War in Ukraine, technical and military aspects only

[MiGG0]

11 minutes ago, Josh said:

If you classify AIM-9/120/AASM as “short ranged air defense missiles “, since all of the above have ground based launchers now, you could probably win the Argument on a technicality. But obviously in actual long range SAMs the opposite is true by a wide margin.

Hard to say as there is almost nothing about RUS production numbers available except generic analysis that they have increase their production aswell quite a bit.

Edited November 18, 2025 by MiGG0

[Josh]

2 hours ago, MiGG0 said:

Hard to say as there is almost nothing about RUS production numbers available except generic analysis that they have increase their production aswell quite a bit.

Well if nothing else, they started with a vastly larger number of systems and presumably a modestly adequate number of reloads. They always took their air defense very seriously. The bigger question to my mind is burn rate rather than production - are they nailing all these UAVs with SAMs, and if so, which varieties? I know there were traveling AD machine gun units much like Ukraine, but we have no idea if they are as effective or if they too have been marginalized by higher flying altitudes.

Is Russia known to use any kind of “frankenSAM” or ground launched ASM?

[MiGG0]

9 minutes ago, Josh said:

Well if nothing else, they started with a vastly larger number of systems and presumably a modestly adequate number of reloads. They always took their air defense very seriously. The bigger question to my mind is burn rate rather than production - are they nailing all these UAVs with SAMs, and if so, which varieties? I know there were traveling AD machine gun units much like Ukraine, but we have no idea if they are as effective or if they too have been marginalized by higher flying altitudes.

Is Russia known to use any kind of “frankenSAM” or ground launched ASM?

RUS use mixed methods intercepting UAVs (MGs, drones, Helicopters, etc). For SAM I would think Pantsir types are most common, as their missiles are faster/cheaper to produce (and some Pantsir variants are evolved to carry more/cheaper missiles for drones)

[Roman Alymov]

Multiple ATACMS missiles intercepted above Voronezh today https://t.me/anna_news/86711

[Roman Alymov]

Rare case of close flight of UMPK filmed by DGI Mavic https://t.me/anna_news/86691

[Roman Alymov]

20 hours ago, Roman Alymov said:

Multiple ATACMS missiles intercepted above Voronezh today https://t.me/anna_news/86711

Return strile by Iskander(s) on two M270 MLRS launchers 50 km s-e from Chuguev https://t.me/sashakots/57787  https://t.me/infomil_live/24279

map Село Волосская Балаклея — карта, что посмотреть, как добраться, координаты

Effectively, it means that to reach Voronezh by ARACMS (distance ~260km from where launchers were detected), NATO have brought at least two launchers ~20 km to current frontline, within the reach of regular FPVs not to nention FABs. But relatively expencive Iskander (or even two missiles) were used to destroy the launchers - probably, because the lack of quick communication from high command drones providing recon abd units on the ground. It is quicker to use Iskanderы with airburst high-frag warhead since command chain to it is much shorter.

    Note the strike on Voronezh was in daytime and, probably, took all missiles from launchers (as at least 4 missiles were seen intercepted above Voronezh), while return strike is at night and launchers are burning as if they are loaded with nissiles again, so probably they were caught while preparing for second launch.

P.S. RusMoD reported second interception of four ATACMS missiles above Voronezh this night, so probably more then two launchers are taking part, indicating relatively large-scale coordinated operation https://t.me/boris_rozhin/187511

P.P.S. Fragments of ATACMS missiles   https://t.me/infomil_live/24282

"First of all, the images are notable for the fact that the footage shows the wreckage of the MGM-104E Block 1A Unitary (QRU), a version of the ballistic missile with the M48 unitary high-explosive warhead, which uses the WDU-18/B warhead from the AGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missile with 97.5 kg of DESTEX explosive. It is known that only 176 units of these versions were released between 2001 and 2003. The rocket shown in the pictures was launched in 2001. The few MGM-104es produced, which were used in Operation Iraqi Freedom, proved to be very effective in defeating the command posts of the Iraqi army." https://t.me/infomil_live/24286

P.P.P.S. It turned out that last part of MoD video (with fires) is actually from 2024 video 

"The video published by the Russian Ministry of Defense in the morning (https://t.me/mod_russia/58624 ) of the "destruction of ATACMS missile launchers that attacked Voronezh" is identical to the footage of the Iskander-M strike on the M270 MLRS in the village of Rudnevka, Sumy region, which was published by the military department on September 5, 2024 (https://t.me/mod_russia/42998 ).

In fact, the slightly zoomed-in and cropped footage of the strike more than a year ago from the Sumy region follows a video fragment from a reconnaissance drone filming a convoy of vehicles in the woods of the Kharkiv region. 

It is likely that the M270s that struck Voronezh were indeed immediately detected near the village of Volosskaya Balakleya in the Kharkiv region (which was captured on the actual video from the drone), but they did not have time to quickly hit them in response. After that, last year's video of the impact from the neighboring Sumy region came into play on the mounting table." https://t.me/milinfolive/160857?single

Edited November 19, 2025 by Roman Alymov

[alejandro_]

This basically involves installing a 155mm barrel in the Hyacinth-B carriage.

Most of the 2A36 "Giacint-B" towed howitzers have already been converted to 2P22 "Bogdana-BG".

This was reported to "Military" by sources in military circles.

At the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the Armed Forces of Ukraine had up to 180 Hyacinth-B units in service and storage. According to Oryx , the loss of 17 howitzers of this type has been documented.

Ukrainian artillerymen also received an unknown number of Hyacinth-B guns, which were previously in service with Finland.

The shell casing for the Hyacinth-B has a longer body and a specific shape that is not compatible with the chambers of other guns.

The shortage of these shells was probably the deciding factor for installing the artillery unit from the Bogdana. Also, unlike other Soviet guns, the Hyacinth-B carriage can carry a heavy gun 52 calibers long.

In August 2024, it became known that the designers intend to install the artillery part from the Ukrainian self-propelled howitzer "Bogdan" on the carriage of the Soviet artillery system.

In October of the same year, Ukraine first demonstrated a prototype of the Bogdana-BG towed artillery mount to foreign partners.

At the same time, it became known that it was placed on the carriage of the 152-mm artillery mount 2A36 "Giacinth-B" with changes in its design.

In April 2025, a manufacturer representative announced that the Ukrainian Bogdana-BG towed gun would receive a new carriage by the end of 2025.

The first Bogdana-BG towed howitzer entered service with the 47th Artillery Brigade . It was also spotted in service with the 13th Charter Operational Brigade of the National Guard, the 3rd Assault Brigade , and the 147th Artillery Brigade of the Ukrainian SSR.

In July, it was reported that from the beginning of 2025 until July of the same year, five batches of Bogdana-BG towed howitzers were delivered to the army.

https://militarnyi.com/uk/news/bilshist-giatsynt-b-pererobyly-v-prychipni-bogdany/

[alejandro_]

6 hours ago, Roman Alymov said:

Return strile by Iskander(s) on two M270 MLRS launchers 50 km s-e from effective in defeating the command posts of the Iraqi army." https://t.me/infomil_live/24286

Thanks for the summary.
 

Russia has reportedly modified its Iskander 9M723 ballistic missiles making them harder to intercept. The causes are unclear, but the impact on Ukraine is not.

Recently, there have been a series of reports that Ukraine’s ability to intercept the Russian 9M723 Iskander-M ballistic missile with Patriot interceptors is deteriorating. Given the sensitivities around the subject, precise reasons have not been provided although several reports have alluded to software upgrades which have allowed the Iskander to manoeuvre more effectively in its terminal phase, thus evading Patriot interceptors. This article seeks to evaluate the plausibility of both this and other competing hypotheses regarding the seeming increase in the performance of the 9M723. It does not provide conclusive answers but rather an assessment of the relative weight which researchers might attach to competing explanations.

The Importance of Caution in Assessing Intercept Rates

It is worth beginning by noting that one should be cautious in interpreting data regarding intercept rates. The use of percentages predisposes readers to assume that there is, all other things being equal, a given likelihood of any missile being intercepted by a particular defensive system. In reality the data is marked by discontinuities and largely driven by specific high impact events.

Data of Russian missile strikes since September 2022 compiled by Petro Ivaniuk, a Ukrainian researcher and confirmed by CSIS, the Washington-based think-tank, shows that Ukraine’s interception rates of 9M723 have never been particularly high. The dataset up to 24 October 2025, shows that 939 Iskanders and Kinzhals have been fired at Ukraine, and just 227 have been intercepted. This represents a somewhat positive picture – it suggests that 24% of Russia’s ballistic and aero-ballistic missiles are intercepted.

However, this includes 18 events where all or most of the missiles were intercepted, out of a total of 345 attacks that included them. This is a very high success rate for those 18 attacks, and represents something of an anomaly. Interpreting the data in another way, it indicates that in just 4% of attacks, Ukraine has succeeded in intercepting most of the Iskander and Kinzhal missiles fired at it. Of those 345 attacks, in 273 instances Ukraine’s air defences did not intercept any Iskander or Kinzhal missiles. As a result, 593 missiles made it through the country’s air defences, although 22 of those missiles reportedly failed to reach their targets.

It is of note that the absence of an intercept does not imply a failure of Patriot, per se; the missile may have been employed against targets which did not receive the protection of one of Ukraine’s limited arsenal of six Patriot batteries. If one narrows the search down to attacks on locations where a Patriot launcher was known to be present (for example Kyiv and Odessa) there does appear to be a considerable deterioration of air defence effectiveness. While data still shows discontinuities, with virtually every Iskander intercepted in some months while none are in others, a downward trend is nonetheless visible and by 2025 there are no months with very high intercept rates (30% being the maximum achieved around Odessa).

Hypothesis 1: Employment of a Higher Altitude Trajectory

...

Hypothesis 2: Improving Decoys

...

Hypothesis 3: Salvos

...
https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/iskander-improved-russian-missile-tests-ukraines-air-defence

The interception data used by Ivaniuk seems to be the one published by the Air Force Command, which I find unreliable. According to these data interception rate was 37% in August and 6% in September for Iskander missiles. In August 2024 the data presented by colonel general Oleksandr Syrskyi showed that the interception rate for Iskander missiles was 4.3%. 

 

[DB]

On 11/15/2025 at 6:19 PM, TrustMe said:

You have to wonder how Poland can afford this massive military build up. It reminds me of the Shah of Iran in the late 1970's, and we all know what happened to him.

Fastest growing EU economy, I think.

[seahawk]

The analysis misses one big point - there are different versions of the PAC missile. If they run out of PAC3 interceptors, they will hardly hit an Iskander. 

Edited November 19, 2025 by seahawk

[Markus Becker]

2 hours ago, DB said:

Fastest growing EU economy, I think.

Actually Poland is more or less where we used to be in the Cold War.

 

Quote

“During the Cold War, Europeans spent far more than 3 percent of their GDP on defense,” the former Dutch PM said. In the early 1980s, before the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO's European members spent an average of about 3.8 percent of GDP on defense.

Poland is at 4.2 intending to hit 4.8. That's where the UK was in the 80s.

https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmdfence/494/49404.htm

Edited November 19, 2025 by Markus Becker

[JWB]

Tonight’s drone and missile attack by Russia was one of the largest of the war against cities in Western Ukraine, with cruise and ballistic missiles, as well as attack drones, heavily targeting Lviv, Ternopil, and Ivano-Frankivsk, with several drones possibly having entered Poland.

https://x.com/sentdefender/status/1991032102062641594

 

[Roman Alymov]

Captured German Bergepanzer 2 ARV undergoing repairs 

https://t.me/milinfolive/160870

[Roman Alymov]

1 hour ago, JWB said:

Tonight’s drone and missile attack by Russia was one of the largest of the war against cities in Western Ukraine, with cruise and ballistic missiles, as well as attack drones, heavily targeting Lviv, Ternopil, and Ivano-Frankivsk, with several drones possibly having entered Poland.

https://x.com/sentdefender/status/1991032102062641594

 

"The buildings of the PORT industrial Park were destroyed by a missile strike in Lviv. 

In a Forbes article from 2023 with the headline: "The Big War turns Lviv into the main logistics hub of the country," it was the two industrial parks destroyed in Lviv over the past 1.5 months (SPARROW and PORT) that were noted as flagship projects for the reorientation of cargo supplies from the Black Sea ports to the western border of Ukraine. It is unnecessary to specify which cargoes are currently a priority for supplies to Ukraine." https://t.me/boris_rozhin/187551

[Roman Alymov]

Photo galery of pro-Ukr construction process of "net corridor" somewhere in Donbass https://t.me/milinfolive/160920

Nice SUV pickup on one of the photos. Nothing new, just another visit of European civilisation to barbaric Russia

[Roman Alymov]

VKS experimenting with portable FPV drone detectors on helicopters, as drones are increasingly replacing SAMs https://t.me/milinfolive/160926?single

[Roman Alymov]

FPVs vs. pro-Ukr logistics going in and out of Pokrovsk/Mirnograd.  Notre not only fiberFPVs are used, but also "regular" radio-controlled FPVs, indicating pro-Ukrainians there are, probably, out of EW stations (or out of fuel for generators providing them with power)

https://t.me/creamy_caprice/10581

[ink]

12 hours ago, Roman Alymov said:

VKS experimenting with portable FPV drone detectors on helicopters, as drones are increasingly replacing SAMs https://t.me/milinfolive/160926?single

Interesting!

However, this is a short-term fix at best. I imagine drones that target helicopters and other drones will be among the first to receive some form of AI guidance since a target against the sky (whether in TI or visual imaging) Will stand out enough for the model to ID it pretty easily.

[bojan]

Drone detectors on helicopters have seen sporadic use since early 2024. at least.

[Roman Alymov]

Rare TOS-3 "Dragon" in action https://t.me/anna_news/86844

Drone video of TOS-1A salvo with one of the missiles failing (and falling just meters from the launcher) https://t.me/infomil_live/24371

 

[Roman Alymov]

FPV drones vs.  BvS 10 Viking near Rodiskoye (entrance to Pokrovsk-Mirnograd poket). Note the density of FPV strikes, and aslo note the transporter was loaded with fuel (blue canisters in rear part, exploded by final drone strike)

https://t.me/infomil_live/24379

[Roman Alymov]

Western armor back on the frontline near Pokrovsk, probably indicating "mobile attack brigades" created for NATO-planned offensives are taken from the reserves where they were staying far away from danger and are sent to battle to save situation

    Also, again, note radio-controlled FPVs back in action, probably indicating pro-Ukr EW system collapse

https://t.me/freeukrainianrepublic/1524

[Roman Alymov]

Drone-assisted assault on pro-Ukr stronghold in tunnel under railway, Seversk region. First, RPOpA thermobaric RPG is fired at extremely close distance, then pack of AT mines used as demolition IED  https://t.me/infomil_live/24396

[Roman Alymov]

Pro-Ukrainian are deliberately cutting forests to cretate obstacle to obstruct pro-Rus advance in Dnepropetrovsk region https://t.me/boris_rozhin/187942

[seahawk]

So a crime against nature.