britain exceeded Germany in mobilization, slightly in 1940 but fell behind in 1941. Only the USSR exceeded the German economic commitment to the war...through 1942. They were neck and neck thereafter. In 1943, 51.1% of the civilian work force in Germany were women...it was 38.8% in Britain that same year.

Quote

In 1943. My Grandmother was working in an ammunition factory since 1940. How much production capacity do you think Germany lost along the way, taking their time to gear up and introduce female production staff? Makes no difference by 1943, the time when it mattered was 40 to 42.

And once again, you are not recognising that 'we fell behind' because there was no need to mass produce tanks to those numbers anymore, when they were safely arriving off the boat. Not just from America I might add, but increasingly from Canada as well. We demonstrated, we could out produce Germany if we needed to. Germany couldnt outproduce America either, but they get plaudits for their apparent stellar efforts and we dont? Whats up with that?

Yes, Germany did not have the industrial capacity, capital, or manpower to compare to the coalition it faced...but seriously? No duh. The U.S. had half the manufacturing capacity of the world. It also had sufficient if not infinite manpower and tended to squander what it did have, which only did not cripple the war effort because of the workforce's high productivity.

You need to revisit Harrison, Gropeman, Tooze, and others.

Rich, I respect your intellect and your knowledge base, you know that. But I realy dont need to hear again the same contemptuous 'Oh well you guys were not that great, you needed us', I heard quite enough of that from Kingsargent thanks. Yes, we know that, we appreciate your massive contribution in military aid, we get it. I still dont think you pay due credit to a country that is under U boat blockade can churn out, 15000 strategic bombers, and by my rough calculation, over 14000 tanks through the war. Over 30000 fighters, nearly 8000 Mosquitos.  And thats not mentioning Destroyers, Corvettes.

We made a significant contribution, and  for most of the war it was swamping the Germans in numbers. It wasnt JUST American production capacity that swung the War, even though it is what ultimately won it. It was British and Canadian, and yes, ultimately also Australia and South Africa, that made a signficant difference, not least in 41 when the Soviets were crying out for tanks, and got them for the Battle of Moscow.

 Its not how much the Germans were making at the end, which was mostly junk anyway. Its how much we were making in 1940, 41 and 42, when it really mattered.

 

 

 

[Stuart Galbraith]

20 hours ago, Sardaukar said:

Actually, it did work out at least to some point, since Germany was having serious tungsten (wolfram) deficiency. That e.g. caused that after middle 1942 (IIRC) Germany mainly stopped using tungsten for armour-piercing rounds and dedicated supply for tools. 

Oh well, good to know.

They had a very good podcast all about this on 'We have Ways' if anyone wants to look it up.

[Rick]

3 hours ago, RichTO90 said:

With me? 😁

Why ever would they want to do that? Yes, Britain produced a large number of agricultural tractors during the war, around 50,000 per year. Germany turned most of its tractor production to prime movers and such and probably produced fewer than 50,000 in the entire war. However, why would they want to produce so many? German small-hold farms were generally dirt poor, tiny places unsuited to tractor cultivation in the first place - Deutz did okay prewar but there wasn't much of a market and when the war came...why would the Germans build agricultural tractors it didn't need and could not fuel anyway?

Yes, Britain outproduced Germany in tank chassis production. In 1939 Germany built 787 and Britain 969. In 1940 it was 1,729 to 1,399. Oh, wait. In 1941 it was 3,816 German tanks to 4,841 British tanks and only 769 of the British tanks were Covenantor and only 706 were Churchill 2-pdr, both of which were essentially non-operational. Oh, wait. In 1942 it was 5,847 German tanks to 8,611 British tanks and only 925 were new built Covenantor and only 566 were rebuilt Covenantor and only 760 were the near useless Churchill 2 pdr but at least 529 were Churchill rebuilt to workable standards and 138 were conversions from 2 pdr to 6 pdr so at least a few had some actual utility. Oh, wait. In 1943 it was 11,949 German tanks to 7,476 British. Oh, seriously now wait a minute. British tank manufacture was contracting? In 1944 it was 19,091 German tanks to 4,854 British. Seriously now, wait a minute, British tank manufacture was contracting again?

Um, sorry, no, dispersal did not ramp up production, it reduced production by affecting productivity, as did the CBO. Nor were we talking about quality falling off a cliff. Do I need to bring up Covenantor again? Its production, along with many other items was continued because even though it was known to be a dog quality-wise it was kept in production because it was something that could be called a tank.

You can stand on the head of a pin if you wish but it doesn't make your point. 😁 For one thing you are mixing up production numbers and quality with mobilization of the nation and productivity. The U.S. had exceedingly high productivity, but did not mobilize as much as the rest of the world. In economic terms, NNP, Britain exceeded Germany in mobilization, slightly in 1940 but fell behind in 1941. Only the USSR exceeded the German economic commitment to the war...through 1942. They were neck and neck thereafter. In 1943, 51.1% of the civilian work force in Germany were women...it was 38.8% in Britain that same year.

Yes, Germany did not have the industrial capacity, capital, or manpower to compare to the coalition it faced...but seriously? No duh. The U.S. had half the manufacturing capacity of the world. It also had sufficient if not infinite manpower and tended to squander what it did have, which only did not cripple the war effort because of the workforce's high productivity.

You need to revisit Harrison, Gropeman, Tooze, and others.

Rich, would you elaborate on the bolden part.

[Sardaukar]

Well, with Luftwaffe Field Divisions and Waffen SS, Germany's use of manpower was rarely optimal. 

[RichTO90]

4 hours ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

Rich, I respect your intellect and your knowledge base, you know that. But I realy dont need to hear again the same contemptuous 'Oh well you guys were not that great, you needed us', I heard quite enough of that from Kingsargent thanks. Yes, we know that, we appreciate your massive contribution in military aid, we get it. I still dont think you pay due credit to a country that is under U boat blockade can churn out, 15000 strategic bombers, and by my rough calculation, over 14000 tanks through the war. Over 30000 fighters, nearly 8000 Mosquitos.  And thats not mentioning Destroyers, Corvettes.

Stuart, if you think I was being contemptuous, you weren't listening very well.

You made an argument based on a raft of incorrect assumptions about the German mobilization effort. I pointed out your errors.

Quote

We made a significant contribution, and  for most of the war it was swamping the Germans in numbers. It wasnt JUST American production capacity that swung the War, even though it is what ultimately won it. It was British and Canadian, and yes, ultimately also Australia and South Africa, that made a signficant difference, not least in 41 when the Soviets were crying out for tanks, and got them for the Battle of Moscow.

Where did I argue that the British contribution wasn't significant? The Soviets received 361 tanks from Britain in 1941. How many were engaged in the Battle of Moscow? How many of the 4,867 Soviet tanks manufactured in the second half of 1941 were? Yes, British contribution was significant - 7.42% significant.

Quote

 Its not how much the Germans were making at the end, which was mostly junk anyway. Its how much we were making in 1940, 41 and 42, when it really mattered.

That would be wonderful if it had anything to do with the argument I made. How much did Britain make in 1940, 1941, and 1942 that had an actual impact on the world war? It mattered to British North Africa, where in 1940 all the tanks were British but considerably less so in 1941 and 1942. Which has zero to do with the argument I made.