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Posted
12 hours ago, glenn239 said:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hundred_Days_Offensive

Total casualties between August 1918 and November 1918 were 1,172,075 German vs 1,070,000 Allied.  Of the German casualties, 386,342 were POW's.  So the number of German battle casualties were 785,733.

Take away the Americans, the conclusion seems to be more that the 100 Days was unsustainable for the Anglo-French, does it not?

No, Don't know where you get that non-sense, which, on the other hand, is one of those fallacies you so much love. Can you prove the allies were running out of men? no, you can't because they weren't.

Typically, you quote losses but omit the strength on 11/11: 4.649.000 vs 3.562.000 (without Americans) or this graph that shows German strength falling precipitously in Oct/Nov:

Riflemen-1918-Western-Front.jpg

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Posted
12 hours ago, glenn239 said:

Tough to say.  The Entente advantage is economic; the Central Powers' economies were in serious trouble by 1917.   It's easy to picture the decay being terminal into 1919 or 1920, leading to collapse.

The CP advantage was on the battlefield; in each year of the war, they had picked off one Entente satellite power from the war, (Belgium in 1914, Serbia in 1915, Romania in 1916, Russia in 1917).  It's easy to picture Italy and Greece being picked off in 1918 as the next on the list, instead of a major German offensive in France.  In Russia, if the war is still going on when the Russian revolution breaks out, the Germans will ally with the Whites and the Reds will lose.

 

 

This is typical of the non-sense you spout continuously. Belgium wasn't picked off the war, nor was Serbia, both continued to field armies into 1918. The Central Powers tried an offensive in Italy in 1918 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Battle_of_the_Piave_River) and it failed miserably, essentially finishing off the Austrian Army, and this was followed by Vittorio-Veneto, which crushed the Austrian Army. In September, Bulgaria had been "picked off" by the allies, which were advancing unopposed to Serbia and Turkey, so the Central Powers were no more.

In 1919 it would be Germany alone, blockaded and out of manpower against attacks from the West and the South.

Posted

But that Italian Army depended a lot on food supplies coming in from the USA. And if you remove the US Navy from convoy duty in the Atlantic, the Allies must either accept more damage by U-Boats or take away surface combatants from other theatres, which means they get weaker there.

Without a doubt if everything stays the same, just the US does not sent an army to the continent, the end result is the same, but if America completely stays out of the conflict the changes are much deeper. Just removing the US made trucks and locomotives changes the supply situation of the allies by some margin.

The economic impact of the US joining the war is imho underestimated. The amount of money raised through war bonds alone is huge and imho there is no way that the Allies could raise that amount of money on their own.

https://www.thoughtco.com/world-war-i-economy-4157436

Posted

Ive already suggested the USN did a LOT of work in the North Atlantic, and did a lot to keep the U boat menace under control. Would it have made the difference that they were not there? Well the RN was still the worlds largest navy.The U boats were still largely bottled up in Belgium and the North German coast. They had relatively little ability to operate in the Med. I would suggest that such threat as they present is more to Britain than to France, and even less to Italy. They can do relatively little, unlike in WW2, to operate further afield and stop supplies coming into Europe from South America, or troops from the rest of the British Empire.

I think the resulting blockade would have hit Britain as hard as it did in WW2. And yet, I cant see it being more effective than it was in 1941, where they also failed.

Posted

Italy needed food. Food that needs to be shipped to Italy. Remove the US shipping and the Allies will have less shipping available for other duties. Stabilizing the Italian army after Caporetto without US supplies will not be easy.

Posted
5 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

This is typical of the non-sense you spout continuously. Belgium wasn't picked off the war, nor was Serbia, both continued to field armies into 1918. The Central Powers tried an offensive in Italy in 1918 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Battle_of_the_Piave_River) and it failed miserably

Belgium sure as hell was overrun by the Central Powers in 1914, and Serbia was overrun by the CP in 1915.  Contingents exited the country and kept fighting, true, similar I suppose to how some Polish military escaped from Poland in 1939 and fought on with the Allies afterwards.

The Austrians did fail on the Paive in 1918.  The operative term being "Austrians".  By 1918, in reality, the Austrian army was no longer capable of offensive operations and crossing the Paive to attack the Italian army backed by several corps of Anglo-French troops was simply beyond them.  There was no chance of success.  Whether or not Operation Michael would fail on the Paive, that would be another question entirely. 

Posted
17 hours ago, glenn239 said:

The Germans did not necessarily have to develop countermeasures to the 1918 Allied tactics, they simply had to fall back into the Ardennes..........

That was possible in military terms. But politicly it would force the Kaiser to abdicate.

Posted
1 hour ago, glenn239 said:

Belgium sure as hell was overrun by the Central Powers in 1914, and Serbia was overrun by the CP in 1915.  Contingents exited the country and kept fighting, true, similar I suppose to how some Polish military escaped from Poland in 1939 and fought on with the Allies afterwards.

The Austrians did fail on the Paive in 1918.  The operative term being "Austrians".  By 1918, in reality, the Austrian army was no longer capable of offensive operations and crossing the Paive to attack the Italian army backed by several corps of Anglo-French troops was simply beyond them.  There was no chance of success.  Whether or not Operation Michael would fail on the Paive, that would be another question entirely. 

The Axis logistics on that front was already inadequate to supply the historical number of troops, which were under supplied and malnourished already, it could not support more troops.

Posted (edited)
8 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

No, Don't know where you get that non-sense, which, on the other hand, is one of those fallacies you so much love. Can you prove the allies were running out of men? no, you can't because they weren't.

Didn't say the Anglo-French were out of men.  Said that the 1918 offensive was unsustainable for too much longer.  Those are two different things.  There would have to be a pause.  

Quote

Typically, you quote losses but omit the strength on 11/11: 4.649.000 vs 3.562.000 (without Americans) or this graph that shows German strength falling precipitously in Oct/Nov:

1. The Germans had been outnumbered approx. 3:2 on the Western Front routinely, so 4.6 to 3.5 was not out of the ordinary for 1915-1917.

2. Assuming no American involvement, the chances of Germany winning the war on the offensive in the West were nil.  If Ludendorff engages in his 1918 offensives, the result will be the same as the historical, even if the US is not in.  The question was whether the Anglo-French could win the war on the offensive in the West without the Americans, or if they'd have to rely on the blockade into 1919 or 1920 for their best play.

3.  The length of the front in October 1918 was about 430 miles.  Once the Germans fall back into the Ardennes, the front falls to 230 miles, and little of it was as suited to Allied offensive tactics as in Flanders.  The German army in the West in November 1918 is 3.56 million by your numbers.  Across 430 miles of front, that's an average of 8,300 per mile.

Add, let's say, 200,000 because the Americans are not there to inflict those casualties.  I'll subtract, let's say 500,000 required on other fronts to keep the CP in the war into 1919, let's call it 3.2 million.   The frontage is more like 230 miles, or a density of 14,000 troops per mile, (3.2 million divided by 230 miles).  The terrain in the Ardennes and along the Franco-German border was much worse for Allied offensive tactics.  That is to say, even assuming  half a million troops diverted elsewhere, even assuming all the results of the 1918 offensive 'as is', the Germans increase their coverage from 8,300 to about 14,000 per mile.

Edited by glenn239
Posted (edited)
24 minutes ago, seahawk said:

The Axis logistics on that front was already inadequate to supply the historical number of troops, which were under supplied and malnourished already, it could not support more troops.

Agreed, the Austrian army was dissolving in 1918 as more and more troops drifted home.  The Austrians are largely done, (maybe half a million under arms and falling by the fall of 1918), the rest have wandered away or increasingly demobilized).  The Bulgarians a shell.  The Turks kept fighting after the war, so the Ottomans could do so as well.  The German Hindenburg armaments program of 1916 was unsustainable and would have to deeply curtailed in order to keep the home economy functioning, meaning a large and increasing Anglo-French material advantage. 

 

Edited by glenn239
Posted
7 hours ago, seahawk said:

But that Italian Army depended a lot on food supplies coming in from the USA. And if you remove the US Navy from convoy duty in the Atlantic, the Allies must either accept more damage by U-Boats or take away surface combatants from other theatres, which means they get weaker there.

Without a doubt if everything stays the same, just the US does not sent an army to the continent, the end result is the same, but if America completely stays out of the conflict the changes are much deeper. Just removing the US made trucks and locomotives changes the supply situation of the allies by some margin.

The economic impact of the US joining the war is imho underestimated. The amount of money raised through war bonds alone is huge and imho there is no way that the Allies could raise that amount of money on their own.

https://www.thoughtco.com/world-war-i-economy-4157436

It should be noted that the submarine situation was mostly due to the Admiralty pig-headedness regarding convoys. Once they accepted convoying, losses dropped and the Battle of the Atlantic was won.

That the US stays out of the war doesn't mean that US industry stays out, and again, the US did a huge effort mobilising itself for war in less than a year, financing included, but the allies only needed to increment a bit more their debt situation to finance what remained of the war, so the US wasn't decisive except by bringing forward German surrender by 6 months or so.

Posted
2 hours ago, glenn239 said:

Belgium sure as hell was overrun by the Central Powers in 1914, and Serbia was overrun by the CP in 1915.  Contingents exited the country and kept fighting, true, similar I suppose to how some Polish military escaped from Poland in 1939 and fought on with the Allies afterwards.

The Austrians did fail on the Paive in 1918.  The operative term being "Austrians".  By 1918, in reality, the Austrian army was no longer capable of offensive operations and crossing the Paive to attack the Italian army backed by several corps of Anglo-French troops was simply beyond them.  There was no chance of success.  Whether or not Operation Michael would fail on the Paive, that would be another question entirely. 

Belgium had 190.000 men on the front in 1918, you can look for Serbia, so even if overrun, their contribution wasn't small. Operation Michael in italy would fail for the same reason it failed in the Western front, the Germans lacked the ability to penetrate deep enough to make a difference, with the addition that it would be logistically unsupportable and would need to take into account the Austrians. So yes, it would be another matter entirely, it would weaken the German army more than it did.

Posted
24 minutes ago, glenn239 said:

Didn't say the Anglo-French were out of men.  Said that the 1918 offensive was unsustainable for too much longer.  Those are two different things.  There would have to be a pause.  

1. The Germans had been outnumbered approx. 3:2 on the Western Front routinely, so 4.6 to 3.5 was not out of the ordinary for 1915-1917.

2. Assuming no American involvement, the chances of Germany winning the war on the offensive in the West were nil.  If Ludendorff engages in his 1918 offensives, the result will be the same as the historical, even if the US is not in.  The question was whether the Anglo-French could win the war on the offensive in the West without the Americans, or if they'd have to rely on the blockade into 1919 or 1920 for their best play.

3.  The length of the front in October 1918 was about 430 miles.  Once the Germans fall back into the Ardennes, the front falls to 230 miles, and little of it was as suited to Allied offensive tactics as in Flanders.  The German army in the West in November 1918 is 3.56 million by your numbers.  Across 430 miles of front, that's an average of 8,300 per mile.

Add, let's say, 200,000 because the Americans are not there to inflict those casualties.  I'll subtract, let's say 500,000 required on other fronts to keep the CP in the war into 1919, let's call it 3.2 million.   The frontage is more like 230 miles, or a density of 14,000 troops per mile, (3.2 million divided by 230 miles).  The terrain in the Ardennes and along the Franco-German border was much worse for Allied offensive tactics.  That is to say, even assuming  half a million troops diverted elsewhere, even assuming all the results of the 1918 offensive 'as is', the Germans increase their coverage from 8,300 to about 14,000 per mile.

Now you are fibbing by pulling random numbers to see if they stick, typical Glennism. In no scenario Germany can achieve a stalemate that would lead to a negotiated peace. re terrain, I'd suggest you go and read on the Meuse-Argonne offensive.

Posted
11 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

It should be noted that the submarine situation was mostly due to the Admiralty pig-headedness regarding convoys. Once they accepted convoying, losses dropped and the Battle of the Atlantic was won.

That the US stays out of the war doesn't mean that US industry stays out, and again, the US did a huge effort mobilising itself for war in less than a year, financing included, but the allies only needed to increment a bit more their debt situation to finance what remained of the war, so the US wasn't decisive except by bringing forward German surrender by 6 months or so.

I agree as long as the US brings its industrial and financial power to bear, the outcome does not change. Especially the Italian campaign shows this. After Caporetto the Italians were close to breaking, but the influx of US supplies (food, clothes and other consumables) stabilized that army enough to first hold the AHs and then push them back. There are interesting soldier memories written by AH soldiers, which show that the US entry not only forced them to rush for a decisive victory, but also what huge effect the supplies had on the morale on both sides. Till fall 1917 both sides were under supplied and hunger was normal for the soldiers. By early 1918 the AHs could see the smoke from the campfires of the Italians rising, could smell the food and could see the Italians eating. This was devastating as their own supply situation only got worse.

Posted
19 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

Operation Michael in italy would fail for the same reason it failed in the Western front, the Germans lacked the ability to penetrate deep enough to make a difference, with the addition that it would be logistically unsupportable and would need to take into account the Austrians. 

When the Austrians alone attacked across the the Paive in June 1918, 50,000 Italians could not surrender fast enough.  If Michael hits the Italians, the expected result is therefore the entire front caving in.

Posted (edited)
20 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

Now you are fibbing by pulling random numbers to see if they stick, typical Glennism. In no scenario Germany can achieve a stalemate that would lead to a negotiated peace. re terrain, I'd suggest you go and read on the Meuse-Argonne offensive.

The Meuse–Argonne was a primarily American battle in which, at the height of the period of German surrenders after July, the Allies suffered 192,000 battle casualties against 68,000 German battle casualties (2.82 to 1)  and 58,000 surrenders.    This despite the Germans being outnumbered 2.7 to 1:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meuse–Argonne_offensive

The bigger point is this - I think the French were reaching the end of their rope.  The 1918 offensives were the last gasp.  There was not going to be some great crusade into Germany in 1919 without the Americans.  The French army would hold its ground, defend the state, but that was it.  The British still had some gas in the tank, but I don't think even they get  much further than the Belgian-German border without the ranks starting to get angry at more attacks.

So, without the Americans, I think the war was going to settle down into a 1939-like situation somewhere around the German border whereby the Allies were going to let the blockade do its work to see if Germany fell apart.   Which it very well might have.

 

 

 

Edited by glenn239
Posted
34 minutes ago, glenn239 said:

The Meuse–Argonne was a primarily American battle in which, at the height of the period of German surrenders after July, the Allies suffered 192,000 battle casualties against 68,000 German battle casualties (2.82 to 1)  and 58,000 surrenders.    This despite the Germans being outnumbered 2.7 to 1:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meuse–Argonne_offensive

The bigger point is this - I think the French were reaching the end of their rope.  The 1918 offensives were the last gasp.  There was not going to be some great crusade into Germany in 1919 without the Americans.  The French army would hold its ground, defend the state, but that was it.  The British still had some gas in the tank, but I don't think even they get  much further than the Belgian-German border without the ranks starting to get angry at more attacks.

So, without the Americans, I think the war was going to settle down into a 1939-like situation somewhere around the German border whereby the Allies were going to let the blockade do its work to see if Germany fell apart.   Which it very well might have.

 

 

 

No.

https://www.dw.com/en/world-war-i-the-black-army-that-marched-in-from-africa/a-46239274

 

Posted
4 hours ago, glenn239 said:

When the Austrians alone attacked across the the Paive in June 1918, 50,000 Italians could not surrender fast enough.  If Michael hits the Italians, the expected result is therefore the entire front caving in.

That's not the "expected" result, it's what you make up, do not confuse the two of them.

The actual course of the battle has nothing to do with that: 

"General Diaz learned the exact timing of the Austro-Hungarian attack: 3:00 a.m. on 15 June, so at 2:30 a.m., the Italian artillery opened fire all along their front on the crowded enemy trenches, inflicting heavy casualties. In some sectors the artillery barrage had the effect of delaying or stopping the attack, as Austro-Hungarian soldiers began to retreat to their defensive positions, believing they had to face an unexpected Italian attack, but on the greater part of the front the Austro-Hungarians still attacked as planned. Boroević launched the first assault, moving south along the Adriatic coast and in the middle course of the Piave River. The Austro-Hungarians were able to cross the Piave and gained a bridgehead 15 miles (24 km) wide and 5 miles (8 km) deep[8] in the face of Italian heavy resistance, before Boroević was finally stopped and forced to order a retreat. On the subsequent days Boroević renewed the assault, but the artillery barrage destroyed many of the river's bridges; the Austro-Hungarian formations that had crossed the river were unable to receive reinforcement and supplies. To make matters worse, the swollen Piave isolated a great number of units on the west bank of the river, which made them an easy target for the Italian fire. It was reported that a large number of Austro-Hungarian soldiers drowned while trying to reach the east bank.[9] On 19 June, Diaz counterattacked and hit Boroević in the flank, inflicting heavy casualties.

In the meantime Conrad attacked along the Italian lines west of Boroević on the Asiago Plateau (on 15 June), with the objective of capturing Vicenza. His forces gained some ground, but came upon stiff resistance from Italian units;[8] 40,000 casualties were added to the Austro-Hungarian total. In the aftermath, Boroević was particularly critical of the behavior of Conrad who, after the complete failure of the first attack, preferred to continue the assaults in the subsequent days but with diminished strength, rather than send reinforcements to the Piave sector.[8]

Lacking supplies and facing attacks by armored units, the Austro-Hungarians were ordered to retreat by Emperor Karl, who had taken personal command, on 20 June.[8] By 23 June, the Italians recaptured all lost territory on the southern bank of the Piave and the battle was over."

Posted
3 hours ago, glenn239 said:

The Meuse–Argonne was a primarily American battle in which, at the height of the period of German surrenders after July, the Allies suffered 192,000 battle casualties against 68,000 German battle casualties (2.82 to 1)  and 58,000 surrenders.    This despite the Germans being outnumbered 2.7 to 1:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meuse–Argonne_offensive

The bigger point is this - I think the French were reaching the end of their rope.  The 1918 offensives were the last gasp.  There was not going to be some great crusade into Germany in 1919 without the Americans.  The French army would hold its ground, defend the state, but that was it.  The British still had some gas in the tank, but I don't think even they get  much further than the Belgian-German border without the ranks starting to get angry at more attacks.

So, without the Americans, I think the war was going to settle down into a 1939-like situation somewhere around the German border whereby the Allies were going to let the blockade do its work to see if Germany fell apart.   Which it very well might have.

Again, shit you make up, what proof you have the French were reaching the end of their rope? none. Same for the British, in fact, there the gas was still quite full, with an empire of volunteers and not so volunteers to fill in the ranks.

Posted
5 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

That's not the "expected" result, it's what you make up, do not confuse the two of them.

2nd Battle of the Paive here,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Battle_of_the_Piave_River

Total Italian casualties were 87,181, of which 48,182 gave themselves up as POW's.  I don't think that level of POW total indicates an army likely to stand up to a properly conducted German offensive.  Therefore, Operation Michael against the Italians would have torn them apart.  

Posted (edited)
On 12/6/2022 at 3:53 PM, Murph said:

Thank you.   Now here is something interesting to think about: Would Great Britain have gotten involved if Germany HAD NOT invaded Belgium, and if they did not, what would have been the outcome of the war?   Would Kaiser Willy II have kept at the UK with his ship building program, until the RN HAD to swat him down?  Or would he have crushed France like a grape, and then demanded French colonies as forfeit?  

On the High Seas Fleet, the German Naval Laws were utterly unsustainable.  When the 1900 Law passed (34 battleships), the Wittelsbach Class was shy of 13,000 tons.  By the time of the 1912 amendment (41 battleships, 18 large cruisers), the Bayern Class battleships then on the drawing boards were 28,500 tons, and the blueprints that followed them (L20) were 43,800 tons.  In 1901 a fleet of 41 battleships at 13,000 tons each would be 533,000 tons.  A fleet of 41 battleships of 43,800 tons each would be 1,795,800 tons.  I think that without the war, the German Naval Laws would have to be either scrapped or deeply gutted in terms of planned construction simply because the tonnage of a typical battleship design was increasing so quickly.

 

Edited by glenn239
Posted
On 12/6/2022 at 3:53 PM, Murph said:

Thank you.   Now here is something interesting to think about: Would Great Britain have gotten involved if Germany HAD NOT invaded Belgium?

Most likely, yes, IMO, the British would have come in anyways.  In 1870, during the Franco-Prussian War, the British genuinely wished to remain neutral, and to accomplish that aim, during the summer they signed two identical treaties of alliance, one with France and one with Prussia.  The treaties stated with Prussia that if France invaded Belgium, the British would come in on the Prussian side and campaign in Belgium in alliance with Prussia until the French had been ejected, (and the treaty with France stated the same thing, targeted at Prussia).  This policy could have been repeated in 1914, but was not, I think, because Britain had no intention of making Belgium the focus of its continental policy.

Assuming Germany did not invade Belgium, France would.  The Ardennes were basically empty of Belgian forces, surrendering the Ardennes to the warring parties.  The French would advance with their left to try and flank the Metz-Thionville line of forts from the north via Luxembourg and the Belgian Ardennes.  The Belgians, in one of those happy coincidences that were probably not, were north of the Meuse where the French had no intention of operating, so deconflicted from the line of advance.

Once the French advanced, the Germans would do so as well and fighting would break out in Belgium.  For this reason, the British would be dragged in and, since the British would under no circumstance go to war with France, they would go to war with Germany.  Therefore, the British policy I think can be summed up as war if Germany invaded Belgium, war if it did not, and war with Germany if France invaded Belgium.

Posted
8 hours ago, RETAC21 said:

Again, shit you make up, what proof you have the French were reaching the end of their rope? none. Same for the British, in fact, there the gas was still quite full, with an empire of volunteers and not so volunteers to fill in the ranks.

In fairness the Empire was starting to squeek for manpower by 1917-18. While Lloyd-George was holding back reserves, the manpower balance with industry had peaked and really needed to shrink a bit to reach a sustainable level. The Dominions were all past the first flush too, eg Australia wasn't able to maintain its full force without conscription so would have gone down to just 3 Divisions for 1919. 

It's like every nation had a manpower curve, that started out with mobalisation, expanded, over expanded, and then either drew down to a more practical level, or became overstretched as its commitments extended beyond the manpower pool it could draw on.  Britain and France could do the former to one degree or another, the Germans, Austrians and Russians could  not, the Italians and Americans never hit contraction point. 

Posted
3 hours ago, glenn239 said:

2nd Battle of the Paive here,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Battle_of_the_Piave_River

Total Italian casualties were 87,181, of which 48,182 gave themselves up as POW's.  I don't think that level of POW total indicates an army likely to stand up to a properly conducted German offensive.  Therefore, Operation Michael against the Italians would have torn them apart.  

Dear Glenn

Please note that while humanity proposes, it is geography that disposes. The German Spring offensives, wherever they were launched, could only go so far as the Army logistics could support them - and that's 1918 logistics not 1914 levels of supply. Historically they hit the issues of crossing the shelled zone with horse transport that has practical distributing range of 1 day's transit from its point of supply (rail head/motor dump/depot). 

It matters not if the assault is a hot knife to a defensive block of butter, the Army is only moving forward on a piece of elastic, that's only got, in this case, 20 miles of slack at best. 

It turns out a decisive advance on the western front in 1918 needed motor transport and all the battlefield victories wasn't going to change that. 
 

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