Japan winning the Pacific War

[Argus]

2 hours ago, glenn239 said:

The Japanese started the war with adequate ASW means suitable for a short war.  

No on two points.
1/ Factually incorrect, they had the worst ASW of any major power by any objective standard, so given the world leaders in ASW proved barely up to the job,  the IJN did not come within a bulls roar of 'adequacy' for war of any length, and speaking of which....
2/ What is this short war BS again? Short decisive wars are pretty hard to pull off if some bugger in a sub torpedoes your critical CV's or BB's. I gave you three warships sunk by submarine in blue water. Now sure the Japanese did not lose ships this way, but that was on the allies fucking up, not anything the Japanese were doing - 'cos they were not doing shit. 

 

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But to invest for the USN submarine campaign in 1943 or 1944?  This was a waste of resources.  If the war is going on in 1944, then Japan has already lost it and it does not matter what new ASW tech or platforms they've introduced. 

How is 'ASW' is not just trade protection, attritional economic warfare and all that jazz unclear? Warships are not immune to torpedoes from submarines.  

 

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That logic certainly applies for the Americans who can afford everything, but not at all for the Japanese who could not.  ASW tech was expensive on warship building resources and on the need for electronics - two things Japan did not have to spare.  It was also defensive in nature, something that will not win a short war.

Oh please, we are talking about the navy that specifically emphasised technical quality over the quantity they knew they could not have - turns out they failed at both, but Yamato, Long Lance.... they WANTED the best just as much as any other navy if not more.

ASW is not that expensive in shipbuilding resources, utter rubbish. Yes it has costs, the weapons have a bit of ship impact, sure, and there's some accommodation to be made for the Sonar. But please, if a better ASW capability then the IJN put on DD's, could be retrofitted to hundreds of fishing trawlers under emergency conditions in the UK... It's not even that expensive in electronics - again the RN's Type 122/123 ASDIC mass produced for trawlers, the Type 122 came with its own turbo generator for ships that didn't have an electrical system.

 The problem with capturing shipping on a raid is two fold, a/ none of those ships wanted to surrender to the Japanese, so taking them more difficult than it might be, b/ once taken the Japanese fleet is now stuck at the speed of the slowest ship it just captured, which is likely to be sub-10 knots. This is not a place any fleet commander wants put themselves. 

Edited January 13, 2023 by Argus

[glenn239]

23 hours ago, Argus said:

No on two points.
1/ Factually incorrect, they had the worst ASW of any major power by any objective standard, so given the world leaders in ASW proved barely up to the job,  the IJN did not come within a bulls roar of 'adequacy' for war of any length, and speaking of which....

The IJN's capacity for ASW was adequate for the first year of the war.   During the 2nd year it started to be revealed as clearly deficient, and during the 3rd year it pretty much collapsed.  None of it mattered a lick in terms of the pace at which Halsey and Spruance tore the Japanese outer, then inner, perimeter defenses apart.

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How is 'ASW' is not just trade protection, attritional economic warfare and all that jazz unclear? Warships are not immune to torpedoes from submarines.  

We have to account for the raw power of the 1944 USN offensive.  Japan needed the war resolved before the late war USN carrier forces started to roll.  Delicate planning to better convoy protection and such was not going to alter the outcome to anything.  All it would do is increase the score of American air and carrier airpower in the total numbers of Japanese merchant ships sunk, as rampaging US carrier task forces wiped out hundreds of merchant ships that better ASW kept afloat into late 1944.  
 

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 The problem with capturing shipping on a raid is two fold, a/ none of those ships wanted to surrender to the Japanese, so taking them more difficult than it might be, b/ once taken the Japanese fleet is now stuck at the speed of the slowest ship it just captured, which is likely to be sub-10 knots. This is not a place any fleet commander wants put themselves. 

Doctrinally the problem was that the IJN was a criminally brutal organisation in which the murder of civilian crews wouldn't cause a second thought.  Yet, if a navy wants merchant ships to surrender, it is absolutely vital that ships doing so will have their merchant crews returned to a friendly port unharmed.

[glenn239]

On 1/5/2023 at 10:46 AM, futon said:

The only other person that would argue that Japan had a chance to win is Glenn.  

Having considered the premise, while not changing my opinion that Japan cannot defeat the US in a war,  I would suggest the following as maybe being along the lines of what might eek out whateverchance there was of a short war.  You will note that while all of what is listed below was theoretically possible, none of it was politically likely to happen, or even plausible within the culture of the early war IJN leadership.  But I think this is the scale of ASB required to meet your premise.  Perhaps the conclusion is that Japan could not win a war against the United States?

1.  The Kamikaze Corps is formed before the war.  Carrier and land based air elements, purpose built planes and rocket/glide bombs, a large Kaiten corps for the submarine forces.

2.  The Japanese need to take Hawaii at the start of the war.   All out assault in overwhelming strength, at the cost of all other operations.

3.  Once Hawaii was secured, pivot and seize the Netherlands East Indies.   Land and submarine based kamikaze forces will secure the Eastern perimeter against a USN counterattack, as no US carrier task force could dare approach a kamikaze base before 1943.

4.  An all-out offensive against the British Empire in the Indian Ocean, the Middle East and Africa supplied from oil refineries in the Netherlands East Indies.

The idea of this rather infeasible long shot is that the US will be tempted to end the war in the Pacific because their British allies are frantically lobbying an end to the fighting to avoid the loss of India, and the USN will have reported to the White House that even with the Essex carriers that it might not be possible to retake Hawaii against the kamikazes.  Perhaps FDR will be tempted to minimize the risks and make a deal.

Edited January 14, 2023 by glenn239

[futon]

TN has trigger/troll-net mode to keep site on life support with merry-go-round talk for sake of talk *yawn* life-support system fail.

[Ssnake]

That's pretty rich, coming from the guy who kicked off this thread. You wanted to know if Japan could have won. We're looking at the various angles because of you. It's just that you don't like the answers, and now we're the trolls?

Shame on you.

[futon]

1 hour ago, Ssnake said:

That's pretty rich, coming from the guy who kicked off this thread. You wanted to know if Japan could have won. We're looking at the various angles because of you. It's just that you don't like the answers, and now we're the trolls?

Shame on you.

You're posts were fantastic. Why back the Glenn game, no idea. 

[sunday]

Well, as most of the people here, Glenn is not always wrong. He has been very insightful in some topics.

Reason the argument, not the person.

[futon]

Glenn knows a lot of stuff about the Pacific War. He's been going back and fourth with Rich many years back. So when he wants, he knows how to play merry-go-round with the topic. I got a pretty good set of answers already. I'm not fully convinced the possibiliy to win was zero but partly because I tend to be open minded about most things and how nothing is a done deal until its done. If the end result of 1942 was better, then its too open to be certain for sure since so many variables are different. At least me. Thank for the responses. I don't have the time to play long exploration exchanges with Glenn though.

[urbanoid]

On 1/8/2023 at 8:52 PM, glenn239 said:

I'd take it further and say no aggression of any sort, not just against the US.  Pull back out of Indochina, retreat to Manchukuo, hunker down like DB suggested, and pray that Americans do not become angered.  The Japanese fuel reserve was 6 million tons, which should be good for the merchant fleet during WW2 if the battle fleet were made inactive.  The withdrawals might allow some concessions on trade, such as more oil.

 

The US didn't recognize Manchukuo and in their ultimatum they wanted Japan to retreat from 'China', including Manchukuo. Absolutely impossible politically and everybody knew that. I'd say it was almost as if the US wanted for their ultimatum to be rejected.

[urbanoid]

Would it be possible for Japan to not only occupy Hawaii, but also the Panama Canal zone? Just temporarily for the latter, for enough time to destroy the canal as much as possible, so it takes years to rebuild. 

[RETAC21]

58 minutes ago, urbanoid said:

Would it be possible for Japan to not only occupy Hawaii, but also the Panama Canal zone? Just temporarily for the latter, for enough time to destroy the canal as much as possible, so it takes years to rebuild. 

Neither of those was feasible even on Dec 7, we had a thread several years ago (20? - the last King contributed to...) in which the capabilities of Japan and the US at the time were checked out exhaustively (including such trivia as time to react on Dec 7 for the US Army and waves on the available beaches...). The Japanese lacked the forces and the means to pull off Hawaii, Panama was not even in the cards.

[TrustMe]

1 hour ago, urbanoid said:

Would it be possible for Japan to not only occupy Hawaii, but also the Panama Canal zone? Just temporarily for the latter, for enough time to destroy the canal as much as possible, so it takes years to rebuild. 

Pre WW2, the Japanese built long range sub's with the ability to fly long range aircraft from it, with the stated aim of bombing the Panama Canal.

Edited January 14, 2023 by TrustMe

[urbanoid]

3 minutes ago, TrustMe said:

Pre WW2, the Japanese built long range sub's with the ability to fly long range aircraft from it, with the stated aim of bombing the Panama Canal.

Bombing is one thing, inflicting serious damage would require boots on the ground for at least some time. 

[glenn239]

3 hours ago, urbanoid said:

Would it be possible for Japan to not only occupy Hawaii, but also the Panama Canal zone? Just temporarily for the latter, for enough time to destroy the canal as much as possible, so it takes years to rebuild. 

Panama Canal was not possible.  Hawaii could have been taken if done right at the start of the war, but an invasion was in no way a sure thing and other operations would have had to be postponed for the attempt.  

[glenn239]

4 hours ago, futon said:

Glenn knows a lot of stuff about the Pacific War. He's been going back and fourth with Rich many years back. So when he wants, he knows how to play merry-go-round with the topic. I got a pretty good set of answers already. 

If you want Rich's opinion on the Pacific War, it'll be that Japan didn't have a hope in hell to win it.  How do you think Japan could win a war against the US?  I'm all ears.

 

[glenn239]

5 hours ago, sunday said:

Well, as most of the people here, Glenn is not always wrong. He has been very insightful in some topics.

To win a war, Japan had to get the Americans themselves to conclude that they wanted to make a deal.  The only possible way that could happen is if the US military came to the conclusion that (a) the naval buildup could not win the war against Japan and (b) continuing the war would compromise the chances against Germany.   IMO, it's not possible to get to those conditions without going historically ASB. 

[urbanoid]

Probably the biggest pre-war Japanese mistake was letting the instrument of policy to set policy. I'm obviously talking about Kwantung Army and the second push into China in 1937. There was basically no way to decisively win that one, no matter how many victories were achieved. The Nationalist Chinese in general fought like retards and had their asses handed to them even in late 1944/early 1945, but it still drained a lot of Japanese resources AND set Japan on a collision course with the US.

[sunday]

21 minutes ago, glenn239 said:

To win a war, Japan had to get the Americans themselves to conclude that they wanted to make a deal.  The only possible way that could happen is if the US military came to the conclusion that (a) the naval buildup could not win the war against Japan and (b) continuing the war would compromise the chances against Germany.   IMO, it's not possible to get to those conditions without going historically ASB. 

ASB? Seems you have read SM Stirling!

It could also be said that 1940s USA is not 1900s Russia.

The victory on the Russo-Japanese war could have been a dangerous illusion for the Japanese Powers That Be.

[urbanoid]

Isn't ASB a widely used term in AH scenarios? 

Btw. the idea of invading Panama Canal zone came from Stirling's Drakaverse, where the Japanese did exactly that, in addition to the occupation of Hawaii. And still lost.

[RichTO90]

2 hours ago, TrustMe said:

Pre WW2, the Japanese built long range sub's with the ability to fly long range aircraft from it, with the stated aim of bombing the Panama Canal.

As I understand it, only the I-400 class were built with that plan in mind, based on a 1942 concept developed by Yamamoto. Initially 18 were planned but only 3 were completed.

The prewar concept of operations for the aircraft carrying submarines was as fleet scouts not as air attack vessels.

[RichTO90]

21 minutes ago, urbanoid said:

Isn't ASB a widely used term in AH scenarios? 

Btw. the idea of invading Panama Canal zone came from Stirling's Drakaverse, where the Japanese did exactly that, in addition to the occupation of Hawaii. And still lost.

Too many objectives, too little time, too far away, and too little force to implement the operations.

[R011]

5 hours ago, urbanoid said:

The US didn't recognize Manchukuo and in their ultimatum they wanted Japan to retreat from 'China', including Manchukuo. Absolutely impossible politically and everybody knew that. I'd say it was almost as if the US wanted for their ultimatum to be rejected.

It wasn't an ultimatum.  That implies "accept this or we declare war", like the Anglo-French ultimatum to Germany in September 1939. There were no consequences for rejecting it save a continuation of sanctions. 

According to Toland, the American proposal did not intend  that Japan withdraw from Manchukuo.  This was not made clear in the proposal itself and the Japanese took it as Manchukuo being included without asking for clarification or making a counter proposal.  Not that the Army would have accepted a withdrawal to the pre-war lines.

[futon]

5 hours ago, urbanoid said:

Probably the biggest pre-war Japanese mistake was letting the instrument of policy to set policy. I'm obviously talking about Kwantung Army and the second push into China in 1937. There was basically no way to decisively win that one, no matter how many victories were achieved. The Nationalist Chinese in general fought like retards and had their asses handed to them even in late 1944/early 1945, but it still drained a lot of Japanese resources AND set Japan on a collision course with the US.

I have arrived to thinking it was possible to end the war in China had CKS's Nationalists not been receiving aid. The closer towards collapse the Nationalists went, the more aid the SU and the US sent in. The Wang regime also used the same Nationalists Chinese flag. The end goal was for the resisting Nationalists in Chongqing to merge into the Wang regime in Nanjing/Shanghai. And that would have suited Wang fine since his original purpose of switching to the Japanese was to seek an end to the war to begin with. In 1940 both sides sent feelers to see if an end could be found. CKS's side was emboldened enough to not seek going forward with a peace process because of receiving a new larger line of credit from the US which meant short term funding ensured and long term continual US involvement.    

[glenn239]

21 hours ago, sunday said:

 

The victory on the Russo-Japanese war could have been a dangerous illusion for the Japanese Powers That Be.

 

It certainly was the case that previous military victories had distorted beyond recognition of Japanese perceptions of their own relative strength, but in all fairness, Japan would not be the first (or last) empire in history that suffered a culture of runaway jingoism after a string of military successes.  

[Argus]

On 1/14/2023 at 10:58 AM, glenn239 said:

The IJN's capacity for ASW was adequate for the first year of the war.   During the 2nd year it started to be revealed as clearly deficient, and during the 3rd year it pretty much collapsed.  None of it mattered a lick in terms of the pace at which Halsey and Spruance tore the Japanese outer, then inner, perimeter defenses apart.

Glenn, seriously mate I AM NOT TALKING ABOUT CONVOY, nor have I been since I started talking about battleships, aircraft carriers and heavy cruisers that were sunk by submarines. Their ASW was poor, if the USN had had torps that worked or the Anglo-Dutch had enough submarines the IJN would have paid heavily for their neglect of ASW. 

 I don't want to be that guy, but when I post:

 

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How is 'ASW' is not just trade protection, attritional economic warfare and all that jazz unclear? Warships are not immune to torpedoes from submarines.  

and your paragraph in response contains a sentence like this
 

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 Delicate planning to better convoy protection and such was not going to alter the outcome to anything. 

I'm not sure we are on the same planet - and even 180 degrees out of phase, you manage to grab the wrong end of the stick.

No I don't have to account for the savage fury of the USN's 1944 campaign, I'm not arguing that point at all, I agree with you, the Japanese were going to lose, the only questions being when and at what price. But since you keep wanting to talk about the impact of better IJN ASW on the late war, ok lets talk about that. The USN shaped the battlefield of 1944-5 with its submarines in 42-3, ripping Japanese merchant shipping to shreds and with it gutting Japans ability to furnish a defence. 

 Better ASW for the IJN would have increased the cost and decreased the effectiveness of the Allied (mostly USN) submarine campaign against Japanese trade. The winner being Japanese shipping and with more materials flowing into Japan, and more military resources shipping out of Japan, the US is going to have much harder time in 43-45. Sure we can say its just making things worse to no good end. Japan is going to lose anyway, so the harder she fights the more men die to no purpose - but I'm sure if you'd offered the option to the Japanese at time time they'd have taken it worth both hands. 

So no IJN ASW  was not adequate for a short war, their fleet was far too vulnerable to submarine attack, and in a long war it would have made a substantial difference. 

 

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Doctrinally the problem was that the IJN was a criminally brutal organisation in which the murder of civilian crews wouldn't cause a second thought.  Yet, if a navy wants merchant ships to surrender, it is absolutely vital that ships doing so will have their merchant crews returned to a friendly port unharmed.

Almost, we almost agreed on something, but then... nup.  Merchant seamen have always been a strategic resource, they only get turned over to a friendly port as a very last option - but absolutely, a fair chance at seeing a POW camp would made a difference in more than just this area. 
The reason I don't agree with brutality being a problem per say, is that a reputation for brutality has been by far the most effective means of getting merchant ships to surrender for most of recorded history.  It is the staple of piracy through the ages, give the prize two options and absolutely no doubt of the consequences should they chose the wrong one. 🏴‍☠️