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Japan winning the Pacific War


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First thing to declare, is what compels the thinking of it, at least more seriously than before. First of three, what it could mean (beneficially for Japan in this region that is) in the face of Japan really having no choice but to either kowtow or go to 2% and doing things like digging underground again due to PRC BMs, all part of an emerging an East Asia Cold War with no sign of the PRC willing to relax its goals regarding Taiwan. It's all very unpleasant thoughts. So changes in the past become more tantalizing thoughts. Pardon the venting. The second is simply learning more and more about the Pacific War and all the planning, weapons, and battles, making it easier to come across to identifying smaller things that could be changed in sort of what-if thinking. Third, a Japanese victory in the Pacific does not make necessary an invasion of the US homeland (nor Australia.. or even just Hawaii), anything beyond token bombardment even not really necessary.  So the what-if wouldn't produce such ill-fated result for them so that rubs less (hopefully) with whom are currently extremely important partners in this new East Asia Cold War. But what about China's fate.. well they fell to Mao's communism, etc, so overall end resulting sentiment, kind of meh. And if the Wang regime succeeded as under state of Japan.. it's happend to China before by the Mongolians-Yuan and Manchus-Qing. Lots more associated blah blah if again.

So that out of the way..

The first and possible biggest factor is sinking a US carrier during the PH attack. Like many battle related points, there's a factor of chance. If rerolling the dice, a worse result for the Japanese than actual history is also possible. But a better roll would be catching one of the carriers. Even if Japanese thinking may have put priority on BBs, had a carrier been spotted, surely it would be targeted. Nearest carrier to Hawaii at the time was USS Enterprise. Second closest but towards Midway being Lexington. Through 1942, the balance of naval power was favorable to Japan but the US having enough carriers to enable operations of putting a check on Japan such as Coral Sea, Doolittle, Midway, and Guadalcanal. 

On the Japanese side, assuming no change to PH, would be better naval codes or rather updated at a more frequent rate. How feasible, IDK. ISTR something about an update to the codes were planned for Spring for 1942 but didn't happen. Updated codes would reset US level of code breaking, and delay the arrival of decephering enough for benefit by a couple of months or so.

For ground forces, initially could be viewed as far less of a factor, but better forsight and ambition for anti-tank capability. The Japanese were very ambitious in designing things like the Yamato or the Zero. But for tanks and anti-tank weaponry, a lot of emphasis on size and practicality. Up until 1941, the 47mm gun tank and anti-tank gun was quite well enough but design work for successor was to slow. Sooner design and implementation of long 57mm gun (there was a real wheeled carriage project but it finished by 1943 and not adopted in the end) or 75mm gun was (i.e. quicker production and deployment of Type 1 Ho-Ni, sooner realization of something like Type 3 Chi-Nu based on Type 2 Ho-I project -- reduce or end Chi-Ha Shinhoto production sooner), in hindsight, necessary. With improved anti-tank capability comes a much harder challenge for the US in fighting on the islands as M4 armor becomes more vulnerable, a tedious threshold with big influence, increasing various kinds of costs.

That's all for now.

Edited by futon
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I just don't think that Japan ever had a chance to win against the US.

The industrial capacities were too dissimilar (and not in Japan's favor, not even in '42 after capture of the Dutch East Indies). Japan heavily relied on its merchant fleet to transport the goods from a geographically vastly dispersed empire to a central industrial base . That made the whole supply situation highly precarious. As soon as the US Navy got their act together with the torpedo thing and their sub doctrine - and god knows, it took them quite a while - Japan was KO'd by end of '44 already. 50% of all supplies were transported east, or west of Taiwan. You simply had to cover the region with constant sub patrols. Some in the USN realized this early on, with Lockwood they finally managed to get things right, at which point it simply was a slaughter of the Japanese merchant marine. I just don't see how Japan could possibly recover from these blows after 1944. The strategic vulnerability wouldn't disappear, geography being what it is. There weren't enough escorts to go protect the merchant fleet in its entirety, even ignoring the fact that the IJN didn't have a good escort doctrine.

 

This brings us back to the question, could a quick decapitation have resulted in the US suing for peace?

I'm having a hard time believing this. It would have required extraordinary circumstance. Sure, the US came out of a deep recession and were somewhat demoralized. But I guess it would have also required an early death of FDR, stronger Nazi support among the US population, a preparatory PR campaign to brand US policy towards Japan as unjust, Japanese troops not behaving like they did in Nanking and elsewhere.

At Coral Sea, Japan might have been more lucky. A more careful approach against Midway might have reversed the outcome (say, Lexington can't be patched up in time or didn't make it back to Pearl to begin with), more respect for US codebreaking might have resulted in a feint to ambush the US trap, ... At the same time, Japan already came out lucky on a couple of occasions. Had there been a radio set at the radar station on Hawaii, had the USN taken the signs of an attack on Pearl more seriously (let's not forget, US intelligence had predicted the attack, it was just exactly one week off); Coral Sea could have also swung the other way, ...

What I'm saying is, good and bad fortunes were somewhat in balance if not slightly favoring Japan early on. The strategic situation always was deeply unfavorable. It would have required an extraordinary string of lucky events to knock out all carriers no later than Midway (and even then, probably only if there had been only two rather than three carriers present). Even if the USN had not only lost most of its surface fleet but also all its carriers, there still would have been the submarine fleet to cripple the merchant marine. It might have taken longer. It would have been more arduous. It would have cost most sailors' lives (and possibly more Marines, too). Well, there would have been more nukes on Japan, and Japan-occupied territories, eventually. But I just don't see the US rolling over and giving up. Objectively it simply was in too good a strategic position. Proposing negotiations would have been political suicide for any US politician.

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What Ssnake stated plus the fact that Pearl Harbor was a sneak attack. Americans, then more than now imo, are enraged about being the victim of anything "sneaky" especially physical violence. The sneak attack on Pearl Harbor ensured that the American spirit the Japanese hoped to break was never going to occur. 

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Well, had the Japanese diplomats been able to deliver the note three hours earlier it technically wouldn't have counted as a sneak attack; that they were left waiting in the state department didn't help, of course. From a psychological point of view I guess the three hours didn't make much of a difference as the US population simply wasn't psychologically prepared for war, so I guess unless the US had been given a week's warning the narrative of a heinous sucker punch would still have been peddled by the same US politicians that were responsible for their part of the escalation with Japan right up to the outbreak of the war - because they knew that the US couldn't lose.

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Even if all USN three carriers had been eliminated/sidelined before Midway, there were another four in the Atlantic Fleet, with a whole slew of surface and  submarine combatants to support them, which — if it became imperative — could have been transferred to the Pacific.

Besides the long, very susceptible sea lanes mentioned, the economic situation of the two nations was very disparate. A nice, easily comprehensible study is provided at the Combines Fleet site:
Why Japan Really Lost The War

---
Leo

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Rather than thinking about how, I suppose Futon assumes that Japan won, let's say the US surrenders or decides a Pacific war is too hard, so where does that leave the current nations?

 

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2 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

Rather than thinking about how, I suppose Futon assumes that Japan won, let's say the US surrenders or decides a Pacific war is too hard, so where does that leave the current nations?

 

Nah, I was thinking how to get it done.

I think the point about difference in economy and production gets too emphasized. I think this point is beatable. How things play out can override the diffence in size between countries.  Examples of wars in which the smaller country won exists, such as the Winter War between Finland and the Soviet Union. 

The US did indeed lose carriers in 1942 and they were not promptly replaced by existing carriers from the Atlantic. So if the result of early war engagements are toggled better for Japan, which was very possible (yes, opposite of worse with dice reroll is also possible), then 1942 goes better. That would mean essentially no Guadalcanal grind.  Many of the veteran Japanese pilots would remain alive to train, advise, and face the next big wave coming in 1944. Also consequently due a worse naval result for the US side, fewer experienced pilots to be in play in 1944. The US would still come in with Hellcats and ship borne radar in 1944 so its still challenge, but surely not a turkey shoot this time around.

The hardest part to overcome is the submarines. Assuming a better 1942 which leaves off the 1943 New Guenea and other destroyer relatated troop ferrying operations, it relaxes some strain on the destroyer fleet. As the US submarine operations really start to take off, Japan would be in better position to adapt too new circumstances. In actual history, they were able to destroy a decent of US subs as things had played out. So this result could be better. But good enough?, maybe this is the hardest to turn around since the US had produced so many subs. Although maybe the training of sub crews was a little less than actual subs. To alliviate a little on the great maritime dependency, a land route from Indochina was established in 1944 and could start trinkling in materials upwards.

As for nukes, as long as Saipan was defended, then the ability to deliver nukes on Japanese cities would come later. If Tinian was nuked, then it becomes unusable for further offense pushing. Just nuking Saipan may still leave cave defenders alive and able to report inteligence, meaning Saipan would still need to be captured. But nuking it in some ways actually helps defend it from being captured and usable for allies offensive until US side can feel comfortable in sending some units after radiation clears away. 

Edited by futon
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14 hours ago, Ssnake said:

Well, had the Japanese diplomats been able to deliver the note three hours earlier it technically wouldn't have counted as a sneak attack; that they were left waiting in the state department didn't help, of course. From a psychological point of view I guess the three hours didn't make much of a difference as the US population simply wasn't psychologically prepared for war, so I guess unless the US had been given a week's warning the narrative of a heinous sucker punch would still have been peddled by the same US politicians that were responsible for their part of the escalation with Japan right up to the outbreak of the war - because they knew that the US couldn't lose.

The Japanese note wasn't even a proper declaation of war.  Even a proper devclaration given simultaneously with an attack would likely have been considered sneaky.

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I think the Japanese were arguing themselves down a blind hole by their own logic. Naval battles, even decisive naval battles, don't win wars in and of themselves. Rather they allow wars to be won, generally at the treaty table but on the battlefield too. If P-H had sunk every US warship west of the Rockies there'd still be nothing forcing the US to surrender if they chose not to, and still a war to fight before Japan could make them. 

So at best P-H was good set-up for the campaign around the decisive battle they needed to have to have, to open the way to allow them to exert the military pressure required to get the US talking - all against the ticking clock of US mobilisation, and whatever else is going on. If Japan has also taken this opportunity to start a fight with the British Empire and the Dutch as per historical, a greater level of Japanese naval success in the Pacific is going to change the global picture. I mean its not beyond the bounds to suggest we might see an invasion of Norway to eliminate NWE 'big ship' problem and allow more of the RN's strength to go east. Likewise the Med might see Torch and Husky in some form to open the Med to shipping, but then a diversion of effort to the Japanese. I mean Britain is going to respond to the US facing a serious threat, does this in turn see Hitler in Moscow and ultimately an atomic sunrise over Berlin? Who knows. 

Edited by Argus
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10 hours ago, futon said:

Nah, I was thinking how to get it done.

1) I think the point about difference in economy and production gets too emphasized. I think this point is beatable. How things play out can override the diffence in size between countries.  Examples of wars in which the smaller country won exists, such as the Winter War between Finland and the Soviet Union. 

2) The US did indeed lose carriers in 1942 and they were not promptly replaced by existing carriers from the Atlantic....

3) The hardest part to overcome is the submarines. 

4) As for nukes, as long as Saipan was defended, then the ability to deliver nukes on Japanese cities would come later. 

ok, ok. so let's go by this point by point:

1) The only way that the US doesn't outproduce Japan is if the US had taken an isolasionist stance and cut back on its weapon production capability (further...) in the 30s. After the Two-Ocean Navy Act, there was no way Japan was going to match the US.

2) The US had pretty much lost its pre-war fleet by the end of the Solomons campaign, either sunk or damaged and temporarily out of commission, but it didn't matter because replacements were coming on line starting in 1943 and at a increasing pace. Not only machines, but also men, so even if the best trained men are lost in 1941/42, they are going to be replaced.

3) Japan couldn't hope for a better scenario in 1941-43, the torpedoes had multiple issues that limited sinkings and the commanding officers had been badly trained, but all of it eventually was turned around. The only way to keep up was to launch an extensive escort construction program from the start and proper convoys (let's say, learning from British experience in WW1) but both would cut into other things, be it new destroyer buildings or fuel availability, so the trade off may meant a faster US advance up the mid-Pacific island chains.

4) Remember these are about the smallest nuclear weapons ever deployed, if used tactically, they are not going to make an island unusable as Bikini atoll atests. On the other hand, conquering Saipan later will mean the quirks of the B-29 would be worked out and the bombs would be in serial production, so it won't be 2 cities that will be bombed but a lot of them!

The only way to win the Pacific war IMO, is for Japan to keep the US out somehow.

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The problem is that Japan did not only fight the US but also the British (and later Soviets) and the US did not only fight the Japanese but also the Germans. So when Germany looses, the winners will be coming for Japan.

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10 hours ago, futon said:

I think the point about difference in economy and production gets too emphasized. I think this point is beatable. How things play out can override the diffence in size between countries.  Examples of wars in which the smaller country won exists, such as the Winter War between Finland and the Soviet Union.

Well, Finland didn't perish in the Winter War, but it lost a decent chunk of its territory and became politically isolated and, if not a puppet of the Soviet Union, about as close to one as you can get while retaining your political and economic independence. And even that required massive material support from Nazi Germany.

I find this example hardly supportive of your argument.

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2 hours ago, Ssnake said:

Well, Finland didn't perish in the Winter War, but it lost a decent chunk of its territory and became politically isolated and, if not a puppet of the Soviet Union, about as close to one as you can get while retaining your political and economic independence. And even that required massive material support from Nazi Germany.

I find this example hardly supportive of your argument.

Well...militarily we call it "defensive victory". In practice we put up a good fight but neither in 1940 nor 1944 it was "victory"... More like we persisted. 

We managed to retain our independence and way of life, unlike many other countries.

Appeasement policy towards Soviet Union really started in late 50s- early 60s and onwards, when it was politically convenient to use "Soviet Card" to enhance own political ambitions.

Most blatant example was 1956 when Urho Kekkonen was elected as president via special law. 

We kind of didn't get rid of that mindset ("do not aggravate the bear") until 1991. Obviously, it was also unsaid thing that there was only one enemy. As we say: "only one good thing rises from east...and that is sun...".

In many ways, Baltic states and Eastern Europe that had been under Soviet occupation were way more realistic afterwards. They had actually lived through occupation.  

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5 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

ok, ok. so let's go by this point by point:

1) The only way that the US doesn't outproduce Japan is if the US had taken an isolasionist stance and cut back on its weapon production capability (further...) in the 30s. After the Two-Ocean Navy Act, there was no way Japan was going to match the US.

2) The US had pretty much lost its pre-war fleet by the end of the Solomons campaign, either sunk or damaged and temporarily out of commission, but it didn't matter because replacements were coming on line starting in 1943 and at a increasing pace. Not only machines, but also men, so even if the best trained men are lost in 1941/42, they are going to be replaced.

3) Japan couldn't hope for a better scenario in 1941-43, the torpedoes had multiple issues that limited sinkings and the commanding officers had been badly trained, but all of it eventually was turned around. The only way to keep up was to launch an extensive escort construction program from the start and proper convoys (let's say, learning from British experience in WW1) but both would cut into other things, be it new destroyer buildings or fuel availability, so the trade off may meant a faster US advance up the mid-Pacific island chains.

4) Remember these are about the smallest nuclear weapons ever deployed, if used tactically, they are not going to make an island unusable as Bikini atoll atests. On the other hand, conquering Saipan later will mean the quirks of the B-29 would be worked out and the bombs would be in serial production, so it won't be 2 cities that will be bombed but a lot of them!

The only way to win the Pacific war IMO, is for Japan to keep the US out somehow.

Hah, "Nippon".. what a loser :)

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Maybe, Japan should of focuesed on the lesser important naval ships, Destroyers and Corvettes. When the US sub's started sinking so many merchant ships the Japanese Navy didn't bother defending them and their economy ground to a halt becuase it relied so much on imports. Something that the modern Japanese Navy rectified many years ago and organised their navy around four Escort Fleets.

If the Imperial Japanese Fleet had defended these merchant ships better, then Japan would of still been in the fight longer than 1945.

Edited by TrustMe
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1 hour ago, futon said:

Hah, "Nippon".. what a loser :)

Ah, so you are again not interested on debate, just drama.

How about you try to show how do you think that Japan could win and trump the economic imbalance between the US and your beloved Japan?

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1 hour ago, TrustMe said:

Maybe, Japan should of focuesed on the lesser important naval ships, Destroyers and Corvettes. When the US sub's started sinking so many merchant ships the Japanese Navy didn't bother defending them and their economy ground to a halt becuase it relied so much on imports. Something that the modern Japanese Navy rectified many years ago and organised their navy around four Escort Fleets.

If the Imperial Japanese Fleet had defended these merchant ships better, then Japan would of still been in the fight longer than 1945.

There was a bunch of "kaibokan" made, ships that were 700 to 900 tons. Of the various classes, probably the most fancy class was the Ukuru class, only 20 were made in '44 and '45. 940 tons, max speed 19.5 knots. It had both active and passive sonar on it, 16 depth charge launchers and 120 depth charges. The active sonar type was based off of German design. Two following classes were an economized design that were more produced, 56 and 67 respectively, all made in '44 and '45. Both weighed less than Ukuru yet still a little slower than Ukuru. 12 depth charge launches. Still 120 depth charges, a mortar but doubtful if proved helpful. Looks like no sonar, not even passive. So even with many of these, they didn't seem to contribute anything meaningful. 

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1 hour ago, RETAC21 said:

Ah, so you are again not interested on debate, just drama.

How about you try to show how do you think that Japan could win and trump the economic imbalance between the US and your beloved Japan?

The only other person that would argue that Japan had a chance to win is Glenn. :) I'll take that hint and walk off now. 

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Could Japan have taken the Hawaiian islands in early 42, and defended them successfully?

I don't think so, but suppose they did. The US could have launched their subs only from the west coast, and Australia - assuming that most of the remaining campaign had gone in a similar way.

Would it have been a realistic prospect of hopping the Aleutians and then seize the Alaskan shore?

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14 minutes ago, Ssnake said:

Could Japan have taken the Hawaiian islands in early 42, and defended them successfully?

I don't think so, but suppose they did. The US could have launched their subs only from the west coast, and Australia - assuming that most of the remaining campaign had gone in a similar way.

Would it have been a realistic prospect of hopping the Aleutians and then seize the Alaskan shore?

I think grabbing either or both still leaves the question how does that force the US to the negotiating table?  Japan couldn't force China out of the war despite being effectively unopposed at sea and in the air for most of that war.  That the US was able to send vital supplies to China, Australia, the UK and the USSR and varying amounts of weapons while still building what amounted to an entirely new Navy and army from scratch in less than 6 years doesn't really leave much room for a Japanese victory.   

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9 hours ago, futon said:

The only other person that would argue that Japan had a chance to win is Glenn. :) I'll take that hint and walk off now. 

Ok, tag. 

I've never argued that Japan could win WW2 against the Americans, so no idea what you're talking about there.   I've argued that it might have been possible for Japan to lose the war less painfully.  That ain't the same thing as what you're seeking.

 

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16 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

ok, ok. so let's go by this point by point:

1) The only way that the US doesn't outproduce Japan is if the US had taken an isolasionist stance and cut back on its weapon production capability (further...) in the 30s. After the Two-Ocean Navy Act, there was no way Japan was going to match the US.

Look correct.  I would add that I would expect even an isolationist USA would vastly outproduce Japan.

Quote

2) The US had pretty much lost its pre-war fleet by the end of the Solomons campaign, either sunk or damaged and temporarily out of commission, but it didn't matter because replacements were coming on line starting in 1943 and at a increasing pace. Not only machines, but also men, so even if the best trained men are lost in 1941/42, they are going to be replaced.

Yes, the US programs for warships, merchant ships, all forms of naval equipment vastly exceeded Japan's.  The main exception I think was submarines, but even here Japanese efforts did not produce a viable fighting force.

Quote

3) Japan couldn't hope for a better scenario in 1941-43, the torpedoes had multiple issues that limited sinkings and the commanding officers had been badly trained, but all of it eventually was turned around. The only way to keep up was to launch an extensive escort construction program from the start and proper convoys (let's say, learning from British experience in WW1) but both would cut into other things, be it new destroyer buildings or fuel availability, so the trade off may meant a faster US advance up the mid-Pacific island chains.

Might have helped, but I think the small size of the Japanese merchant marine, (about 6 million tons), and poor production during the war, (about 3 million tons plus 1 million captured), would decide the matter even with more escorts.

Quote

4) Remember these are about the smallest nuclear weapons ever deployed, if used tactically, they are not going to make an island unusable as Bikini atoll atests. On the other hand, conquering Saipan later will mean the quirks of the B-29 would be worked out and the bombs would be in serial production, so it won't be 2 cities that will be bombed but a lot of them!

 Delaying the fall of the Marianas into 1945 is a nexus - all sorts of butterflies there.  None of them flap to a Japanese victory, but many might move the needle to a different Japanese surrender.

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The only way to win the Pacific war IMO, is for Japan to keep the US out somehow.

For Japan to have had any chance at all, Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union had to be allies.  This was difficult to do when Barbarossa happened over 5 months before the war.

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2 hours ago, glenn239 said:

Ok, tag. 

I've never argued that Japan could win WW2 against the Americans, so no idea what you're talking about there.   I've argued that it might have been possible for Japan to lose the war less painfully.  That ain't the same thing as what you're seeking.

 

My apologies.

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