War in Ukraine, technical and military aspects only

[MiGG0]

23 minutes ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

As far as defence infrastructure, its precisely the same thing.

But only minor part of funding/end products goes to UKR. And that amount has decreased.

[Josh]

31 minutes ago, kokovi said:

There were articles on German defense sites about a US Army experimental exercise where 90% of fires were observed with UAVs which led to 50% less munitions used and 300% more effectivity at the same time.

The stats I read were the same. Now the counterpoint would be that the U.S. OpFor in those exercises were not similarly equipped, so the fight was one sided (though IIRC the OpFor was three times as large). But my point was more that the U.S. is hardly holding still on the issue; it is updating two dozen IBCTs to this standard inside 2-3 years after an experimental period of a little over a year with three test IBCTs.

Also it is worth noting that the U.S. Army in general and its light brigades in particular are likely not envisioning a peer tech level opponent. It seems unlikely there’s a major land war between the U.S. and PRC, and even a future Russian engagement probably only happens post war and rearmament against US Army armored BCTs. Those are just starting their experiment cycle now and presumably would take a lot longer to absorb new equipment, since it probably has to be integrated with existing vehicles instead of used off the shelf.

[Josh]

44 minutes ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

Sure, hire Mercs.

I meant the planes, not the pilots, though that is a difficulty as well.

[Stuart Galbraith]

20 minutes ago, MiGG0 said:

But only minor part of funding/end products goes to UKR. And that amount has decreased.

And yet, absolutely no indication its having battlefield effects. Britain just  just dropped a load of LMM rounds on Ukraine 3 months early.

I said it before, the battlefield is largely irrelevant now, because Russias gains are minimal. Deep strike is where the war will be decided, one way or another.

[Josh]

I am very interested in the actual volume of FP-5 attacks. Ukraines production claims seem quite fanciful, but even a steady supply at a much lower rate could have an effect. I think the ERAM program also has the potential to alter the conflict, since it specifically addresses high volume, long ranged PGM production. That is only 800 projected for the next year, but it is a not insubstantial number and that is presumably the LRIP period.

[MiGG0]

14 minutes ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

And yet, absolutely no indication its having battlefield effects. Britain just  just dropped a load of LMM rounds on Ukraine 3 months early.

I said it before, the battlefield is largely irrelevant now, because Russias gains are minimal. Deep strike is where the war will be decided, one way or another.

In what world you live? UKR N/NE Pokrovs counter attack failed and RUS is pushing them back again. They are losing currently in 3 relatively large town to RUS (Pokrovs, Myrnohrad and Kupjansk) and 1 is looking very bad (Lyman is getting cut of from supplies). Basically RUS is advencing whole front and UKR military situation is worsening daily.

Edited October 22, 2025 by MiGG0

[R011]

1 hour ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

Sure, hire Mercs.

By the time these could be delivered, Ukraine should be able to train pilots and ground crew and build infrastructure.

[Stuart Galbraith]

12 hours ago, MiGG0 said:

In what world you live? UKR N/NE Pokrovs counter attack failed and RUS is pushing them back again. They are losing currently in 3 relatively large town to RUS (Pokrovs, Myrnohrad and Kupjansk) and 1 is looking very bad (Lyman is getting cut of from supplies). Basically RUS is advencing whole front and UKR military situation is worsening daily.

Well you live in the world where Russia is Blitzkrieging like Zhukov towards Kyiv, I live in the world that, as of june, Russia had advanced only 60km in a year and a half. Thats a 60km advance, spread across the entire length of the Ukrainian frontline. Some areas, like Kursk, got 8km. Many areas got absolutely nothing.

https://news.liga.net/en/politics/news/in-almost-a-year-and-a-half-russia-has-advanced-only-60-km-in-ukraine-csis

Since then, it has sped up a bit admittedly. They captured 16km of territory spread across the entire Ukrainian frontline, a herculean pace that im sure gave all the Russian soldiers nosebleeds. And despite what you heard, the Ukrainian units at Pokrovsk have not withdrawn, and the Russians STILL have not relieved those surrounded units. They seem best I can tell to try and starve them out.

At the current rate of advance, its going to take Russia at least 4 years to take all of  Donbas. I submit, anyone expecting a battlefield resolution to this war is smoking some really great stuff, and Id like some thanks.

Edited October 23, 2025 by Stuart Galbraith

[Stuart Galbraith]

11 hours ago, R011 said:

By the time these could be delivered, Ukraine should be able to train pilots and ground crew and build infrastructure.

Yeah, Im hearing that the first deliveries were going to arrive 3 years hence. As one Ukrainian critic pointed out, the time to promise this was 3 years ago, and they arent wrong. But better late then never.

 

[seahawk]

At the moment with Russian dominance in drone technology, they would walk over NATO with ease. 

[Stuart Galbraith]

And their Donkey Rifle Regiments would be in Paris in a decade!

[Roman Alymov]

Rare view on pro-Ukr efforts to restore river crossing (Lancet vs. old Soviet КС-4562 mobile crane, bridges over Seversky Donets off Raygorodok, Kramatorsk district of Donetsk oblast) https://t.me/anna_news/85829

[Roman Alymov]

Short documentary on how improvised "barn-tanks" are made (in Russian) https://t.me/DKulko/1280

Edited October 23, 2025 by Roman Alymov

[MiGG0]

4 hours ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

Well you live in the world where Russia is Blitzkrieging like Zhukov towards Kyiv, I live in the world that, as of june, Russia had advanced only 60km in a year and a half. Thats a 60km advance, spread across the entire length of the Ukrainian frontline. Some areas, like Kursk, got 8km. Many areas got absolutely nothing.

https://news.liga.net/en/politics/news/in-almost-a-year-and-a-half-russia-has-advanced-only-60-km-in-ukraine-csis

Since then, it has sped up a bit admittedly. They captured 16km of territory spread across the entire Ukrainian frontline, a herculean pace that im sure gave all the Russian soldiers nosebleeds. And despite what you heard, the Ukrainian units at Pokrovsk have not withdrawn, and the Russians STILL have not relieved those surrounded units. They seem best I can tell to try and starve them out.

At the current rate of advance, its going to take Russia at least 4 years to take all of  Donbas. I submit, anyone expecting a battlefield resolution to this war is smoking some really great stuff, and Id like some thanks.

Uh, no. I have not sayed anywhere how fast RUS is advencing or winning (in any point of conflight). I have only sayed RUS is winning and eventually they will win and UKR position is worsening daily. RUS "win" does not come from RUS advences, but either that UKR is forced to peace treaty with RUS demands or their army collapses totally and after RUS just can walk to Kiev without pretty much any resistance (Personally I think first option more likely). Only thing that can change from that outcome is direct west intervention. I have been pretty clear/consistent in this.

And there are no surrounded units in any other than deep fake (uh, mean state) maps and his associate youtubers like your belowed Denys. All respectable mappers, that actually need proofs to change their maps, show that.

Edited October 23, 2025 by MiGG0

[Stuart Galbraith]

44 minutes ago, MiGG0 said:

Uh, no. I have not sayed anywhere how fast RUS is advencing or winning (in any point of conflight). I have only sayed RUS is winning and eventually they will win and UKR position is worsening daily. RUS "win" does not come from RUS advences, but either that UKR is forced to peace treaty with RUS demands or their army collapses totally and after RUS just can walk to Kiev without pretty much any resistance (Personally I think first option more likely). Only thing that can change from that outcome is direct west intervention. I have been pretty clear/consistent in this.

And there are no surrounded units in any other than deep fake (uh, mean state) maps and his associate youtubers like your belowed Denys. All respectable mappers, that actually need proofs to change their maps, show that.

How winning? they are moving Metres towards the border of Donbas, blowing thousands of troops, consuming 40 years worth of military investment, ending up in hock to china, and losing 60 years worth of investment in their petrochemical industry. Alright, sp they take villages. Now look at the cost the country is paying for those villages, and tell me its anywhere near worth it. 

 

 

[MiGG0]

15 minutes ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

How winning? they are moving Metres towards the border of Donbas, blowing thousands of troops, consuming 40 years worth of military investment, ending up in hock to china, and losing 60 years worth of investment in their petrochemical industry. Alright, sp they take villages. Now look at the cost the country is paying for those villages, and tell me its anywhere near worth it. 

 

 

Destroying UKR capability to fight. UKR is running out of manpower (multiple reports of that) and RUS can keep up this meat grinder longer than they can unless west directly intervenes. Losses are not that one side as Deep Fake (Uh sorry, again "state") or his associates  claims.

Edited October 23, 2025 by MiGG0

[Stuart Galbraith]

11 minutes ago, MiGG0 said:

Destroying UKR capability to fight. UKR is running out of manpower (multiple reports of that) and RUS can keep up this meat grinder longer than they can unless west directly intervenes. Losses are not that one side as Deep Fake (Uh sorry, again "state") or his associates  claims.

By whose barometer? Russian refineries are going up all over the Eurasian landmass, storage sites, pumping plants. The question is not who is being degraded by the war, but whom is running out of money the quickest. Russia is already cutting wages on its plant workers because they cant afford them, there are plants that havent been paid in months, and today Ukraine gets another bridging loan to keep the economy going. 

And yes, the manpower thing. They have been running out of manpower since day one of the war and yet, somehow, here we are easing up to year 4 and they are still here. Because Ukraine went all in on drones, whereas Russia prefers to go with meatwaves. Good luck with that, I already here volunteers are tailing off in Russia after the stories got back.

 

[MiGG0]

1 hour ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

By whose barometer? Russian refineries are going up all over the Eurasian landmass, storage sites, pumping plants. The question is not who is being degraded by the war, but whom is running out of money the quickest. Russia is already cutting wages on its plant workers because they cant afford them, there are plants that havent been paid in months, and today Ukraine gets another bridging loan to keep the economy going. 

And yes, the manpower thing. They have been running out of manpower since day one of the war and yet, somehow, here we are easing up to year 4 and they are still here. Because Ukraine went all in on drones, whereas Russia prefers to go with meatwaves. Good luck with that, I already here volunteers are tailing off in Russia after the stories got back.

 

No money dont matter. It just west "view" how they try to "win". RUS keep fighting long time after their "cash" money is gone (UKR own production/money has gone long time ago). It just get worse for civilians in russia, but war will go on with RUS focusing things that matter for war and they will get loans, etc. Money wont affect to who eventually win.

UKR cannot defend by just drones (thats is main reason why they currently lose ground) and RUS has gone "all" drones aswell. They use more drones that UKR (they have superiority in numbers in even there) and those "meatwave" nonseses just tells how credible your beloved "Denys" is.

Edited October 23, 2025 by MiGG0

[mkenny]

35 minutes ago, Stuart Galbraith said:

And yes, the manpower thing. They have been running out of manpower since day one of the war and yet, somehow, here we are easing up to year 4 and they are still here. Because Ukraine went all in on drones, whereas Russia prefers to go with meatwaves. Good luck with that, I already here volunteers are tailing off in Russia after the stories got back.

 

Yes the body-exchanges clearly show a massive disparity-just not the  version you are peddling.

 

 

 

[MiGG0]

2 minutes ago, mkenny said:

Yes the body-exchanges clearly show a massive disparity-just not the  version you are peddling.

 

 

 

That wont tell whole picture. RUS advence and get to keep land… and all bodies around.

 

But there are other claims that show casualty ratios being quite close each other. IE ”verified” number or casuslties on both side. 

[Josh]

5 minutes ago, mkenny said:

Yes the body-exchanges clearly show a massive disparity-just not the  version you are peddling.

 

 

 

There are all sorts of reasons this could be happening, in particular because the Russians are still advancing and come into contact with more bodies in secure zones. I will not hazzard to guess what the casualties are in absolute or even relative terms.

Tgere is definitely a Ukraine manpower problem, but the fact that younger citizens are not yet being drafted seems to indicate they are not on the cusp of collapse yet.

[Yama]

On 10/22/2025 at 9:02 PM, kokovi said:

Perhaps it can be reengineered for the EJ200? Dimensions are similar and the Eurofighter engine has a bit more performance.

EJ200 doesn't exist as a single engine version, so it would be substantial cost increase.

[alejandro_]

Interesting article on the cost of missiles used by Russia in the conflict. The cost stated for the Iskander is higher than the one quoted here before (600-700k manufacturing cost).

From Caliber to Kinzhal: How Much Do Russian Missiles Really Cost?

To strike strategic targets and Ukrainian cities, Russia uses a wide arsenal of long-range weapons, the names of which are now known to every ordinary citizen. These include the Kalibr and Kh-101 cruise missiles, the Iskander ballistic missile, as well as the Kinzhal and Zircon.

Their massive use by the enemy has given rise to a lot of discussions and misconceptions about the cost of the missiles, which are usually overestimated or greatly underestimated due to the lack of reliable data, subjective assessments of export deals, and numerous expert opinions in the media. The pace of production of these products by the Russian defense industry remains an even greater mystery.

Information from procurement documents obtained by Militaryny sheds light for the first time on missile deliveries to the Russian army during 2024-2027.

The "winged" triad of Russia

The main "far hand" of the Russian army for strikes on Ukrainian targets in the deep rear remains land-based, sea-based, and air-based cruise missiles. They are the ones that deliver strikes where strike drones and the necessary destruction of capital structures fail.

One of the most massive weapons is the 9M728 " Iskander-K " from the ground-based complex of the same name. This cruise missile with a range of about 500 kilometers carries a 480-kilogram warhead.

During 2024-2025, the Russian Novator Design Bureau received at least two orders for 303 missiles of this type. The cost of the product ranged from 135-142 million rubles, or about $1.5 million per unit.

In parallel, the Russian Defense Ministry ordered the first batch of modernized 9M729 missiles , the flight range of which has increased to over 2,000 km. It was their appearance that led to accusations of Russia violating the international Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles and its termination in 2019.

The documents also confirm that the new missile is incompatible with the original missile system and can only be used with a separate type of Iskander-M1 launcher.

In 2025, 95 missiles of this type were contracted for the Russian army. The cost of the product was estimated at 146 million rubles or 1.4-1.8 million dollars , depending on the exchange rate.

Continuing the story, it is necessary to mention the "twin brother" of this sea-based missile called 3M14 "Caliber" . They are placed on Russian frigates, corvettes, small missile ships, as well as submarines and are periodically launched by the Russian Black Sea Fleet on the raid from Novorossiysk.

The Russian Defense Ministry has signed two major contracts, which provide for the delivery of 240 missiles in the period 2022-2024 and another 450 missiles in 2025-2026. Their cost was estimated at 168 million rubles, or up to $2 million per unit.

In addition to conventional weapons, the Russian Novator Design Bureau has been tasked with producing a batch of 56 3M-14S missiles with a special warhead — a nuclear warhead. They are to be delivered between 2024 and 2026.

The cost of the product during the production period will increase, presumably due to exchange rate fluctuations, within 175-190 million rubles or 2-2.3 million dollars .

The Russian triad is closed by the Kh-101 aviation cruise missile, or more precisely, the "Izdeliye 504AP" - a modification created during the war with a system for firing thermal traps and electronic warfare, which provides protection against anti-aircraft missiles with an infrared homing head.

Among other Russian cruise missiles, it stands out for its longest flight range of over 2,500 km, the use of stealth technologies, and a more complex flight control system, which, in addition to satellite signals, also navigates by terrain, which is compared with standards in the flight program.

The missile is one of the most massive deep-strike weapons in the Russian-Ukrainian war. It is carried by the Tu-95MSM and Tu-160 strategic bombers.

The Russian Raduga Design Bureau received several contracts for the production of 525 missiles by 2024, each worth 164 million rubles, or $2 million per unit.

The Russian Defense Ministry has already contracted 700 missiles of this type for 2025, with a cost ranging from 171-194 million rubles or $2-2.4 million . Another 30 missiles at the same cost have been ordered for 2026.

Also among the documents were found mentions of the order of a classified model of long-range cruise missiles "Izdelie 506" , which are also known as the Kh-BD and were positioned in the Russian media as a promising replacement for the Kh-101 for strategic aviation.

The Raduga Design Bureau received two orders for the supply of 32 missiles in 2024 and 2026 in conventional and special (nuclear) versions. The cost of the missile was estimated at 337 million rubles per unit, or $4.2 million .

The new Russian missile was developed for the PAK DA promising strategic bomber project, but as part of the modernization project, it is to be retrofitted to Tu-160M bombers.

There is currently no other reliable information about the new Russian weapon, but open sources contain information about the development of the project based on the developments of "Product 504". From this it can be assumed that the missile will inherit its stealth and survivability technologies. It is also stated that the product will have an increased flight range of up to 6,500 km and a Doppler radar for navigation and terrain avoidance.

Iskanders and Russian hypersonics

If Russian cruise missiles can be called an instrument of civilian terror, then the Russian army uses ballistic missiles mainly for strikes on important military targets. The enemy's main weapon of this class is the 9M723 Iskander-M missile .

The 9M723 is more expensive and complex to manufacture, and has a much shorter range than cruise missiles. However, these shortcomings are more than offset by its invulnerability to most conventional air defense systems.

The missile is capable of delivering a half-ton warhead up to 500 kilometers — it can be a 480-kilogram monoblock high-explosive fragmentation warhead of several types, or a cluster with 54 submunitions for various purposes.

The Kolomenskoye Mechanical Engineering Design Bureau received an order for 1,202 ballistic missiles for 2024-2025:

9M723-1K5 (185 missiles) with cluster warheads — costing 238 million rubles or $3 million per unit
9M723-1F1  (59 missiles) with high-explosive fragmentation warhead — costing 238 million rubles or $3 million per unit
9M723-1F2 (771 missiles) with a high-explosive fragmentation warhead of the second type — costing 192 million rubles or $2.4 million
9M723-1F3 (217 missiles) with a high-explosive fragmentation warhead of the third type — costing between 189 million / 238 million rubles in different years

Thus, a total of 589 ballistic missiles of various types were contracted for production by 2024 and another 643 missiles for the following year.

Military also drew attention to a relatively small order for 18 missiles with the atypical index 9M723-2 , which may relate to the Iskander-1000 extended-range missile project. Their production is scheduled for 2025, and the cost of the product was estimated at 221 million rubles or $2.5

Continuing the topic, it is worth mentioning the class of Russian "pseudo-hypersonic", one of the main representatives of which is the 9-S-7760 " Dagger " aeroballistic missile , which was developed based on the technical solutions of the Iskander-M missile.

Russia classifies this type of aircraft weapon as hypersonic due to its Mach 5.5 flight speed on the marching section of the path, which significantly reduces the time for anti-aircraft system operators to react. However, on approach to the target, the missile's speed drops by half and it becomes vulnerable to interception, as has already been demonstrated by the Patriot system .

The Kolomenskoye Design Bureau of Mechanical Engineering received an order to produce 44 missiles in 2024, as well as another 144 units the following year. Each cost 366 million rubles, or $4.5 million.

Such a significant difference in cost with the original 9M723 ballistic missile is explained by the use of a navigation system and structural elements capable of operating at hypersonic speeds, as well as an all-titanium penetrating warhead.

Another "pseudo-hypersonic" weapon in the arsenal of the Russian military is the 3M22 Zircon anti-ship missile , which can be based in the launchers of Russian warships and the Bastion coastal missile complex.

Despite its intended purpose, the 3M22 is capable of engaging ground targets. It was used to a limited extent in strikes on Zaporizhia and Kyiv in 2024. The Russians launched groups of two to four missiles from the ground-based complex from the territory of occupied Crimea, but in all cases they failed to achieve any significant results.

The Russian Defense Ministry has signed a contract for an unspecified number of missiles with annual deliveries of 80 units during 2024-2026. The cost of each product was estimated at 420 million rubles, gradually increasing to 450 million rubles, equivalent to 5.2-5.6 million dollars .

The Zircon remains one of the least studied Russian missiles used in this war. To date, there are still no high-quality images of this product in the public domain, but Military previously reconstructed its approximate appearance from photographs of the wreckage.

https://militarnyi.com/uk/articles/vid-kalibra-do-kynzhala-skilky-naspravdi-koshtuyut-rosijski-rakety/

[MiGG0]

Big hit for UKR wishes to get all 150 Grippens:

https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-leaders-donald-trump-ukraine-russia-war-defense-summit-finance/

 

[Roman Alymov]

1 hour ago, alejandro_ said:

Interesting article on the cost of missiles used by Russia in the conflict. The cost stated for the Iskander is higher than the one quoted here before (600-700k manufacturing cost).

From Caliber to Kinzhal: How Much Do Russian Missiles Really Cost?

To strike strategic targets and Ukrainian cities, Russia uses a wide arsenal of long-range weapons, the names of which are now known to every ordinary citizen. These include the Kalibr and Kh-101 cruise missiles, the Iskander ballistic missile, as well as the Kinzhal and Zircon.

Their massive use by the enemy has given rise to a lot of discussions and misconceptions about the cost of the missiles, which are usually overestimated or greatly underestimated due to the lack of reliable data, subjective assessments of export deals, and numerous expert opinions in the media. The pace of production of these products by the Russian defense industry remains an even greater mystery.

Information from procurement documents obtained by Militaryny sheds light for the first time on missile deliveries to the Russian army during 2024-2027.

The "winged" triad of Russia

The main "far hand" of the Russian army for strikes on Ukrainian targets in the deep rear remains land-based, sea-based, and air-based cruise missiles. They are the ones that deliver strikes where strike drones and the necessary destruction of capital structures fail.

One of the most massive weapons is the 9M728 " Iskander-K " from the ground-based complex of the same name. This cruise missile with a range of about 500 kilometers carries a 480-kilogram warhead.

During 2024-2025, the Russian Novator Design Bureau received at least two orders for 303 missiles of this type. The cost of the product ranged from 135-142 million rubles, or about $1.5 million per unit.

In parallel, the Russian Defense Ministry ordered the first batch of modernized 9M729 missiles , the flight range of which has increased to over 2,000 km. It was their appearance that led to accusations of Russia violating the international Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles and its termination in 2019.

The documents also confirm that the new missile is incompatible with the original missile system and can only be used with a separate type of Iskander-M1 launcher.

In 2025, 95 missiles of this type were contracted for the Russian army. The cost of the product was estimated at 146 million rubles or 1.4-1.8 million dollars , depending on the exchange rate.

Continuing the story, it is necessary to mention the "twin brother" of this sea-based missile called 3M14 "Caliber" . They are placed on Russian frigates, corvettes, small missile ships, as well as submarines and are periodically launched by the Russian Black Sea Fleet on the raid from Novorossiysk.

The Russian Defense Ministry has signed two major contracts, which provide for the delivery of 240 missiles in the period 2022-2024 and another 450 missiles in 2025-2026. Their cost was estimated at 168 million rubles, or up to $2 million per unit.

In addition to conventional weapons, the Russian Novator Design Bureau has been tasked with producing a batch of 56 3M-14S missiles with a special warhead — a nuclear warhead. They are to be delivered between 2024 and 2026.

The cost of the product during the production period will increase, presumably due to exchange rate fluctuations, within 175-190 million rubles or 2-2.3 million dollars .

The Russian triad is closed by the Kh-101 aviation cruise missile, or more precisely, the "Izdeliye 504AP" - a modification created during the war with a system for firing thermal traps and electronic warfare, which provides protection against anti-aircraft missiles with an infrared homing head.

Among other Russian cruise missiles, it stands out for its longest flight range of over 2,500 km, the use of stealth technologies, and a more complex flight control system, which, in addition to satellite signals, also navigates by terrain, which is compared with standards in the flight program.

The missile is one of the most massive deep-strike weapons in the Russian-Ukrainian war. It is carried by the Tu-95MSM and Tu-160 strategic bombers.

The Russian Raduga Design Bureau received several contracts for the production of 525 missiles by 2024, each worth 164 million rubles, or $2 million per unit.

The Russian Defense Ministry has already contracted 700 missiles of this type for 2025, with a cost ranging from 171-194 million rubles or $2-2.4 million . Another 30 missiles at the same cost have been ordered for 2026.

Also among the documents were found mentions of the order of a classified model of long-range cruise missiles "Izdelie 506" , which are also known as the Kh-BD and were positioned in the Russian media as a promising replacement for the Kh-101 for strategic aviation.

The Raduga Design Bureau received two orders for the supply of 32 missiles in 2024 and 2026 in conventional and special (nuclear) versions. The cost of the missile was estimated at 337 million rubles per unit, or $4.2 million .

The new Russian missile was developed for the PAK DA promising strategic bomber project, but as part of the modernization project, it is to be retrofitted to Tu-160M bombers.

There is currently no other reliable information about the new Russian weapon, but open sources contain information about the development of the project based on the developments of "Product 504". From this it can be assumed that the missile will inherit its stealth and survivability technologies. It is also stated that the product will have an increased flight range of up to 6,500 km and a Doppler radar for navigation and terrain avoidance.

Iskanders and Russian hypersonics

If Russian cruise missiles can be called an instrument of civilian terror, then the Russian army uses ballistic missiles mainly for strikes on important military targets. The enemy's main weapon of this class is the 9M723 Iskander-M missile .

The 9M723 is more expensive and complex to manufacture, and has a much shorter range than cruise missiles. However, these shortcomings are more than offset by its invulnerability to most conventional air defense systems.

The missile is capable of delivering a half-ton warhead up to 500 kilometers — it can be a 480-kilogram monoblock high-explosive fragmentation warhead of several types, or a cluster with 54 submunitions for various purposes.

The Kolomenskoye Mechanical Engineering Design Bureau received an order for 1,202 ballistic missiles for 2024-2025:

9M723-1K5 (185 missiles) with cluster warheads — costing 238 million rubles or $3 million per unit
9M723-1F1  (59 missiles) with high-explosive fragmentation warhead — costing 238 million rubles or $3 million per unit
9M723-1F2 (771 missiles) with a high-explosive fragmentation warhead of the second type — costing 192 million rubles or $2.4 million
9M723-1F3 (217 missiles) with a high-explosive fragmentation warhead of the third type — costing between 189 million / 238 million rubles in different years

Thus, a total of 589 ballistic missiles of various types were contracted for production by 2024 and another 643 missiles for the following year.

Military also drew attention to a relatively small order for 18 missiles with the atypical index 9M723-2 , which may relate to the Iskander-1000 extended-range missile project. Their production is scheduled for 2025, and the cost of the product was estimated at 221 million rubles or $2.5

Continuing the topic, it is worth mentioning the class of Russian "pseudo-hypersonic", one of the main representatives of which is the 9-S-7760 " Dagger " aeroballistic missile , which was developed based on the technical solutions of the Iskander-M missile.

Russia classifies this type of aircraft weapon as hypersonic due to its Mach 5.5 flight speed on the marching section of the path, which significantly reduces the time for anti-aircraft system operators to react. However, on approach to the target, the missile's speed drops by half and it becomes vulnerable to interception, as has already been demonstrated by the Patriot system .

The Kolomenskoye Design Bureau of Mechanical Engineering received an order to produce 44 missiles in 2024, as well as another 144 units the following year. Each cost 366 million rubles, or $4.5 million.

Such a significant difference in cost with the original 9M723 ballistic missile is explained by the use of a navigation system and structural elements capable of operating at hypersonic speeds, as well as an all-titanium penetrating warhead.

Another "pseudo-hypersonic" weapon in the arsenal of the Russian military is the 3M22 Zircon anti-ship missile , which can be based in the launchers of Russian warships and the Bastion coastal missile complex.

Despite its intended purpose, the 3M22 is capable of engaging ground targets. It was used to a limited extent in strikes on Zaporizhia and Kyiv in 2024. The Russians launched groups of two to four missiles from the ground-based complex from the territory of occupied Crimea, but in all cases they failed to achieve any significant results.

The Russian Defense Ministry has signed a contract for an unspecified number of missiles with annual deliveries of 80 units during 2024-2026. The cost of each product was estimated at 420 million rubles, gradually increasing to 450 million rubles, equivalent to 5.2-5.6 million dollars .

The Zircon remains one of the least studied Russian missiles used in this war. To date, there are still no high-quality images of this product in the public domain, but Military previously reconstructed its approximate appearance from photographs of the wreckage.

https://militarnyi.com/uk/articles/vid-kalibra-do-kynzhala-skilky-naspravdi-koshtuyut-rosijski-rakety/

This entire article is based on claims by "Ukrainian intelligence" so hardly any reason to debate that. Let's wait for more factual data.